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Abstract 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who was a nationalist leader and founder and first president of the 
republic of Turkey, still remains an important figure in the Turkish political and social landscape. 
Kemalist historiography, which is based on Mustafa Kemal’s six-day speech (Nutuk) in October 
1927, emphasizes the foundation of the Republic as central to Turkish history. While this 
historiography emphasizes that Mustafa Kemal had an explicit plan during his modernization 
efforts, this dissertation will cover how Mustafa Kemal was incoherent in his actions and changed 
his discourses over and over again during the change of the political structure of Turkey. Beyond 
that, this study will suggest that Mustafa Kemal was an opportunist and pragmatist who utilized 
every single event to establish a Jacobin style autocracy. This research will discuss how Mustafa 
Kemal succeeded in using every opportunity, such as the Law of Supreme Commander Act in 
August 1921, the abolition of Sultanate in 1922, the establishment of Republic in 1923, the 
abolition of Caliphate in 1924, and the elimination of opposition in 1925, to establish his personal 
autocracy. In particular, the records of Assembly debates, not sufficiently used by Turkish 
historians, will be helpful to understand the creation of this personal autocracy. 
While Kemalist historiography credits Mustafa Kemal Ataturk with the original and unique 
conception of the social, legal, and educational reforms of the early Republican period, this 
dissertation argues that this approach is not balanced. Although the Kemalist historiography asserts 
that Mustafa Kemal and his legacy represent carrying out Enlightenment ideals in an obsolete 
society almost totally ignorant of these principles, the Kemalist modernization got a great 
inheritance from its predecessors, the Young Turks. Therefore, the Kemalist overstatement of an 
idealist figure of Mustafa Kemal is wrong in some degree. This dissertation aims to scrutinize the 
contribution of the Ottoman reformers and contradictions, mistakes, and overstatements of the 
   
Kemalist modernization project in social, legal, and educational areas by the help of wide primary 
sources which include official reports of the Grand National Assembly, the Republican Era 
archives and a mass of periodicals which were published in 1920s in Turkey.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction: The Establishment of Kemalist Autocracy 
and Its Reform Policies in Turkey 
 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkish Republic and its first president 
from 1923 to 1938, was a strong nationalist leader who was successful in creating a nation-state 
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. He was born in Salonica in 1881, when the Ottoman 
Empire was in a time of great social and political turmoil. While he was raised in a Muslim 
Turkish-speaking household, his birthplace was a diverse community, in where Jews and Greeks 
formed the largest communities. Therefore, he was raised in a place in where ethnic, religious, and 
cultural struggles helped to shape his political and intellectual perspective.1 
Mustafa Kemal was one of the greatest figures of Turkish history who has affected later 
generations deeply. The struggle against the ancient regime of the Ottoman dynasty and its 
historical, religious, and socio-economic structure under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal is called 
as the Kemalist movement. Because of his role as founder of the nation, Mustafa Kemal has 
acquired high status in Turkish society. His leadership and policies were unquestioned in the 
country long after his death in 1938. An entire historiography praises his achievements. For much 
of the twentieth century, this historiography played a public and political role. It was taught in 
schools and became a source of national pride/identity. Open criticism of Kemalist principles were 
taboo well into the 1980s, fifty years after Mustafa Kemal’s death.  
                                                 
1 Andrew Mango, Ataturk: The Biography of the founder of Modern Turkey, (London: Penguin, 2002), 8-10. 
 2 
The famous 1927 Speech (Nutuk), which was delivered by Mustafa Kemal from 15 to 20 
October 1927, at the second congress of his Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), 
laid the foundation stone for the official historiography of the Turkish Republic. This speech has 
been an important source for the study of Kemalism. The Speech covered the events from the start 
of Mustafa Kemal’s personal involvement in the Turkish War of Independence (19 May 1919) to 
the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. In the Speech, Mustafa Kemal narrated his own 
historiography of the War of Independence. He talked of his cause, the conditions of the national 
struggle, and the difficulties he faced; thus, he left a written document in his own words. The 
speech discredited not only the sultan and the henchmen of the old regime, who had sabotaged the 
national struggle, in Istanbul, but also Mustafa Kemal’s former colleagues, who actually fought in 
the War of Independence.2 From this perspective, Mustafa Kemal revealed the inner struggle of 
the nationalist leadership with this speech and made an apologia for his actions during this struggle.  
When Mustafa Kemal addressed his speech to the members of RPP in October 1927, the 
Kemalist press glorified his work and speech which would be later the basis of Kemalist 
historiography. In particular, Yakup Kadri and Necmeddin Sadak, underlined the importance of 
Mustafa Kemal’s action during the National Struggle. Both of these Kemalist authors described 
Mustafa Kemal as “making his own history” after achieving his goals.3 In the late 1920s, Kemalist 
orthodoxy emphasized the importance of Speech in the introduction part of its English translation 
in 1929 as: “Unconventional as the length and character of this speech is, the subject of it, which 
is a comprehensive account of one of the most remarkable events in the many centuries of Turkish 
                                                 
2 Birol Baskan, From Religious Empires to Secular States: State Secularization in Turkey, Iran, and Russia, 
(London: Routledge, 2014), 57. 
3 Yakup Kadri [Karaosmanoglu], “Yapti ve Yazdi” [He did and made it], Milliyet, 16 Oct. 1927, 1-2. Necmeddin 
Sadik [Sadak], “Tarihi Yapan da odur, Yazan da” [He was that one who made History], Aksam, 16 Oct. 1927, 1. 
 3 
history, is equally unique. It reveals the activity of the speaker from the time when he first felt 
himself called upon to take the leadership of his nation into his own hands and guide it from shame 
and threatened ruin to freedom and power. Mustapha Kemal Pasha is moved to show his people 
how this new Turkey has been built up, on what foundations she is standing and what are the paths 
she must tread in future.”4  
The Speech has being considered as one of the main source of the modern Turkish history 
by Kemalist orthodoxy until today. Writing in the 1970s, Cavit Orhan Tutengil described the 
Speech as the foundation of a national and modern state. Besides, the Speech was evaluated as an 
historical document which covered not only the interval of 1919 and 1927 by Tutengil.  According 
to him, the Speech would shape the future of state because of its universal ideas.5 Sami Ozerdim 
evaluated the Speech as one of the most important socio-political work beside its narration of the 
War of Independence. Ozerdim emphasized that the Speech was a summary of the conflict between 
modernizers and reactionaries. Mustafa Kemal conveyed his thought that catching the modern 
states would be possible under the guidance of reason and science to the next generations via the 
Speech.6 Emre Kongar described the Speech as the product of a highly intelligent person who was 
righteous in his actions during the War of Independence. Mustafa Kemal aimed to explain some 
historical events which were happened during the war. Besides, he wanted to warn the next 
                                                 
4 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal: President of the Turkish Republic. 
October 1927, (Leipzig: K.F. Kochler, 1929), 1. 
5 Cavit Orhan Tutengil, “Soylev’in Ogretisi” [The Doctrine of the Speech], Turk Dili 314, 1977, 367-368. 
6 N. Sami Ozerdim, “Nutuk’ta Dizin Sorunu,” [The Index Problem in the Speech], Turk Dili 314, 1977, 510. 
 4 
generations to be watchful for some of important subjects in the Speech.7 More recently, Baran 
Dural asserted that the Speech was still coherent and well written document.8  
Kemalism became the core of the modern Turkish Republic in the 1930s. The term of 
Kemalism, as an ideology, was coined by Ahmet Cevat, a Turkish linguist, translator, and writer, 
in 1930. In his article, “about the Great Turkish Revolution,” Ahmet Cevat described Mustafa 
Kemal as “the Great Guide,” and he explained the content of Kemalism.9 In December 1930, Ali 
Naci Karacan, another influential journalist, stated that “there should be Kemalism in Turkey as 
an ideology like communism in Soviet Union and fascism in Italy,” in his newspaper Inkilap 
(Revolution).10 While Mustafa Kemal and his friends were not initially interested in the name and 
concept of Kemalism, but the perception was changed in mid-1930s. At the Fourth Congress of 
Republican People’s Party (RPP) in May 1935, the name of Kemalism was accepted as the 
regime’s political way.11 After this congress, the concept of Kemalism became popular among the 
Turkish scholars who aimed to explain the notion of Kemalism.12 Seref Aykut, a pro-Kemalist 
deputy and historian, explained the political program of RPP in his book Kamalism in 1936. He 
underlined that it was impossible to explain the Turkish revolution with the ideologies of Marxist 
                                                 
7 Emre Kongar, “Soylev Hangi Kosullar Altinda Soylendi,” [Had the Speech Addressed under which 
Circumstances?], Türk Dili  314, 1977, 374. 
8 A. Baran Dural, His Story: Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Revolution, (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2007), 131. 
9 Ahmet Cevat, “Buyuk Turk Inkilabina Dair” [About the Great Turkish Revolution], Muhit, Jul. 1930, 152. 
10 Nedim Yalansiz, “1930lar Turkiyesi’nde Demokrasi ve Kemalizm Tartismalari” [Discussions about Democracy 
and Kemalism in the 1930s in Turkey], Cagdas Turkiye Tarihi Arastirmalari Dergisi 3, no: 8, 25-42, 34. 
11 Dogu Perincek, Kemalist Devrim-5: Kemalizm’in Felsefesi ve Kaynaklari [Kemalist Revolution-5: The 
Philosophy and Sources of Kemalism], (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 2006), 10-13.  
12 Hakan Uzun, “Tek Parti Doneminde Yapilan Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Kongreleri Temelinde Degismez Genel 
Baskanlik, Kemalizm ve Milli Sef Kavramlari” [the Fixed General Presidency, Kemalism, and National Chief 
Concepts on the Basis of Conventions Held by Republican People’s Party in the Single-Party Period], Cagdas 
Turkiye Tarihi Arastirmalari Dergisi 9, no:20-21, 233-271, 245. 
 5 
and Fascist regimes. Above all of these regimes, Aykut pointed out that Kemalism was a religion 
of living and a kind of religion which was based on economic basis. Besides, one of the main 
character of this religion was its revolutionary structure.13  
In the late 1930s, another book shaped the Kemalist orthodoxy. Moiz Cohen, who was born 
to a Jewish family in Salonica in 1883 and changed later his name to Munis Tekinalp, was another 
Kemalist ideologue presented the principles of Kemalism in his book Kemalism which published 
in Istanbul in 1936. Tekinalp described the Turkish revolution as a changing step from being an 
eastern society to a western society. Mustafa Kemal ordered to create a new state, a new homeland, 
and a new type of Turk after the abolition of Sultanate and Caliphate. Besides, Tekinalp underlined 
that Mustafa Kemal was aware of his main enemy on his modernization efforts. This great enemy 
was theocracy which became an obstacle for Turkish people to westernize the state.14 In the same 
decade, M. Saffet Engin was also interpreted the philosophical and historical grounds of Kemalist 
principles in his book in 1938. According to Engin, Kemalism was a result of a national salvation 
and rising which had never seen in the history of mankind. Engin indicated that the Kemalist 
revolution destroyed Islamic sharia and replaced it with the sense of community. This sense of 
community emerged from the nation’s high character. Like the other authors of Kemalism, Saffet 
Engin also praised Mustafa Kemal as an infallible leader whose statements and actions were right 
and well-timed.15  
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk has portrayed as a charismatic leader who has elevated to a position 
of cult symbol by the Kemalist orthodoxy. All efforts of modernization has attributed to the 
                                                 
13 M. Seref Aykut, Kamalizm [Kemalism], (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1936), 15. 
14 Munis Tekinalp, Kemalizm [Kemalism], (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1936), 296- 297.  
15 M. Saffet Engin, Kemalizm Inkilabinin Prensipleri [The Principles of Kemalist Revolution], (Istanbul: 
Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1938), 81-84.  
 6 
vigorous energy of Ataturk. Aykut Kansu described the main attitude of this Kemalist 
historiography as: “Mustafa Kemal’s political vision and will is brought to the forefront of 
historical discussion which leads, almost invariably, to personality worshipping. In this version of 
hero-worshipping, Turkey owes its existence to his leadership alone.”16As mentioned above, this 
orthodoxy started in the late 1930s by the first group of Kemalist ideologues, like Engin, Tekinalp, 
and Aykut. In the 1960s, Lord Kinross continued this tradition. He underlined the superiority of 
Mustafa Kemal among his compeers as: “All were patriots, practical soldiers, men of common 
sense and intelligence. But among them only Kemal had the necessary overall grasp both of 
internal and external affairs, that peculiar compound of intuition and reason, resilience and energy, 
and above all willpower, required to carry such an enterprise to a successful conclusion.”17 In the 
1980s, Dankwart Rustow also emphasized Mustafa Kemal’s charismatic leadership. He underlined 
that the successes of Mustafa Kemal went well together with the hypothesis of charismatic 
leadership.18 In the early 2000s, Metin Heper agreed the charismatic leadership theory. Heper 
indicated that Mustafa Kemal was aware of his charisma which affected people. He asserted that 
Mustafa Kemal used this charisma for realizing the modernization projects in his mind, instead of 
establishing a personal autocracy.19  
The ideology’s basic principles, the Six Arrows of Kemalism, were republicanism, statism, 
populism, laicism, nationalism, and reformism. These six principles were enumerated in the 
                                                 
16 Aykut Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 12.  
17 Lord Kinross, Ataturk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey. New York, (NY: William 
Morrow and Company, 1965), 164.  
18 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Devlet Kurucusu Olarak Atatürk” [Ataturk as the Founder of State], Yavuz Abadan’a 
Armagan (Ankara: Sevinc Matbaasi, 1969), 588. 
19 Metin Heper, Turkiye’de Devlet Gelenegi [State Tradition in Turkey], (Ankara: Dogu Bati Yayinlari, 2006), 115-
116.  
 7 
Republican People's Party Statutes of 1935, and they were incorporated in the constitution of 1937, 
which remained in effect until 1961, then only to be reformulated with slight modifications.20 
These principles formed the state ideology of Kemalism and the basis for indoctrination in schools, 
the media and the army.21 They represented a kind of Jacobinism, defined by Atatürk himself as a 
method of utilizing political despotism in order to break down the social despotism prevalent 
among the traditionally minded Turkish-Muslim population. Kemalism constituted the official 
ideology of the state, and endured publicly unchallenged until the 1980s.22 In particular, Turkish 
military served as a bastion of the Kemalist legacy from the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 
1923, and actively promoted the nationalist and secularist ideals of Mustafa Kemal. Over time, the 
military intervened in national politics on multiple occasions by staging coups against opposition 
and failed governments. This occurred in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Besides, the military also 
promoted its Kemalist ideals by aiding in drafting the 1924, 1960, and 1982 constitutions. This 
intervention into politics and government policies stopped any kind of challenge to the regime.23 
Therefore, challenging to the Kemalist historiography became impossible until the mid-1980s.     
Most historians have upheld an orthodox view of Kemalism and asserted the progressive 
side of Kemalism. Writing in the 1960s, Niyazi Berkes emphasized “the significant political, legal, 
cultural, social and economic changes that were implemented under the leadership of Mustafa 
                                                 
20 Ergun Ozbudun, Otoriter Rejimler, Secimsel Demokrasiler ve Turkiye [Authoritarian Regimes, Selective 
Democracies and Turkey], (Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2011), 99. 
21 Erik Jan Zurcher, the Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National 
Movement, 1905-1926, (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 182. 
22 Mete Tuncay, "Kemalism." In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0440 
23 Juliann Merryman, Kemalism: A Revolutionary Ideology and its Islamist Opposition, (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2013), 43. 
 8 
Kemal Ataturk in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Ataturk and his Republican People's 
Party applied their western-inspired modernization to all areas of government. Central to the 
reforms was the belief that Turkish society would have to westernize itself both politically and 
culturally in order to modernize.”24 Falih Rifki Atay, one of the closest allies of Mustafa Kemal in 
the early Republican period, described Kemalism positively. According to him, Kemalism was an 
ideology which aimed to participate Turkish nation in the civilized nations by realizing the 
freedom of conscience and reason.25 Nadir Nadi Abalioglu, a Kemalist journalist and writer, 
described Kemalism as a political doctrine which was based on civilization, hard science, 
conscious nationalism, and individualism.26 Tarik Zafer Tunaya described Kemalism as an 
ideology which emerged from Mustafa Kemal’s ideas and actions.27 Besides these Turkish 
scholars, Bernard Lewis also underlined the positive side of Kemalism in the 1960s. He described 
the Kemalist revolution in his book The Emergence of Modern Turkey as “having brought new life 
and hope to the Turkish people, restored their energies and self-respect, and set them firmly on the 
road not only to independence, but to that rarer and more precious thing that is freedom.”28 
In the 1980s, the Kemalist orthodoxy became very strong in Turkish historiography. In 
particular, after the military coup d’état of 1980, the new military administration promoted the 
Kemalist values and principles within the state. This approach was seen in the academic circles 
also. Turkish historians stressed the positive sides of Kemalism exceedingly in the early 1980s. 
                                                 
24 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 461-465. 
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Hamza Eroglu emphasized that Kemalism emerged from the realities of Turkey. It contained the 
National Struggle in one hand and the radical changes on the other hand. Briefly, Kemalism was 
the ideological power of the Turkish revolution and it would be Turkey’s future ideal.29 Enver Ziya 
Karal asserted that the Turkish revolution was one of the greatest revolution in the world. It was 
an original revolution and the greatest one in the twentieth century. Kemalism emerged from this 
revolution. Kemalism was totally different than the other ideologies. The process of Turkish 
revolution was different than the others; while principles were determined first and then revolution 
came after these principles in other revolution, the situation was just the opposite in Turkish case. 
The Kemalist principles were determined after the Turkish revolution became successful.30 Suna 
Kili indicated that the distinctive specialty of the Kemalist ideology was its national character. 
Besides, it was formed from the historical, cultural, and socio-economic conditions and structures 
of the Turkish society. Kemalism benefited from both Marxist and Western-style development 
models. Kemalism aimed to establish pluralist and liberal society which was based on reason and 
hard sciences.31       
More recently, Erik Jan Zurcher again described the impact of Kemalism in terms of 
modernization and westernization: “Mustafa Kemal Ataturk led the Turkish nation out of the 
Ottoman Empire into the modern world, changing the entire system of government in Turkey. His 
philosophy on republicanism, secularism, nationalism, statism, and modernism, which today is 
called Kemalism, moved Turkey towards Western thought and away from a theocratic state.”32 
                                                 
29 Hamza Eroglu, Ataturkculuk El Kitabi [Handbook of Kemalism], (Ankara: Olgac Matbaasi, 1981), 7.  
30 Enver Ziya Karal, Atatürk ve Devrim [Ataturk and Revolution], (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1980), 148. 
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32 Erik Jan Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (New York: I.B. Tauris& Co. Ltd., 2004), 181. 
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Ahmet Mumcu praised Mustafa Kemal for applying Enlightenment ideals to an obsolete society 
which was almost totally ignorant to these principles.33 Like others, Samuel P. Huntington 
indicated that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had created a new Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman 
Empire and had launched a massive effort both to westernize it and to modernize it. Besides, 
Huntington pointed out that Kemalism involved the difficult and traumatic task of destroying the 
Islamic culture of Turkey that has existed for centuries and putting in its place a totally new culture 
imported from a another civilization.34  
Kemalist orthodoxy has depicted Kemalism as a successful, westernizing, and modernizing 
ideology in part out of a basic agreement with its rightness in the Turkish context. Besides, this 
orthodoxy has interpreted the principle of republicanism in the Six Arrows as Kemalism aimed 
democracy. In the late 1920s, Kemalists stood against dynastic control and theological forms of 
governance and they believed that a republic was the most modern form of state government. In 
the introduction part of Mustafa Kemal’s Speech, in its English translation, modern Turkish state 
described as “the present Turkish State under its new Constitution is an extremely democratic 
republic, which emphatically declines to be influenced by religious considerations. As an easily to 
be understood, and we may even say inevitable counter-blast to the close connection existing for 
many centuries between the most absolute monarchy and a religion permeating every sphere of 
private and public life, the freedom of the citizen and the complete separation of State from 
Religion have become the battle-cry of the present day.”35 
                                                 
33 Ahmet Mumcu, Ataturkculukte Temel Ilkeler [The Fundamental Principles in Ataturkism], 4th ed., (Istanbul: 
Inkilap Yayinevi, 2000), 67. 
34 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2007), 74. 
35 Ataturk, Speech, 1. 
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In the early 1960s, Niyazi Berkes described the goal of Kemalist ideology as seeking to 
create a modern, democratic and secular nation-state, guided by educational and scientific progress 
based on the principles of Positivism, Rationalism and the Enlightenment.36 Like his Turkish 
counterparts, Bernard Lewis emphasized also the democratic mentality of Mustafa Kemal in his 
most well-known book The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Lewis underlined that Mustafa Kemal 
showed respect for decency and legality, for human and political standards. He asserted that 
Mustafa Kemal was not a revolutionary junior officer seizing power by coup d’etat, but a general 
and pasha, taking control by gradual, almost reluctant steps in a moment of profound national 
crisis. Besides, he described Kemalism as different from Bolshevism and fascism, but in terms of 
liberalism and democracy.37 Lord Kinross, another influential author in modern Turkish history, 
emphasized the democratic mentality of the Mustafa Kemal. Kinross saw Mustafa Kemal as a 
realist, who thought not in terms of gestures, but of actions, who infused Turkish people with a 
belief in the values of Western democracy.38  
In the 1980s, Ahmet Mumcu stressed that the popular sovereignty which became a reality 
after the establishment of Grand National Assembly in 1920 was a sign of Kemalist revolution and 
democracy in his book Ataturkculukte Temel Ilkeler (The Fundamental Principles in Ataturkism) 
which was published in 1988. Besides, Mumcu differentiated the Kemalist modernization from 
the Ottoman reforms that Mustafa Kemal destroyed entire obsolete thoughts from society and put 
the new principles. Therefore, Kemalist movement was a revolutionary movement and is different 
than the Ottoman reformations.39 Vakur Versan described Kemalism as a democratic and non-
                                                 
36 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 481-490. 
37 Lewis, The Emergence, 290-291.  
38 Kinross, Ataturk, 504. 
39 Mumcu, Ataturkculukte Temel Ilkeler, 66-67. 
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dogmatic ideology of national modernization. He believed that Kemalism could provide a good 
model for the political, economic, and cultural modernization of developing countries.40 Writing 
in the 1990s, Toktamis Ates described the change of the monarchial authority to a popular 
sovereignty as a revolution and aimed to establish democracy in his book “Biz Devrimi Cok 
Seviyoruz.”41 Like these Turkish scholars, Andrew Mango also shared the same idea as Kemalism 
aimed to establish a democracy in Turkey. Mango described Mustafa Kemal as democrat in theory 
who left behind him the structure of democracy, not of dictatorship. Besides, Mango emphasized 
Mustafa Kemal’s vision as humanist and universalist.42 
Kemalism was accepted as a revolutionary movement widely by Kemalist orthodoxy. In 
1930s, Kemalism was identified as an “ideology of revolution” in school textbooks. The first 
Kemalist attempt in these school textbooks was the four-volume set of history textbooks, which 
were written by the Turk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti (Turkish History Research Society) and designed 
for use at the high school level were the model of, and provided resource material for, school 
history textbooks at every level after its publication in 1931. The fourth volume of this history 
textbook “Tarih IV,” which was an ideological textbook taught by Kemalist educators in high 
schools, summarized Kemalism as “the most perfect political system among the others in all over 
the world.”43 This book, which was devoted to the history of Republic, contained the basic 
elements of the Kemalist interpretation. It described that in the history of humankind, only Turks 
                                                 
40 Vakur Versan, “The Kemalist Reform of Turkish Law and Its Impact,” in Ataturk and the Modernization of 
Turkey, ed. Jacob M. Landau, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 247. 
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42 Mango, Ataturk, 536. 
43 Tarih IV, Kemalist Egitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941) [History IV, History Textbooks of the Kemalist 
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managed to establish many states and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey was the most 
modern one.44  
Like Tarih IV, other history textbooks were seen as introducing the theme of civilization 
to the students by the Republican elite. For example, the textbook which was published by the 
Ministry of Culture in 1936 for the fourth grade students emphasized the importance of civilization 
as: “It is this sort of progress that creates civilization. Nations who walk on the path of progress 
become more civilized. However, one must know that there is no end to this path of civilization 
and progress. A nation cannot say this much progress and civilization is enough for me. Because 
the continued advancement of other peoples and nations means the one nation is staying behind, 
becoming weak and not being able to protect possessions it has against its enemies. A nation’s not 
remaining behind becomes possible by the individuals separately coming forward in all 
competition. Then we can comprehend what kind of preparation is needed for Turkish children so 
that the Turkish nation will always remain ahead.”45 In another example, Ali Resat stressed that 
the Republic embraced Western civilization as a whole in his book Tarih Dersleri, 5 (History for 
Fifth Grade).46 All these history textbooks reflected the idea of Mustafa Kemal about the 
modernization and Westernization. Mustafa Kemal declared that “there may be a great many 
countries in the world, but there is only one civilization, and if a nation is to achieve progress, she 
must be a part of this one civilization."47 Thus, all of these history textbooks were written under 
the influence of Mustafa Kemal’s opinion about civilization and modernization. 
                                                 
44 Turk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti, Tarih IV [Turkish History Research Society, History IV], (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 
1932). 1.  
45 T. C. Kultur Bakanligi, Tarih, 4 [Ministry of Culture, History 4], (Istanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1936). 81.  
46 Ali Resat, Tarih Dersleri, 5 [History Courses, 5], (Istanbul: Turk Nesriyat Yurdu, 1931), 280 
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Some foreign scholars shared the same idea that Kemalism was a revolution in their works. 
As an example, Rom Landau described Kemalism as “a philosophy and a method of life” which 
had its own spiritual and material innovations which were products of Kemalist revolution in his 
book “Search for Tomorrow” which was published in 1938.48 Niyazi Berkes continued this 
Kemalist tradition in the 1970s. He indicated that Kemalism was a revolution which was 
accomplished by a minor group of progressives under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal after 
defeating a major group of reactionaries.49  
Taboos of the Kemalist regime were barrier on the way of an objective view to Mustafa 
Kemal’s Speech and early Kemalist modernization until 1980s. Memoirs of the military leaders, 
such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir, and Ali Ihsan Sabis, who were Mustafa Kemal’s 
former colleagues actually fought in the War of Independence, were published in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. These memoirs, which were different than the narrative in the Speech, created an 
alternative perspective to look at the War of Independence. However, the Kemalist orthodoxy has 
ignored most of these memoirs. Moreover, when Kazim Karabekir’s book “Istiklal Harbimiz” 
(Our War of Independence) was published in 1960, the Kemalist Government confiscated the book 
and banned it because of its critics to Mustafa Kemal.50 The Law code 5816, which protected the 
legacy of Mustafa Kemal, was used for banning all these alternative approaches. 
In the early 1980s, the Kemalist orthodoxy was challenged by both Turkish and foreign 
scholars. First, the main Kemalist sources were criticized as not looking at the big picture of the 
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modern Turkish history by these revisionist scholars. As an example, Kemalist orthodoxy asserted 
that Mustafa Kemal started the National Struggle against the invaders and became the leader of 
the resistance movement. Bulent Tanor explained this approach as Kemalist orthodoxy created a 
myth around Mustafa Kemal that when the nation was slothful, Mustafa Kemal was so energetic 
to illuminate people to save their land.51 On contrary this approach, Zurcher pointed out in his 
book “the Unionist Factor,” the Committee of Union and Progress was very active during the War 
of Independence and the role of its members was very crucial, while the Kemalist orthodoxy 
ignored their effort during the war.52 Like Zurcher, Bulent Tanor mentioned about many different 
resistance movements and their congresses before Mustafa Kemal started his mission in May 1919 
in Samsun in the early 1990s.53 In his book “Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmî Kaynakları 
Atatürk’ün Nutuk’u” (The Official Sources of the Political Culture in Turkey, Ataturk’s Speech), 
Taha Parla criticized Mustafa Kemal’s narration of the Turkish War of Independence in his Speech 
in 1927. He emphasized that Mustafa Kemal’s attitude in the war had some mistakes. Parla 
portrayed Mustafa Kemal as not paying attention other’s opinions and behaving as an infallible 
person during the war. 54 Therefore, he criticized a Speech-centered narration of early Republican 
period. 
The Kemalist orthodoxy’s claim that Kemalism aimed to establish a democratic state was 
questioned by the revisionist approach after the late 1980s. Nilufer Gole underlined the 
misconception of Kemalist orthodoxy as showing the Kemalist anti-religious attitude as 
                                                 
51 Tanor, Turkiye'de Yerel Kongre Iktidarlari, 105-106. 
52 Zurcher, the Unionist Factor, 53. 
53 Tanor, Turkiye'de Yerel Kongre Iktidarlari, 105-106. 
54 Taha Parla, Turkiye’de Siyasal Kulturun Resmi Kaynaklari Ataturk’un Nutuk’u [The Official Sources of the 
Political Culture in Turkey, Ataturk’s Speech], (Istanbul, Iletisim Yayinlari, 1991), 28.  
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democracy instead of its authoritarian secularism. Gole stressed that in this context Kemalism was 
neither pluralist nor accommodating, but militant secular.55 More recently, Taha Parla was also 
against the concept of Kemalist democracy. Parla indicated the weak points of Kemalist assertion 
about its democratic character as: “in the tutelary democratic accounts of Kemalism, both the cult 
of the hero status sprung up around Kemal and the authoritarian measures taken by his regime are 
downplayed as having less to do with Kemal’s personal ambition or with Kemalism’s essential 
antidemocratic content than with the needs of people in a heavily traditional context. Kemalism’s 
early authoritarian elements were “tutelary” democratic- meaning, democratizing measures 
undertaken by a trustful and trustworthy guardian, a great leader prepared to set and capable of 
setting an extraordinary example in order to lay the foundation for democratic practice.”56 
The originality of social and legal reforms during the Kemalist modernization has been 
discussed for many years by both Turkish and foreign scholars. Kemalist orthodoxy has depicted 
Mustafa Kemal as an idealistic figure during his struggles over the political structure of Turkey 
and has overlooked continuities with the Young Turks for a long time. However, it is a fact that 
the Kemalist modernization got a great inheritance from its predecessors, the Young Turks, 
referring to the members of the Ottoman society who were progressive, modernist and opposed to 
the status quo. Therefore, the Kemalist overstatement of an idealist figure of Mustafa Kemal is 
wrong in some degree. In particular, the inheritance of Young Turks was clear in political, social, 
legal, and educational spheres during the Kemalist modernization. 
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Kemalist orthodoxy stressed the Kemalist modernization attempts as “a brave and new 
experiment” in 1920s and 1930s, and they were not very familiar with the achievements of the late 
period of the Ottoman Empire.57 In particular, this assertion was seen in the early books of 
Kemalist authors like Saffet Engin and Munis Tekinalp, and history textbooks, like History IV. 
Bernard Lewis continued the same tradition in the 1960s. He described the creation of the Republic 
of Turkey as: "one of the major revolutions of modern times, involving a radical and violent break 
with the social, cultural, and political traditions of the past.”58 This orthodoxy has preferred to 
ignore the contribution of the Ottoman intellectuals to the reform movements for a long time. In 
the 1980s, main Kemalist sources differentiated the Kemalist modernization from the Ottoman 
reforms. As an example, Ahmet Mumcu emphasized that Mustafa Kemal destroyed all of the 
obsolete thoughts from society and put the new principles, therefore the revolutionary character of 
the Kemalist modernization was different than the Ottoman reforms.59 Another Kemalist author, 
Ahmet Taner Kislali, also thought that Kemalist modernization was different than the Ottoman 
reforms in the 1990s. He stressed that, while the Ottoman reforms aimed only to save the state, on 
contrary, Mustafa Kemal aimed to create a modern state by the help of people’s support which had 
never seen in the past.60 
While the image of “a brave and new experiment” has persisted in the popular writings on 
Turkey in the early 1980s, in the academic writing this attitude has superseded by depicting the 
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Kemalist policies as the last phase of reform policies initiated by the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-
1980s, Paul Dumont pointed out that, “Kemalists were guided by convictions that had already 
inspired several generations of Ottoman Turkish reformers and, duly assimilated, had become part 
of the national intellectual patrimony.”61 In the early 1990s, the importance of the Young Turks’ 
legacy was mentioned by the revisionist scholars. As an example, Feroz Ahmad stressed this 
legacy in his book The Making of Modern Turkey in 1993. In this book, Ahmad pointed out that 
“The Young Turks who came to power through the constitutional movement in 1908 retained the 
dynasty and tried to manipulate its legacy in order to carry out a programme of radical reform and 
structural change. On the other hand, the regime led by Mustafa Kemal which succeeded the 
Young Turks, tried totally to reject the entire legacy, abolished the monarchy, banished the 
dynasty, and set up a secular republic.”62 More recently Turkish scholars, like Sukru Hanioglu, 
shared the same idea that the Republican era was a period of triumph for the Young Turks’ 
ideology.63 Finally, Hanioglu and this revisionist approach have evaluated the Kemalists' reforms 
as not a "radical and violent break with the past," but rather the culmination of an extensive reform 
process over at least the previous 200 years.64  
This revisionist approach stressed that with the help of Young Turks’ legacy, Mustafa 
Kemal established the scientific mentality as the core of the new republic.65 Huseyin Aydin 
interpreted the importance of positivist ideology as “when Turkish intellectuals sought an ideology 
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to save the country, they found positivism so popular and actual in Europe; therefore, they 
immediately embraced positivism and thought that science would be superior to everything.”66 
Writing in the early 1990s, Levent Koker emphasized that positivist thought was the most 
important notion which was inherited from the Young Turks’s legacy by Kemalists.67 Serif Mardin 
also accepted the ideological heritage of Young Turks to Kemalists, in particular the positivist 
ideology. He distinguished Mustafa Kemal from his predecessors as using science as an important 
tool to reshape Turkish society.68 Ali Kazancigil pointed out that many revolutions, such as, 
women’s rights, prohibition of polygamy, accepting hat instead of fez, secularization of education 
and law, and the language reform were dreamed by Young Turks, before they were realized by 
Kemalists during the Kemalist modernization.69  
A better way to understand the political development of Turkey is to examine concepts like 
autocracy and Jacobinism. These were not temporary phenomena, but rather central to the way 
Ataturk viewed political power. An autocracy is a form of government in which a country is ruled 
by a person or group with total power.70 While Kemalist orthodoxy emphasizes the autocracy and 
single-party regime was a burden for Kemalists and asserts “in Turkey, single-party system is the 
result of the incapability of the first legislative assembly which could not demonstrate a positive 
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performance beyond discussions,”71 this dissertation rejects this Kemalist idea. In particular, 
parliamentary debates prove that the first legislative assembly which lasted until April 1923 was 
more democratic and plurivocal than other assemblies which were controlled strictly by the 
Kemalist majority. Even though the state was in condition of life and death, opposition stressed 
the importance of superiority of Assembly over any personality and it did not give up its rights to 
the Kemalist majority unconditionally.  
In modern concept, Jacobin generally indicates a supporter of a centralized republican state 
and strong central government powers and supporters of extensive government intervention to 
transform society. Mustafa Kemal and his associates were guided by this concept of the Jacobin 
thought: “in the primacy of politics and in the ability of politics to reconstitute society.”72 
Therefore, Mustafa Kemal started to increase his power during the Turkish War of Independence 
1919-1922. His desire of controlling all of the powers in his hands became possible after the 
Supreme Commander Act of 1921. After that, Mustafa Kemal and his allies destroyed the 
traditional power, the office of sultanate and caliphate were abolished in 1922 and 1924. Finally 
this struggle ended as establishing a Jacobin style autocracy.  
Kemalist orthodoxy has tolerated this Jacobin mentality of Kemalist reforms. One of the 
popular periodicals of 1930s, Ulku [Ideal], defended the Kemalist Jacobinism in a utopian way in 
the late period of 1930s. Kemalist revolutionary elite generally felt themselves responsible for 
maturing and ascending the spiritual quality of people that would elevate them to a position at 
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which they can be represented.73 In the 1980s, Niyazi Berkes evaluated Kemalist reforms that they 
seemed like Jacobin reforms because the society was so primitive at that time. According to him, 
Kemalist reforms had implemented by the help of a bunch of intellectuals.74 In the 1990s, Taner 
Timur underlined the positive sides of Jacobinism in his article “Sivil Toplum, Jakobenler ve 
Devrim.” He stressed that Jacobins were the forefathers of democratization, and by rejecting the 
distinction between active and passive citizens, they saw to it that the population at large 
internalized the principle of universal suffrage… In a peasant society where the Enlightenment 
thought had not surpassed the tiny elite class, the Jacobins introduced the ideas of freedom and 
equality to the whole of population. Moreover, Timur pointed out that Kemalists followed the 
same path like the French Revolution and its Jacobin method as using violence against the 
opposition. From this perspective, Timur asserted that Kemalists created their nation like 
Jacobins.75 Foreign scholars also described this Kemalist Jacobin mentality as reconstituting 
people. As an example, Eisenstadt emphasized that Jacobin faith “in the primacy of politics and in 
the ability of politics to reconstitute society” guided Mustafa Kemal and his associates.76 More 
recently, Ahmet Insel stressed the importance of positivism and French Revolution behind the 
Kemalist Jacobin mentality. He emphasized that “Kemalism embraced the positivist comment of 
religion. Positivist comment of religion meant Jacobin tradition and it was not atheist but deist.  
Kemalism was so close with Jacobin tradition. French Revolution and Jacobin tradition were most 
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important inspiration sources of Kemalism.”77 Hasan Under also described early modernization of 
Turkey as “the political method of Atatürk is Jacobenist, his attitude to people is paternalist.”78  
On the other hand, some Turkish and foreign scholars emphasized the negative effect of 
Jacobin mentality in a revisionist way. Writing in the early 1980s, Mete Tuncay indicated that 
Kemalism had a Jacobin approach which was proper to the basic character of positivism. 
Especially the motto “for people in spite of people” was an illusion for the Kemalist regime.79 Serif 
Mardin stressed that the destruction of the old social order was one of the negative side of the 
Kemalist regime in the 1990s. According to Mardin, with the Kemalist prohibition of Islam as a 
social force, the link between the elite and the masses was cut once and for all. The old Ottoman 
social order had tolerated pluralism in a society held together by Islam. The Kemalist order was 
most of all based on a Jacobin conception of a Republic as one and indivisible, where all 
ideological minorities were assimilated and declared as feudal remnants.80 Nilufer Gole asserted 
that Kemalism followed the French Jacobinism instead of Anglo Saxon liberalism, and this 
situation was a barrier on the way of the Turkish democracy.81 More recently, Ernesto Laclau 
underlined this Jacobin mentality of Kemalist regime as “during most of his rule- and this applies 
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also to his immediate successors- Ataturk was confronted with the paradox of having to construct 
a ‘people’ without popular support.”82  
Modernization is a process of long-range cultural and social change accepted by members 
of the changing society as beneficial, inevitable, or on balance desirable. Modernization as a 
historical concept includes such specific aspects of change as industrialization of the economy or 
secularization of ideas. It involves a marked increase in geographic and social mobility, a spread 
of secular, scientific, and technical education.83 Modernization became a phenomenon in many 
non-Western countries in the early eighteenth century and afterward. The West was symbolized 
by intellectual and scientific ascendancy, and provided the blueprint for the ideal society of the 
future for many states.84 Thus, Turkish modernization was a product of this mentality. 
 Kemalist modernization was the last phase of this Turkish modernization which initiated 
by the Ottoman Empire at the end of the eighteenth century. In the Ottoman Empire, the period of 
Selim III (1789-1807) was considered as the starting point in dealing with modernization attempts 
when military defeats of the Ottoman forces in wars with the Western powers. Selim III's reign, 
from his accession in 1789 until 1792/93, after which the reform agenda shifted significantly to 
military reforms and the challenge of funding them.85 After Selim III, Mahmud II was determined 
to modernize the empire by adopting European laws over the traditional Ottoman ones. Sultan 
Mahmud’s first aim in modernizing the military was to remove the ineffective Janissaries and 
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replace them with a modern army trained along European lines. After the destruction of Janissaries 
in 1826, the Ottoman Army and state officials all wore European style uniforms and progress was 
made in modernizing military, navy and state laws. The Tanzimat era extending from 1839 to 1876 
brought many renovations and a completely different mentality to the Ottoman bureaucracy and 
institutions. As a matter of fact, Tanzimat renovations became the genesis of Ottoman 
constitutionalism which emerged in approximately 50 years after the proclamation of the Script.86 
Tanzimat reforms enabled to establish a constitutional monarchy in 1876. The First Constitutional 
Era lasted until 1878, when Abdülhamid II restored his own absolute monarchy after suspending 
the Assembly. The Second Constitutional Era established in 1908 after the Young Turk 
Revolution. The Ottoman parliament was assigned as a sovereign body and the constitution had 
more democratic and liberal features after this revolution.87 Therefore, Kemalist modernizers got 
a great inheritance from all these reform movements. 
Turkish modernization had many similarities with some other non-Western states, like 
Japan, Russia, and Iran, which aimed to modernize themselves in the military, economic, political, 
cultural, and educational areas. The strong-center model had naturally affected modernization in 
both countries. Like Peter the Great in Russia, Meiji in Japan, Mahmud II and Kemal Ataturk in 
Turkey, the leaders at the center in both political systems had always been the principal actors 
throughout the periods of modernization. Thus, rules were decided by the center. The center 
usually represented modernity; the periphery had represented the ancient and the obsolete. First, 
all rulers of these states were aware of their weakness against the Western superiority in military 
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like their counterpart the Ottoman Empire. After trying to solve their military problems, these 
states tried to modernize their social, political, and economic structures. Russians started their 
modernization before the Ottoman Empire. The apex of the Russian Westernization and 
modernization movement is seen as occurring during the reign of Peter the Great (1672-1725). His 
modernization efforts included almost every aspect of the Russian sociopolitical structure. Peter 
the Great tried to reform the state, the economy, the church, the military, education, and even 
private life in Russia. He forbade the seclusion of women and commanded both sexes to adopt 
European styles of dress. Besides, Peter the Great, Alexander II (1894-1917) was another “great 
reformer” in Russia. The modernization carried out by Alexander II aimed not to restore but to 
change life in Russia. During his reign he introduced key concepts of western jurisprudence 
including equality before the law, trial by jury, and the separation of criminal and civil laws.88  
Reforms aimed to restructure mainly the state apparatus in these modernizing states. The 
same need of modernization in state apparatus was also shared by some other non-Western states. 
One of these states was Japan. Type of Japanese and Turkish modernization was coined as 
“revolution from above” by Ellen Kay Trimberger. From her perspective, the extralegal takeover 
of political power and the initiation of economic, social, and political change was organized and 
led by some of the highest military and often civil bureaucrats in the old regime.89 Like Ottoman 
Empire, Japan focused first and foremost on science and technology during the Meiji Period 
(enlightened government) after the late of 1860s. In 1868, Emperor Meiji proclaimed a five article 
“Charter Oath.” One of the most important articles of this Charter was a future establishment of 
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an Assembly. Japan's first modern legislature was the Imperial Diet established by the Meiji 
Constitution in force from 1889 to 1947. The Meiji Constitution was adopted on February 11, 1889 
and the Imperial Diet first met on November 29, 1890. The Diet consisted of a House of 
Representatives and a House of Peers. The House of Representatives was directly elected, if on a 
limited franchise; universal adult male suffrage was introduced in 1925. Another important step 
was the abolition of feudalism in Meiji Restoration. This event enabled to centralize the state led 
to the establishment of national army drawn from all ranks of the society. The new government 
formulated national code of laws also. Moreover, the government pushed for the immediate 
formation of codes along Western lines. By 1871, two volumes of criminal codes were ready. The 
Gregorian calendar was adopted in this period also. In addition, with the realization that education 
could be an asset in the development of national industry, universal education was introduced.90 
The Meiji Restoration accelerated industrialization in Japan, which led to its rise as a military 
power by the year 1905, under the slogan of to “enrich the country and increase its military 
strength.”91 
The Iranian modernization that started in the late period of the nineteenth century had some 
similarities with the Turkish modernization. First of all, Iranian case was also another 
modernization from above. Second, both countries transferred their political systems from 
monarchy to constitutionalism in similar periods, while the constitutional monarchy was 
established in 1876 first and then 1908 in Turkey, the Iranian constitutional period started in 1906. 
Like Turkish modernizers, the bulk of the Iranian reformers consisted of high government 
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bureaucrats in Persian embassies abroad, the few Western educated Persians, and some graduates 
of the Darolfonun, Iran’s first modern school.92 When both Qajar and Ottoman dynasties were 
abolished in the 1920s, modernization efforts were carried of two military autocrat in both states. 
Reza Shah’s modernization efforts between 1924 and 1941 had many similarities with the 
Kemalist modernization. The shah began by mandating Western-style dress in an effort to make 
Iranians look more Western. In 1935, all men in Iran were ordered to wear a fedora or bowler hat, 
which was implemented in Turkey after the Hat Reform in 1925.93 Another Iranian reform was in 
women’s dress in this period. However, this reform caused many problems in the Iranian society. 
Many women, as a result, stopped leaving their homes and became isolated from much of the 
outside world during this modernizing period in Iran. 
This dissertation contributes this revisionism by looking at the parliamentary debates. My 
main argument in this thesis is that modernization is the most important aspect of Kemalism, 
because the Kemalist regime had a Jacobin-style modernization policy which implemented after 
the Kemalist autocracy was established in 1925. All the other arguments I make, and all the 
examples I give throughout the thesis serve to underline this main argument. I shall list the other 
important arguments showing in detail how they relate to my main argument. Assembly debates 
will be able to show that 1919-1925 was a period that many issues were unsettled. Policies about 
government, society, and religion were in flux. There were multiple positions, different political 
opinions in the Assembly. However, through a process of centralization and the establishment of 
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autocracy, these options were eliminated. One of the main goals of this dissertation is to uncover 
the openness of the debates before March 1925, when the Law on the Maintenance of Order was 
accepted. Thus, this dissertation contributes to our knowledge of early modern Turkish history, by 
providing news insights from parliamentary archival documents.  
This dissertation will show Ataturk’s opportunism. Chapter one focuses on the 
establishment of the Kemalist autocracy in the political structure of Turkey. While Kemalist 
orthodoxy has advocated that Kemalist ideology sought to create a modern, democratic and secular 
nation-state, this dissertation rejects the democratic mentality of the Kemalist modernization. On 
contrary, this dissertation will examine the Kemalist autocracy when Mustafa Kemal succeeded in 
using every opportunity, such as the Law of Supreme Commander Act in August 1921, the 
abolition of Sultanate in 1922, the establishment of Republic in 1923, the abolition of Caliphate in 
1924, and the elimination of opposition in 1925, to establish his personal autocracy. Kemalist 
historiography emphasize that Mustafa Kemal had an explicit plan during his modernization 
efforts. Most of Kemalist scholars refer to the memoirs of Mazhar Mufit Bey, who was one of the 
closest friends of Mustafa Kemal, as a proof of this explicit plan of Mustafa Kemal to change the 
Turkish society.94 However, if the Kemalist modernization at the beginning of 1920s is examined 
carefully, the discourse of Mustafa Kemal changed over and over again. Therefore, this 
dissertation will cover incoherent actions of Mustafa Kemal during the change of the political 
structure of Turkey in the first chapter.  
Chapter two focuses on Kemalist reforms in social and legal structure of Turkey after the 
single-party regime was established. Kemalist leadership enabled to decrease the role of Islam in 
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public life, and managed to reform the Islamic law codes, language and dress by its modernization 
efforts. All these reforms were made by top down methods. Most of them imposed from the 
country’s capital center, Ankara, on the entire social masses or the periphery.95 The goal of these 
top-down, state imposed political and cultural reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to create a 
secular society and state in Turkey. 96 While the Kemalist historiography depicts Mustafa Kemal 
as an idealistic figure during the modernization of Turkey, this chapter argues that this approach 
is not balanced. Although the Kemalist historiography asserts that Mustafa Kemal and his legacy 
represent carrying out Enlightenment ideals in an obsolete society almost totally ignorant of these 
principles, the Kemalist modernization got a great inheritance from its predecessors. Therefore, 
this chapter aims to scrutinize this continuity. It will particularly focus on the modernization of 
traditional customs and laws, such as the headgear reform of 1925, the abolition of dervish lodges 
in 1925, and a new Civil Code in 1926. The expansion of women’s rights is one of the source of 
pride for many Kemalists. This chapter covers these contradictions by the help of wide primary 
sources which include the official reports of the Grand National Assembly, the Republican Era 
archives and a mass of periodicals which were published in 1920s in Turkey and in abroad. As 
such, beyond independence and initiation phase of, the examination of these records in the 
formation stage of Turkish system contributes to our knowledge of a shady era that has not been 
critically examined by students of Kemalism.  
Chapter three focuses on educational policies of the Kemalist regime and its contradictions. 
Education was one of the important pillars of the Kemalist modernization and it was seen an 
important mechanism to create a new generation under the Kemalist doctrine by many Kemalist 
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scholars. Nationalist and secular education was the main goal for the Kemalist regime in 1920s 
and 1930s. While the regime wanted a secular education, there were many contradictions during 
this modernization in education.  
From this study of political actions and legal, and educational reforms, a portrait of 
Kemalism emerges that is fundamentally different from the traditional view of Turkey’s founding 
period. In particular, Assembly debates, which are not examined very well, expand our knowledge 
of Kemalist reforms and the formation of the political systems in the early Republican period.  
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Chapter 2 - The Establishment of Kemalist Autocracy in Turkey 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire became a fact after World War I. The Ottoman Empire 
joined World War I on the side of the Central powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) against the 
Allied powers (France, Great Britain, and Russia) in November 1914. At the end of 1918, the 
situation for the Ottoman Empire was a catastrophe. It seemed that the “Sick Man of Europe” was 
about to die at last. The Committee of Union and Progress dictatorship had caused great resentment 
among Ottoman citizens and this broke the people’s will to defend the country. In July 1918, the 
last Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed VI, had succeeded to the throne. In October, the CUP ministers 
resigned and the new Sultan appointed Ahmed Izzet Pasha as Grand Vizier with the task of 
reaching an armistice.97 The armistice of Mudros was negotiated by Vice-Admiral Calthorpe, the 
chief British plenipotentiary, and Huseyin Rauf Bey, his Turkish counterpart. After three days of 
preliminary negotiation, on October 29, 1918, Rauf Bey went on board H.M.S. Agamemnon and 
signed the armistice the next day. World War I ended for the Ottoman Empire in the Armistice of 
Mudros on October 30, 1918.98 Following the armistice, the Allied powers immediately started to 
occupy Mosul, Iskenderun, Antep, Maras, Mersin, and Adana, which had been in the possession 
of the Ottoman armies before the armistice. On November 13, 1918, Allied warships anchored in 
the harbor of Istanbul. In 1919, Greek troops began to occupy Izmir and the Aegean region. Italian 
troops landed in Antalya. The French occupied Adana. British forces entered Antep, Birecik, 
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Maras and Urfa in the southeast, Batumi and Kars in the northeast, and Samsun on the Black sea 
cost.99 This occupation of different parts of Anatolia, ethnically Turkish, caused the emergence of 
the resistance movements.  
The emergence of the national struggle against the Allies was analyzed by Mustafa Kemal 
in his six-day long speech delivered in October 1927. In this speech, Mustafa Kemal indicated that 
the national struggle started with his arrival in Samsun on May 19, 1919, to organize the Turkish 
people in Anatolia to “save the homeland from enemies.”100 This approach has been widely 
accepted by Kemalist historiography. While some authors emphasize that in the Turkish War of 
Independence the nationalist movement was launched by Mustafa Kemal and his allies,101 some 
authors give the main portion to Mustafa Kemal alone.102 As an example Asa Lundren writes: “A 
nationalist resistance movement, ‘the Committee for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and 
Rumeli’ was formed in 1919 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.”103 Moreover, the official 
discourse disregarded the roles of the members of the Istanbul government, other leading figures, 
and intellectuals in the national struggle.104 
While the official discourse gives credit to Mustafa Kemal and his efforts after his arrival 
in Samsun, resistance movements emerged in different parts of Turkey only a few days after the 
Armistice of Mudros was signed. There were a number of Defense of Rights organizations in 
Anatolia and Thrace that aimed to resist Armenian and Greek territorial demands at the regional 
                                                 
99 Lundgren, The Unwelcome Neighbor, 29. Lewis, The Emergence, 235. Ozkan, From the Abode of Islam, 80. 
100 Ozkan, From the Abode of Islam, 81. 
101 Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats, 8. 
102 Heper, Historical Dictionary, 14.  
103 Lundgren, The Unwelcome Neighbor, 30. 
104 Ozkan, From the Abode of Islam, 81. 
 33 
level, and established before Mustafa Kemal arrived in Samsun. The first was established in Thrace 
as a “Society for the Defense of Rights” in November 1918 at Edirne. Izmir followed with its own 
regional organization in December 1918. In the eastern Ottoman Empire, the first organization was 
founded in Kars in November 1918, followed by Trabzon and Erzurum, both in February 1919.105 
The main force behind these societies was local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress 
in the provinces. Beyond these local branches, the “Karakol (Guard) society” also established a 
national resistance movement in Anatolia. The actual founders of the Karakol were Colonel Kara 
(Black) Vasif (an important member of the inner circle of Unionist officers) and Kara Kemal, the 
Unionist party boss in Istanbul. The society’s main goal was to strengthen resistance in Anatolia 
and the Caucasus by sending able people, money, arms and supplies from the capital.106 While the 
impact of these societies was limited, the national struggle accelerated after Mustafa Kemal joined 
the resistance movement in Anatolia in May 1919.  
During the World War I, Mustafa Kemal successfully defended the Dardanelles against a 
large Allied fleet in 1915. Despite his prestige as the only remaining victorious general in the 
Ottoman Empire,107 the political situation was not in favor of Mustafa Kemal’s career in Istanbul 
in 1919. He was convinced by his close friends in the General Staff to head for Anatolia in May 
1919. When the government of Sultan Mehmed VI requested that he go to Anatolia to enforce the 
disarmament of the Ottoman troops there, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the 
Armistice of Mudros, Mustafa Kemal used this chance for his later career. Mustafa Kemal was 
appointed by Sultan Mehmed VI as the Inspector-General in the Third Army in eastern Anatolia 
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on April 30, 1919.108 Valentine Chirol interpreted this appointment as: “the nationalists found a 
leader who had shown himself possessed of fine military qualities during the Great War.”109 After 
the patriots in Istanbul had arranged his appointment, other patriots in Anatolia prepared for his 
arrival in May 1919. His participation to the national struggle as a brilliant soldier and an intelligent 
leader, brought the Turkish War of Independence to victory. Mustafa Kemal’s fellow countrymen 
had proved themselves ready to fight under his leadership for the survival of the Turkish people.110  
After the agreements between the resistance movement and the Istanbul government, the 
last Ottoman Parliament, which was formed after elections in autumn 1919, opened on January 12, 
1920. The Parliament adopted the National Pact in a secret session on January 28, 1920. The 
National Pact was published on February 17, 1920. The core of the National Pact was rejection of 
partition and foreign occupation of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace and the realization of the 
objectives of the resistance movement.111 The first article of the National Pact defined the 
boundaries of the Ottoman state and advocated not Turkish national sovereignty but that of all 
Muslim Ottomans, i.e. Turks, Kurds, Lazs, and Circassians. The reaction of the Allies to the 
National Pact was the occupation of Istanbul by Britain on March 16, 1920. The last Ottoman 
Parliament was finally dissolved by the Sultan on April 11, 1920.112 
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The British occupation of Istanbul and closure of the last Ottoman parliament enabled 
Mustafa Kemal and his associates to organize a new Assembly in Ankara.113 As an opportunist 
and pragmatist leader Mustafa Kemal decided to take advantage of the religious feelings of the 
people. Prior to the opening of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, he issued a proclamation 
on April 21, 1920, in which he stated that the opening of the assembly would take place on Friday, 
April 23, a holy day in Islam. After the religious ceremonies were held with all “honorable 
deputies” reciting from the Koran and other Islamic prayers, sermons were delivered on the 
importance and sacred character of the National Struggle. Mustafa Kemal participated these 
prayers, and his prayers made for an excellent photograph for propaganda purposes later.114 
Finally, the Grand National Assembly was established in Ankara on April 23, 1920. This Assembly 
henceforth conducted the National Struggle in the name of the nation. After the establishment of 
the Assembly in Ankara, the city became the de facto seat of the provisional government in Turkey. 
Moreover, the new Parliament became the government’s source of legitimacy.115 After the 
establishment of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal strengthened his position 
within the state.  
   During the War of Independence, 1919–1922, the Ankara parliament was composed of 
different types of deputies. It was quite a heterogeneous and unruly body. In this period, there were 
337 deputies in this Assembly including conservatives, liberals, and socialists.116 They had only 
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one main goal: to rescue the homeland from invasion by the Allies. Some minor groups emerged 
at the early stage of the Grand National Assembly. The distinction between these groups was 
related to their political ideas. The differences among the deputies soon became opposing factions 
by the end of 1920, though precise numerical strength is hard to determine. The conservatives 
established ‘Muhafaza-yi Mukaddesat’ (the Protection of the Holy Concepts) in January 1921 
under the leadership of Hoca Raif Efendi. This conservative group opposed socialist and Bolshevik 
ideas which had a great influence on the Kemalist leadership at that time. Moreover, this 
conservative group strongly defended the rights of Sultan and Caliph. Besides, most of the 
members of this group opposed any kind of modernization attempt which was against Islamic 
sharia.117  
The second group in the Assembly was the socialists. During the Turkish War of 
Independence, the Bolshevik regime in Russia gave its support to the Ankara Government and this 
collaboration influenced some MPs in the Assembly. The Bolshevik infiltration in Anatolia 
became stronger after the various leftist groups were established within the Grand National 
Assembly. The total number of these groups is not clear. These organizations were the Communist 
Party of Turkey (TKP) and its peers, the Green Army Association (Yesil Ordu Cemiyeti) and 
People’s Communist Party (Halk Istirakiyun Firkasi).118 The Green Army was the first 
organization which was established in May 1920, with the approval of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.119 
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The organization consisted of people who supported a mixture of Islamic, anti-imperialist, and 
socialist ideas. When Cerkez Ethem, the head of the Circassian irregular fighters, joined the Green 
Army, it became a force to be reckoned with and a potential threat to Mustafa Kemal’s 
leadership.120  Beyond Cerkez Ethem’s defiance of Mustafa Kemal, the main threat of the Green 
Army was seeing itself as a Turkish counterpart of the Russian Red Army. It started to spread its 
influence through a subversive newspaper Yeni Dunya (New World) published in Eskisehir. The 
newspaper was useful to Bolshevik agents who exploited the discontent of the Turkish peasantry 
and indoctrinated irregular soldiers. This was not acceptable to Mustafa Kemal, whose leadership 
was threatened by these underground communist activities, so the Green Army was disbanded in 
July 1920 by his order. However, the radicals of the Green Army reorganized as the Halk Zumresi 
(People’s Faction) the same month.121 
While the Bolshevik influence was a threat to Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, he still needed 
Bolshevik help to overcome the invaders. To control underground communist activities and not 
lose Bolshevik interest, Mustafa Kemal decided to establish a communist party under his control. 
Therefore, the official Communist Party of Turkey was established on October 18, 1920 in Ankara. 
While Mustafa Kemal forced the communist and leftist-leaning deputies to join this Party, he 
always kept control over it by help of his friends within the organization.122 On the other hand, the 
Bolshevik regime supported the unofficial Communist Party of Turkey, led by Mustafa Suphi,123 
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which was established after the Baku Congress in September 1920. The followers of Mustafa 
Suphi established the People’s Communist Party (Halk Istirakiyun Firkasi) in December 1920 
within the Grand National Assembly. When this real Communist Party became influential by 
accepting Bolshevik ideas, the party was suppressed and its members brought to trial by the 
Kemalist regime in January 1921.124 The party reemerged in August 1921, but was banned totally 
in September 1922 after the War of Independence was won. This party was a real socialist 
organization which defended the rights of peasants and workers.125 The liberal group in the 
Assembly was popular among the young MPs who mostly supported Mustafa Kemal. They 
advocated the general welfare of the people, the continuation of the reforms begun during the 
Constitutional Era, and popular participation in administration. The numerical strength group was 
unknown also.  
While these groups had limited influence in the Assembly, the real struggle between the 
Kemalist majority and the opponents started in May 1921. To alleviate clashes between the 
different cliques and achieve a harmony among his followers, Mustafa Kemal and his close 
associates formed Mudafaa-i Hukuk Grubu (the group of Defense of the Law) on May 10, 1921. 
The Kemalist majority reached 202 members during the first period of the Assembly.126 After the 
formation of the Mudafa-i Hukuk Grubu in May 1921, the rest of the deputies became independent 
in the Assembly. After this date, an opposition emerged in the Assembly and the clashes between 
the Kemalist majority and the opposition became intense. In July 1922, some of these independent 
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deputies, opposed to the autocratic tendencies of Mustafa Kemal, united officially under the name 
of Second Group of Defense of the Law, or simply Second Group, during the discussions about 
the third extension of the Supreme Commander Act.127 The total number of the Second Group 
reached 63 members in early 1923. The Second Group was an active opposition to the Kemalist 
majority within the Parliament. Kemalist historiography categorizes the Kemalist majority as 
reformist and the Second Group as conservative and against national sovereignty. On the contrary, 
in the abolition of the Sultanate, the Second Group agreed with the Kemalist majority.128 
Moreover, this group was ideologically very heterogeneous, including conservative, liberal, and 
socialist deputies within the group. Their main goal was to decrease Mustafa Kemal’s growing 
autocracy and radicalism.129 The Second Group was a very strong opposition any kind of personal 
autocracy or dictatorship under the name of Sultan or President. This attitude was seen many times 
during the extensions of the Supreme Commander Act.  Over the next two years, the Kemalists 
moved to end this opposition and establish an autocracy under Kemal. The Assembly debates 
reveal this process.  
This chapter will examine the establishment of the Kemalist autocracy when Mustafa 
Kemal utilized every single event to establish an autocracy instead of a democratic regime. The 
Law of Supreme Commander Act in August 1921, the abolition of Sultanate in 1922, the 
establishment of Republic in 1923, the abolition of Caliphate in 1924, and the elimination of 
opposition in 1925 were the key events on the way of the establishment of this personal autocracy. 
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This chapter will scrutinize these key events by using the official reports of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, archival documents from the Premiership Archive, and the periodicals of 
1920s and 1930s both in Turkey and in abroad comprehensively. In particular, it will use the 
records of Assembly debates in both open and secret sessions, not previously used enough by 
foreign and Turkish scholars, to understand the creation of this autocracy.  
2.1 Unity of Powers and the Supreme Commander Act of 1921: First Attempt to the 
Autocracy 
Unity of powers is the assemblage of legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power 
in the hands of a single person or an institution. Unity of powers has mostly taken place in 
monarchic and despotic regimes. This notion is totally against the principles of democracy. 
Freedom of speech and thought are at risk of in these regimes because of its control of the judicial 
system. Therefore, the separation of powers is an alternative to this system. Under the model of 
separation of powers, the state is divided into branches, each with separate and independent powers 
and areas of responsibility so that the powers of one branch are not in conflict with the powers 
associated with the other branches. In Turkey, unity of power was established in April 1920 after 
the Grand National Assembly was inaugurated. This implementation was maintained in the 
Constitution of 1921 and 1924.130 
Unity of powers suited Mustafa Kemal’s possible autocracy. While the Kemalist orthodoxy 
asserts unity of powers was a product of the extraordinary conditions of the Turkish War of 
Independence,131 Mustafa Kemal retained this political concept until his death. As an example, in 
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the book of “Medeni Bilgiler”, which was written in the early 1930s, he supported unity of power 
and asserted that the separation of powers did not fit the Turkish nation.132 This book was one of 
the main ideological books for raising the future generation. From this perspective, even though 
the extraordinary conditions of war were over, the Kemalist regime maintained full powers in its 
hands. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal’s Republican People’s Party maintained the form of 
administration of Turkish nation as unity of power in its program until 1947.133 For a better 
understanding of the establishment of the Kemalist autocracy, it is helpful to scrutinize the 
discussions of the legal status of the state in the first period of the Assembly which lasted from 
April 1920 to April 1923. The Assembly debates, which are not mentioned completely before, will 
be helpful to cover this subject.  
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which was inaugurated on April 23, 1920, 
adopted the principle of unity of power as governmental system the next day. In his resolution, 
Mustafa Kemal underlined the extraordinary situation of country and the exigency of forming a 
government at that period. In the fourth article of his resolution, Mustafa Kemal declared that the 
Grand National Assembly had legislative and executive authority. A committee which included 
some of the members of the Assembly would deal with governmental duties. The speaker of the 
Assembly would be the head of this committee also.134 The resolution was discussed on May 1, 
1920, in the Assembly. It was accepted by the votes of 110 deputies the next day. 15 deputies were 
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against this resolution and 5 of them abstained.135 Law #3136 was promulgated on May 2, 1920, 
concerning the selection of the Council of Ministers.137 One of the interesting detail of this law is 
that all opponents of this resolution, except Refik Sevket Bey, became members of the Second 
Group who could not elected for the second period of the Assembly in August 1923. 
The struggle for power between the Kemalist majority and the opposition was seen in the 
first period of the Grand National Assembly. The opposition group, which would become the 
Second Group in 1922, was against the notion of unity of power which enabled Mustafa Kemal to 
establish his dictatorship. Law #3 gave an opportunity to Mustafa Kemal to be president of the 
Assembly and the head of Government at the same time. The opposition forced Mustafa Kemal to 
leave his position as head of the Government in January 24, 1921.138 This was a significant chance 
to stop Mustafa Kemal’s desire to gather all of powers in his hands. However, the desperate 
situation in the battle of Kutahya-Eskisehir in July 1921, gave a chance for Mustafa Kemal to take 
all powers in his hands by the Supreme Commander Act in August 1921. 
After the third offensive attack of the Greek army, the Greeks succeeded in capturing the 
important towns Afyon-Karahisar, Kutahya, and finally Eskisehir in summer 1921. Due to Turkish 
defeat in this battle, the Turkish War of Independence of 1919–1922 turned into a gloomy phase. 
While two military victories at Inonu in January and April 1921, and the Treaty of Moscow in 
March 1921 had strengthened Mustafa Kemal’s position within the state, the fall of Eskisehir and 
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the possibility of the evacuation of Ankara caused a blow in his leadership. The decision to 
evacuate Ankara represented the lowest point in his leadership in the War of Independence. In this 
difficult period, hope for the salvation of country, which was the ultimate goal of the National 
Pact, was decreasing among the deputies in the Assembly at Ankara. When the Ankara government 
prepared to flee, a number of deputies in the Grand National Assembly compelled Mustafa Kemal 
to decide on a more determined stand in defense of Ankara. This difficult crisis of the state gave 
an opportunity for personal gain, military success, and national survival to Mustafa Kemal after 
centralizing the entire authority of the Grand National Assembly to his hands.139  
Mustafa Kemal’s close companions supported him in achieving his opportunistic goals. 
For regaining hope for salvation, the Kemalist deputies introduced a bill, which charged Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha with the duty of supreme commander of the Turkish Army. George Gawrych also 
describes this initiative as: “Mustafa Kemal relied on loyal deputies to facilitate the passage of this 
enabling price of legislation. A handful of deputies submitted a bill that would confer upon Mustafa 
Kemal the position of commander in chief.”140     
Lord Kinross emphasizes this crisis as an “ironical chance” for Mustafa Kemal to obtain 
full power. He describes the situation as: “by an ironical chance Kemal in this crisis had for the 
first time the support of the bulk of the Assembly. He would thus obtain the supreme command. 
But he must obtain it on his own terms. While the storm raged within and without the Assembly, 
he kept a wary silence, showing no disposition to accept the command, and thus turning into a 
positive conviction the general fear that disaster was inevitable. As soon as he judged that feeling 
had reached this point he called a secret session and mounted the rostrum. He agreed to accept the 
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supreme command provided he was given the full powers of the Assembly. Only thus could he 
prepare the army with sufficient speed for the next round in the struggle.”141 From this point of 
view, Mustafa Kemal waited until desperation made his rule appear to be right choice to obtain 
the full authority of the Assembly to his hands.  
Mustafa Kemal’s desire for obtaining complete power was related to his character. Irfan 
Orga stresses the character of Mustafa Kemal as: “his greatest failing was his egocentricity; 
convinced as he was that only he could save the nation, he could not bear to see anyone else 
assuming popularity or getting too much attention. He could not govern alone but he distrusted 
everyone around him. The Assembly, as the voice of the nation, was often vociferous in its 
untimely demands; many of the deputies were right thinking, level headed men and they resented 
his appropriation of power. He detested criticism, feeling that those who criticized had the least 
ability to do so.”142  
While Mustafa Kemal detested criticism, the Supreme Commander Act was discussed 
many times in secret sessions in the Grand National Assembly. Its extensions were criticized 
mostly by the opposition. While the opposition showed their dissatisfaction to the act in secret 
sessions, they tried to show the unity of the Assembly in the open sessions. This act was the first 
attempt of Mustafa Kemal to control the state and the first step to establish his personal autocracy. 
While Kemalists stressed the extraordinary situation, the policy did not change even in more 
normal times. 
Kemalist deputies thought that the fate of the Turkish War of Independence required a 
strong commander who would lead the entire army. Therefore, his friends requested that the Grand 
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National Assembly give more authority to Mustafa Kemal. Vehbi Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of 
Karesi, underlined that if Mustafa Kemal undertook the Supreme Military Command, the problems 
could be solved within 15 days.143 Mustafa Kemal was also aware of this unlimited power. He 
warned the Assembly if it interfered in his military duties, the situation would be worse. He 
underlined that it would be impossible to manage these difficult problems by the written laws and 
a mutual agreement of the Assembly. By his word, Mustafa Kemal hinted his need for getting 
extraordinary authority to manage the military problems. 144  
The Supreme Commander Act was discussed in the Grand National Assembly on August 
5, 1921. Article two stated that “in order to develop the forces of the army materially and morally 
to the fullest extent, so as to secure and consolidate the leadership and the administration of these 
forces, the Commander in Chief will be authorized to exercise full powers of the TBMM in the 
name of the Assembly in these matters.” Article three limited this authority to three months but 
with the possibility of renewal.”145 During the debates over this act, Mustafa Kemal played his 
cards very well to convince deputies in the Assembly. After he thanked to the Assembly for their 
confidence, he requested to limit his authority to three months as a representation of his loyalty to 
national sovereignty.146 However, his opponents were aware of his desire for absolute power. The 
opponents criticized Mustafa Kemal especially in the subjects of his title and unlimited authorities. 
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First Selahaddin Bey, one of the prominent figures of the Second Group and deputy of 
Mersin, insisted on using the title of the “Vice-Supreme Commander”147 because of his belief that 
the Office of Supreme Commander was retained by the Grand National Assembly. If Mustafa 
Kemal wanted to use the title of Supreme Commander, it would be misunderstood at home and 
abroad as Mustafa Kemal becoming the new Sultan of Turkey.148 This approach was one of the 
common concerns of the opponents against Mustafa Kemal at that period. Mustafa Kemal rejected 
this proposal unconditionally. He would be Supreme Commander or nothing at all.149 Hakki Hami 
Bey, deputy of Sinop and later a member of the Second Group, criticized Mustafa Kemal about 
the issue of his unlimited authority. According to him, within these three months the Grand 
National Assembly would not be existent. All of its powers would be held by a single authority.150  
The probability of establishing a dictatorship was another concern of many deputies. Not 
only opponents but even some Kemalist deputies had this concern. As an example Seref Bey, who 
was an ardent Kemalist deputy at that time, supported the extraordinary authorities which were 
demanded by Mustafa Kemal. He believed that those authorities were necessary, and he gave some 
historical examples to support his idea. However, he had some doubts after Mustafa Kemal’s 
resolution. He feared creating another Napoleon and establishing a dictatorship in Turkey. Seref 
Bey disavowed his concerns later and said that Mustafa Kemal Pasha would prefer to be a servant 
of national will instead of being a Sultan. However, the concern was not removed totally. Hulusi 
Bey, an opposition deputy of Karahisar, showed his fear that the events would turn Mustafa Kemal 
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in a different channel, like establishing a dictatorship. Therefore, Grand National Assembly should 
not give its authority to any person.151 Those concerns became a reality after 1926. After that year, 
there was not any opposition to the Kemalist regime in the political arena in Turkey.    
While opponents increased their voices against Mustafa Kemal, he responded to all these 
critics in a very clever way. First of all he rejected the title of “Vice-Supreme Commander” as an 
outmoded title which was used in the First World War. According to Mustafa Kemal, using the 
same title was unnecessary. Another drawback to this title was the approval of the Sultan. Mustafa 
Kemal asserted that if Sultan Mehmed VI would say that he did not appoint any Vice-Supreme 
Commander, the situation would be problematic for the Assembly. His possible refusal to appoint 
someone for this title would be an obstacle for future. Moreover, he did not violate the Grand 
National Assembly’s possession of this title. Mustafa Kemal underlined the three-month limit of 
his emergency authority which would be important in this very crucial period. In the dictatorship 
question, Mustafa Kemal accepted the opponents’ concerns as reasonable and logical. However, 
he thought that there was no need for obtaining authority from Assembly. The duty of Supreme 
Commander should be based on confidence. Mustafa Kemal tried to convince the Assembly as 
these words: “if you don’t have any confidence to your leader, it is harmful to entrust him.”152 
While these words swayed most of deputies in the Assembly, the opposition continued 
their resistance to this extraordinary law. Selahaddin Bey, deputy of Mersin, especially emphasized 
the situation of country was not sufficiently bad to take these kinds of extraordinary measures. He 
pointed out that the subject should be discussed very carefully. He did not want to leave his rights 
to any person because of the second matter of this Act, and would retain these rights for the benefit 
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of the people.153 The resistance of opponents had some effect in the second session. Mustafa Kemal 
accepted the possible disadvantages if the Assembly would cede its legislative and executive 
authorities to any person. He forced himself to express his appreciation for the attitude of the 
Assembly in this subject.154  
In the second session, most of the deputies talked about the possibility of establishing a 
dictatorship. Mustafa Durak Bey, an independent deputy of Erzurum, was in favor of giving a title 
to Mustafa Kemal as “Commander of Nation” instead of the Supreme Commander. Riza Nur Bey, 
pro-Kemalist deputy of Sinop who later became Minister of Health and Education, was anxious 
about appointing someone with unlimited powers. He wanted to add a limitation to the law as 
“…except to change and to abolish the Assembly and to keep the inviolability of deputies.” He 
thought that this matter would stop a personal autocracy. Kemalist deputies tried to assuage these 
concerns by pointing to the situation at that time. Emin Bey, a close associates of Mustafa Kemal 
and deputy of Eskisehir, was in favor of appointing unlimited authorities to Mustafa Kemal. He 
said that if Mustafa Kemal used his authority for a dictatorship, this would be beneficial for the 
state. Moreover, if Emin Bey had a chance to give a title to Mustafa Kemal, he would give him a 
title more important than Sultan. Another deputy raised the Greek invasion and said he preferred 
to be under the feet of Mustafa Kemal Pasha than under the rule of Greek invaders.155 While 
Kemalist deputies tried to convince the Assembly by invoking the extraordinary situation, the 
opponents still had concerns about the future of the state. They were so anxious about a possible 
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dictatorship after ceding the authority of Grand National Assembly to a person. This concern 
became a fact when Mustafa Kemal controlled the state totally in 1926.      
The act was accepted by the votes of 169 deputies on August 5, 1921. 13 deputies voted 
against to this decision. The chairman requested that these opponents support the act in the open 
session to show the unity of the Grand National Assembly against external enemies. In the open 
session, the act was accepted unanimously by the votes of 184 deputies on August 5, 1921. Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha would be the single authority in legislative, executive, and judicial matters. After the 
decision was taken by the Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal showed his thanks to the 
Assembly. In his speech, Mustafa Kemal aimed to convince deputies of the victory of Turkish 
armies. He said that he needed the protection of the Assembly and the support of the Turkish 
people to achieve his goals. After Mustafa Kemal’s speech Kemalist deputies started to praise him. 
Seref Bey, deputy of Edirne, underlined the importance of this decision and said that Mustafa 
Kemal was the greatest leader of the greatest nation. He believed that Mustafa Kemal would save 
the state and his name would be written in history. Muhiddin Baha Bey, a Kemalist deputy of 
Bursa, exalted Mustafa Kemal’s personality, declaring “our hope is dependent upon your great 
ability which was shining in the past.”156 
Kinross and Orga indicate that the Supreme Commander Act of 1921 enabled Mustafa 
Kemal to be a military dictator for the next three months.157 Besides, this law is seen as “a 
revolutionary step” by Gawrych. According to the old Ottoman constitution, the sultan was the 
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commander in chief, but, this new law gave Mustafa Kemal as commander in chief the authority 
to make decisions in the name of Parliament on matters related to the military.158 
After Mustafa Kemal used this extraordinary power in the military matters in three months, 
the first extension of the Supreme Commander Act for another three months was accepted on 
October 31, 1921. Mufid Efendi, deputy of Kirsehir who later joined to the Second Group in 1922, 
gave a proposal, which offered to extend the act, to the Grand National Assembly on October 30, 
1921. The proposal was discussed in the Assembly the next day. In the discussions Kemalist 
deputies emphasized the importance of the act, which had proven effective both militarily and 
politically during the War of Independence. The mission had not accomplished yet and the act 
should be extended according to Mufid Efendi. Husrev Bey, a close associates of Mustafa Kemal 
and deputy of Trabzon, emphasized that the military situation was not different than the period 
when the act was accepted in August 1921. According to him until the decisive victory against to 
the enemies, the discussion about abandoning this act was unnecessary. Tunali Hilmi Bey, pro-
Kemalist deputy of Bolu, indicated that this act affected people very positively when it was 
accepted. According to him, this act should be extended without discussion. Mustafa Durak Bey, 
deputy of Erzurum, was also in favor of this extension until the victory of War of Independence 
would be realized. Musa Kazim Efendi, Kemalist deputy of Konya, and Abdullah Azmi Efendi, 
another Kemalist deputy of Eskisehir, underlined the troubles of war were still continuing, 
therefore until the victory this extension had to be accepted by the Assembly. 159 
The main objection from the opponents to this act was that it entrusted full powers to a 
single authority. While, the opposition was agreed on the importance of this act during the war, 
                                                 
158 Gawrych, Young Ataturk, 152-155.  
159 TBMM ZC (secret session), 31 Oct. 1921, v. 2, 413-417. 
 51 
the opponents thought that giving all authority to a person was a danger for a nation. Huseyin Avni 
Bey, deputy of Erzurum and future leader of the Second Group in July 1922, conceded the 
successes of this act until that time. He indicated that Mustafa Kemal accomplished his military 
goals by the help of this act. After that time, however, he had to return back to the Assembly to his 
office of Presidency. Necip Bey, deputy of Ertugrul who was a member of opposition group, 
indicated that he was against giving the full powers of the Assembly to Mustafa Kemal.160 After 
these discussions, the extension of the acted was voted by the deputies. While 12 deputies161 were 
against, 152 voted for the extension of the Supreme Commander Act.162  
After the first extension of the Supreme Commander Act in October 1921, another struggle 
between the Kemalist majority and its opposition started in November 1921 in the subject of form 
of government. On November 24, 1921, the Grand National Assembly began to discuss the duties 
and authorities of the government. The report of the Special Commission, which was established 
in January 1921, was read in the Assembly the same day. As the official author of this report 
Selahaddin Bey underlined that after accepting this proposal, the legislative authority of the cabinet 
would be clearer. First of all, the head of Government would set forth his program to the Assembly 
and this program would be approved by the Assembly. After that, the activities of the Government 
would be supervised by the President of the Assembly. If there would be some misdeeds against 
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the authority of the Assembly, the president would have to protect the rights of the Assembly.163 
Moreover, Selahaddin Bey pointed out the differences between unity of powers and separation of 
powers in his speech. According to him the essence of unity of power was absolute despotism. 
Today, the example of absolutism and despotism was unity of powers. The ruler could do whatever 
he wanted with the help of unity of powers. Therefore, Selahaddin Bey and his friends aimed to 
stop the negative effects of this situation by accepting this proposal.164 
One of the negative effects of unity of powers was the extreme power of a person could be 
dangerous for the future of the country. Hasan Hayri Bey, deputy of Dersim who later joined to 
the opposition group, expressed this possibility by giving a common example. In his speech Hasan 
Hayri Bey mentioned the fate of Enver Pasha, who was the responsible for the defeat of the 
Ottoman armies in World War I.  Enver Pasha had unlimited powers and the destiny of the Ottoman 
Empire was in his hands during World War I. At that time, giving unlimited powers to him was a 
mistake. Hasan Hayri Bey warned the other deputies as: “if we want Mustafa Kemal to fall into 
the same fate, let’s give him the same powers.” While Hasan Bey wanted to prevent Mustafa 
Kemal from this negative possibility, Mustafa Kemal responded to him harshly as not comparing 
him with Enver Pasha.165   
The lack of a clear model of government was another concern for the opposition. Necati 
Bey, a member of Second Group and deputy of Erzurum, mentioned this concern in his speech. 
He pointed out that, they – MPs- had to think about the future not only for daily issues. Necati Bey 
commented that the form of government did not satisfy the national will so far. The enemies of 
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Turkish people could blame the Assembly in future as “you established a personal government 
instead of national government in Anatolia.” Therefore, the Grand National Assembly had to alter 
the form of government.166  
Yusuf Ziya Bey, deputy of Bitlis and later a prominent figure of Second Group, was in 
favor of the bill. He thought that this bill was a successful step on the way of determining basic 
laws. He thought that this bill was a necessary for the future governments in the Assembly. If the 
Assembly did not make clear the duties and responsibilities of the next government, they would 
be like “ships without compasses.” Moreover, he indicated the lack of written programs and laws 
which determined the duties of both deputies and the governments. Therefore, that lack should be 
completed immediately. This bill, which was discussed in the Assembly, would be a positive step 
according to him.167 
The notion of separations of powers was not welcome to the Kemalist majority in the 
Assembly.  Zekai Bey, a prominent Kemalist deputy of Adana, voiced the Kemalist thesis in this 
issue that separation of powers was a hindrance to the unity of national will. According to him, 
this theory had been discussed from nineteenth century by the constitutionalists and it had many 
flaws. Therefore, this decayed thought would not be a remedy for the future of the country. Zekai 
Bey criticized Selahaddin Bey’s proposal as aiming to establish a Council of Ministers which was 
not proper for the Constitution. He referred to the thought of Montesquieu in this subject also. 
According to him, the main thing should be the balance of powers instead of separation of powers. 
If one of these branches of power dominated the others, it would be a problem.168  
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Mahmud Esad Bey, a close associates of Mustafa Kemal and deputy of Izmir who later 
became Minister of Justice in 1926, was also against separation of powers. He mentioned the 
practices which were put into effect by different nations. He mostly focused on the American 
system which was accepted the separation of powers. He indicated that Woodrow Wilson, the 
President of US, complained about the negative effects of the separation of powers. According to 
Wilson, the Constitution of US caused the division of the general authority of Government into 
small parts. Each branch of Government had a tiny responsibility and each of them looked for an 
escape from responsibility. Moreover, they blamed each other because of avoiding responsibility. 
Beyond the US, Mahmud Esad Bey thought that the separation of powers an obstacle for South 
American states. He brought up the Mexican example. He asserted that the reason for military 
coup d’états in Mexico was the separation of powers. Mahmud Esad Bey did not believe that the 
separation of powers was suitable for the Turkish society. He warned the rest of MPs as if they 
wanted to achieve liberty and national sovereignty they should not separate the powers but unite 
them.169  
  The possibility of a parliamentary system was another point of Kemalist objection in this 
bill. Behcet Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of Kangiri, indicated that the bill aimed to establish a 
parliamentary regime which was not favorable for the Turkish nation at that time. He underlined 
that the Assembly did not need to search a form of Government. The main goal was to rescue the 
Turkish land which was determined by the National Pact. Moreover Behcet Bey mentioned the 
differences between Western and Eastern societies. According to him, it would be impossible to 
carry out a Western form of Government, especially “a deformed form”, in Turkey.170 From his 
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perspective, the parliamentary system was interpreted as a deformed Western system, which would 
not suitable for the Turkish society which was an Eastern one.     
Mustafa Kemal’s thoughts about unity of power give us some details about his desire to 
establish an autocratic state under his leadership. Unity of powers was indispensable for Mustafa 
Kemal because of his desire to control all power in his hands. As a military leader in his 
background, Mustafa Kemal knew the importance of controlling discipline and powers in a center. 
Therefore, the separation of powers would not be favorable for his future plans. In his speech in 
the Assembly on December 1, 1921, Mustafa Kemal declared that “there was not separation of 
powers in reality, in nature, and in universe.”171  
In his speech Mustafa Kemal gave the details of his preference with regard to the separation 
of powers. He mentioned that he scrutinized many works of intellectuals who were concerned 
about delimiting the power of absolute rulers. According to Mustafa Kemal, most of these 
philosophers were distressed because of not achieving their goals in delimiting the power of rulers. 
Mustafa Kemal referred the notion of separation of powers to Jean Jacques Rousseau in this 
speech. He ridiculed the French political philosopher without providing any explanation.172 He 
expressed his thoughts about Rousseau as: “Read the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau from 
beginning to end. When I read this, I have realized two essences which I believe apparent in this 
author. One of them is grief and the other is insanity. I was curious about this special case of this 
author. I realized that this man was insane and he wrote his book in a state of insanity. Therefore, 
the theory which we were based on mostly was a product of this mentality.”173 Mustafa Kemal 
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was mistaken: the separation of powers is not the principle of Rousseau, but instead belongs to 
Montesquieu. In this case, can we say Mustafa Kemal did not know the principle very well? It is 
unlikely. In the Ataturk Library, there are books which Mustafa Kemal read before. Mustafa Kemal 
took notes on Rousseau’s The Social Contract. One of these notes related to power and 
sovereignty. Mustafa Kemal underlined the sentence “the power of sovereignty is simple and 
unique; to divide this power means to destroy it” as “important.”174 In this case, did Mustafa Kemal 
make a mistake when he referred to Rousseau? It is unlikely again. Mustafa Kemal knew both 
authors very well and he referred Rousseau’s personal situation as insane and distressed. Mustafa 
Kemal distorted the importance of separation of powers which was contrary to his interests at that 
time. His personal autocracy would be in conflict with the notion of separation of powers and he 
aimed to discredit this principle. After these discussions, the proposal was sent back to the Special 
commission by the Assembly.175 The Kemalist majority in the Assembly accepted to continue 
unity of powers in the administration. This decision enabled the establishment of an autocracy 
which lasted until the end of World War II in Turkey.  
The second extension of the Supreme Commander Act, which was accepted on February 
4, 1922, was another discussion subject between the Kemalist majority and the opposition.176 Ferid 
Bey, another Kemalist deputy of Corum, and his 43 companions proposed to the Assembly on 
January 31, 1922, the extension of the act for another three months. This proposal was discussed 
in the Assembly on February 2, 1922, for the first time. At that time, there was not a lot of 
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discussions about this extension. Only Huseyin Avni Bey showed his dissatisfaction about this 
extension. According to him, the foreigners wanted to decrease the value of the national movement 
by saying the personal desire of Mustafa Kemal was sovereign instead of the national sovereignty 
in Turkey. He emphasized that after the acceptance of the Supreme Commander Act, the Assembly 
accepted Mustafa Kemal as the leader of the national movement. However, by accepting this act 
Mustafa Kemal was entrusted with this duty by the Assembly. Therefore, this Assembly could 
appoint someone as a Supreme Commander, or as a Marshal, or even a private soldier.177 Huseyin 
Avni Bey argued for the supremacy of the Assembly over any personality by this statement.  
When the extension of the act was discussed in the Assembly on February 4, 1922, the 
opposition proposed a change to the second article of the act. Mustafa Bey, deputy of Karahisar-i 
Sarki who later joined to the Second Group, emphasized the importance of the second article in 
this act. In his proposal, Mustafa Bey pointed out that the Assembly could lift the authority of 
Mustafa Kemal if it deemed necessary. According to him, he did not oppose Mustafa Kemal as a 
Supreme Commander but he thought that it was not legal to give entire power to Mustafa Kemal. 
Selahaddin Bey, deputy of Mersin and a prominent opponent, supported this proposal also. He 
emphasized that this new proposal could provide the same benefits as the original proposal, given 
by Ferid Bey. Moreover, Selahaddin Bey indicated that this new proposal was better because it did 
not have any restriction of the Assembly’s power. According to him, the present situation was not 
so bad as to justify giving any extraordinary authority to anyone.178 From his perspective, the 
opponents were well aware of not giving the rights of the Assembly to any person. However, the 
President of the Assembly opted for Ferid Bey’s proposal and sent the opponents’ proposal to the 
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commission of petition (layiha encumeni). The opponents rejected this decision that “this proposal 
was accepted by force” and “despotism of the presidency.” After these discussion, the President 
of the Assembly asked to the deputies to accept or reject the extension of the Supreme Commander 
Act for another three months by raising their hands. While, the opposition rejected this method, 
the extension was accepted by the majority of the Grand National Assembly.179 
The third extension of the Supreme Commander Act was accepted on May 6, 1922.180 
Husrev Bey, deputy of Trabzon, and his 15 colleagues gave a proposal for another extension of 
this act to the Assembly. When this proposal was read in the Assembly, the Kemalist deputies 
wanted this proposal to be discussed in secret session, but the opponents rejected a secret session. 
Huseyin Avni Bey questioned the meaning of discussion about an overt act in a secret session. He 
emphasized that the Assembly gave its authority to a person by the help of this Supreme 
Commander Act. Huseyin Avni Bey asked the Kemalist deputies if it was forbidden to speak out 
against this act. He declared openly that he would talk about in which conditions the Assembly 
could leave or not leave some of its rights. Selahaddin Bey and Ziya Hursit Bey agreed with him 
that discussion in a secret session was unnecessary.181 
The opposition showed their hostility to the extension of this act once more in these 
debates. One reason for this rejection was that the wartime circumstances were better than they 
were in August 1921, when this act was accepted the first time. Ali Sukru Bey, deputy of Trabzon 
who was later killed by Topal Osman Agha the commander of Mustafa Kemal's special Bodyguard 
Regiment in 1923, emphasized the positive conditions of the state in the new period and declared 
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that the Assembly should take its rights back. Selahaddin Bey also referred to the better conditions 
of the state. According to him, Mustafa Kemal should return to his Presidency in the Assembly 
and leave his position to other commanders in the army.182   
The opposition was very reluctant to give the rights of the Assembly to any person and 
their voice was very strong in this issue during the third extension of the Supreme Commander 
Act. Huseyin Avni Bey expressed the importance of the legislative and executive rights of the 
Assembly. He pointed out that he did not see any person as superior to the Assembly. Huseyin 
Avni Bey warned the other deputies to keep and not transfer their rights, which were given by 
people to them, to an individual person.183  
The Kemalist deputies were somewhat defensive during these discussions. They tried to 
show the critical situation of the state was still on going. Therefore, this extension should be 
accepted without any change.  According to Rauf Bey, the Prime Minister at that time, removing 
of the second article in this act would show distrustfulness to Mustafa Kemal who governed the 
entire army. This distrustfulness would cause many negative effects at home and abroad. Muhittin 
Baha Bey also agreed with Rauf Bey. If the powers granted in this act would be decreased, this 
situation would cause many problems.184  
After these debates, Selahaddin Bey and 15 of his colleagues gave a proposal to eliminate 
the second article in the Supreme Commander Act. After the voting, 73 deputies agreed to 
eliminate it, 91 deputies were in favor of maintaining the authority to Mustafa Kemal, and 12 
deputies abstained.185 The proposal of the extension of the act was postponed on May 6, 1922. 
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While the opposition could not eliminate the second article at that day, this situation was a victory 
for them. The Kemalist majority encountered a great threat on May 4, 1922, and the authority of 
Mustafa Kemal was shaken by a united opposition.  
The strong objection to the extension of the Supreme Commander Act forced Mustafa 
Kemal to explain the situation and convince his opponents. Therefore, he gathered the Assembly 
in a secret session on May 6, 1922.186 First of all Mustafa Kemal stated that he could not join the 
last session because of his illness. He reviewed all statements of his opponents and he examined 
all of the votes. Mustafa Kemal assured the Assembly that he was not in favor of continuing a 
position which was unnecessary. He rejected the idea he was infringing on the Assembly’s rights 
and declared that he did not ask anyone to appoint him as the Supreme Commander or gave all 
these powers to him. Mustafa Kemal underlined that he accepted this position because of the 
deputies’ statement, which was “there was no other solution.” Therefore, he had never thought to 
seize the rights of the Assembly partially or completely. 187   
Mustafa Kemal evaluated the situation as a military issue instead of a parliamentary issue. 
The objection of the opposition, which was the Supreme Commander Act was unnecessary at that 
time because of a better situation at the front, was interpreted by Mustafa Kemal as helping to 
weaken the military. He accused the opposition of making decisions which were not based on any 
reality. The extension of the act was rejected before its term was over. Therefore he was 
commanding the army without any legal authority. Mustafa Kemal asked to the Assembly if the 
army should be without any commander. He answered his own question as: “I cannot leave and I 
will not leave the commandership.” Mustafa Kemal wanted to stop this anarchy in the Assembly 
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as soon as possible, because of the continuing difficult circumstances which had not changed. He 
tried to reassure the deputies about their doubts in the second article of the act. According to him, 
this article was legal. The Assembly did not transfer its rights to the Supreme Commander, but 
only strengthened the military by the help of this act.188 After Mustafa Kemal’s speech, the 
extension of the act was voted by the deputies. In the end, the Grand National Assembly renewed 
Mustafa Kemal’s mandate, with 177 votes for, 11 against, and 15 abstentions.189 Mustafa Kemal’s 
speech and his strong determination about not leaving the commandership was very effective on 
the decision of the deputies. While two days before this speech, the opposition showed a great 
resistance against to the second article of the act. However, the appearance of Mustafa Kemal in 
the Assembly gave a great confidence to the Kemalist majority and they managed to extend the 
act another three months.  
The last extension of the Supreme Commander Act was accepted on July 20, 1922.190 
While the first three extensions were limited to a three-month period, this extension was accepted 
indefinitely. Refik Bey, a close associates of Mustafa Kemal and deputy of Bayazid, and Emin 
Bey, another pro-Kemalist deputy of Bursa, gave a proposal to the Assembly for extending the act 
for another three months on July 20, 1922. This time, the act was not discussed much in the 
Assembly. First of all Mustafa Kemal Pasha explained the reasons when this act was accepted first 
time in August 1921. According to him, when the military situation was in crisis, the Assembly 
gave most of its rights to him. There were two reasons behind this decision. One of them was the 
extraordinary situation of the state. The second reason was the great confidence of the Assembly 
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to Mustafa Kemal. He thanked to the deputies for their great trust in him. After one year Mustafa 
Kemal pointed out that the situation of the army was in a great condition, Therefore, there was no 
need to continue this title.191  
While Mustafa Kemal did not show any interest in continuing the title of Supreme 
Commander, the Kemalist deputies gave another proposal for another extension. Ali Riza Bey, 
pro-Kemalist deputy of Istanbul, gave another proposal to the Assembly which emphasized that 
the Supreme Command was a necessity to defeat the state’s enemies. According to him, until the 
final victory, Mustafa Kemal should hold the title of Supreme Commander. Moreover, this title 
could not be restricted with a limited time. According to Ali Riza Bey’s proposal, Mustafa Kemal 
would be the Supreme Commander until the end of the war, and the second article would be 
changed so that the Assembly could take back this title from Mustafa Kemal whenever it wanted. 
The opposition agreed with this decision also. Durak Bey indicated that Mustafa Kemal should be 
the Supreme Commander until victory. He pointed out that someone had to take the responsibility 
of the military during this critical period. If the Assembly took back this authority from Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha, he could say “you took back my authority when I was on the verge of the victory”, 
if something was going wrong.  To eliminate this possibility, Mustafa Kemal should continue his 
duty until the end of the war.192 
In conclusion, the unity of power is the assemblage of legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of power in the hands of a single person or an institution. While this notion is contrary to 
democracy, Mustafa Kemal was a great admirer of this idea. At the early stage of the Grand 
National Assembly he supported unity of power as the most ideal system. According to him, it was 
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superior to the rest of the systems by the developed nations.193 The Assembly debates prove that 
the opposition underlined that the essence of unity of powers was absolute despotism. According 
to them, the example of absolutism and despotism was unity of power. One of the negative effects 
of unity of power was the extreme power of a person could be dangerous for the future of the 
country. On the contrary, the notion of separations of powers was not welcome to the Kemalist 
majority in the Assembly. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal rejected the separation of power as “there 
was not separation of powers in reality, in nature, and in universe.”194 By the help of unity of 
power, Mustafa Kemal continued to centralize fill power in his hands. 
The Supreme Commander Act of 1921 was another critical event on the way of Kemalist 
autocracy. Mustafa Kemal expanded his power in the state after obtaining the entire authority of 
the Grand National Assembly in his hands. As a highly confident person, Mustafa Kemal 
convinced the majority in the Assembly that only he could save the nation. After his close 
associates’ initiative to give full power to him, Mustafa Kemal played his cards very well to keep 
his title of Supreme Commander until the end of the war, while the opposition remarked against 
leaving their rights to a single authority. The Assembly debates proved that the opposition to the 
Kemalist majority in the Assembly, adamantly rejected any kind of personal autocracy and military 
dictatorship during these discussions. In every extension, opponents showed their dissatisfaction 
with giving an unlimited authority to Mustafa Kemal by this act.  
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2.2 Abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate 
Kemalist attitudes toward to the last Sultan of the Ottoman Dynasty changed during the 
Turkish War of Independence from 1919 to 1922. Initially, Mustafa Kemal and his followers 
maintained good relations with the Sultan and the Court. When the National Assembly was 
inaugurated in April 1920, Kemalists declared their aim as rescuing the Sultan and Caliph from 
the captivity of the foreign yoke. But after the military victories at Inonu in January and April 
1921, and the Treaty of Moscow in March 1921 Mustafa Kemal’s position was stronger, and the 
Kemalists started to criticize Sultan Mehmed VI as “a coward who was the puppet of the invaders” 
in mid-1921. After the Kemalist victories against the Greeks in western of Turkey in September 
1922, Mustafa Kemal gained a great reputation and this reputation enabled him to consolidate his 
power against the Istanbul Government. Thus, the Kemalists launched a massive attack on the 
Sultan as “a traitor and degenerate man” who had to leave his position forever at the third and last 
stage.    
As an opportunist, Mustafa Kemal eliminated one of his rivals by abolishing the Sultanate. 
After the end of the Ottoman Sultanate, Mustafa Kemal separated the Caliphate from the Sultanate. 
The main goal for him was to divide religious authority from state affairs. Controlling the Caliphate 
under the protection of National Assembly would increase the power of Mustafa Kemal. His next 
steps would be the establishment of Turkish Republic in October 1923, and the abolition of the 
Ottoman Caliphate in March 1924. After these attempts, Mustafa Kemal would manage to dismiss 
the religious authority from the political structure of Turkey and establish his personal autocracy 
in a secular way. This section demonstrates these Kemalist actions by using the records of the 
Assembly debates and periodicals.  
 65 
2.2.1 The Ottoman Empire and Kemalists’ Loyalty to the Sultan at the First 
Stage of the  Turkish War of Independence: A Captive Sultan  
The Ottoman Empire was essentially a theocratic state in where religion was more 
important phenomenon than language or ethnic lines in determining identity. The Sultan embodied 
the leadership of the Islamic world as Caliph, as well as being temporal ruler of the Ottoman 
Empire. From this perspective, the Ottoman Sultan was seen as the shadow of God upon Earth, 
with whom all creatures seek shelter. Moreover he was perceived by them more as a protector than 
an overlord.195 These ordinary people, mostly peasants, raised with this patriarchal traditions and 
could not imagine a country without its Sultan. Not only these peasants could not break this tie 
easily but also many adherents of the Young Turks of the 1908 Revolution who had a tradition of 
a constitutional monarchy.196 
Sultan Mehmed VI was the thirty-sixth and the last Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, reigning 
from 1918 to 1922. Mehmet VI pursued a passive policy when Istanbul and parts of Anatolia were 
being invaded by the Allied powers following World War I. While he adopted a stance of 
cooperation with the conditions of the armistice in order to gain a reasonable peace settlement, on 
August 10, 1920, under the Treaty of Sevres, the bulk of the remaining Ottoman lands were divided 
up among the Allied powers, and his attitude did not change against the invaders.197  
The attitude of Mustafa Kemal and his companions toward Sultan Mehmed VI was positive 
at this early stage of the Independence War.  In the Erzurum Congress in July 1919, the resistance 
movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal declared that the congress acted directly in the 
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sultan’s service, asking for God’s aid not only in destroying their enemies, but also in “preserving 
the Sultan and Caliph of the Muslims, the Sultan Mehmet VI.”198 The British occupation of 
Istanbul and closure of the last Ottoman Parliament enabled Mustafa Kemal and his associates to 
organize a new Assembly in Ankara.199 As an opportunist and a pragmatist leader Mustafa Kemal 
decided to take advantage of the religious feelings of the people for getting popular support. He 
issued a proclamation on April 21, 1920, in which he stated that the opening of the assembly would 
take place on Friday, April 23, a holy day in Islam. Mustafa Kemal participated in these prayers, 
and his praying made for an excellent photograph for propaganda purposes later.200 When the 
Assembly was inaugurated on April 23, 1920, the Kemalists were establishing contact and coming 
to a conciliation with the sultan-caliph.201 They showed their loyalty to Sultan Mehmed VI when 
the Assembly was inaugurated. In the opening ceremony of the Grand National Assembly the 
interim president Serif Bey, deputy of Sinop and a close friend of Mustafa Kemal,  uttered his 
feelings as: “I pray God to give us successes in rescuing Sultan Mehmed VI, who is the Caliph of 
all Muslims and the Sultan of all Ottomans; from the restrictions of foreigners and freeing Istanbul, 
which is our dear capital forever, from the occupation of the Allies; and for saving all of our cities 
which were annihilating by the occupiers under the great atrocities.”202   
The following day Mustafa Kemal summarized the general feeling of their movement in 
the Assembly. He pointed out that the only way to rescue the state and Sultan was the collaboration 
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of all patriots and intellectuals who were deeply upset because of the occupation of state, a horrible 
situation for the people of the Ottoman Empire.203 Mustafa Kemal expressed his loyalty to the 
Sultan as: “I display and assure to be loyal forever to the Caliphate and Sultanate until the last day 
of my life with a great obedience. I pray God to rescue the Sultan from all of the disasters and pray 
for his health.”204 Moreover, Mustafa Kemal declared his hopes for future as seeing Sultan 
Mehmed VI as free and independent from the yoke of the Allies. After his salvation, Sultan 
Mehmed VI would take his position which would be set right by the Grand National Assembly.205 
From this perspective, Mustafa Kemal considered that Sultan Mehmed VI would keep his position 
should the War of Independence would be successful. This was a general belief of the deputies at 
the early days of the National Assembly.  
While the Ankara GNA aimed to rescue and restore the Istanbul government, the position 
of the Sultan and his government after the salvation of the state caused some suspicions among 
citizens in Istanbul. Opening another Assembly in Ankara and forming a government which was 
led by Mustafa Kemal were the main suspicions for people in the capital city. Beyond Mustafa 
Kemal’s speech, Muhiddin Baha Bey tried to eliminate all doubt about establishing another 
government in Ankara. According to him, the real government for the members of National 
Assembly was in Istanbul. The Office of Sultanate and Caliphate conducted the government in 
Istanbul. In his speech Muhiddin Baha Bey expressed the real situation for the new Assembly as: 
“we do not constitute a new government. Our committee is a national committee which aims to 
rescue the Government in Istanbul which was under the captivity and to defend and protect its 
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rights instead of to constitute a new one. Therefore, there is no reason to mention about constituting 
a new government. The individuals of people, who gathered in Assembly, will carry out their 
duties to defend the rights of Turkish people in the name of them.”206 Muhiddin Baha did not agree 
with to denominate the interim government which was constituted for a while.  
In these days, a letter was written to the Sultan by the members of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly. In this letter, the general condition of Anatolia was elucidated and the 
members of the Assembly proclaimed their loyalty to the Sultan Mehmed VI.207 Hamdullah Suphi 
Bey, an influential writer, rhetorician, and politician in the early period of the Republican era and 
deputy of Istanbul in the first period of Assembly, expressed the greatness of this loyalty as these 
sentences: “O our Padishah. We are gathering around your throne to be bonded tighter and 
excessively with our hearts which are filled with loyalty and obedience to you. The first word of 
this Assembly was to be loyal to Sultan and Caliph and last word will be the same.”208 Beyond this 
letter, there was an act, related to the form of oath, accepted by the members of Assembly. In this 
oath, the members of Grand National Assembly had to say: “I say ‘Vallahi’209 I will not follow 
any other goal except the salvation and freedom of Caliphate, Sultanate, country, and nation.”210 
Moreover, in the first draft of the new constitution, the loyalty to Sultan was underlined in the first 
article as “the Grand National Assembly was formed as to pursue the goals of living independently 
in its national borders and rescuing the Office of Sultanate and Caliphate.”211 
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The deputies expressed their loyalty to the Sultanate with very sincere speeches in the 
Assembly. Ihsan Bey, one of the pro-Kemalist deputies of Cebelibereket, exalted the Office of 
Sultanate as source of pride for not only the Turkish nation but also for entire Muslim World. He 
underlined that the main goal for the Assembly was not to control the Government but to resist 
enemies, who had hostile attitudes towards to the Sultanate and the freedom of Ottoman people.212 
In the discussions of the budget of the Government, Ferit Bey, the Minister of Finance, mentioned 
the appropriation for the Sultanate. More than five-hundred thousand Turkish liras would be given 
to the Office of Sultanate as gratitude of the Assembly. Ferit Bey indicated that the Sultan was 
under captivity in Istanbul, but whenever he would be free he would get his position again in 
Ottoman society.213     
Mustafa Kemal and his allies seemed more loyalist rather than their opponents in this 
period of the Assembly. When Huseyin Avni Bey, deputy of Erzurum and the prominent member 
of the Second Group, raised the authority of the Assembly in the execution of capital punishments, 
which were the prerogative of the Sultan. Mustafa Kemal rejected these issues as untimely. He 
underlined that the Assembly accepted the Office of Sultanate and Caliphate in principle. Mustafa 
Kemal declared the rights and authorities of Sultan were required by the Islamic law and the 
tradition of state. On contrary, Huseyin Avni Bey pointed that the Grand National Assembly had 
all the authorities of Sultanate in its powers and would determine the entire authority of the Sultan 
in future.214  
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The invitation of the Ankara Government to the Conference of London in February 1921 
caused another debate between Kemalist deputies and the opposition. When the British 
Government invited the Istanbul Government to peace talks, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram to 
Tewfik Pasha, the head of Istanbul Government, to unite the national forces. In his telegram, 
Mustafa Kemal showed his respect to the Office of Sultanate and Caliphate once more. To continue 
this respect, Mustafa Kemal asked Tewfik Pasha to ensure Sultan Mehmed Vahideddin would 
accept the Grand National Assembly was the only representative of the national will.215 Huseyin 
Avni Bey criticized Mustafa Kemal’s telegram to the Istanbul Government as a case of 
appropriation of the Office of Sultanate. According to Huseyin Avni Bey, Mustafa Kemal agreed 
to give an appropriation to the Sultan in return for his acceptance of the Ankara Government. 
Huseyin Avni Bey thought about this attitude as incorrect and ugly.216     
Mustafa Kemal and his allies had a positive attitude towards to the Sultanate from May 
1919 to April 1921. After April 1921, however, members of the National Assembly started their 
attack directly to the person of Sultan Mehmed VI, especially after the Second Battle of Inonu in 
March 1921 gave more credit to the Ankara Government. After this victory, Mustafa Kemal 
blamed the Sultan with harsh words, such as a coward and puppet of the invaders. This period was 
the second stage of the relationships between the Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul and the Kemalist 
leadership in Ankara.  
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2.2.2 First Reactions  Against to the  Personality of the Sultan: A Coward 
Sultan who was the Puppet of the Invaders 
At the end of 1920, Turkish troops became more organized and gained self-confidence in 
stopping the Greek occupation in the western part of Turkey. In December 1920, the Greeks had 
advanced on two fronts from Izmir and approached Eskisehir, just 100 kilometers from Ankara. 
The first Greek offensive was thwarted by the troops under Colonel Ismet Pasha at Inonu on 
January 10, 1921. This was the regular army’s first success in the west.217 This victory gave a great 
confidence to the Kemalist movement. The second battle of Inonu commenced on March 26, 1921. 
On March 31, the Western command finally broke the Greek offensive and the Greek army forced 
to retreat back to Bursa. The battle ended where it had started on April 4, 1921. This defensive 
success was celebrated by the citizens of Ankara and the deputies in the Grand National Assembly. 
Mustafa Kemal emphasized the importance of this success with inspiring words written to Ismet 
Pasha: “you have defeated not only the enemy but the ill fortune of our nation.”218 These victories 
helped Kemalists to consolidate their power at home and abroad. At home, Kemalists started to 
consolidate their power against the Sultan and abroad they welcomed Soviet aid for their ultimate 
goal, to expel enemies from the country. The Assembly debates prove how Kemalist deputies 
became disrespectful to the authority of Sultan Mehmed VI after these victories.  
After the victory of the Turkish army in the Second Battle of Inonu, the prestige and power 
of Mustafa Kemal increased considerably. At this period, Kemalists started to criticize the Sultan 
and his government directly. Sultan Mehmed VI was seen as a puppet in the hands of the 
                                                 
217 Zurcher, Turkey, 153-154. Howard, History of Turkey, 88. Butler, Shadow of the Sultan’s Realm, 227. 
218 Gawrych, Young Ataturk, 140-141.  
 72 
Entente.219 Thus, the image of “captive Sultan”, which was depicted by Kemalists, was destroyed 
by them after April 1921. Mahmut Celal Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of Saruhan, summarized the 
Kemalist notion at that time as: “the current Sultan became a puppet of Robert Frew,220 who is the 
agent of Britain.” Neset Bey, another Kemalist deputy of Istanbul, was yelling as “down with the 
Sultan, he is the same as Frew.”221 
Preservation of the dynasty and the maintenance of the seat of the caliphate in Istanbul 
were the main goals for Sultan Mehmed VI. For realizing these goals, he was willing to cooperate 
with the Entente as long as the peace treaty being drafted guaranteed the continuance of these 
institutions.222 His political maneuvers were described as a selfish attitude by pro-Kemalist 
deputies at this period. Rasih Effendi, one of the staunch Kemalist deputies from Antalya, 
criticized Sultan Mehmed VI, Vahideddin, as apathetic to the Greek atrocities against Turkish 
citizens in western part of Turkey and in Thrace. He blamed the Sultan as a selfish man who cared 
only for his throne. Sultan Mehmed VI was silent about all these aggressions while he had a 
responsibility to protect his subjects, the Muslim community. Rasih Effendi also mentioned the 
insulting attitude of Venizelos’ son, who violated the sacred tomb of Osman Gazi in Bursa. Sultan 
Mehmed VI could not object to this violation and could not protect his forefather’s tomb. Because 
of this cowardly attitude of the Sultan, Rasih Effendi called him “Muziriddin”223 instead of his 
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name, “Vahideddin.”224 When Rasih Effendi called the Sultan “Muziriddin”, some of the 
parliamentarians shouted as “God damned him.”225  
2.2.3 Strong Reactions to the Personality of the Sultan: A Traitor and 
Degenerated Sultan 
Sultan Mehmed VI has been a controversial figure, who has been regarded as a traitor to 
the national cause by Kemalist historiography.226 The emergence of this historiography mostly 
related with Mustafa Kemal’s famous Nutuk (Speech) which was delivered in the Republican 
People’s Party Congress of 1927.  After eliminating all of his opponents, Mustafa Kemal became 
the sole authority of Turkey in 1926. In this “Nutuk”, Mustafa Kemal criticized almost all of his 
opponents. Sultan Mehmed VI got his portion from these critics. Mustafa Kemal described him as 
“degenerated”227, “traitor”228, “tool of enemies,”229 “usurper”,230 “vile”231 etc. in this speech. This 
Kemalist discourse has been used for many decades in the all levels of education in Turkey by 
Kemalist authors. As an example, in one of the school textbook of the fifth grades in 1930, the 
subject of Sultan Mehmed VI was described as:  
The cooperation of the Caliph with the enemies during the War of Independence 
proved very clearly the uselessness of those authorities. As you know, when the 
Greek army began to march into the interior of Anatolia by attacking beautiful 
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Izmir, all the Turks had sworn not to have their country trampled by the enemy and 
had begun arming themselves in  order to drive out the Greeks. The enemy 
marched, burning the places through which he passed. While the Turkish heroes 
were struggling to crush the enemy’s soldiers, they saw that the real great enemy, 
who bore the name of Padishah and Caliph, had cooperated with the Greeks. Yes, 
Vahideddin, who is the most treacherous king in the world, had gathered a band 
named “the Army of the Caliphate” in Istanbul and unleashed it upon the heroes 
who were trying to save the country. However, the brave Turk defeated both 
enemies, and the treacherous Vahideddin fled away on an enemy boat. The Turkish 
nation, which had groaned for hundreds of years under the tyranny of the Padishahs, 
would not, after seeing this, keep those men at its head. There remained no more 
place for the Padishahs and their families, who had drawn their weapons against 
the nation at its most sorrowful hour, and who had thought only of their own ease 
in the midst of the most horrible calamities. The Grand National Assembly, which 
realized this, abolished the reign of the Sultans, and proclaimed the Turkish 
Republic; it saved our nation from the tyranny of the treacherous Padishahs. 
Children, there is no doubt that we began to live from that day on, in an atmosphere 
of freedom and independence which hasn’t been seen in Turkish history until 
now.232 
On the other hand, the Kemalist orthodoxy has not been challenged for a long time. Some 
conservative authors emphasized the importance of Sultan Mehmed VI at the beginning of the 
Turkish War of Independence. They stressed that Sultan Mehmed VI laid the foundations of the 
War of Independence and used every means to realize a solution.233    
After the victory in the Battle of Sakarya in August 1921, Mustafa Kemal’s power within 
the Assembly increased. He was the President of the Assembly, the head of the council of 
ministers, and most importantly the Supreme Commander of the Army. Describing Sultan 
Mehmed VI as a “coward” was the first step to depreciate his status among the Ottoman people. 
In the second step, Kemalists started to blame him as a “traitor.” Noel Barber points out that 
Mustafa Kemal wanted to dismiss the old Sultan from office, but, he realized that injuring the 
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religious feelings of the people who were still loyal to the Sultanate could be suicidal. For 
removing this obstacle, Mustafa Kemal “secretly engineered a campaign of vilification against the 
political actions of the Sultan, branding him and his cabinet as pliant tools of the foreigner and 
politically traitors to Turkey.”234 The Assembly debates prove that this campaign became very 
strong in the period of mid-1922.  
 In the discussions on the authority of the newly established Ankara Government, Mustafa 
Kemal accused Sultan Mehmed VI of collaborating with enemies to dissolve the Parliament in 
Istanbul. According to him, after this collaboration, people became regretful and they would not 
be deceived by the Sultan anymore.235 The collaboration of Sultan with the Allies, especially with 
Great Britain, was mentioned many times in the Assembly. Seref Bey, deputy of Edirne, raised 
this issue. While some of members of Turkish National Assembly in Ankara visited Sultan 
Mehmed VI to convince him to join as head of the National Struggle, he did not accept this 
proposal. When the Sultan sent the committee members away empty handed, he welcomed Robert 
Frew in order to collaborate with the British Government.236   
Tahsin Bey, pro- Kemalist deputy of Aydin, exaggeratedly accused Sultan Mehmed VI of 
killing one and a half million Muslims because of his plots. He thought that Sultan Mehmed VI 
provoked some Ottoman citizens under the name of “The Caliphate Army”237 to fight the national 
army. Moreover, he collaborated with Greeks to wipe out the national resistance against the 
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intruders.238 Yahya Galib Bey, another Kemalist deputy of Kirsehir, also criticized Sultan Mehmed 
VI as consulting with Greek generals. He compared the attitude of Sultan with the attitude of the 
King of England. While the King of England visited the graves of his soldiers and prayed for them, 
the Sultan of Ottomans was collaborating with enemies. Yahya Galib finished his words as “God 
damn you forever.”239  
In the course of the discussions about the authority and duties of the Ankara Government, 
Huseyin Avni Bey, future leader of Second Group, criticized the Sultan and his court severely. 
According to Huseyin Avni Bey, there were two reasons for the humiliation of the Turkish people 
after World War I. The first reason was the occupation of the Ottoman Empire by Allies and the 
second was the Sultan’s court, which only aimed to steal all possessions of people and neglected 
them because of its selfish attitude. The court exploited people unmercifully.240 After explaining 
the poor conditions of Anatolian people, Huseyin Avni Bey summarized his point of view as: “We 
don’t see any Padishah, Sultan in here. Now, I am telling to you that a nation which goes with 
oxcarts does not want the Sultanate.”241 During the same discussions, Yusuf Ziya Bey, deputy of 
Bitlis and another prominent figure of the Second Group, attacked the selfish attitude of Sultan 
Mehmed VI. Yusuf Ziya Bey accused the Sultan as a “covetous old man” who betrayed his people 
and his victorious forefathers to continue his Sultanate for a few days more. And from now on, 
Sultan Mehmed VI had no right to govern the nation.242 
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The Kemalists’ attacks on Sultan Mehmed VI started describing him a coward in mid-
1921. Then they became harsher in late 1921, and the Sultan was described as a killer and traitor 
at that time. Not only Kemalists criticized Sultan Mehmed VI, but the democrat deputies in the 
opposition were also against him. These opponents, Huseyin Avni Bey and Yusuf Ziya Bey, 
mostly described the Sultan as a selfish man who wanted to continue his personal sovereignty 
without attention to the miserable conditions of his subjects. His selfish and apathetic character 
was the main target for these opponents.  
2.2.4 End of the  Sultanate 
As an opportunist, Mustafa Kemal capitalized on further military successes. After the 
Turkish victory at Dumlupinar in August 1922, a Turkish reoccupation of Izmir and the evacuation 
of Anatolia by the Greeks in September 1922, Mustafa Kemal consolidated his power both at home 
and abroad. 243 As a consequences of this victory, the Greek invasion in the West of Turkey 
terminated and the Ankara Government was invited to the peace conference in Lausanne, 
Switzerland. The British Government invited the Istanbul Government to the Peace Conference 
also. The Allied double invitation caused a great fury among the Kemalist deputies, who thought 
that only Ankara had paid the price to warrant attendance at Lausanne. The Ankara Government 
declared itself as the only representative of the Turkish nation. Mustafa Kemal did not waste this 
opportunity and decided to move against the Sultanate. For removing this duality in the Peace 
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Treaty, Kemalists resolved to abolish the sultanate by separating it from the caliphate.244 
According to Kinross, “it was hoped by this compromise to dispose of the Sultan while at the same 
time placating the religious elements in parliament.”245 
On October 30, 1922, the demand of the Istanbul Government to join the Peace Conference 
in Lausanne was discussed in the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. In the discussions, Feyzi 
Bey, Minister of Public Works and a close ally of Mustafa Kemal, mentioned the Treaty of Serves, 
which was signed by the Istanbul Government. By signing this Treaty, the Istanbul Government 
accepted the annihilation of the Turkish people. Therefore, they had no rights to represent the 
nation in a new peace conference. Feyzi Bey expressed his feelings about the Ottoman Dynasty 
as: “today, the nation deems the Ottoman Sultanate ‘a thing of the past’.” The nation does not 
acknowledge the Ottoman Sultanate; they accept national sovereignty directly. After today, the 
nation will not follow the people who are in favor of Sultanate. Most of the people are not agreed 
with the Sultan and his Government. There is only a small group of people who want to continue 
Sultanate because of their personal interests in Istanbul.”246 
Ilyas Sami Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of Mus, criticized Sultan Mehmed VI harshly and 
warned the people who thought that Sultan was a captive in the hands of Allies. According to him, 
the Sultan was not captive; he did not take his negative actions against the national forces because 
of his hopeless situation in Istanbul. Sultan Mehmed VI took these negative actions against the 
national forces to continue his authority. While Muslims were killed by the invaders, he was 
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apathetic to these tragedies and neglected his subjects.247 Ilyas Sami Bey’s speech was an 
interesting one. The captivity of the Sultan was mostly expressed by the Kemalist deputies in the 
Assembly in a positive way at the early stage of the War.   
At the same day Riza Nur, deputy of Sinop, and 78 of his friends introduced a motion, on 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, to the Grand National Assembly. Supported by a 
supplementary motion by Huseyin Avni Bey this motion resulted in the drafting of a bill, 
abolishing the Sultanate.248 In the motion, Riza Nur and his friends summarized their thoughts as: 
“because of the ignorance and lavishness of The Court and the Sublime Porte, the State and the 
nation were writhing in great catastrophes. When the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was destined, 
the nation, which was the real owner of the state, started to struggle against the invaders and 
Ottoman Court, which collaborated with enemies against the Turkish nation. When the nation saw 
the treason of the Court, popular sovereignty was accepted in the Law of Fundamental 
Organizations.”249 After this introduction, Riza Nur and his friends introduced a proposal which 
included six articles to the Grand National Assembly. In these articles:  
1- Ottoman Empire was abolished with its autocratic system. 
2- A government of the Grand National Assembly, established on the basis of a national 
people’s government, was established under the name of State of Turkey. 
3- The new Turkish government is the only inheritor of the extinct Ottoman Empire in its 
national borders.  
4- Because of resting national sovereignty in the Legislation, the Sultanate in Istanbul 
became a thing of past.  
5- There is no legal government in Istanbul and its environs. Therefore, this area has to be 
governed by the government of the Grand National Assembly.  
6- The Turkish government will rescue the Office of Caliphate from its captivity.”250 
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During discussion of this proposal, Sultan Mehmed VI and his government were under 
attack by Kemalist parliamentarians. Riza Nur expressed his feelings joyfully as: “messieurs! The 
autocratic government was abolished. A person will no longer govern over this nation arbitrary. 
This nation does not tolerate this situation anymore. The nation cannot live in poverty and send 
money to Istanbul because of wastings of the Court.”251 While Riza Nur was talking self-assuredly 
about the autocratic government, he became a target of another autocratic administration in 1926. 
He escaped to abroad from Kemalist wrath when he became an opponent of the regime at that 
time.  
 Nusret Effendi, deputy of Erzurum, heralded the members of the Assembly that the 
Sultanate had become a corpse and they would put it in a grave.252 Ali Fuad Pasha, deputy of 
Ankara and later one of the founders of Progressive Republican Party in 1924, referred to hostility 
against the Sultan and his government while the national movement was struggling against its 
enemies. Ali Fuad Pasha considered the Sultan as an enemy like the Allies to the national 
movement.253 Tunali Hilmi Bey, deputy of Bolu, described Sultan Mehmed VI as a “coroneted 
traitor”, who had to be dismissed from the Sultanate and Caliphate.254 Mufid Effendi, deputy of 
Kirsehir, offered to judge Sultan Mehmed VI because of his high treason.255 Rasih Effendi, deputy 
of Antalya, specified his regret why they did not be aware of the real character of Sultan Mehmed 
VI, like a “killer”, a “traitor”, and an “ignorant’ man.256 The worst defamation against Sultan 
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Mehmed VI came from Yahya Galib, deputy of Kirsehir. To enter World War I caused many 
troubles and catastrophes to the Turkish people. After summarizing the responsibilities of the 
Sultan and his government in this issue, Yahya Galib insulted the Sultan as a “bastard”, who took 
many negative actions against his people. According to him, the nation would not give its affairs 
to like this person anymore.257 
After these discussions in the Assembly on October 30, 1922, Mustafa Kemal put his 
proposal to a meeting of the Association for the Defence of Rights the next day.258 Finally the 
proposal was discussed in the Assembly on November 1, 1922. First of all Mustafa Kemal talked 
about the future of the Caliphate and the Sultanate. In his speech, Mustafa Kemal started with the 
origin of the Turks and their contribution to Islamic Government. According to him, the origins of 
the Turkish nation went back to an individual named Turk who was the son of Japheth and the 
grandson of Noah.259 After stressing the importance of the Turks for their contribution to the 
Islamic state, Mustafa Kemal talked about God and Prophet Muhammad with proper deference. 
He showed his respect to the Prophet as the last of the prophets and to the Book (Quran) as 
perfect.260 Mustafa Kemal used Islamic history to argue for popular sovereignty in his speech also. 
He remarked that after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the first four caliphs were elected and 
that they relied on consultation for matters dealing with leadership, the state, and the society.261  
After pointing out the Ottoman Dynasty and its importance to the Caliphate subject, 
Mustafa Kemal placed personal blame on Mehmed VI for nearly bringing the Turkish nation into 
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enslavement.262 In his speech, Mustafa Kemal repeated the treason of Sultan Mehmed VI and 
described him as a “foolish man” who became a tool of foreigners to destroy the existence of 
Turkish nation. Because of his treason, Sultan Mehmed VI deserved his fate. According to him, 
after today there would be no other government except the Ankara Government and no other 
sovereignty except the Grand National Assembly.263 At the end of his speech, Mustafa Kemal 
showed his satisfaction that the deputies were united and had a unanimous decision in this 
subject.264 After Mustafa Kemal’s speech, the motion of Riza Nur Bey was sent to a Special 
Commission, which included the Sharia, Constitution, and Justice commissions, for an 
investigation.  
There was a strong opposition to the motion of Riza Nur Bey in the Special Commission. 
In particular the members of the Sharia Commission, who were mostly men of religion, raised all 
kinds of legal and theological objections to the motion. Mustafa Kemal was very unsatisfied 
because of these strong objections to the abolition of the Sultanate. He sent them a message 
threatening them with arrest if they delayed.265 The Office of Sultanate was an obstacle to his 
personal autocracy and he wanted to destroy it forever. From his sayings it can be understood that 
he would destroy the Office of the Sultanate regardless:  
Finally, I asked the Chairman of the joint committee for permission to speak, and, 
jumping on the bench in front of me, I made this statement, in a loud voice: “ 
Gentlemen, I said, Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone by anyone 
because scholarship proves that they should be; or through discussion or debate. 
Sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, by power and by force. It was by 
force that the sons of Osman seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish 
nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now the Turkish 
nation has rebelled, has put a stop to these usurpers, and has effectively taken 
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sovereignty and sultanate into its own hands. This is an accomplished fact. The 
question under discussion is not whether or not we should leave Sultanate and 
sovereignty to the nation. That is already an accomplished fact – the question is 
merely how to give expression to it. This will happen in any case. If those gathered 
here, the Assembly, and everyone else could look at this question in a natural way, 
I think they would agree. Even if they do not, ‘the truth will still find expression, 
but some heads may roll in the process.’ As regards the theological aspect of the 
matter, there is no need for alarm or anxiety on the part of the reverend gentlemen. 
Let me give you scholarly explanations. Having said this, I went on to give a 
lengthy explanation. Thereupon one of the deputies for Ankara, Hodja Mustafa 
Efendi said: “I beg your pardon, sir, we were looking as the matter from another 
point of view. We have been enlightened by your explanations.266 
Irfan Orga emphasizes the psychological attitude of Mustafa Kemal as: “Cool and steady 
he faced them, his own personal bodyguard beside him. The deputies growled uneasily and the 
bodyguard made a great show of examining their guns. Mustafa Kemal, it was obvious, would stop 
at nothing to gain his point; murder might be committed in the Assembly that would seem like 
accident. It was in moments like this that he was the Supreme Dictator, insisting – by force if 
necessary- on imposing his will. He believed passionately that he was right and that the nation 
could grow strong only without a Sultan.”267  
After convincing the members of the Sharia Commission in the Special Commission, a 
draft law was quickly drawn up, and read at the second sitting of the Assembly on November 1, 
1922. The draft, which had two articles, was passed by the Assembly the same day. In the first 
article, the draft indicated that people of Turkey considered that the form of government in Istanbul 
resting on the sovereignty of an individual had ceased to exist on March 16, 1920, and passed 
forever into history. In the second article, the draft recognized that the Caliphate belonged to the 
Ottoman house and the candidate to that office would be elected by the Grand National Assembly 
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itself.268 While some of the deputies wanted a roll-call vote for the draft, Mustafa Kemal rejected 
this suggestion. He stated that there was no need for this suggestion and he was sure that the 
Assembly would unanimously adopt the principles which would forever preserve the 
independence of the country and nation.269  
After Mustafa Kemal’s suggestion for the voting method, Huseyin Avni Bey gave his 
reaction to the draft law. According to him the nation decided to take the full authority to its hands 
nearly three years ago from the first session of the Grand National Assembly. The nation sacrificed 
uncountable victims to realize national sovereignty. There were some two or three hundred people, 
benefitting from the luxury of the Court, who did not want to leave their offices. The Grand 
National Assembly would not make the nation a servant to anyone for the sake of a few hundred 
wretched people.270  
After Huseyin Avni Bey’s speech, the draft bill was put to the vote by the chairman. While 
the chairman announced that the bill had been unanimously accepted, Ziya Hursid Bey, deputy of 
Trabzon, rose and said that he was opposing the law. Thus, the draft was accepted by the majority 
of votes, not unanimously. However, his opposition was drowned by the other deputies crying 
“silence.”271 Finally the Sultanate was abolished by the Grand National Assembly on November 
1, 1922. 
Turkish newspapers described this situation as a great event. Aksam (Evening), a Kemalist 
newspaper published in Istanbul, announced the abolishment of Sultanate as “our state is the new 
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Turkish state in Ankara, after today there is no Sultan for the Turkish people.” In the article on the 
first page, Aksam blamed the Sultan and his government because of their action against Turkish 
nation while the entire World was the enemies of Turks.272 In Renin (Scream), a Turkish newspaper 
published in Istanbul, Huseyin Cahid Bey, one of the most prominent figures of the Turkish press, 
called this event as a “revolution”, which completed the revolution of 1908.273 
The abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate was observed carefully by the foreign press also. 
The New York Times announced this event as: “Angora Hostile toward Sultan” on November 3, 
1922. The resolution of Riza Nur, which accused the Istanbul Government of treason, was 
mentioned in this copy.274 The next day, the article “Sultanate ended by Angora Decree; Assembly 
Supreme” was published in the New York Times. In this article, Edwin L. James pointed out that 
the Sultan was dethroned and the end of Ottoman Empire was declared by the National Assembly. 
Moreover, the Assembly reserved the right to elect the new Caliph. James underlined the French 
point of view that this action was equivalent to the establishment of a republic in Turkey.275 
Speculation about establishing a republic appeared in the Swiss press, too. In an article in the 
Journal de Genève, the deposition of Sultan was seen as establishing a republic.276  Le Temps 
announced the Ankara Government’s decision about the abolishment of Sultanate to its readers on 
November 3, 1922.277 On November 5, 1922, Le Temps emphasized five important decisions of 
the new national Turkish Government, which were mentioned in the resolution of Riza Nur.278 
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Corriere della Sera, the Italian newspaper, announced the news as, “historic days in Turkey.” 
Arnaldo Fraccaroli, the special correspondent of the Corriere della Sera, underlined that the 
National Assembly would be the only sovereign and the representative of people in Turkey after 
the abolishment of the Sultanate.279  
According to the foreign press there was a risk of Bolshevism in Turkey. The decision of 
Ankara Government raised some concerns among Monarchists and Turkish moderate circles. 
According to Edwin L. James, these circles expected internal dissension as a consequence of the 
action of the Grand National Assembly. These circles expressed that “the step of the Ankara 
Government was a triumph for the Bolshevist policy in the Near East and a prelude to the 
sovietization of Turkey.”280 However, the Turkish press denied the sovietization of the country. In 
an article in the newspaper Aksam, Necmeddin Sadik Bey discussed the relationship between 
Turkey and the Soviet Union. In the article, “The administration of Turkey and Bolshevism”, 
Necmeddin Sadik suggested that the friendship of these two states was very close, but the social 
and economic structures of these countries were totally different than each other. Therefore, the 
new Turkish administration would never imitate Bolshevik policies.281  
The end of the Sultanate became a fact after the consolidation of Kemalist power. Victories 
against the Greek Army in August 1922 enabled the Kemalist movement to make peace 
negotiations with the Allies. The duality of the Turkish representation would be a problem for the 
Turkish side in the Peace Conference. Mustafa Kemal used this possibility in favor of improving 
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his leadership to abolish the Sultanate and to make the Istanbul Government void. After 
eliminating the rival, Mustafa Kemal and his government became the sole power in the country.  
2.2.5 After the  Abolition of the  Sultanate 
The Ankara Government became the only legitimate political power in Turkey after the 
abolition of the Sultanate on November 1, 1922. Tewfik Pasha, head of the Istanbul Government, 
tried to obtain advice and assistance from the Allied commanders in these days. However, after 
losing the hope of getting any assistance, he resigned his office on November 4, 1922. Ironically 
there was no authority, because of the abolition of the Sultanate, competent to accept the 
resignation of Tewfik Pasha Cabinet in Istanbul. Therefore, he gave his seal of office to Refet 
Pasha, the Grand National Assembly’s representative who had arrived in Istanbul on October 19, 
1922.282 The Ankara Government accepted a new resolution on the election of the new Caliph on 
November 5, 1922. The new caliph would be chosen by the Grand National Assembly.283  
Sultan Mehmed VI attended the last “Cuma Selamligi”284  as the Caliph of all Muslims on 
November 10, 1922. He encountered an immediate protest, the troops presented arms without 
cheering for the Padishah, and only the Caliph – not the Sultan- was mentioned in the Khutba, the 
Friday sermon. On November 16, 1922, the Grand National Assembly accused Sultan Mehmed 
VI of high treason and ordered him and his cabinet ministers to be placed on trial.285 Beyond that 
Sultan Mehmed VI thought that his life was under threat and he was afraid of being killed in the 
Friday prayers. Because of his concern about his life, on November 17, 1922, Sultan Mehmed VI 
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requested British protection from General Charles Harrington, the Commander of the British 
occupation forces in Istanbul and he was conveyed to Malta on board HMS Malaya.286 The British 
authorities declared a memorandum about the situation of the Sultan and his letter for the British 
protection.287 When this letter was read in the Grand National Assembly, the members of 
Assembly shouted as “go to hell” after the flight of the last Sultan of the Ottoman Empire.288  
The Turkish press badmouthed the flight of the last Sultan. In Aksam, Falih Rifki Bey, one 
of the staunch Kemalists, blamed Sultan Mehmed VI as a coward who left the country under the 
protection of enemies. In his article, “Korkarak kaciyor”, Falih Rifki warned the ex-Sultan as: 
“The curses of God, the Prophet, and the nation follow you. O coward fugitive, where will you 
escape?”289 According to the Kemalist press the flight of the Sultan increased the hatred of Turkish 
people towards him. 290 
The getaway of the Sultan under the British protection was mentioned by the foreign 
newspapers also. On November 18, 1922, the New York Times mentioned this news as “Sultan in 
flight on British Warship.” Mehmed VI requested asylum because of the Kemalist threat on his 
life. In the article, Sultan Mehmed VI told to the British authorities that he would not abdicate 
from his Crown. The British Government was so anxious about this event because of the possible 
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stirring among its Muslim subjects in India.291 Le Temps mentioned about this event on November 
19, 1922. In the news, the French newspaper referred El Mukaddem, the Egyptian newspaper, the 
departure of Sultan agitated Muslims in Egypt and Sharif Hussein, the emir of Mecca, invited him 
to Mecca.292 This possibility disturbed the Ankara Government. In the National Archives, there is 
a document which warns the government about the future plan of the ex-Sultan. In this document, 
it was reported that Sultan Mehmed VI would go to Egypt from Malta and he would make 
propagandas in the Islamic World.293 However, this possibility had never become a reality.   
After the flight of the last Sultan, Mehmed VI, on November 17, 1922, the Office of the 
Caliphate became vacant. On November 18, 1922, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara 
gathered to appoint a new Caliph.294 During the discussions the last Sultan was criticized harshly. 
Rauf Bey, the head of Ankara Government, blamed Sultan Mehmed VI as a traitor who left the 
Caliphate for British protection. According to him, this kind of treason was not seen before in the 
Turkish history.295 The vacancy of Caliphate would not be good for the nation; therefore, a new 
Caliph had to be appointed. Vehbi Effendi, the Minister of Sharia, wrote a fatwa which described 
the dethronement of Sultan Mehmed VI as the Caliph of Muslims.296 In the elections, Abdulmecid 
Effendi got 148 votes out of 162 from the members of the Assembly and was appointed as the new 
Caliph by the Ankara Government.297 
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After the decision was taken by the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram and 
congratulated the new Caliph. He also wished that the Caliphate would be auspicious for the 
Muslim World.298 On the other hand, this event was seen as “the downfall of the bulwark of 
theocracy” in the Ottoman Empire by foreign observers. William H. Crawford summarized the 
separation of Church and State in his article in the New York Times on November 19, 1922. In the 
article, Crawford thought that the separation of the Caliphate from all material power would be the 
end of theocracy in Turkey.299 
The abolition of Sultanate and the flight of the last Sultan meant the Ankara Government 
would be the only representative of Turkey in the Peace conference in Lausanne, Switzerland. The 
Conference began on November 20, 1922, and the Turkish delegation was represented under the 
leadership of Ismet Inonu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.300  
In conclusion, the attitude of Kemalists towards to the last Sultan of the Ottoman Dynasty 
changed during the stages of the Turkish War of Independence 1919-1922. At the first stage, 
Mustafa Kemal and his followers made good relations with the Sultan and the Court. When the 
National Assembly was opened in April, 1920, Kemalists declared their aim as rescuing the Sultan 
and Caliph who was under the captivity of the foreign yoke. After the Kemalist victories against 
the Greeks in the West part of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal gained a great reputation and this reputation 
enabled him to consolidate his power against the Istanbul Government. As an opportunist, Mustafa 
Kemal eliminated one of his rivals by abolishing the Office of Sultanate. After the end of the 
Ottoman Sultanate, Mustafa Kemal separated the Caliphate from the Sultanate. The main goal for 
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him was to divide the religious authority from the state affairs. Controlling Caliphate under the 
protection of National Assembly would increase the power of Mustafa Kemal. His next steps 
would be the establishment of Turkish Republic in October 1923, and the abolishment of the 
Ottoman Caliphate in March 1924. After these attempts, Mustafa Kemal would manage to dismiss 
the religious authority from the political structure of Turkey and establish his personal autocracy 
in a secular way.  
2.3 The Establishment of the Turkish Republic 
After the abolition of the Sultanate on November 1, 1922, the Kemalist movement took 
another step by establishing the Republic on October 29, 1923, on the course of changing the 
political system in Turkey. According to Dietrich Jung, “the proclamation of the Turkish republic 
was the final step towards abandoning the patrimonial identity of the Empire, and was the key 
event in a series of political and cultural reforms implemented during the fifteen years of Mustafa 
Kemal’s presidency.”301 On the other hand, this change was an important step towards the 
Kemalist autocracy. When the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished in November 1922, the political 
structure of the new emerging Turkish state was still somewhat indeterminate. Turkey was ruled 
by the National Assembly, which elected not only the president but also every minister directly.302 
This system was a barrier to Mustafa Kemal’s controlling the entire system. However, after 
Mustafa Kemal was elected as the President of Turkish Republic, he became the most powerful 
man in Turkey.  
Mustafa Kemal is seen by the Kemalist orthodoxy as a foresighted man who decided and 
created the establishment of the republic before this date. The core of this orthodoxy is based on 
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Mustafa Kemal’s myth of the “national secret” (milli sir). In his Speech in 1927, Mustafa Kemal 
stressed the evolution of the idea of republic and his future plans about the modernization:  
The practical and secure path for success was to implement each phase at the most 
opportune moment. This was the sound way for the development and advancement 
of the nation. However, this practical and secure method of success has sometimes 
been the reason for and explanation of certain essential and secondary conflicts, 
indignations [vexations], and even separations between some of the gentlemen who 
were known to be my close associates with regard to convictions. Some of the 
fellow travelers who started the national struggle have come to the point of resisting 
and opposing me as they have reached the limits of their own ideas and 
psychologies in the course of the progress of the national life leading up to the 
present Republic and its Republican laws. I will indicate these points one by one in 
due course in order for you to become enlightened and also to facilitate 
enlightenment of the public opinion. If it is possible to summarize these last words 
of mine, I can say that I was bound to put into force step by step this great capacity 
for progress that I sensed in the nation’s conscience and future, all the while 
carrying it in my conscience like a national secret.303 
This national secret myth was emphasized in the memoirs of Mazhar Mufit Bey also. When 
Mustafa Kemal started to organize the national movement in eastern Turkey in May 1919, Mazhar 
Mufit Bey asked “what would be the form of the government if the national movement won 
victory?” Mustafa Kemal responded “let me say frankly: the form of government will be a republic 
when the time is ripe.”304 According to Mazhar Mufit Bey, the establishment of the republic was 
one of the future projects of Mustafa Kemal. However, Andrew Mango is skeptical that these long 
term objectives were clear in Mustafa Kemal’s mind at that time. He stresses that “there is little 
doubt that Mustafa Kemal did indeed harbor these designs, although he was probably not as 
explicit as Mazhar Mufit claims.”305 This section covers discussions about the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic in the Grand National Assembly and in the Turkish press.  
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2.3.1 Towards to the Republic 
Mustafa Kemal announced his intention to dissolve the Assembly and to hold new elections 
on April 1, 1923. In this session Mustafa Kemal gave a key speech. He emphasized that the core 
of the Turkish state was national sovereignty. Moreover, he had confidence in the maturity of the 
Turkish people to continue its sovereignty. Therefore, there would not be a sovereign or a dictator 
who would rule the state in the future.306 A week later, he presented a nine-point manifesto for his 
People’s Party. After the amendment to the High Treason Law, which declared that to campaign 
for a return to the sultanate was illegal, was passed in the Assembly on April 15, 1923, the Grand 
National Assembly was dissolved the next day.307 
The two-stage elections for a new assembly were held in June and July 1923. Mustafa 
Kemal was actively involved in the process through the speeches he made and the alliances he 
formed. There was no question that Mustafa Kemal tried to control the election process and to 
influence the outcome. Beyond that Mustafa Kemal’s strict policy for choosing candidates enabled 
a great victory for his People’s Party. Not only Mustafa Kemal’s involvement in the elections 
causes the defeat for the former Second Group. The former opposition group was defeated because 
of lack of a nationally organized party and no charismatic leader like Mustafa Kemal.308 The 
Second group was a vibrant group in the Assembly, but, it was impossible for them to cope with 
Mustafa Kemal’s prestige after the Turkish War of Independence was won.   
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Despite the consolidation of Mustafa Kemal’s hold on power that the elections of June-
July 1923 represented, another opposition emerged after the second period of the Assembly 
convened on August 11, 1923. Some individuals like Rauf Bey and Kazim Karabekir Pasha, who 
had won fame during the national struggle, had the political stature to compete with Mustafa Kemal 
for leadership roles within the Mustafa Kemal’s People’s Party. These individuals were relatively 
more gradualist in their approach to questions of modernization and political change.309  
While foreign observers interpreted the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate as declaring a 
republic in Turkey,310 Turkish public opinion was not as bold. Mustafa Kemal had used the word 
‘republic’ for the very first time in an interview with the Neue Freie Presse in Vienna on September 
22, 1923.311 In the interview, Mustafa Kemal talked about the first articles of the Turkish 
Constitution which specified the sovereignty of the people unconditionally. Beyond this, Mustafa 
Kemal added “executive power and the authorization of legislation was vested and congregated in 
the National Assembly which was the sole representative of the people. It is possible to summarize 
these two words in a word: republic.”312  
This interview electrified Turkish public opinion. Lord Kinross describes the situation in 
Turkey as: “The concept of a republic was one wholly at odds with that of the traditional Moslem 
state, and this was the first time the ugly word had been uttered in a Turkish context. The threat of 
the change caused commotion, both in the press of Istanbul and in the lobbies of Parliament, where 
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no serious republican movement had yet existed.”313 It is a fact that after this interview of Mustafa 
Kemal with a foreign correspondent, the Turkish press started to discuss this subject intensively.  
The pro-Kemalist newspaper Aksam pointed out the importance of Mustafa Kemal’s 
declaration. The newspaper underlined that the advancement of Turkey had not ceased and the 
democratic republic would be the ultimate goal for Turkey.314 Another pro-Kemalist newspaper 
Vakit mentioned the interview also. Vakit interpreted Mustafa Kemal’s words as: “the future 
evolution of Turkey will be a republic.”315 The conservative newspaper Tevhid-i Efkar asked “will 
our form of government be a republic?”316 Vatan described the future republic as a “people’s 
republic” in its columns.317 Tanin also declared the new state as “a People’s republic of Turkey” 
on September 24, 1923.318 In his article in Tanin, Huseyin Cahid exhibited his sympathy to the 
notion of a republic. He believed that the state would be better under the presidency of Mustafa 
Kemal. He advised Mustafa Kemal to separate himself from the struggles of partisanship which 
would be disaster of the country.319 
On September 25, 1923, Vakit announced that a group of People’s Party had gathered to 
discuss the alteration of the Constitution. The correspondent of Vakit was sure about the acceptance 
of a republic as the form of government and Ankara as the new capital of this republic.320 Huseyin 
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Cahid warned the deputies to think over this subject carefully. According to him, an alteration 
which was examined carefully would stop all future debates on this subject.321  
Conservative criticism of the republic came from Tevhid-i Efkar mostly. The editor of 
Tevhid-i Efkar was surprised at these discussions about a change of regime. In his article, “Where 
did the subject of republic emanate from?” Velid Ebuzziya showed his reluctance. According to 
him, the form of the Turkish state had been changed just ten months ago after the abolition of the 
Sultanate in November 1922, therefore another change would be unnecessary. Velid Bey 
complained that when they - the editors of the Istanbul press- alleged the lack of perfection of the 
last change which actualized ten months ago- the Ankara press and Government attacked them as 
traitors. They were accused by Ankara government of “high treason” because of their reluctance. 
Velid Bey expressed his astonishment about the new attitude of Ankara Government in ten months. 
Therefore, this future change could cause new problems. Because of these concerns Velid Bey 
showed dissatisfaction.322 Beyond these concerns, he believed that the notion of republic would 
not be reconcilable with national sovereignty. Velid Ebuzziya described different types of 
republics in the world. According to him, the French style and the American style of republics 
were the best but neither of them were compatible with the decision of the abolition of the 
Sultanate.323  
On September 26, 1923, Aksam raised the possible change in the structure of the 
government. The author believed that the prospective form of the republic would be different than 
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the forms of other republics.324 Even though the correspondent of Aksam designated the possible 
regime as a republic, the differences between Turkish style republic and the others was not clear. 
The next day, the attitude of the newspaper changed. On September 27, 1923, the correspondent 
of Aksam suggested debates about the form of the government were ongoing and the acceptance 
of a republic was not decided definitely at that time.325  
On September 28, 1923, discussions about the form of government in the Istanbul press 
were seen as hurried and unnecessary by the newspaper Aksam. According to the newspaper, the 
People’s Party was not interested in this subject. The only thing known by public opinion, was the 
interview of Mustafa Kemal with a foreign correspondent.326 At the same day, Rasih Effendi, 
deputy of Antalya, stated that the subject was not mentioned in the party group.327 However, the 
party group was split into two factions. One supported the republic and wanted to see Mustafa 
Kemal as the president of the Republic. The other faction, which was supporting a gradual change 
in the political structure, wanted to keep the status quo and the position of Mustafa Kemal.328 
Because of this struggle, the People’s Party was bifurcated.329 This is an important detail which 
suggests there was an opposition to the autocratic tendency of Mustafa Kemal within his own 
party.  
Discussions of a republic became a source of humor. In the magazine Akbaba, one of the 
famous humor magazines at that time, joked that:  
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I am being astonished as read the newspapers. It seems that everybody is follower 
of republic in our society. Every author is writing in favor of the republic, 
everybody is praising the republic. They all say it is impossible to live without 
republic. All of these men are intelligent, experienced, and erudite men. I do not 
see any reason to disbelieve their words. I do not know, how it was happen that to 
want a republic came to nobody’s mind. When the People’s Party wanted to change 
the Turkish Constitution of 1921 and became pro-republican, everybody reminded 
it. The newspapers opened up their columns to the republic and the authors started 
to serenade to it. Almost in unison they said that ‘o sweet republic, nice republic! 
Our lives sacrifice for the sake of you.’ Everybody seems as a follower of the 
republic. The famous opponent journalist of Tanin is proud of being a republican 
for a long time; even, the conservative journalist Ebuzziya Hoca says ‘republic is a 
right.’ I wonder if everybody is sincere in this subject. Unfortunately the people’s 
inner feelings are not as seen as their faces.330  
The foreign press observed the discussions and developments. As mentioned above, after 
the abolition of the Sultanate, the new regime of Turkey was entitled as a republic by some foreign 
newspapers. In September 1923, the news about the possible change in the Turkish regime was 
discussed intensely. The New York Times announced rumors about the establishment of a republic 
in Turkey on September 29, 1923. In the news, the newspaper underlined that the rumor was not 
confirmed yet by any direct Turkish sources.331 The Journal de Genève reported the same news 
which it referred from the Reuter Agency. The newspaper announced that the proclamation of the 
Turkish Republic was declared.332 Corriere della Sera asked the question as “Is Republic in 
Turkey?” in its copy on September 30, 1923. In the news, Corriere della Sera referred the dispatch 
of the Havas Agency and announced that there was no clear decision for the change of the 
constitution until that time.333 Discussions about the future change in the Turkish Constitution 
appeared in the foreign press also. According to the New York Times, the new Turkish Constitution 
would provide that “Turkey be proclaimed a republic, with a President elected for a period of four 
                                                 
330 “Cumhuriyet” [Republic], Akbaba, 27 Sep. 1923, 1. 
331 The New York Times, 29 Sep. 1923, 1.  
332 Journal de Genève, 29 Sep. 1923, 8. 
333 Corriere della Sera, 30 Sep. 1923, 2.  
 99 
or five years.”334 In Journal de Genève, the term of presidency was reported as four or six years.335 
Corriere della Sera reported that after the change in the Constitution, the term of Presidency would 
be three or four years.336  Los Angeles Times expressed that American ideas would be copied by 
the Ankara Government for possible changes to the Constitution. The newspaper also mentioned 
about the growing opposition in Istanbul against the change of regime in Turkey. Despite these 
opponents, the Ankara Government “determined to call a spade a spade and formally proclaim 
Turkey as republic.”337 This prediction of the Los Angeles Times would be a reality within two 
weeks.  
2.3.2 Kemalist “Fait Accompli”: The Cabinet Crisis  
The President of the Assembly was the head of the state and the prime minister and 
ministers were appointed individually by the votes of the members of the Assembly. It was still 
responsible for the election of ministers, a privilege which impaired its cohesion by encouraging 
factional and personal maneuvers for power.338 Because it stopped his personal maneuvers for 
getting full power, Mustafa Kemal considered this method of election harmful to a strong 
government.339  
The faction within the party labeled as a “Secret Opposition” by Mustafa Kemal put 
forward two candidates for vacant posts in the government on October 25, 1923. While Mustafa 
Kemal objected to these nominations, the Assembly nonetheless elected Rauf Bey and Sabit Bey 
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to the posts of vice-president of the Assembly and Home Secretary respectively, in preference to 
the government candidates. From this perspective, it was clear that there was a great confidence in 
Rauf Bey within the People’s Party. This situation was unacceptable to Mustafa Kemal. He later 
provoked a crisis of government by persuading the existing ministers under the premiership of Ali 
Fethi Bey to resign, while also convincing other prominent members of the Assembly to refuse 
appointment to ministerial posts.340 
Establishing the Republic of Turkey became possible after the government crisis on 
October 27, 1923. While Valentine Chirol emphasizes that the Cabinet was in collusion with 
Mustafa Kemal and suddenly resigned,341 Tamkoc asserts that Mustafa Kemal precipitated a 
government crisis by asking Ali Fethi Bey to resign.342 Like Tamkoc, Zurcher emphasizes that 
“Mustafa Kemal persuaded the government of Prime Minister Ali Fethi that this constituted a 
motion of no confidence, upon which the government resigned. The Assembly was automatically 
charged with replacing it with a new council of ministers, but once Mustafa Kemal had instructed 
his more prominent followers not to accept posts, this proved impossible.”343 
Ali Fethi Bey, the head of the last government of the National Assembly, resigned from 
his position with all his allies. The resignation of the government was an abrupt but necessary step 
because of losing the support of the Grand National Assembly. In his resignation letter Ali Fethi 
Bey pointed out that “they believe that a strong government which gets the entire support of the 
National Assembly is a certain necessity for concluding the internal and external duties of the 
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Turkish state with ease and success.” Ali Fethi Bey expressed the reasons for his resignation and 
the Assembly accepted it.344 This crisis was an intentional crisis which aimed to show the so-called 
weakness of the previous system of government. Metin Tamkoc describes this as a Kemalist trick: 
“Mustafa Kemal hoped that the Assembly responsible for the election of ministers was not going 
to be able to agree on a list of ministers. He would then suggest that the system of government be 
changed.”345 Mustafa Kemal later took advantage of this crisis to change the Constitution. These 
changes in the constitution enabled the establishment of the republic.346 
2.3.3 Birth of the Republic  
Because the assembly could not produce a list of ministers acceptable on October 27 and 
28, 1923, Mustafa Kemal took action to solve the government crisis on behalf of consolidating his 
power. On the night of October 28, 1923, Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha together completed a 
draft amendment of the constitution. One element of this amendment was “the form of the state is 
a republic.” Other amendments dealt with the election of the president of the republic and the 
selection of the members of the council of ministers.347  
The next day, the People’s Party group gathered at 10 am to discuss the amendments 
proposed by Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha. Everybody was sensible of the importance of this 
gathering which would be a key historical event. In his speech in the group, Mustafa Kemal 
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explained the difficulties of forming a government in the former system and he advised a 
republican model to remove these difficulties. The party group accepted this proposal in the group 
meeting.348 Many important figures of the Turkish War of Independence, such as Rauf Bey and 
Kazim Karabekir Pasha who would probably have opposed the move as premature, were not even 
in Ankara at that time.349 The group assembly ended at 8 pm and the discussions about the proposal 
started in the Grand National Assembly after that time.350 There are many irregularities in this 
decision. First of all, Mustafa Kemal took this decision with the deputies who were loyal to him, 
but almost half of the Assembly was not in Ankara while this urgent decision was taken. Secondly, 
the Kemalist approach to the Cabinet system was negative when the Second Group offered the 
separation of powers during the discussions about the duties and authorities of the Government. 
The Kemalist deputies criticized the opponents harshly in this subject as mentioned in the second 
section of this chapter.  
The name of the regime was discussed on October 29, 1923. In the Grand National 
Assembly, Yunus Nadi Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of Mugla and the head of the Commission of 
Constitution, explained the six articles which were proposed as changes in the Constitution. In his 
resolution, Yunus Nadi equated popular sovereignty to a republic in his perspective. According to 
him, this change would clarify the ambiguity of the name of Turkish regime. Yunus Nadi 
elucidated his point of view as “after accepting the republic, a president has to be chosen. The 
future government will be assigned by the President.”351 After Yunus Nadi’s proposal was read in 
the Assembly, Vasif Bey, another Kemalist deputy of Saruhan, came to the pulpit. In his speech, 
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he summarized the difficulties of recent years which upset all except the Sultan and the Court. He 
accused the Sultan’s regime as being apathetic to the people’s sufferings.352  
Religion and religious rituals were raised once again by the Kemalist deputies. Mehmed 
Emin Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of Karahisarı Sarki, compared the similarities between the happy 
times of the period of Prophet Muhammad and the present times in Turkey: “A sword in one of 
his hands and a stick in the other hands, a great Prophet was sent for making a great revolution. 
For giving honor to unnamed people, freedom to enslaved people, and welfare to the miserable 
people; he established a government of God which was named as republic.”353 After describing 
the period of Prophet Muhammad, Mehmed Emin Bey expressed his feelings about the historical 
period of Turkish people in those days as: “O my friends! After fourteen centuries, a great nation 
was chosen to establish a divine government and enabled a second miracle of God. This nation is 
Turkish nation. The government, which was established by Prophet Muhammad in Mecca fourteen 
century ago, was established in Ankara by the Turkish nation. In these glorious hours, as an old 
man, I demand God’s blessing for this Government.” Mehmed Emin Bey concluded his speech for 
asking to shout “long live the Republic” three times from the members of the Grand National 
Assembly.354 The deputies shouted “long live the Republic” three times after this demand. Sheikh 
Saffet Effendi, a prominent Kemalist deputy of Urfa, also shared the same religious sentiments as 
Mehmed Emin Bey. Saffet Effendi thought that the National Assembly returned to the happy times 
of Prophet Muhammad after accepting the Republic.355 After these speeches, the Turkish Republic 
was proclaimed by the deputies in the Grand National Assembly.  
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After the form of Turkish regime was determined as a republic, the election for the 
presidency was fulfilled at 9 pm on October 29, 1923. In the election, Mustafa Kemal got 158 
votes and was elected unanimously356 as the first president of Turkish Republic.357 This decision 
was accepted by the Assembly while Rauf Bey and other prominent leaders, such as Ali Fuat, 
Adnan, Refet and Kazim Karabekir, known to have some disagreements with Mustafa Kemal were 
out of Ankara.358 Metin Tamkoc interprets the election of Mustafa Kemal as the first president of 
the Republic of Turkey as: 
The number of votes cast in the assembly for the election of Mustafa Kemal as 
president of the republic is indicative of his lack of popularity among the deputies. 
Announcing the result of the election, Ismet pasha said: “158 deputies have 
participated in the election of the President of the Republic. By 158 votes they have 
unanimously elected His Excellency the Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, deputy for 
Ankara, President. The fact of matter was, however, that there were almost twice 
as many deputies in the Assembly. There were more than 100 abstentions. 
Moreover, following the general elections of August 1923, the Second Grand 
National Assembly was supposed to have been packed by Mustafa Kemal and was 
expected to be responsive to his will. The result, therefore, cannot be construed as 
a unanimous vote of approval of the establishment of the republic or as a unanimous 
vote of confidence in the first president of the republic. However, the fact that no 
one openly opposed his election indicated that Mustafa Kemal’s opponents in the 
assembly were by this time totally intimidated.359 
 After the election, Mustafa Kemal thanked all the members of the Parliament and promised 
to progress together.”360 
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2.3.4 After the Establishment of the Turkish Republic 
The establishment of the Republic was accepted and the election of the presidency was 
fulfilled on October 29, 1923. After these steps, Mustafa Kemal, now elected as the first President 
of newly established republic, appointed Ismet Inonu, deputy of Malatya, to form the first cabinet 
of the Republic of Turkey on October 30, 1923.361 Ismet Inonu offered his list of the Cabinet 
members to the Grand National Assembly for approval. The Assembly approved the list with all 
166 votes.362 According to Kemalist discourse, the new government immediately became stronger 
than the old system.363 However, if these two governments are compared, it is seen that there is no 
significant difference between them. Most of the ministers kept their position in the first Cabinet 
of the Republic.364 Therefore, the crisis of government realized Kemalist wishes but did not bring 
real change. 
With a 101-gun salute the proclamation of the republic was announced throughout the 
whole country on October 29, 1923. Beyond this, the Grand National Assembly sent telegrams to 
public institutions to organize ceremonies after the Republic was accepted and Mustafa Kemal was 
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elected as the first President.365 People sent telegrams to Mustafa Kemal to congratulate him. 
Abdulmecid Effendi, the Caliph, sent a telegram to Mustafa Kemal with his hope for the best for 
the state and nation.366  
The Kemalist press expressed the staged celebrations of people over the establishment of 
the Republic. In Ankara and Istanbul, people greeted this event with artillery salvos.367 People 
decorated their houses and stores with flags, flowers, and ornamentations. All government 
agencies were closed to join this enthusiasm. Torchlight processions were organized to increase 
popular enthusiasm. In the mosques, people prayed for the republic. The exclamation of “Long 
Live the Republic” was heard in everywhere.368 The newspaper Akbaba congratulated this happy 
event on November 1, 1923. In the article, the author mentioned about the rumors of the birth of 
republic. According to these rumors, the establishment of Republic was decided by a bunch of 
people without people’s support. Because of the concealment of this news from the nation, there 
were some negative thoughts circulated among the people. Celebrations stopped all these negative 
thoughts. The author was hopeful for the future of the republic. He advised people to protect this 
new-born baby together. Even though some people were not ready to accept this baby right now, 
they would care about it soon.369 Ismail Mustak expressed his happiness by accepting the 
republican regime in his article, “Proclamation of the Republic of Turkey,” in Tanin. He believed 
that the republic was the appropriate regime for the Turkish people.370 In Vatan, the new regime 
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was congratulated as well. Turkey became the thirty-third republic out of eighty-four independent 
nations at that time. In the newspaper, the US was stated as the oldest republic and Turkey as the 
newest.371 
While the majority of the Turkish press, especially the staunch Kemalist press in Ankara, 
celebrated the establishment of the Republic, there was opposition in Istanbul to this decision 
because of its haste.  According to Lord Kinross: “It aroused outspoken criticism from the Istanbul 
press, which was freer than that of Ankara – its master’s voice.”372 In Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal 
condemned this opposition very harshly. He criticized his opponents, who gathered in Istanbul, as 
not sharing the same joyful feelings of the majority of people.373 While the Istanbul press was not 
against the concept of a republic, the Kemalist orthodoxy condemned this opposition group as anti-
republican. This is another Kemalist distortion. Mustafa Kemal’s historic speech in 1927 was a 
political speech which aimed to explain the reasons for the purge of opponent. However, its 
political character mostly aimed to discredit and disgrace the opponents in the Turkish public 
opinion. 
As mentioned above, the decision to establish a republic was taken while a number of 
notables from the independence war, such as Huseyin Rauf, Ali Fuat, Adnan, Refet and Kazim 
Karabekir were not in the Grand National Assembly. While Mustafa Kemal attacked the 
opposition for their anti-republican ideas, this is not true. Their objection was mostly related the 
lack of democratic process in the decision.  They affirmed that the forms of a republic were not so 
important and did not themselves guarantee democracy.374 Zurcher describes the psychology of 
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the opponents very well:  “they reacted angrily to the proclamation in interviews in the Istanbul 
press, calling the decision premature, and stressing that calling the state a republic did not in itself 
bring freedom and that the real difference was between despotism and democracy, whether under 
a republican or a monarchic system.”375 
The Istanbul press, which was mostly opposed to Mustafa Kemal’s autocratic tendencies 
at that time, interviewed Rauf Bey about the urgency in the foundation of republic. Rauf Bey 
shared the same concerns as the Istanbul press. Moreover, Rauf Bey did not pay attention to the 
concept of a republic. He believed that any government which provided prosperity and freedom to 
the Turkish people would be acceptable.376 Rauf Bey drew attention a very important point: even 
though the name of regime was a republic, it could not necessarily bring freedom and prosperity 
to its people. Therefore, Rauf Bey indicated the democratic character of the regime was more 
important than its name.  
The Istanbul press showed their dissatisfaction with the Kemalist decision in Ankara. The 
process was criticized by the newspaper Vatan. In Vatan, Ahmet Emin Bey, editor of the 
newspaper, enumerated the mistakes in his article. He criticized the attitude of the clique377 who 
gathered around Mustafa Kemal. According to him this clique did not act openly in this issue. 
Moreover, they concealed the initiatives for this change from the government. While the first 
Republican government was considered a stronger government than the previous one, the new 
government was formed of almost the same people who had resigned just a few days before.378 
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This same contradiction was mentioned by Velid Ebuzziya in his article in the newspaper Tevhid-
i Efkar. In this article, Velid Ebuzziya doubted that the change of the form of government would 
make the state affairs better.379 In the newspaper Tanin, Huseyin Cahid in his article “Yasasin 
Cumhuriyet” (Long Live the Republic) believed that the republic could not survive with clapping, 
prayers, and carnivals if it did not change the mentalities of the statesmen. As a follower of 
republican ideology, he warned the people not to worship the term “republic” as an idol. According 
to him, the destiny of a republic would be in the hands of the people who would conduct it. Huseyin 
Cahid had some doubts about their capability.380 Moreover, Huseyin Cahid underlined the 
importance of freedom of speech. This would be impossible after the Law on the Maintenance of 
Order, which banned and closed indefinitely all opposition newspapers in March 1925.  
The criticism by the Istanbul press of the rapid change of the form of the government was 
shared by some of pro-Kemalist press also. Necmeddin Sadik Bey had some concerns about the 
formation of the new regime, seeing urgency as a handicap. Beyond this concern, Necmeddin 
Sadik thought that if the government tried to change the structure of government in every crisis, 
this would be catastrophic for the country.381 Moreover, Necmeddin Sadik thought that there was 
a partisan spirit in the Ankara press, which blamed every single critic as being against popular 
sovereignty. As a follower of the republic, Necmeddin Sadik described this sectarian attitude as: 
“Who is against the national sovereignty? Who are the followers of the Sultanate? Then, the people 
who criticize the Government are the followers of the Sultanate. We have to stamp out these 
people.” Necmeddin Sadik said that they did not invent such an absurd judgment but it sometimes 
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blew from Ankara this way. Lastly, Necmeddin Sadik did not believe that there was a group who 
were the followers of the Sultanate in Istanbul. According to him, the sectarian attitude of the 
Ankara press was far more harmful for the new regime.382 This sectarian attitude was seen as 
stifling concerns in the Istanbul press about the decision.383 Necmeddin Sadik Bey, as a staunch 
Kemalist in his political life, proved a very important reality with his comment in here. The clique 
gathered around Mustafa Kemal stifled all opposition to their ideology. The victory of the Kemalist 
majority over its opponents concluded by establishing an autocracy in 1926. This autocracy was 
the consequence of this Ankara clique. 
The Kemalist press in Ankara targeted Rauf Bey as the head of the dissidents in Istanbul. 
Yeni Gun was the foremost newspaper which attacked Kemal’s opponents. On November 2, 1923, 
Yunus Nadi Bey, the editor of Yeni Gun and deputy of Mugla, condemned Rauf Bey as a deceptive 
man who wanted to confuse the public. Yunus Nadi believed that there was an opposition group 
bitter over the establishment of a republic in Istanbul. He threatened “to tear down the palaces of 
these opponents over their heads.” Yunus Nadi condemned Rauf Bey and his friends as “stooges 
to the ex-Court.” 384 In another article, “Vuzuh, Sarahat ve Katiyet Lazimdir”, Yunus Nadi pointed 
out that the long interview of Rauf Bey but mentioned nothing about the Republic. Yunus Nadi 
asked Rauf Bey to be clear if he opposed the establishment of the Republic.385  Rauf Bey responded 
to these allegations in a moderate way. He underlined that everybody was free in their opinions. 
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According to Rauf Bey, the only duty of Turkish press was to illuminate the youth and people of 
Turkey on the basis of truth.386 Ahmet Agaoglu, pro-Kemalist deputy of Kars, likewise criticized 
Rauf Bey for his ambivalent attitude towards the Republic.387  
When Rauf Bey returned to the Assembly at the end of November 1923, he was subjected 
to harsh criticisms by Kemalist loyalists. In the group discussion on November 22, 1923, he was 
interrogated by the Kemalist deputies. In this meeting Rauf Bey clarified that he was in favor of 
the Republic. According to him, unconditional national sovereignty was the greatest possible 
blessing for the country. When Rauf Bey said that he hoped he would be able to continue to work 
with his colleagues in the People’s Party for the good of the country, Ahmet Agaoglu attacked him 
sharply. Ahmet Agaoglu described Rauf Bey as making anti-republican statements to the press in 
anger. Agaoglu stressed that if Rauf Bey would not recant his statements about the republic as 
premature and the form of a republic as not particularly important, this would end their friendship. 
Ahmet Agaoglu asked why Rauf Bey hadn’t raised similar objections to the abolition of the 
sultanate which had been decided upon even more quickly. “Rauf,” said Agaoglu, “was like a man 
who says he wants a child and then laments that it has been born too fast- one can only take it to 
mean that he didn’t really want the child.”388 After these discussions, Rauf Bey tried to convince 
the Assembly members that as a republican he was against autocracy.389 The case of Rauf Bey 
shows the Kemalist pressure on freedom of speech. Even though Rauf Bey, a deputy in the 
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Assembly and one of the prominent figures of Turkish War of Independence, could be a target of 
Kemalist’ wrath, the situation of the ordinary people was far worse. 
The change of the regime created confusion. Falih Rifki described the attitude of imams 
who were bewildered. When the Sultanate existed, they were praying for the perpetuity of the 
Sultanate. However, they were unsure whether to pray for the new regime.390 Erasing the remains 
of the ex-Sultanate would be another goal for the Kemalist movement. Ekrem Bey, deputy of Rize, 
proposed a resolution to the Grand National Assembly to remove all tughras391 from official 
buildings and place republican badges instead.392 As a result, Kemalists aimed to wipe out all the 
remnants of the ex-regime to establish the republican regime in society. The extreme hatred to the 
Ottoman period caused the annihilation of many historical remnants at that time.  
The establishment of a republic in Turkey was observed by the foreign press intensely. The 
New York Times announced the change of the regime in Turkey the day after the Grand National 
Assembly accepted the resolution, and included Mustafa Kemal’s unanimous election.393 Corriere 
della Sera expressed that the ex-Government lost its credit and resigned, therefore, the 
establishment of the Republic came after this resignation.394 Le Temps mentioned the declaration 
of a republic and the election of a president on October 31, 1922.395 Journal de Genève pointed 
out that the majoring party in the Grand National Assembly proclaimed the republic in Turkey.396 
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The interpretation of Journal de Genève is particularly interesting, because at that time there was 
not any other party besides the People’s Party of Mustafa Kemal in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly. The first cabinet of the Turkish republic was another subject in the foreign press. 
Journal de Genève mentioned that the cabinet was approved unanimously by the Assembly.397 Le 
Temps gave the entire list of the Ismet Pasha’s cabinet in its copy on November 1, 1923.398 
Turkey was called the “Anatolian Republic” by the New York Times when it was 
established. The attitude of the Turkish leaders was seen as imitating the founding fathers of the 
United States, as the New York Times reported that the Ankara Government liked to compare itself 
with America in the first days of its national life and the Turkish leaders considered themselves as 
“Washingtons, Hamiltons or Jeffersons.” These new leaders did not find their political prototypes 
in the Turkish history, like Osman Ghazi, Suleiman the Magnificent or Abdul Hamid II.399 
In conclusion, after the abolition of the Sultanate on November 1, 1922, the Kemalist 
movement took another step by establishing the Republic on October 29, 1923. Mustafa Kemal 
manipulated the crisis of government to carry out a fait accompli in the change of regime. When 
the Assembly was gathered on October 29, 1923, the members who were loyal to Mustafa Kemal 
dominated it. Even though there was only a single party in the Assembly at that time, the opponents 
within the People’s Party were not in Ankara while the Republic was declared. Mustafa Kemal 
was elected as the first President of Turkey by 158 votes. He was elected unanimously in the 
Assembly, but 132 members of Assembly were in absentia. The Turkish Press in Istanbul showed 
its reluctance to the establishment of republic. According to the newspapers in Istanbul, this 
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decision was taken in hurry and not discussed enough by society. Rauf Bey, the head of the future 
opposition movement, shared the feelings of the Istanbul press. He was criticized harshly by the 
Ankara press which attacked him as “anti-republican.” Mustafa Kemal overcame this opposition 
and kept going on his political agenda after the establishment of the Republic. The final attack to 
the traditional structure in Turkish politics would be the abolition of the Caliphate. After abolition 
of the Caliphate, Mustafa Kemal would achieve the elimination of his traditional rivals totally. 
2.4 Abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in March 1924 
At the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence, Kemalists were seen as loyalist to 
the traditional institutions, the Sultanate and Caliphate. When the Grand National Assembly was 
inaugurated on April 23, 1920, Kemalists were establishing contact and coming to a conciliation 
with the sultan-caliph. They showed their loyalty to Sultan Mehmed VI when the Assembly was 
inaugurated.400 The following day Mustafa Kemal summarized the general feeling of their 
movement in the Assembly. He pointed out that the only way to rescue the state and Sultan was 
the collaboration of all patriots and intellectuals who were deeply upset by the occupation of the 
state, a horrible situation for the people of the Ottoman Empire.401 Mustafa Kemal expressed his 
loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph as: “I display and assure to be loyal forever to the Caliphate and 
Sultanate until the last day of my life with great obedience. I pray God to rescue the Sultan from 
all disasters and pray for his health.”402 However, the relationship between Kemalists and the last 
Sultan deteriorated during the National Struggle. As a result of this deterioration, the Ottoman 
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Sultanate was abolished by the Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1922. This abolition 
separated the Caliphate from the Sultanate.  
After the abolition of the Sultanate in November 1922, the traditional power of religious 
authorities diminished but not totally end. The Kemalist regime wanted to establish a Caliphate 
without temporal power. The new Caliph was supposed to be a solely spiritual leader and 
dependent on the Government of the Grand National Assembly by Kemalists.403 However, the 
political competition between Ankara and Istanbul made the office of Caliphate the center of 
opposition to the Kemalist government. This section scrutinizes the importance of the abolition of 
the Caliphate on the way of the establishment of the Kemalist autocracy.  
2.4.1 Historical Background of the Caliphate and the Ottoman Caliphate 
A caliphate is the traditional Islamic form of government, presided over by a caliph, a 
successor of Prophet Muhammad. The Caliph was a title signifying the religious and political 
preeminence of a Muslim ruler over other Muslim rulers.404 After the Turkish invasion of Cairo 
led by Selim I, Yavuz Sultan Selim, in 1517, the Ottoman Dynasty took control of the Caliphate 
of all Muslims.405 The Ottoman Sultans acquired the status of “Custodians of the Holy Places”- of 
Mecca and Medina- after they conquered the Islamic core lands of Syria, Egypt, and the Hejaz.406  
While the Ottoman Caliphate began after the Turkish invasion of Egypt in 1517 and the 
title of Caliph was used by the Ottoman Sultans after that year, the Office of Caliphate occupied a 
minor place in the Ottoman diplomatic arsenal. When the Ottoman Empire became relatively weak 
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in the eighteenth century, real Ottoman claims to the caliphate were made by the Ottoman Sultans 
at that time. The Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty of 1774 was the first example of using the power of the 
Caliphate in the political arena. During the negotiations over this treaty, the Ottomans used the 
importance of the Caliphate against Russia. As a consequence of this Treaty, Russia recognized 
the Ottoman Sultan as caliph of the Crimean Tatars. After the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, the title 
of Caliph, as signifying the religious head of the worldwide Muslim community, became a 
permanent attribute of Ottoman sultans.407 
 In the nineteenth century the Ottoman Caliphate became useful for the Ottoman rulers who 
tried to hold together the Muslim peoples of the empire. Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876) was the 
first Ottoman ruler to adopt a pan-Islamic approach in his relations with other Muslim countries. 
He tried to appeal to a shared Islam as the basis for concerted action with the other countries under 
his leadership as the caliph of all Muslims. However, Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876- 1909) was the 
Ottoman Sultan who most emphasized the caliphate. Both Sultans Abdulaziz and Abdulhamid II 
made use of the title for political and diplomatic purposes. Sultan Abdulhamid II used the caliphate 
as an instrument during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878. The Ottoman Caliphate was 
likewise used during the World War I as a political instrument. Sultan Mehmed V declared a holy 
war against the Allies in his capacity as the caliph of all Muslims when the Ottoman Empire 
entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in 1914.408  
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2.4.2 Kemalist Approach to the Office of Caliphate During the Turkish War 
of Independence  
At the early stage of the National Struggle, one of goals of the British invasion was 
considered as to annihilate the Office of Caliphate by the Kemalist deputies. The National 
Assembly published a declaration, aimed at gaining popular support, against to the British 
occupation on May 9, 1920. In this declaration, Mufid Effendi, pro-Kemalist deputy of Kirsehir, 
underlined that: “When the British, who are the mortal enemy and merciless executioner of Islam, 
took a decision to annihilate our Islamic Caliphate, to rule over the entire World, and to destroy 
Muslims completely, it is not excusable not to struggle against them.”409 
The importance of the Caliphate was stressed many times by the deputies – both Kemalists 
and their opposition- in the Grand National Assembly. Abdulkadir Kemali Bey, deputy of 
Kastamonu and later prominent opponent to the Kemalist majority, hailed the geographical and 
political unity of the Muslim nations in the Assembly. In his speech, he said that the Arab 
government established in Iraq could not be separated from the Ankara Government. Moreover, 
he added that Iraq, Syria, and all Arabia were loyal to Anatolia as a result of religious feelings and 
all people in Africa and Arabia had never thought of being apart from the Caliphate.410 Mustafa 
Bey, deputy of Karahisar-i Sarki, expressed this as: “…to believe in the needlessness of the 
Caliphate means to play into British and French hands, who are the enemies of the Caliphate; and 
to discredit Turks from the Muslim World.”411 Mustafa Kemal said: “As you know, the British 
always need a tool, to ease their press against the Islamic World, which is under their captivity. 
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They show this need from time to time. In the sight of the British, this valuable tool is the person 
they will seat as the head of the Caliphate by them.”412  
When the members of the National Assembly started to criticize the last Sultan Mehmed 
VI and the Sultanate in mid of 1921, the Caliphate was still considered a significant and sacred 
position by them. Although both positions were held by Sultan Mehmed VI, he lost his credit as a 
Sultan-Caliph. Deputies had a great loyalty and respect to the Caliphate but not the personality of 
the last Sultan. As an example, Huseyin Avni Bey, deputy of Erzurum and future leader of the 
opposition, discredited the Sultanate and credited the Caliphate in his speech on November 28, 
1921. In this speech Huseyin Avni Bey pointed out a sacred Office existed only in Turkey. That 
was the Caliphate. He reminded the other deputies that they could rescue the Caliphate from 
captivity. As Huseyin Avni Bey said, the last Sultan was a traitor and did not deserve to hold the 
title of Caliph. Moreover, he added that the Caliphate was likewise holy and vacant.413 Yusuf Ziya 
Bey, deputy of Bitlis and another prominent opponent, had the same opinion as Huseyin Avni Bey. 
In his speech, Yusuf Ziya Bey said: “Let’s declare to the World as a sole reality that we have a 
great respect and love for the Caliphate in our hearts. That Office is very valuable and exalted in 
our opinions. We will be dignified guards of that Office.”414  
Mustafa Kemal differentiated the Caliphate from the Sultanate. He also criticized the 
attitude of Sultan Mehmed VI, who collaborated with Turkey’s enemies. Mustafa Kemal declared 
that the Caliphate was not only holy for the Turkish nation, but also for the rest of the Muslim 
World. He held that: “the future person, who will take up the Office of Caliphate, will be the 
                                                 
412 TBMM ZC, 29 Jan. 1921, v.7, 414. 
413 TBMM ZC, 28 Nov. 1921, v.14, 369-372. 
414 TBMM ZC, 29 Nov. 1921, v.14, 397. 
 119 
servant of the nation, not the master of the nation.”415 In another speech, Mustafa Kemal declared 
his loyalty to the Caliphate like the rest of the members of the National Assembly: “Yes we are 
devoted to the Caliphate. Because the Office of Caliphate and Sultanate does not belong to anyone. 
It belongs to the Turkish nation directly with the backing of the entire Muslim World. That Office 
is ours, we have protected it and we will until the end.”416 However, Mustafa Kemal’s promises 
lasted until he believed that the Caliphate was an obstacle. The removal of this obstacle will be 
covered in the next section.  
2.4.3 Establishing a Caliphate without  Temporal Power: The End of 
Sultanate and the Last Caliph 
After the Turkish victory at Dumlupinar in August 1922, a Turkish reoccupation of Izmir, 
and the evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks in September 1922, Mustafa Kemal consolidated his 
power both at home and abroad.417 As a consequences of this victory, the Greek invasion in western 
Turkey terminated and the Ankara Government was invited to the peace conference in Lausanne, 
Switzerland. The British Government invited the Istanbul Government to the Peace Conference 
also. To remove this duality in the Peace Treaty, Kemalists resolved to abolish the sultanate by 
separating it from the caliphate.418 
On October 30, 1922, Riza Nur and 78 of his friends introduced a motion, on the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire to the Grand National Assembly. Supported by a supplementary motion 
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by Huseyin Avni Bey this motion resulted in the drafting of a bill abolishing the Sultanate.419 In 
the sixth article of the resolution of Riza Nur, it was declared that the new Caliph would be elected 
by the National Assembly from the members of the Ottoman Dynasty.420 Mustafa Kemal explained 
his positive thoughts about this subject in the Assembly. He believed that the Caliphate was the 
most important matter among the Muslim nations. Beyond this, the Caliphate was an emirate tying 
together the Muslim people.421 He also prophesied that the Caliphate would be very prosperous 
for the Turkish State and the entire Muslim World.422  
The Caliphate was seen as a connection between all Muslims. The members of the National 
Assembly were also aware of this idea. Vehbi Efendi, a conservative deputy of Konya, summarized 
his thoughts as: “…all Muslims have a spiritual connection to the Caliphate. Breaking this 
connection is impossible. When all of the Muslims will perish – God forbid from all disasters-, 
that spiritual connection would be at a standstill. Otherwise, all Muslims, from the West to the 
East, have a spiritual connection in this way.”423  
After the flight of the last Sultan, Mehmed VI, on November 17, 1922, the Office of the 
Caliphate became vacant. On November 18, 1922, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara 
gathered to appoint a new Caliph.424 During the discussions the last Sultan was criticized harshly. 
Rauf Bey, the head of Ankara Government, condemned Sultan Mehmed VI as a traitor who left 
the Caliphate to British protection. According to him, this kind of treason was not seen before in 
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the Turkish history.425 The vacant Caliphate would not be good for the nation; therefore, a new 
Caliph had to be appointed. Vehbi Effendi, the Minister of Sharia, wrote a fatwa which described 
the dethronement of Sultan Mehmed VI as the Caliph of Muslims.426 In the elections, Abdulmecid 
Effendi got 148 votes out of 162 from the members of the Assembly and was appointed as the new 
Caliph by the Ankara Government.427 The Government employed imams and preachers to 
publicize the election of the Caliph and the ceremony organized in honor of the Caliph to all people 
in Turkey.428  
2.4.4 Struggle Between Ankara and Istanbul : Last Caliph as a Powerhouse 
for the Opposition 
The Sultanate was abolished in November 1922, but the Caliphate still existed. This 
institution of the Caliphate, which attracted as much loyalty as the Sultanate among the mass of 
Turkish people, was still an obstacle to Mustafa Kemal’s establishing his personal autocracy. After 
the election of the last Caliph on November 18, 1922, the political struggle between the 
conservatives and Kemalists took another shape. According to the Kemalist assertion, the Caliph 
in Istanbul became the center for opposition to them. Price emphasizes this situation as: “He – 
Abdulmecid- became the center of intrigue, and Nationalists, like Rauf Bey, who nevertheless 
favored monarchy, were suspected of aiming to set the Caliph up as a constitutional sovereign.”429 
Like Price, Orga points out this political struggle between the Kemalist government in Ankara and 
the opposition in Istanbul as: “Mustafa Kemal was only too well aware of the danger of the 
                                                 
425 TBMM ZC, 18 Nov. 1922, v.24, 563. 
426 TBMM ZC, 18 Nov. 1922, v.24, 564. 
427 TBMM ZC, 18 Nov. 1922, v.24, 565. BCA, 19 Nov. 1922, Document No: 13.113.62. Vakit, 20 Nov. 1922, 1. 
428 BCA; 22 Nov. 1922, Document no: 13.113.63. BCA, 14 Dec. 1922, Document no: 13.113.66. 
429 Price, A History of Turkey, 128. 
 122 
Caliph’s popularity spreading. In Istanbul Caliph Abdulmecid, and a group of Mustafa Kemal’s 
most formidable opponents, were doing their best to form a sovereign and religious movement 
which, if unchecked, would defeat Mustafa Kemal.”430 As an opportunist, he waited for an 
opportunity to abolish the Caliphate and consolidate his power within the state.  
Mustafa Kemal was not opposed to the Caliphate when the last Caliph was elected by the 
Assembly in November 1922. However, he started to explore possibilities of removing this 
obstacle to his autocracy in January 1923. Mustafa Kemal held a press conference in Izmit on 
January 16/17, 1923, with the representatives of the Istanbul press, always seen as troublemakers 
for Kemalists. In this conference, there were more than 60 subjects discussed, but Mustafa Kemal 
particularly wanted to hear their opinions about the Caliphate. He declared that the Turkish state 
had no relevance with the Caliph in this conference.431 This conference probed the possibility of 
removing the Caliphate and measured the reactions of prominent journalists should this situation 
happen.  
The Istanbul press stressed the importance of this meeting. In Aksam, one of the major 
Kemalist papers in Istanbul, this meeting was reported as: “The Savior Ghazi Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha laid out his thoughts about national sovereignty, the Caliphate, political reaction, and 
welfare of the people in an extraordinary speech.” Aksam underlined Mustafa Kemal’s view that 
“the nation will not give its rights to any person regardless of his name and position. The National 
Assembly does not belong to the Caliph; it belongs to the nation only.”432 The conservative 
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newspaper Tevhid-i Efkar also discussed this conference. In the details of its news, Tevhid-i Efkar 
pointed out that the Caliphate would be kept by the Turkish Assembly.”433  
Opponents were aware of Mustafa Kemal’s ambitions to strengthen his position. Ismail 
Sukru Efendi, a prominent conservative deputy of Karahisari Sahib, wrote a pamphlet, “Hilafet-i 
Islamiye ve Buyuk Millet Meclisi” (The Islamic Caliphate and the Grand National Assembly), on 
the importance of the Caliphate. In this pamphlet, Sukru Efendi summarized the conservative point 
of view as: “…the Caliphate belongs to the Assembly; the Assembly belongs to the Caliphate.”434 
According to conservatives, the Caliph should be the head of the state, angering Mustafa Kemal. 
In Nutuk, he condemned this as a reactionary movement, which wanted to see the Caliph as a new 
Sultan.435 Kemalists demanded legal proceedings over this pamphlet and Ismail Sukru Effendi.436  
When the first session of the Grand National Assembly was completed in April 1923, 
Mustafa Kemal had a chance to prevent opponents from attending the second session of the 
Assembly. Opponents were purged after the elections which were controlled strictly by 
Kemalists.437 The purge of the members of the Second Group enabled Mustafa Kemal to carry out 
his future projects. Despite the consolidation of Mustafa Kemal’s hold on power that the elections 
of June-July 1923 represented, another opposition emerged after the second period of the 
Assembly which was convened on August 11, 1923.438 The establishment of the Republic caused 
some disquiet within the Kemalist party. The faction, which was led by like Rauf Bey and Kazim 
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Karabekir Pasha, started their opposition to Mustafa Kemal because of his authoritarian 
tendencies. 439 
While the establishment of the Republic was the first round between the Kemalist group 
and the opposition, discussions about the abolition of the Caliphate became the second round 
between these two groups within the same party. The Kemalist approach on this subject stressed 
the uselessness of the Caliphate as an obsolete institution.440 On the other hand, an alternative 
approach sees this situation as a struggle for power between Ankara and Istanbul.441 As an 
alternative approach, Mete Tuncay points out that the abolition of Caliphate was a “show of 
strength” of Mustafa Kemal, who wanted to get his power accepted by the Turkish society. This 
is a part of a process by which Mustafa Kemal wanted to identify the Republic and reforms with 
his personality.442 
As it mentioned in the previous section, the establishment of the Turkish Republic 
generated some reluctance among the opponents in Istanbul. Rauf Bey criticized the haste of the 
declaration of the Republic in Tevhid-i Efkar and Vatan newspapers.443 After the establishment of 
the republic, hopes of the conservative elite were centered on the caliphate to arrest further drastic 
reorganization of the state and society. This elite hoped that the caliphate could also be used to 
return to the traditional system of government. Abdulmecid, who was in a precarious position in 
Istanbul, became the center of heated controversy.444  
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Ismet Inonu, close friend of Ataturk and the second president of Turkey, confessed that the 
abolition of the Caliphate was a political struggle. In his memoirs, Ismet Pasha recounted the 
contacts and connections of the Caliph in Istanbul which worried Mustafa Kemal and all of his 
friends. The attitude of the Caliph and the existence of the Caliphate at the same time with the 
Republic were seen very objectionable.445 Therefore, after the Republic was established, the 
Caliphate had to be removed from the political arena. Zurcher emphasizes the struggle between 
Ankara and Istanbul on the ground of politics as: “The anti-republican feeling was partly fuelled 
by concern over the future of the caliph. Many people, certainly in Istanbul, were emotionally 
attached to the dynasty, but it was also felt that the caliph was the only possible counterweight to 
Mustafa Kemal’s dominance of the political scene. It was – rightly- feared that the proclamation 
of the republic sounded the death knell of the caliphate.”446 Like Zurcher, Metin Tamkoc also 
emphasizes the political struggle between these two groups as: “the conservative majority of the 
people and their spokesmen, the educated elite, centered in Istanbul. Although they appeared to 
have accepted the fait accompli in the establishment of the Republic, they were not to give up the 
fight completely. Their only remaining source of hope and strength was the institution of the 
Caliphate, which, if cleverly manipulated, could evoke so strong a religious reaction on the part of 
the masses that Mustafa Kemal would be compelled to relinquish the state power and agree to a 
return to the theocratic system of government.”447 On the other hand, Roderic Davison emphasizes 
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this struggle more ideological rather than political as: “the caliph Abdulmecid might serve as a 
focal point for opponents of the republic, of innovation, of secularization, of Kemal.”448  
In these days, a vigorous campaign against the Caliph and all the members of the House of 
Osman who were still living in Turkey appeared in the Kemalist press.449 A rumor about the 
resignation of the Caliph Abdulmecid was spread in the Kemalist press. The Ankara papers, 
especially Yeni Gun, spread these rumors.450 They were declared untrue by Abdulmecid Efendi, 
the Caliph. He indicated that he did not see any reason to resign while believers showed kindness 
to him.451 Abdulmecid Efendi was very annoyed by the attitude of the newspaper Yeni Gun.452  
Tevhid-i Efkar, a conservative newspaper in Istanbul, reported the Caliph’s declaration that he was 
elected to his Office legitimately and he would keep his position because the Islamic World was 
still in favor of him. He also underlined that resignation would be ingratitude to people’s 
kindness.453 Le Temps reported this rumor in its article which referred to the news published in 
Aksam. According to the Le Temps, the Caliph would not resign from his position.454 However, 
the pro-Kemalist newspaper Aksam repeated this rumor which agitated public opinion. On 
November 9, 1923, Aksam announced that “the resignation of His Excellency Caliph was strongly 
probable.” According to the paper, when the resignation happened, representatives of all Muslim 
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nations would gather in Istanbul to elect the new Caliph.”455 The next day, Aksam announced that 
the alteration of the form of the Caliphate was absolute.456  
This rumor stimulated conservatives. In November the President of the Istanbul Bar 
Association, Lutfi Fikri Bey, sent an open letter to the press in which he pleaded for a more 
influential position for the Caliph,457 published on November 10, 1923, in the newspaper Tanin. 
In this letter, Lutfi Fikri Bey referred to rumors about the resignation of the Caliph. It would be 
suicide for Turks if the Caliph resigned. According to Lutfi Fikri, the Caliphate was a “spiritual 
treasure” which was very important to the Muslim world.458 Huseyin Cahid supported Lutfi Fikri 
Bey. In his article in Tanin, Huseyin Cahid described the Caliphate as the source of power of 
Turks, and suicide if the Caliphate was expelled from the country.459 Bernard Lewis refers the 
striking points of Huseyin Cahid Bey’s article as: “No great intelligence is necessary to understand 
that if we lose the Caliphate, the state of Turkey, with its five or ten million inhabitants, would 
lose all importance in the world of Islam, and in the eyes of European politics we would sink to 
the rank of a petty and insignificant state… The Caliphate was acquired by the Ottoman dynasty 
and its retention in Turkey thus assured forever; deliberately to create a risk of losing it is an action 
totally incompatible with reason, loyalty, and national feeling.”460 
 On the other hand, Necmeddin Sadik rejected the concerns of Lutfi Fikri Bey in Aksam. 
He pointed out that he shared the grief of Lutfi Fikri Bey about the resignation of the Caliph. 
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Necmeddin Sadik suggested that the possible harmfulness of the Caliphate in the future should be 
considered as well. He was not sure about the attitude of the Lutfi Fikri Bey towards national 
sovereignty. According to Necmeddin Sadik Bey, Lutfi Fikri Bey was concerned about the 
protection of the dynasty but it was not clear how he valued national sovereignty.461 
The debate over the Caliphate was seen as untimely by many Turkish journalists. In Vakit, 
Mehmed Asim Bey thought that the subject was untimely and unnecessary.462 Velid Ebuzziya Bey 
believed that a mistake caused another mistake in this issue. He criticized the pro-Kemalist 
newspaper Aksam as stirring up this issue unnecessarily. Velid Bey, as the editor of the 
conservative newspaper Tevhid-i Efkar, thought that making troubles untimely and unnecessarily 
was the attitude of the Ankara press, but this time it was generated by one of the Istanbul 
newspapers.463   
While the resignation of the Caliph was discussed, the physical location of the Office of 
Caliphate became another topic in these discussions. According to the newspaper Vatan, there 
were three views in Ankara over the future of the Caliphate. According to one of these tendencies, 
the Caliphate would be expelled from Turkey. The second would transfer the Caliphate to Konya, 
close to Ankara. The third would keep the Caliphate in Istanbul.464 Tevhid-i Efkar objected to the 
possible relocation of the Caliphate. The newspaper interpreted this as stirring up troubles.465 
While Tevhid-i Efkar interpreted this as malice, Mehmed Asim Bey believed relocation would be 
                                                 
461 Necmeddin Sadik, “Hilafet Muessesi Hakkinda” [About the Institution of Caliphate], Aksam, 11 Nov. 1923, 1. 
462 Mehmed Asim, “Hilafet Bahsi” [The Caliphate Issue], Vakit, 10 Nov. 1923, 1. 
463 Velid Ebuzziya, “Hilafet Meselesi” [The Caliphate Question], Tevhid-i Efkar, 13 Nov. 1923, 1. 
464 Vatan, 14 Nov. 1923, 1. 
465 Tevhid-i Efkar, 15 Nov. 1923, 1. 
 129 
better for the state. According to him, if the Caliphate was transferred from Istanbul to an Anatolian 
city, it would be protected from all hazards.466   
2.4.5 Letter Crisis and the Kemalist Reaction 
While rumors about the resignation of the last Caliph were circulating in the Kemalist 
press, the question of the Caliphate aroused interest far beyond Turkey. These rumors brought 
anxious inquiries, especially from India, about the intentions of the republican regime. In these 
days, a “letter crisis” arose. Two Indian Muslim leaders, the Agha Khan and Ameer Ali, wrote a 
letter and sent it to Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister of Turkey, on November 24, 1923. Lewis 
summarizes the core of the letter as: “The two signatories pointed out that the separation of the 
Caliphate from the Sultanate had increased its significance for the Muslims in general, and begged 
the Turkish government to place the Caliphate on a basis which would command the confidence 
and esteem of the Muslim nations, and thus impart to the Turkish state unique strength and 
dignity.”467 Moreover these Muslim Indian leaders asked that the caliphate be placed on a basis 
that would command the esteem of Muslims everywhere and called upon the Turkish people to 
preserve the Caliphate.468 They proclaimed themselves true friends and supporters of Turkey. They 
expressed sadness over the exclusion of the Caliph from political life in Turkey. Moreover, current 
uncertainty of the Caliphate was another concern for the Indian Muslim leaders. 469   
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This letter was published by three major Istanbul daily papers on December 5, 1923, before 
it reached Prime Minister Ismet Pasha.470 While Zurcher explains this as “because of the difficulty 
of communications with Ankara, the letter was published in Istanbul before it had been delivered 
to Prime Minister,”471 Orga asserts that “by this attitude the Indians ignored the Ankara 
Government.”472 This letter irritated Kemalist leaders and increased their doubts about the 
Caliphate. The Indian leaders were condemned as tools of the British Government, since they were 
British subjects and believed to possess some influence in British and Indian official circles. This 
was enough to lead the Ankara Government to suspect some deep British intrigue behind the letter. 
Beyond that the Indian leaders were demonized as agents of the British Government.473 Mustafa 
Kemal pointed out that there was danger to their sovereignty; the Aga Khan was an agent of the 
English; the Caliph in Istanbul was weak and susceptible, so it would be very easy for an agent to 
use him as an instrument to defeat the Nationalists. Later the Aga Khan became the sinister symbol 
the British would use to split Turkey: the Caliphate on one side and the Nationalists on the other. 
On the other hand, the Indian Muslim leaders rejected these accusations.474 
This crisis was discussed in a secret session in the Grand National Assembly on December 
8, 1923. Ismet Pasa described these attempts as “foreign propaganda” against the interests of 
Turkey. He also accused the Indian Muslim leaders, who sent this letter to Ankara, as “intimates 
of the British Government and Court” and “loyal British citizens”,475 thus implying this attempt 
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was a British project. Rauf Bey likewise condemned this attempt and wanted to punish those 
people who were in favor.476 
The letter of the Indian Muslim leaders was discussed widely in the Turkish press. In pro-
Kemalist Aksam, Necmeddin Sadik Bey wrote an important article which criticized the Caliphate 
harshly. He suggested that the tie and the solidarity of all Muslims under the banner of the 
Caliphate was a dream. The importance of the Caliphate had decreased in the last centuries. In 
India and Egypt people were fighting against the British occupation in line with their national 
sentiments. The Caliphate was useless during the First World War, when the Caliph declared jihad 
against the infidels. Therefore, Turks would not sacrifice themselves anymore for the sake of the 
spiritual pleasures of the Muslim world. Turkey was a republic and separated religion from the 
state. If the Indian Muslim leaders wanted to see the Caliph as a political leader, it would not be 
accepted. If they showed their loyalty to the Caliph as a religious leader, it could be accepted.477 
The newspaper Vatan interpreted the letter as an insincere effort by Aga Khan and Emir Ali. 
According to Vatan, these two leaders of India had previously accepted the separation of the 
Caliphate from the politics, but now they objected to this decision. This was a kind of 
discrepancy.478 However, the same discrepancy was apparent in the attitudes of the Kemalist 
movement. Kemalists treated the Caliphate respectfully at the beginning, but their attitude changed 
later. Moreover, during the discussions about the abolition of the Sultanate they proclaimed their 
respect to the Caliphate and its importance among the Muslim world. However, they changed their 
mind after this letter crisis occurred.  
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The letter of the Indian Muslim leaders angered the Kemalist deputies and resulted as 
sending the “Istiklal Mahkemesi” (The Independence Tribunal ) to Istanbul. The Grand National 
Assembly appointed four of its members to this extraordinary tribunal for the trial at Istanbul.479 
The editors of the opposition newspapers, Ikdam, Tanin, and Tevhid-i Efkar, were arrested and 
faced trial because of publishing this letter.480 The Independence Tribunal started to investigate 
the supposed treason of these editors and that of Lutfi Fikri Bey, who published an open letter to 
the Caliph, urging him not to resign. Finally, the newspaper editors were acquitted because this 
publication could not be construed into an offence against the law. However, Lutfi Fikri Bey was 
sent to jail for five years because of his letter.481  
Mehmed Asim Bey explained the fear of Indian Muslim leaders’ letter among Kemalists 
as fear of encountering a plot organized by a network in Istanbul against the Republic. He thought 
publishing that letter was unnecessary. Moreover, he interpreted the action of the Indian Muslim 
leaders as interfering in the internal politics of Turkey.482 The Kemalist response to this so called 
plot was sending the most prominent journalists of Turkey to court. The Journal de Genève also 
discussed this trial. It saw this trial as a kind of Kemalist pressure against the freedom of speech.483  
The most important journalists faced court because of publishing a letter which was exaggerated 
by Kemalist regime.  
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The letter issue was commented by the foreign press also. The Journal de Genève reported 
another letter of Indian Muslims to the Swiss Government which was unknown in Turkish public 
opinion. In this letter, Abdel Kadir, one of the Indian Muslim leaders, showed his respect and 
loyalty to the Caliph Abdulmecid and the Ottoman dynasty. He declared his concerns over the 
anti-Caliphate movements in Ankara, and declared Indian Muslims would protest against the 
Turkish Government if it took a decision against the Caliphate.484 The New York Times interpreted 
the letter of Aga Khan as a cause of turmoil in Turkey.485 Corriere della Sera also discussed this 
initiative of the Indian Muslim notables, interpreting it as creating confusion in the nationalist 
government in Ankara. The newspaper also talked about the British effort at establishing an Arab 
Caliphate led by Sharif Hussein in Jerusalem. This possibility disturbed the Indian Muslims also.486 
2.4.6 Kemalist Objections to Attitudes of Caliph Abdulmecid: The Budget 
Crisis and the First Kemalist Attack to the Caliphate 
After the establishment of the Republic in October 1923, the struggle between Ankara and 
Istanbul intensified over the Caliphate. Abdulmecid, the Caliph, “by all accounts a mild and 
scholarly man,” was seen the only possible counterweight to Mustafa Kemal’s dominance of the 
political scene by the opponents of the Kemalist regime.487 The Kemalist objection to the 
personality of the Caliph increased over the Caliph’s royal pretensions. Irfan Orga gives details 
about the behaviors of Abdulmecid as: 
He had for a long time been displaying himself with the great ostentation befitting 
a member of the royal blood. He received distinguished foreign personages and 
held levees. Every Friday he went to a different mosque in Istanbul, the people 
                                                 
484 Journal de Genève, 1 Dec. 1923, 2. 
485 The New York Times, 6 Jan. 1924, 7. 
486 Corriere della Sera, 6 Jan. 1924, 2.  
487 Lewis, The Emergence, 258. Zurcher, Turkey, 167.  
 134 
gathering in the streets to cheer him, his magnificent Arab horses tossing their 
manes and lifting their delicate feet with the precision of the thoroughbred. He 
flouted Mustafa Kemal’s authority quietly and determinedly. He gave constant 
reminders to the populace of the past splendors of the Ottomans, one week wearing 
the headgear of Fatih Mehmet, another week carrying the sword of Sultan Selim 
III. This behavior was a joy to the people of Istanbul but a headache for Mustafa 
Kemal.488   
While he was not a Sultan, Caliph Abdulmecid enjoyed these colorful ceremonies causing 
great concern among the Kemalist cadres at Ankara. Mustafa Kemal decided to seize the 
opportunity. He prepared the ground by reaching an agreement with some of his chief supporters, 
and by persuading influential newspaper editors to campaign against the Caliphate.489 Finally he 
determined to break openly. In the military maneuvers in Izmir at the beginning of 1924, Mustafa 
Kemal decided to destroy the Caliphate as a potential rival. He stayed two months there with his 
close friends, Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister, Kazim Pasha, the Minister of War, and Fevzi Pasha, 
the Chief of the General Staff. In their meeting in Izmir, Mustafa Kemal noted that “we were 
agreed on the need to abolish the Caliphate. At the same time we decided to suppress the Ministry 
of Sharia and Evkaf and to unify public education.”490  
Aware of the threats posed by the caliphate to the Republican regime and to his personal 
prestige and power, Mustafa Kemal decided to abolish that institution at the end of January 
1924.491 For realizing this goal, he waited on the right moment. When the Caliph Abdulmecid 
wanted an augmentation of the Caliphate’s budget on January 22, 1924, Mustafa Kemal refused 
it. Beyond the augmentation of his stipend, Abdulmecid wanted to contact governmental 
committees when they visited Istanbul.492 These demands annoyed Mustafa Kemal and his allies. 
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He felt that he had a chance to dismiss the Caliphate after these demands. Mustafa Kemal sent a 
telegram to Ismet Pasa at the same day. In his telegram, Mustafa Kemal expressed his hostility 
“the Caliph and the entire World has to know that there is neither religious nor political reason for 
the presence of the current protected Caliph and Caliphate in reality. The Turkish Republic will 
not expose its existence and independence to dangers because of these absurdities. The Caliphate 
is not more than a historical remembrance for us eventually. The demand of getting into contact 
with the statesmen of the Republic and the official committees with him is an offense to the 
independence of republic. It is enough for the Caliph to live on a smaller annuity rather than the 
President. The purpose should be living humanely, not in pomposity and splendor.”493 Mustafa 
Kemal immediately banned all Abdulmecid’s colorful processions. His stipend was cut by nearly 
fifty percent. A new law provided for the death penalty for sympathizers who hoped to see the 
Sultanate restored. In February 1924, Mustafa Kemal talked with the leading editors of the Istanbul 
newspapers, but these meetings could not heal the rift between Ankara and Istanbul.494 He decided 
to destroy the Caliphate over the budget issue in the Grand National Assembly at the end of 
February 1924.  
At the end of the February 1924, the death knell was pealed for the Caliphate. In the session 
of February 27, 1924, the deputies criticized the Caliphate openly. Vasif Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy 
of Saruhan, was the foremost deputy to attack it. In his speech, Vasif Bey summarized the 
achievements of Kemalists. He described the treason of the former Sultan and how they 
demolished the Sultanate. Vasif Bey pointed out that they did not deem necessary to abolish the 
institution – the Sultanate- which could be a threat for the Republic. He warned the deputies that 
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the overthrown Sultanate was still a threat to the regime. Vasif Bey believed that the Sultanate was 
trying to continue under the guise of Caliphate. He criticized the pompous ceremonies of the 
Caliph. The annuity of the Caliph was paid for by poor people and this represented a problem. 
Vasif Bey terminated his speech by declaring “in the budget of the Turkish republic, there is no 
annuity for the Caliphate.”495 After Vasif Bey’s speech, Mehmed Emin Bey talked about the 
Caliph and Caliphate. He declared that there was no need for a successor of the Prophet in Turkey. 
He continued that Islam did not require a successor to the Prophet like the Holy See in 
Christianity.496 
This historical session in the Assembly on February 27, 1924, was interpreted as one of 
turning points of the state by the Turkish press. The conservative Tevhid-i Efkar summarized this 
session as: “Vasif Bey requested the exclusion of the Ottoman Dynasty from Turkey.” The 
newspaper held out hope about continuing the Caliphate by a new person or by the Grand National 
Assembly. Tevhid-i Efkar underlined that the Ottoman Dynasty would not keep the Caliphate 
anymore in its hands.497 The newspaper Vatan also described this event as a historical one, seeing 
the Caliphate as a threat to the Republic and its abolition would be better for the state.498 Aksam 
was in favor of the approach proposed by Vasif Bey. It reported the demands of Vasif Bey were 
applauded by members of the National Assembly.499 The newspaper Vakit interpreted this situation 
as the last steps to removing irregularities in the state organization. Vakit also underlined the 
silence of the opposition over this subject. The newspaper interpreted this silence as unanimity in 
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the People’s Party in this subject.500 Tevhid-i Efkar denominated the majority in the People’s Party 
as the radical faction which aimed to destroy the Caliphate completely. Mustafa Kemal was also 
favor of this radical faction. The resolution of this faction would be accepted by the Assembly in 
a few days.501  
Before their fate was approved by the Grand National Assembly, the members of the 
Ottoman Dynasty gathered in the Dolmabahce Palace to make their future plans if the Caliphate 
were abolished and the Dynasty would have to leave the country.502 The expulsion of the Dynasty 
was accepted in the group meeting of the Republican People’s Party.503 The members of the 
Dynasty would leave the state with only their personal possessions, and the government would 
give them travel subsistence.504 
The foreign press observed these turbulent days closely. The New York Times announced 
that the radical reforms were waiting in Turkey in these days. The newspaper especially stressed 
the importance of the opening speech of the Assembly, to be made by Mustafa Kemal on March 
1, 1924.505 Journal de Genève described this period as a radical transformation. The radical steps 
taken by the Ankara Government would cause many troubles in the Muslim world.506 The Journal 
de Genève also reported that the conservatives did not join the debates within the People’s Party.507 
Le Temps interpreted the situation in Turkey as a struggle between radicals and conservatives in 
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the Turkish Assembly. The newspaper interpreted Mustafa Kemal’s speech in the Assembly as “a 
farewell to the East.”508  
2.4.7 Abolition of the Caliphate 
The new session of the Assembly was opened by Mustafa Kemal on March 1, 1924. In the 
opening speech Mustafa Kemal emphasized three main points: the safeguarding and stabilization 
of the Republic, the creation of a unified national system of education, and the need to cleanse and 
elevate the Islamic faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it had 
been for centuries.509 He pointed out that politics were harmful to religion: “it has now become a 
plainly evident truth that it is necessary to liberate and to elevate the Islamic religion from its 
position of being a tool of politics, in the way that has been traditional for centuries.”510 Mustafa 
Kemal prepared a draft bill to abolish the Caliphate. On March 2, 1924, the proposals of Mustafa 
Kemal were discussed and accepted in a meeting of the People’s Party group.511 
The final institutional remnant of empire, the Caliphate, was abolished on March 3, 1924, 
after the bill of Sheikh Saffet Effendi, pro-Kemalist deputy of Urfa, and his 53 co-sponsors was 
discussed in the National Assembly.512 In the first article of the bill, the Caliph was dethroned and 
the Caliphate was abolished. The members of the Ottoman Dynasty had to leave the country within 
10 days, and were barred from Turkish citizenship.513 During these discussions the Kemalist 
majority controlled the Assembly and the objections of the opposition were not taken seriously. 
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Even though there was no significant opposition outside the party, opposition within the party was 
silenced too. Valentine Chirol describes this situation as: “the law was passed by an 
overwhelmingly majority in the GNA, after a long, and sometimes metaphysical, and sometimes 
rather violent debate, though only two deputies ventured actually to vote against it.”514 While 
Chirol asserts that there were two votes against the law, this assertion is not accurate. When the 
Assembly voted for the articles of the law, totally thirteen, the deputies raised their hands if they 
accepted or rejected the articles. While Zeki Bey and Halid Bey were against to the first article on 
the abolition of the Caliphate the vote was announced as “it was accepted”. Some deputies shouted 
“it was accepted by unanimously.”515 
First Ekrem Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of Rize, ascended to the pulpit in the National 
Assembly to support the abolition of the Caliphate. He blamed the Ottoman Dynasty for using 
people as servants. Even though the Sultanate had collapsed, the House of Osman was still living 
pompously under the guise of the Caliphate. Ekrem Bey was astonished by Turkish gullibility to 
assent to this life style of the Ottoman Dynasty. While the Anatolian people were fighting enemies, 
the dynasty was dancing with them. Ekrem Bey underlined that historians, who would write those 
days in the future, would be astonished why the dynasty was not expelled immediately after the 
abolition of the Sultanate.516 Ekrem Bey asked the members of the Assembly “Why are those 
people – the members of the Ottoman Dynasty- clinging to the throne, for serving to the nation?” 
As an extreme Kemalist, Ekrem Bey responded his own question: “You can give many grand 
viziers as examples who served the nation, but you will have difficulties to show any Sultan who 
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served the nation. The sole motive to be attached to the throne for those Sultans was their own 
interests and ambitions.” Beyond these comments, Ekrem Bey condemned the Sultans as the main 
cause of the backwardness of the Turkish nation. He found no inherent relationship between the 
Caliphate and the Ottoman Dynasty. According to Ekrem Bey, the past of this dynasty was full of 
blood and they did not deserve the Caliphate.517  
Ekrem Bey mentioned the political role of the Caliphate in his speech too. He believed that 
the Office of Caliphate was useless, because during World War I Indian Muslim soldiers did not 
halt their attacks against Turkish soldiers fighting under the banner of the Caliphate. Yahya Galip 
Bey, deputy of Kirsehir, supported Ekrem Bey in this issue. He emphasized that the office of 
Caliphate was responsible for the death of ten million Turkish soldiers in Yemen during World 
War I, suggesting Turks sacrificed their lives in distant lands for the sake of the Caliphate while 
exaggerating the number of casualties of Turkish troops.518 However, neither Ekrem Bey nor 
Yahya Galip Bey raised the help of Indian Muslims to the Turkish War of Independence, seen as 
a sacred war by Indian Muslims. For example, when peace negotiations in Lausanne was standstill, 
Indian Muslims threated the British Government if it started a war against Turkey. The New York 
Times recounted the decision of Indian Caliphate Committee: 
The Caliphate Conference, at its concluding session here (Gaya, British India), 
decided in the event of Great Britain’s participating again in a war against Turkey, 
to launch immediately a civil disobedience campaign. This would include the 
spreading of propaganda throughout the police force and the army, prevention of 
recruiting, refusal to subscribe to war loans, boycotting of foreign cloth, picketing 
of liquor shops and prevention of the export of grain. The conference also resolved 
to recruit a legion for service under the Angora Government.519  
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After the speech of Ekrem Bey, Zeki Bey, deputy of Gumushane and sole member of the 
former Second Group (the opposition to the Kemalists autocracy in the first period of the 
Assembly) explained his thoughts in favor of the Caliphate. As a supporter of the Union of Islam, 
Zeki Bey thought that the abolition of the Caliphate would be harmful for the state. He could not 
understand the concerns of the Kemalists over the power of the Caliph. Zeki Bey declared that 
sovereignty belonged to the nation forever. Instead of expelling the Caliph, he could be seated 
instead in Etlik, district of Ankara. Zeki Bey implied that the Republic was converting to the 
personal autocracy at that time, but his voice was silenced by Kemalists’ protests. 520   
Halid Bey, deputy of Kastamonu who joined later the opposition party in 1924, supported 
Zeki Bey. In his speech, Halid Bey mentioned about their shared attitudes during the War of 
Independence. During the war, they had preached the need to save the Caliph from British captivity 
in Istanbul. People were loyal to the Caliph, and the Assembly respected the people’s religious 
sentiments. Halid Bey pointed out that the Muslims were brothers in Islam. He believed that other 
Muslim nations respected Turks for supporting the Caliphate with their struggles for centuries. 
Halid Bey rejected the Kemalist position on the uselessness of the Caliphate, as well as the 
Kemalist discourse of Arab treason and the collaboration of Muslim Indians with the British 
Empire against the Ottoman Empire. He strongly believed that those nations were under the 
captivity of the British Empire and they did not take decisions for themselves. He gave the western 
Turkey as an example. When the west was occupied by the Greeks, that region could not send any 
troops to the rest of Turkey because of their captivity. According to Halid Bey, the situation in 
Arabia and India had to be considered like western Anatolia.521  
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Halid Bey’s main objection to the abolition of the Caliphate was on political principle. As 
a man of principle, Halid Bey raised the People’s Party nine principles declared only six months 
prior. In these principles, the party declared the Caliphate as an exalted Office. Halid Bey asked 
rightly that what changed within six months and the People’s Party had abandoned its principles. 
As a last word, Halid Bey regarded the dethronement of the Caliphate as a handicap for the future 
politics of the country.522  
These objections were silenced by the Kemalist majority in the Assembly. Izzet Ulvi Bey, 
pro Kemalist deputy of Karahisar-i Sahib, was astonished by the opposition to abolition of the 
Caliphate. According to him, the Caliphate had a potential to convert into a Sultanate in some day; 
there was in history no Caliphate without its own government. Izzet Ulvi Bey approved the 
expulsion of the Ottoman dynasty for the sake of the country. It would stop the bloodshed.523 Sadly, 
bloodshed became a reality as a result of Kurdish rebellion because of the abolition of Caliphate, 
destroying the religious ties between these two nations.524 
Vasif Bey, deputy of Saruhan, pointed out that the abolition of the Caliphate was proof of 
the sincerity of the Assembly which established the Republic. Vasif Bey denied the ill effects of 
the abolition of the Caliphate in external politics. He rejected the notion of a Union of Islam raised 
by Zeki Bey. Vasif Bey condemned the Caliphate and the Union of Islam which were useless 
during the First World War. According to him, Turks were killed by fellow Muslims in campaigns 
in Iraq, Canakkale, and Palestine. Vasif Bey asserted that the main military manpower source for 
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the British Empire was the Muslim lands. The fatwa of the Caliph did not stop these Muslim armies 
against the Ottoman Empire.525  
Vasif Bey rejected the objections of Halid Bey also. During the Independence War, 
Kemalist propaganda about saving the Caliphate was necessary at that time, but now, it was 
unnecessary. The absolute necessity of events and time compelled that decision. Vasif Bey stressed 
the treason of the Sultan at that time. Despite this treason, the Assembly did not dethrone him from 
the Sultanate because of the critical time in the war. The Sultan used the Caliphate and religion as 
a tool to oppose national forces. According to Vasif Bey, the Caliphate was more harmful than the 
Sultanate against the national movement. He believed that the abolition of the Caliphate would 
reinforce the Republic. Vasif Bey emphasized that the struggle of a few opponents in favor of the 
Caliphate would fail.526 Vasif Bey’s speech demonstrates the changing policies of the Kemalists 
who showed their loyalty to the Caliph when they needed his power.  
Seyit Bey, Minister of Justice, believed that the Caliphate was a secular issue rather than a 
religious one. He did not think that the abolition of Caliphate would be a problem in the Muslim 
World. Seyit Bey likewise raised the actions of Indian Muslims and Arab troops against the 
Ottomans during the First World War. He thought that the Caliphate and its fatwa had no effect 
among these Muslims.527 While Seyit Bey thought that the Caliphate issue would not be a problem 
abroad, the Caliphate problem in fact lasted until 1932 and the Turkish Government was hampered 
by these initiatives in the Muslim World. These issue will be discussed in the next section.   
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Prime Minister Ismet Pasha spoke last. He totally denied the main motive of the war had 
been rescuing the Caliph or Caliphate. Beyond this, Ismet Pasha listed the negative effects of the 
Caliphate, such as organizing revolts and collaborating with enemies against national forces. He 
warned the Turkish people: “My friends, soldiers, military officers! Wise up! The entire world is 
our enemy. The Caliph is our enemy. The Caliph collaborated with those people who want to 
enslave you.”528 This speech was inconsistent with the realities at the early stage of the Turkish 
War of Independence. Even though Ismet Pasha rejected the motive of rescuing the Caliph, it is 
mentioned above, when the National Assembly gathered on April 23, 1920 in Ankara; the first 
matter was to rescue the Sultan and the Caliph from British captivity.  
The Turkish press announced this historical event widely to its readers. Vatan and Tevhid-
i Efkar underlined that the session was unruly because of the debates between the members of the 
Grand National Assembly.529 These newspapers emphasized objections of Zeki Bey and Halid Bey 
who protested by hitting the desks by the majority group in the Assembly.530 Tevhid-i Efkar 
described the conservative deputies in the People’s Party as anxious about this decision. According 
to the newspaper, six deputies in the Party would resign after the abolition of the Caliphate was 
accepted in the Grand National Assembly.531   
This event was interpreted as the “complete elimination of the Ottoman Empire” by the 
Kemalist press. Mehmed Asim specified this situation in his article in pro- Kemalist paper, Vakit. 
According to the author, the Republican Government decided to eliminate the institutions in 
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conflict with its own structure. This decision was an elimination of the Ottoman history, the main 
motive of which was removing obsolete institutions in the way of progress.532 
The abolition of the Caliphate became an important topics in the foreign press. Le Temps 
considered this new situation as a revolution in the political, social, and religious structure of the 
Turkish state. The newspaper saw the bill accepted by the National Assembly as a result of the 
nationalist and secular ideology of Mustafa Kemal.533 Le Temps stated that prominent 
oppositionists, such as Rauf Bey and Refet Bey, raised no objection to this decision.534 Journal de 
Genève announced the historical event as “Farewell to East.”535 Corriere della Sera interpreted 
this decision as the separation of religion from politics in Turkey.536 In another article, the 
newspaper described the new nationalist character of Turkey, which started to abandon the Islamic 
character of the former Ottoman Empire.537 
2.4.8 After the Abolition of the Caliphate 
As mentioned above, three proposals of Mustafa Kemal were discussed and accepted in a 
meeting of the People’s Party group on March 2, 1924.538 The first proposal was the abolition of 
the Caliphate. When the abolition of the Caliphate was accepted by the Assembly on March 3, 
1924, the Grand National Assembly removed the Ministry of Sharia from the Government on the 
same day. As a second Kemalist initiative, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was established in 
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accord with the resolution of Huseyin Hulki Effendi, deputy of Siirt, and his 57 companions.539 
This new religious institution would appoint preachers, chaplains, and imams and would control 
and organize religious practices.540 The bill was accepted by the Assembly by show of hands. 
There were no objections to this proposal.541 By establishing this religious institution, the 
Government took strict control over religious affairs in the country. The third Kemalist initiative 
was the unification of education to be discussed in the fourth chapter.  
After debate in the Grand National Assembly, the Assembly accepted the deposition of the 
Caliph, the abolition of the Caliphate, and the expulsion of all members of the Ottoman house from 
Turkish territory to prevent “any return to the Ottoman era” on March 3, 1924.542 When the 
decision of the abolition of the Caliphate was taken by the Grand National Assembly, Abdulmecid 
Effendi, the last Caliph was in Istanbul. Orders were sent immediately to Istanbul to expel him 
from the country. The decision of the Assembly was relayed to him by Haydar Bey, the Governor 
of Istanbul, and Sadettin Bey, the Chief constable of Istanbul. The next day at 5 am, the last Caliph 
was forced to leave the country with his family.543 Abdulmecid Effendi and his family got on the 
train in the Catalca station, and departed to Switzerland.544 Bernard Lewis stresses the choice of 
Catalca station to prevent demonstrations as: “the unhappy Abdulmecid was packed into a car and 
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driven to a railway station to board the Orient Express- not the main Sirkeci station, where his 
departure might have provoked demonstrations, but a small one outside the city.”545 
The foreign press reported protest demonstrations. According to the Corriere della Sera, a 
demonstration was organized in Trabzon malcontents who were against the decision of the 
Government.546 Journal de Genève agreed that the exile of the Last Caliph caused demonstrations 
in Trabzon.547 This news was not cited any Turkish newspaper at that time. However, Trabzon was 
a center of the opposition. Therefore, there was a possibility of this kind of demonstration. 
While Kemalists condemned the last Caliph harshly, he accepted the decision of the Grand 
National Assembly calmly. Abdulmecid Effendi declared that he was always a respectful servant 
to his nation and he would be engage in scientific researches abroad.548 While the train was leaving 
the Turkish border, the Turkish journalists wanted to make a last interview with him. In his last 
interview, Abdulmecid Effendi underlined that he would always pray for the nation and would not 
be a tool for foreign ambitions. He also declared that he would be engaged in the fine arts in 
Switzerland.549    
After the abolition of the Caliphate, Mustafa Kemal gathered the editors of Istanbul press 
in Ankara to explain his thoughts on this issue. He believed that the decision to abolish the 
Caliphate would be beneficial for the country and these benefits would be seen soon.550 The 
attitude of the Istanbul press was positive in general. Even the conservative newspaper Tevhid-i 
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Efkar accepted this change. It underlined that by this decision, obstacles in the way of progress 
were removed; therefore, the government should obtain the improvement of the people’s welfare 
immediately.551  
Abolition of the Caliphate was announced with official notices, and was welcomed by 
some Turkish citizens.552 They sent telegrams to the Grand National Assembly celebrating the 
decision. In one of these telegrams, Hasan Bey and Mustafa Ruhi Bey, school teachers in Keskin, 
described the Caliphate as a harmful institution which ate away of the social life of Turks.553 In 
another, Atif Bey, Governor of Kirsehir, was thankful to the members of the National Assembly 
who ended the Office of Caliphate, which had exploited the nation unmercifully for centuries.554 
Fatin Bey, Governor of Kastamonu, and the notables of Kastamonu sent a telegram to the Fethi 
Bey, the President of the National Assembly, blaming the Ottoman dynasty as an obstacle in the 
way of the progress of the Turkish nation. The caliphate was a tool for the Ottoman dynasty to 
continue its despotism.555 From these telegrams it can be said that the officials, such as governors 
and school teachers, were eager to show their loyalty to the Kemalist regime. The attitude of the 
ordinary people was more reluctant. This reluctance caused problems to the regime in following 
months, particularly in the Sheikh Said Rebellion of February 1925.556  
After the abolition of the Caliphate and the dethronement of the Caliph, the Kemalist 
regime ordered imams and preachers to give khutbas557 praying for the prosperity and security of 
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the Republic and nation.558 In the first Friday prayer, imams gave sermons for the good of the 
Republic.559  
2.4.9 Efforts for the Revival of the Caliphate and Kemalist Turkey 
The Kemalist regime considered the Caliphate Question would not be a serious problem 
abroad after its abolition. From discussions in the Assembly, the Kemalist deputies gave no credit 
to the Caliphate and described this institution as useless and unnecessary one. Besides, the 
Kemalist regime tried to convince the public that the Caliphate was useless during the World War 
I and it could not be important in future. However, documents in the national archives undermine 
Kemalist discourse on this subject. The Kemalist regime was aware of the power of Caliphate and 
watched the process. As an example, the Kemalist regime tried to translate foreign articles in 
newspapers560, books561 and all published materials which were related to the Caliphate.  
The demonstrations, against the decision of the Ankara Government show how Kemalists 
stirred Muslim opinion worldwide.562 The Muslim world, especially Indian Muslims, was angry 
about the decision to destroy the Caliphate. While they were calling Mustafa Kemal “sword of 
Islam”, the last decision of the Turkish Assembly caused dissatisfaction in India.563 Valentine 
Chirol summarizes these objections as:  
In some Muslim countries outside Turkey the action of Ankara has already 
produced much more public commotion. The news reached Delhi on the very day 
when the All-India Caliphate Committee was receiving a Turkish Mission 
ostensibly representing the Red Crescent. At this most inauspicious juncture came 
to the bombshell of the Caliph’s deposition. Despairing telegrams were sent to 
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Ankara, begging Mustafa Kemal to reconsider his action, and urging that, at any 
rate before giving effect to it, consultation should take place between representative 
Mohammedans from all parts of the Islamic world. Ankara’s reply was the abolition 
of the Caliphate was a matter of purely internal concern and that Turkey would 
brook no interference from outsiders whether Muslim or non-Muslim.564  
This example is important to undermine the Kemalist assertion of the uselessness of the 
Caliphate. The Turkish assembly sent a mission to India to get financial aid from Indian Muslims 
by representing the Office of Caliphate. Indian Muslims showed their respect to the Caliph and 
responded to Turkish mission very well. Mustafa Kemal notified Indian Muslims that the authority 
of the Caliphate was vested in the Grand National Assembly to reduce their reactions.565 But, this 
did not stop protests abroad, not only in the Muslim World but in Western countries also. The 
protest in the Berlin University in Germany was one of the important demonstrations against the 
decision of the Turkish Assembly.566 
Abolition of the Caliphate was backed by the foreign press and this satisfied the Turkish 
press at the beginning. The newspaper Aksam referred to the positive attitude of the French press 
which interpreted the abolition of the Caliphate as modernizing Turkey and establishing a new 
idea which welcomed Western progress in Turkey.567 However, British and French objections to 
this decision were criticized by Turkish journalists harshly. Necmeddin Sadik specified the 
Kemalist attitude to the abolition of the Caliphate as: “…a Turkish nation, without a Caliph and 
Sultan, frightened the Machiavellist politics of the Western powers. Turks proved that they left the 
adventures of the Union of Islam by abolishing the Caliphate. By this means, the danger of the 
political Islam was eliminated in the Central Asia and India forever. Turks proved that they had 
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no interests in the rest of the World except their own country. British should be content to this 
attitude of Turks.”568 Mehmed Asim Bey criticized the British attitude as the “hatred of Turk” in 
this subject.569  
While the Kemalist press harshly criticized the attitude of the foreign press, the 
conservative newspaper Tevhid-i Efkar described this attitude as a normal one. According to the 
newspaper, the Kemalist press thought that the Caliphate Question was an internal issue. However, 
the attitude of French and British governments and news in the foreign press undermined this 
Kemalist assertion. Tevhid-i Efkar alluded to the deficiency of the Kemalist regime because of its 
failure to evaluate the external effects of the abolition of the Caliphate.570   
In fact, the vacancy of the Caliphate gave a chance to foreign powers, such as Great Britain, 
France, and Italy, to exploit this issue politically. The British project of a new Arab Caliphate led 
by Sharif Hussein, the king of Hedjaz, was one of these initiatives. Following the abolition of the 
Ottoman Caliphate in March 1924, King Hussein made haste to declare his readiness to accept the 
office of Caliphate.571 His followers acclaimed him as the new caliph on March 5, 1924, only two 
days after the Turkish decree. After this acclamation, they organized the Pilgrimage Congress in 
July 1924.572 This project raised some concerns among the great powers, especially in France. The 
French Government was fearful of Great Britain’s potential advantage in influence over Arab 
Kingdoms by establishing an Arab Caliphate. However, when Hussein was toppled by the Saudis, 
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his claim ended also.573 Beyond the British attempt, the French government was also looked at 
creating a new Caliphate in North Africa, probably in Morocco, under the French mandate.574 On 
the other hand, the Italian Government invited the last Caliph to settle in Italy.575 While Kemalist 
orthodoxy claims that the importance of the Caliphate was miniscule, these initiatives deny this 
assertion. The Office of Caliphate was still regarded as an important institution.   
After Sharif Hussein, the British Government used Fuad, King of Egypt, to establish the 
Caliphate in Egypt. Another “caliphate congress” was largely organized by Egyptian religious 
scholars, members of Al-Azhar, in May 1926 at Cairo. Those in attendance represented more of 
the Muslim world but were heavily weighted toward Egyptian and Palestinian delegates.576 
Esposito describes the struggle of the Congress as: “The congress reasserted the traditional 
mainstream belief that the caliphate is legitimate and necessary. However, it acknowledged that a 
caliph with both spiritual and temporal authority was not possible, given the prevailing political 
situation; and so the issue remained unresolved.”577 While Fuad tried to have himself elected 
caliph, he failed due to negative reactions from Muslim leaders. In particular, the Indian Khilafat 
(Caliphate) movement even refused to send delegates, fearing that the Congress was designed to 
advance the Egyptian King’s claims. After these initiatives, another congress was held in 
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Jerusalem in 1931, where the last Caliph, Abdulmecid, tried to gain recognition, but was 
unsuccessful due to political conflicts amongst the participants.578  
In conclusion, after the separation of the Caliphate from the Sultanate in November 1922, 
the traditional power of religious ideology diminished but was not finished totally. The Kemalist 
regime was aware of the potential threat of the Caliphate to its ideological identity. While Mustafa 
Kemal felt that the Caliphate was useful during the negotiations in the Peace Conference in 
Lausanne, he broke his ties with this traditional power after the Peace Treaty was signed in July 
1923, and Kemalists looked for an opportunity to destroy the Caliphate totally. The letter of the 
Indian Muslim leaders to the National Assembly was seen as a good opportunity to attack the 
Caliphate. Kemalists described the Caliphate as an issue justifying foreign intervention, and so 
wanted to abolish it as soon as possible. In March 1924, the abolition became a fact. With this 
decision, Kemalists broke all their ties with traditional Islamic institutions. The main Kemalist 
justification for this decision was the Caliphate became unnecessary, but this is not completely 
true. The Mosul Question between Turkey and the Great Britain was still on the table at that time 
and it is puzzling to not use the political power of the Caliphate against the British. Besides, the 
abolition of the Caliphate would destroy the traditional loyalty of Kurds to the Turkish state. 
Kemalists ignored the Kurdish disappointment with this decision cutting religious ties between 
these two nations. The consequence was the Sheikh Said Rebellion in the Kurdish region of Turkey 
in 1925 because of the Kemalist negligence of the concerns of Kurds.  
2.5 Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925 and the Elimination of First Opposition Party 
The abolition of the Sultanate in November 1922, and the Caliphate in March 1924, 
shattered the traditional political structure in Turkey. The modernization and secularization of 
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Turkey worried conservatives about the future of society. The Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925, the 
first real uprising against the Kemalist modernization and secularization, aimed to revive the 
Caliphate destroyed by Kemalists in March 1924.579 The rebellion was led by Sheikh Said, an 
influential and revered sheikh of the Nakshibendi dervish order among the Zaza tribes which 
mostly inhabited in the eastern provinces of Elazig, Genc, and Dersim.580 
The motives and character of the rebellion have been interpreted in various ways by 
Turkish and foreign scholars. One of these approaches is the nationalist character of the rebellion. 
As an example, Robert Olson sees this rebellion as Kurdish nationalist. In his book, “The 
Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925”, Olson explained 
this rebellion as: “The Sheikh Said Rebellion was the first large-scale nationalist rebellion by the 
Kurds. The role of the Azadi581 was fundamental in its unfolding. Kurdish intellectuals and military 
officers lay at the heart of the nationalist movement, in terms of organization and recruitment. The 
paramount influence of the more secular or non-cleric Kurdish nationalist organizations must be 
separated from the rebellion itself and its ‘sheikhly’ leadership. The Sheikh Said rebellion was led 
largely by sheikhs, a deliberate determination by the leadership of Azadi from 1921 onward.”582 
The second approach sees both religious and nationalist motives behind the Sheikh Said 
Rebellion. Erik Jan Zurcher emphasizes that while “the leadership was undoubtedly motivated by 
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the desire for an autonomous or even independent Kurdistan, the rank and file acted from religious 
motives, demanding the restoration of the holy law and the caliphate.”583 Like Zurcher, Hans-
Lukas Kieser also points out that the rebellion was motivated partly by religion and partly by 
Kurdish nationalism.584 Ersin Kalaycioglu indicates the importance of Kurdish intelligentsia 
behind the rebellion: “Islamic propaganda was a smokescreen to hide the true feelings of the 
Kurdish leaders, who would establish a Kurdish state, under the guise of a ‘Sharia State’ for the 
Kurds. Kurds had been a tribal people, whose identity was deeply influenced by Islam. The 
Kurdish intellectual nationalists assumed that the only way to mobilize the tribes was to rally them 
under the flag of Islam, for their ethnic identity did not seem to transcend beyond their tribal 
allegiances.”585  
The third and most common approach is to emphasize the religious character of the 
rebellion.  Kemalist scholars mostly explain this rebellion as a reactionary uprising which aimed 
to destroy the newly established republic. In particular Behçet Cemal and Metin Toker have 
reflected this Kemalist orthodoxy. Behcet Cemal depicts Sheikh Said as a great agitator. He 
indicated that Sheikh Said’s inflammatory speeches inspired villagers with hatred against the 
Republican government.586 Metin Toker also sees the cause of the rebellion as a reactionary 
mentality. He summarized that the mentality of Sheikh Said as: “the madrasahs have been closed 
down. The Ministry of Religion and Pious Foundations has been abolished. In the newspapers a 
horde of irreligious writers wantonly insult religion and besmirch the name of our Lord the 
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Prophet. I shall this very day, if only I can, start struggling and become one of those who contribute 
to the saving of religion.”587 More recently Yasemin Celik also shares the same Kemalist point of 
view in this subject. Moreover, she gives credit to the opposition behind this rebellion. She asserted 
that “Sheikh Said’s goal was to establish a traditional Islamic order in Turkey, and he was 
supported not only by Kurds but also by groups dissatisfied with the secular direction the country 
was taking.”588 
The religious character of the Sheikh Said rebellion was mostly accepted by foreign 
scholars also. Douglas Howard hold “the rebellion was expressed in a powerful religious idiom, 
calling for restoration of the caliphate and rule by the sharia.”589 The importance of religion and 
the caliphate for the Kurds was mentioned by Eleanor Bisbee also. She stresses that “they (Kurds) 
are Muslims, and when the new Turkish government went so far as to depose the head of their 
religion, the Caliph, and to promulgate secular Turkish laws, the Kurds rebelled.”590 Asa Lundgren 
indicates that the rebellion was framed as a “holy war” by the Kurdish rebels and they were 
demanding the restoration of the Caliphate.591 Henry Elisha Allen depicts the revolt in the eastern 
provinces as “the danger and strength of reaction and ignorant fanaticism in the country.”592 Philip 
Price also emphasizes that Kurds rebelled against the secular republic and for the restoration of the 
Sultan and the Islamic law.593 
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Following the formation of Ismet Pasha’s Government on March 3, 1925, a drastic ‘Law 
on the Maintenance of Order’ was rushed through the Assembly, giving extraordinary and, in 
effect, dictatorial powers to the government for two years on March 4, 1925.594 This law, which 
remained in effect until 1929, provided the administrative basis for the government’s authoritarian 
tendencies.595 The Sheikh Said Rebellion gave a great opportunity to Mustafa Kemal to ban the 
first opposition party in the Grand National Assembly. On the advice of the Independence 
Tribunal, the government closed down the Progressive Republican Party on June 5, 
1925.596According to the tribunal, members of the party had supported the rebellion and tried to 
exploit religion for political purposes.597  
The Kemalist attitude changed frequently during the rebellion. While Kemalists initially 
blamed the rebellion as a reactionary uprising, their view shifted to a nationalist reaction which 
was backed by the British Government at the end. This section will trace these Kemalist changes. 
Moreover, it will discuss Yusuf Ziya Bey, deputy of Bitlis and member of the Second Group in 
the first period of the Grand National Assembly. He later was executed in April 1925 during the 
Sheikh Said Rebellion, accused of being one of the Azadi leaders who were responsible for this 
revolt. However, Yusuf Ziya Bey rejected nationalist aspirations many times in his speeches in the 
Assembly.  The fraternity of the Turkish and the Kurdish nations under the banners of Islam was 
his key idea. His thoughts favored Islamic brotherhood more than Kurdish nationalism.  
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Freedom of press suffered a blow after the Law on the Maintenance of Order was accepted 
by the Assembly. The Kemalist regime’s long term dissatisfaction with the Istanbul press was 
fulfilled after this law was effectuated. The ban on conservative and socialist publications left the 
Kemalist press as the only source of information. Therefore, the Sheikh Said Rebellion gave an 
opportunity to silence the press opposed to the Kemalist regime. This section will cover the 
implementations of Law on the Maintenance of Order as a tool to destroy the opposition on the 
way to Kemalist autocracy. 
2.5.1 Kurdish People and Their Support to the Turkish War of 
Independence  
The War of Independence united the Kurdish and Turkish people under the banner of 
Islam.598 The leaders of the resistance movement were aware of the importance of Islamic 
discourse in the war years. Mustafa Kemal tried to mobilize the religious legitimization at his 
disposal in order to create a broad alliance during the war years. Kurds accepted Mustafa Kemal’s 
leadership only because he promised to protect and preserve the caliphate and form a new, 
religiously legitimized state.599 
The majority of Kurds in the Ottoman Empire supported the resistance movement against 
the invasion of the Allied powers. There were Kurdish representatives, who collaborated with the 
other Muslim elements of the Empire, in the congresses of Erzurum in June 1919, and Sivas in 
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November 1919, and even on the nationalists’ representative committee.600 Denise Natali 
emphasized the Kurdish support to the resistance movement and their rejection of the separatist 
movement as: “…Kurds from Sivas, Diyarbakir, Harput, Van, and Bitlis refused separation from 
the Ottoman community. Kurdish chiefs in the Erzincan region protested against Serif Pasha, 
arguing that the Kurds were the ‘legitimate brothers of the Turks’ and demanding not to be 
separated from their compatriots. Sheikh Abdulkadir, a Kurdish notable and member of the 
Ottoman Council of State, criticized Kurds who demanded independence, claiming it was 
indignant to Kurdish honor. Like Bedirhan, Abdulkadir refused to support Serif Pasha’s map of 
Kurdistan presented at the Paris Peace Conference.”601 
The Treaty of Sevres, the treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Allies at the end of 
World War I, was signed on August 10, 1920. An independent Kurdistan was promised by this 
treaty. However, the Kurds supported the resistance movement, despite the efforts of British agents 
to influence them and despite the fact that they were granted autonomy under the Treaty of 
Sevres.602 Kurdish tribal leaders sent telegrams to the Grand National Assembly to show their 
loyalty. In one telegram, Kurdish leaders underlined that “Kurds understood that small pieces 
could be swallowed easily. We reject the Kurds who want to separate themselves from the Turkish 
unity. The destiny of Kurds is the same as the destiny of Turks. We do not wait any other savior 
except the Ankara Government and we do not wish to beg mercy from the Allies. We will support 
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our Government until peace is achieved.”603 The Kurdish leaders of Van also sent another telegram 
to the Government declaring the only representative of the Kurdish people in the Peace Talks of 
London in 1921 as the Ankara Government.604  
Not only British efforts to recruit Kurds were condemned by Kurds but Greek initiatives 
also. While Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of General Staff, was explaining the military situation after the 
Battle of Sakarya in August-September 1921, he mentioned a Greek initiative which aimed of 
independence for Kurds. Yusuf Ziya Bey, deputy of Bitlis, pointed that this kind of initiative went 
nowhere in Kurdish regions. He went to his polling district and talked with all Kurds there. He 
underlined that there were no subversive ideas in Kurdish region and he believed that those ideas 
would never be effective. He described ordinary Kurds’ thoughts about the Ankara Government 
as: “there was a fire far away and many Kurdish men were sitting around the fire. These men 
became more specific by giving an example. The Ankara Government is a fire, a light for the 
Islamic World. If it will be extinguished, the entire Islamic World would be extinguished.” Ilyas 
Sami Bey, deputy of Mus, also described ineffective propaganda which aimed to separate the 
Kurdish people from their Turkish countrymen.605   
Yusuf Ziya Bey was one of the most important representatives of the unity of Kurdish and 
Turkish people in the Grand National Assembly. He summarized general feelings of people in the 
Kurdish land, stressing the religious identity of Kurdish people many times. When the Ankara 
Government wanted to send a committee to Kurdish territory, Yusuf Ziya Bey advised the 
government to choose mostly religious deputies who could touch the feelings of Kurds. If the 
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government instead appointed military men, the local residents of Kurdistan would be disgusted. 
People in Kurdish lands did not like to see people in uniforms. According to Yusuf Ziya Bey, the 
religious leaders of the Assembly would be most effective if they were sent to the Kurdish region. 
This committee should counsel people in the mosques and preach to them. They had to talk with 
the religious scholars over the religious issues and remove false ideas among the people.606   
After the Turkish victory over the Greeks, the peace talks between the Ankara Government 
and the Allies began in Lausanne, Switzerland. The Kurdish Question was at the table again in this 
Conference. Kurdish deputies in the Assembly showed their support once more for the Ankara 
Government. Diyab Aga, deputy of Dersim, pointed that there were neither Kurdish nor Turkish 
factions in the Assembly. He said that there was a unity between deputies but the enemies wanted 
disunite this fraternity. Suleyman Necati Bey, deputy of Erzurum, underlined the kinship of these 
two nations. He described the unity of Kurds and Turks as the result of a mixture which lasted 
many centuries. He believed that neither Turks nor Kurds could live separated from each other.607  
Yusuf Ziya Bey declared the most powerful words on this subject. He warned the 
representatives of Ankara Government in Lausanne about the Mosul Question. He said that the 
separation of Mosul from eastern Turkey would be the death of Kurdish lands. Moreover, he 
underlined the brotherhood of Turks and Kurds: “Europeans say that the major minority in Turkey 
is Kurds. I am a son of a Kurdish man. Therefore, I want to assure you as a Kurdish deputy, Kurds 
do not want anything except the prosperity and success of their elder brothers, Turks. We – Kurds- 
tread all rights given by Europeans in the Treaty of Sevres under our feet. We fought in the 
Mesopotamia campaigns with Turks together. We sacrificed our blood with Turks, and we did not 
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want to separate ourselves from our Turkish brothers. We did not want to separate from them and 
we will not.” Yusuf Ziya Bey added the importance of Kirkuk and Mosul for Kurds and warned 
the delegation in Lausanne to save that most important Kurdish region.608  
The Mosul Question was the core of the discussions in the Grand National Assembly. Unity 
between Kurds and Turks was evident during these discussions. Rauf Bey, the PM of the Ankara 
Government, explained the situation in the peace talks as “the majority of Mosul was Kurdish and 
Turkish people who united under the same religion, wish and feeling.”609 Sirri Bey, deputy of 
Izmit, referred to Lord Curzon’s statement which underlined that the majority of Mosul was 
Kurdish. Sirri Bey emphasized the unity of Kurdish and Turkish people in Turkey. Therefore, 
Mosul should be left to Turkey because of its majority. If Mosul was dominantly Arab land, then 
it could be discussed. However, it was a dominantly Kurdish land and should be a part of Turkey.610 
Yusuf Ziya Bey expressed his loyalty to his Turkish countrymen once more. In his speech, he 
brought up Lord Curzon’s statement and said that if Mosul was a Kurdish land, the majority of 
Kurds lived in Turkey; therefore the separation of Kurdish Mosul from its majority in Turkey was 
a contradiction for the Allies. If the rights of minorities were accepted by Allies, they had to leave 
Mosul to Turkey. Moreover, Yusuf Ziya Bey described the representatives of the Ankara 
Government as not representing only Turkish people but also Kurdish people. Therefore, this 
committee was a Kurdish committee in Lausanne. The attitude of British statesmen about not 
leaving Mosul to Turkey because of its Kurdish majority was a contradiction according to Yusuf 
Ziya Bey. Kurds and Turks were united and Mosul should follow this unity.611          
                                                 
608 TBMM ZC, 3 Nov. 1922, v.24, 353. 
609 TBMM ZC, 3 Jan. 1923, v. 26, 147. 
610 TBMM ZC, 3 Jan. 1923, v. 26, 157. 
611 TBMM ZC, 3 Jan. 1923, v. 26, 166. 
 163 
British projects for the future of Kurdistan were rejected by Kurdish deputies in the 
Assembly. Yusuf Ziya Bey in particular criticized Lord Curzon for these schemes. As the head of 
the British delegation Lord Curzon asserted that the Kurdish deputies were appointed by Mustafa 
Kemal. Moreover, he dismissed the Kurdish deputies as ignorant and ineligible to represent Kurds. 
Yusuf Ziya Bey rejected all of these ideas. He declared that if ignorance was rejection of British 
policies and poisonous activities, he accepted ignorance. Moreover, he stressed legal elections in 
Turkey. Yusuf Ziya Bey underlined that there was not any single myrmidon of Mustafa Kemal in 
the Assembly, but instead all deputies were elected by the people. When the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire in World War I became a fact and the rights of every nation were supported by 
the declaration of Wilson, the Kurdish people decided to collaborate with their Turkish brothers 
and went to the polls to elect their deputies to the Assembly. According to Yusuf Ziya Bey, Kurds 
had a single idea: to unite the destiny of Kurds with Turks. If Lord Curzon had tried to separate 
Kurdish people 15 years ago, it might have had some effect. However, the Kurdish people and 
intellectuals would not be entrapped by the British after they saw the fate of Albania, Iraq, Syria, 
and Ireland. Yusuf Ziya Bey shouted in the Assembly that they would get Mosul from the British 
as soon as possible. If the British Government did not leave Mosul to Turkey, Yusuf Ziya Bey 
described them as sinking bloody wells near the petroleum wells. According to him, Kurds would 
expel the British from Mosul.612   
Yusuf Ziya Bey showed his dissatisfaction with nationalism, declaring: “I am not 
nationalist. Islam banned nationalism. I am only Muslim and nothing else. I always live in an 
Islamic way and my opinions are suitable to Islam. I do not accept nationalism.”613 He showed his 
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respect to his Turkish countrymen and he rejected the allegations of Kurdish nationalists. In 
another speech when the Mosul Question was discussed in the Assembly, Yusuf Ziya Bey stressed 
once more the importance of Mosul and then he uttered his sincere words about Turks and Turkey: 
“My friends, I am a Kurd who desires the rise, the honor, and the progress of Turkey sincerely. 
The reason for that was my language which gave honor to me to be literate. This language is 
Turkish not my ethnic language Kurdish.  Because of this I want the rise and glory of Turks.”614    
2.5.2 Kemalist Policies towards to the Kurdish People after the War of 
Independence 
After the Turkish War of Independence, the Kemalist attitude changed towards Kurds in 
Turkey. First of all, Kemalists started to break their political promises to the Kurdish people. They 
had not accorded to Sunni Kurds the autonomy for regions in southeast Turkey where large 
Kurdish populations lived. However, this autonomy had been promised by Kemalists to Kurds for 
their collaboration during the War of Independence.615 Zurcher described this attitude as: “Within 
the new borders of the republic about 20 percent of the population was Kurdish, but they were not 
mentioned in the Peace Treaty of Lausanne and promises of autonomy made by the nationalist 
leaders, including Mustafa Kemal himself, during the independence struggle, were forgotten. This 
was a great disappointment to the Kurdish nationalists."616  
While the denial of the political autonomy of the Kurdish region raised dissatisfaction 
among the Kurds, relations between Kurds and the predominantly Turkish republican government 
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deteriorated in 1924. The abolition of the caliphate removed an important religious symbol that 
bound the two communities together. This event drove a wedge between the Turkish nationalists 
and the mostly conservative Sunni Muslim Kurds.617 
Beyond the political and religious concerns, the cultural denial of the Kurdish people 
caused resentment as well.618 The nationalist regime started to construct a new national 
consciousness and developed a repressive policy towards Kurdish identity: the public use of 
Kurdish and the teaching of Kurdish were prohibited. Laws passed by parliament in 1924 
forbidding publications in Kurdish made the chasm between the Turkish nationalists and Kurdish 
people even wider.619 Moreover, Kurds were defined as “Mountain Turks” and they did not receive 
any special benefits, and in fact, laws were instituted in order to deny, and even erase, the separate 
identity of the Kurds. Beyond the ban on the Kurdish language, traditional Kurdish dress was 
banned and various villages with Kurdish names were forced to adopt Turkish ones.620  
2.5.3 Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925 
The Kurdish revolt erupted in February 1925, led by an influential sheikh of the 
Nakshibendi dervish order, Sheikh Said. Ersin Kalaycioglu emphasized that the general resentment 
of the people in Eastern Anatolia was the main motive behind the rebellion. He underlines that 
“the more pious among the Sunni Muslims of Anatolia did not take the decision to abolish the 
Caliphate lightly. There was increasing criticism of Mustafa Kemal and the Republican regime 
among those affiliated with the religious establishment of the ancient regime of the Ottoman 
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Empire. The most important and even critical development, which directly challenged the 
legitimacy of the Republican regime, occurred soon after the Caliphate was abolished, in eastern 
Anatolia.”621  
According to Zurcher, the leaders of the Azadi movement and Sheikh Said were planning 
for rebellion in May 1925; however, the rebellion broke out prematurely due to a shooting incident 
with gendarmeries in the town of Piran on February 8. Sheik Said could not prevent the conflict. 
Evidently, some fugitives were hiding in the town and state officials asked Sheikh Said to 
collaborate in their arrest. While Sheikh Said was trying to mediate between state officials and the 
fugitives, a conflict erupted, and the gendarmes were killed during the armed conflict. This incident 
became the spark of the Sheikh Said Rebellion. After this spark, Sheikh Said and nearly 150 of his 
men started open revolt on February 13, 1925.622 First of all Sheikh Said gave a sermon explaining 
the reasons for the revolt in the mosque of Piran the same day. Sheikh Said lamented that “the 
madrasas had been closed down; the Ministry of Religion and Pious Foundations had been 
abolished. In the newspapers a horde of irreligious writers wantonly insult religion and besmirch 
the name of our Lord the Prophet. I shall this very day, if only I can, start struggling and become 
one of those who contribute to the saving of religion.” Moreover, he summarized his demands as 
the reestablishment of the caliphate and of the “rule of Sharia.”623 
The uprising found sympathizers and participants from among Kurdish tribes in 
southeastern Anatolia after Sheikh Said’s letters asking them for participation in the revolt. Nearly 
all the Zaza tribes and two large Kurmanji tribes of Kurds took part in the insurrection, but “the 
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divisions between the Kurds showed themselves again: the Alevi Kurds fiercely attacked the Sunni 
insurgents.” In his letters Sheikh Said stressed the Islamic reasons for his insurrection. In one of 
these letters, Sheikh Said told Bozan Agha, the head of Izolli tribe in Urfa, “I am fighting against 
the people who aimed to destroy our religion which was sent us by God 1300 years ago. If nobody 
helps me, we all be ruined.”624 Sheikh Said sent another letter to Halil Bey, the head of Milli Tribe 
in Urfa. In that letter Sheikh Said emphasized that “the current government destroyed the 
Caliphate, the office of Sheikh ul-Islam and the Pious Foundations. Moreover, government 
imitated the infidels. The leaders of the government mocked with the principles of the religion and 
aimed to change them. I am requesting your help against the government.”625 
The Kemalist Government did not notice the rebellion at the beginning. The first reaction 
of the government was to disregard the importance of Kurdish concerns. The rebellion was 
mentioned for first time in the Assembly on February 18, 1925. Hakki Tarik Bey, deputy of 
Giresun, asked a question about some rumors in the eastern provinces to the Minister of Interior. 
These reports said that Genc province was captured by Sheikh Said. Cemil Bey, Minister of 
Interior, answered this question as “even though there was brigandage led by Sheikh Said and his 
fellows, the Government took severe actions against them.” According to the Minister of Interior, 
the government thought that this rebellion would be suppressed within a few days.626 Turkish press 
was also sure that the rebellion was insignificant. The newspaper Cumhuriyet indicated that Sheikh 
Said and his 150 men were on the run from the Gendarmerie forces and looking for escape. 
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Cumhuriyet asserted that Sheikh Said was encouraged and assisted by the British.627 The Kemalist 
assertion of a British hand on this rebellion was mentioned for first time by Cumhuriyet.  
While the Kemalist approach to the rebellion was not serious at the beginning, the situation 
changed after February 23, 1925. The conflict spread to neighboring towns and cities around Piran, 
which led the government to take reactive measures. The state declared a state of emergency in 
more than 15 Kurdish-populated cities (Ergani, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Gene, Mus, Dersim, Mardin, 
Urfa, Siverek, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Hakkari, Kigi and Hinis in Erzurum) to prevent the spread of 
rebellion. Ali Fethi Bey’s cabinet established martial law for a month in these cities.628 Cumhuriyet 
also described rebellion in the provinces of Ergani, Diyarbakir, and Genc. The newspaper indicated 
that the foreign provocation was a possible cause. While Cumhuriyet was sure about British 
provocation at the beginning of the rebellion, its line changed to a possible provocation instead of 
a decisive one.629 Another important meeting was held under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, 
which Cumhuriyet described as leading to decisive measures a government declaration about this 
incident.630  
On February 25, 1925, the reasons for martial law and the rebellion were discussed in the 
Assembly. Prime Minister Ali Fethi Bey explained the Government’s position. He described the 
Nestorian Incident of 1924631 which was suppressed by Government. After the suppression of the 
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Nestorians, most rebels escaped to Iraq. There were some aftershocks of this incident still agitating 
the eastern provinces. According to the Prime Minister, Sheikh Said was connected to these 
seditious groups. Sheikh Said met with those opponents of the Government many times. Ali Fethi 
Bey enumerated the military measures that would suppress this rebellion soon. According to him, 
this rebellion aimed to achieve the Kurdish nationalist goals under the guise of reaction. 
Reestablishing the Sultanate of one of Abdulhamid II’s son and reestablishing the Caliphate were 
only the cover stories of the rebellion.632 Beyond Kurdish nationalism, Ali Fethi Bey underlined 
that Sheikh Said’s propaganda, that “the Government destroyed Islam and Islamic laws”, was also 
effective. Ali Fethi Bey described this rebellion as a reactionary one, similar to those seen in the 
late period of the Ottoman Empire, such as the “31 March Incident”.633 Ali Fethi Bey declared that 
Islam had become a tool in this rebellion; therefore the Government needed to punish those rebels 
harshly. Kazim Karabekir Pasha, the leader of the Progressive Republican Party in the Assembly, 
also agreed with the Government in taking all measures against the rebellion. Martial law in the 
eastern provinces was accepted unanimously by the Grand National Assembly. 634 
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Ali Fethi Bey’s Cabinet added a new article to the “Law of High Treason,” which was 
amended to include the political use of religion among treasonable offences.635 In this new article, 
using religion and religious feelings for political activity or being a member of an association 
which aimed to use religion against the Government’s policies was treason.636 Cumhuriyet also 
described this law as stopping people who used religion as a tool.637 
When Ali Fethi Bey condemned the rebellion as a reactionary uprising, public opinion was 
mobilized by local Kemalists. As an example, the mayor of Adana sent a telegram which showed 
the loyalty of people of Adana to the Government. The Mayor displayed his eagerness to destroy 
the reactionaries who aimed to endanger the future of Turkish revolution. 638 Mustafa Kemal gave 
his thanks to the local citizens of Adana.639 The branch of Turkish Hearths640 in Bolu likewise sent 
a telegram, which showed their hate to the reactionary uprising to Kemal.641 Moreover, some of 
the Kurdish tribal leaders showed their loyalty to the regime by sending telegrams to the Grand 
National Assembly.642 The correspondent of Cumhuriyet interviewed Zaro Agha, the oldest person 
in the world at that time. When the correspondent asked about the reactionary movement in 
Kurdish land, Zaro Aga condemned those rebels. As a Kurd, he declared that he did not know 
those people in Kurdish region and he described those rebels as “infidels”.643  
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In the meeting in Turkish Hearths, Halide Edip Hanim, one of the well-known Turkish 
novelist and nationalist and feminist political leader, also condemned reaction in eastern Turkey. 
In the meeting, she said illiterate people were seduced by local sheikhs. According to Halide Edip, 
the Republican administration aimed to raise its people to live in a modern way.644 However, 
Halide Edip barely escaped from the Kemalist regime’s oppression just one year later when the 
Kemalist purge of opponents happened in 1926.  
Reactionary rebellion was the main interpretation in the Kemalist press for the first period 
of the Sheikh Said Rebellion. In his column in Cumhuriyet, Yunus Nadi Bey indicated that the 
revolution could not tolerate these kinds of reactionary activities which caused bloodshed within 
the state. The unity of the Assembly was another point which Yunus Nadi Bey mentioned. The 
support of the opposition leader Kazim Karabekir Pasha for Ali Fethi Bey’s cabinet in the martial 
law issue showed unity against internal and external enemies.645 Necmeddin Sadik Bey, editor of 
Aksam, agreed. There was no doubt about the character of the rebellion. It was a reactionary 
uprising. Even though it was led by Sheiks or was supported by foreigners, this rebellion was a 
reaction against the regime. Necmeddin Sadik Bey used the expression of “31 March”. He believed 
that the regime could not allow another 31 March Incident anymore.646 The Kemalist jargon in this 
expression was shared by the magazine Akbaba also. The uprising in the eastern provinces of 
Turkey was identified with the 31 March Incident. However, Akbaba blamed some conservative 
deputies, such as Hoca Ziyaeddin Efendi, and newspapers for provoking this uprising. Moreover, 
Akbaba asserted that these newspapers abused the freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 
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Akbaba warned these conservative newspapers that if they had been published during the 
Government of Committee of Union and Progress, some of their members could have been 
executed and some newspapers banned.647  
While the Kemalist orthodoxy saw the Sheikh Said Rebellion as a reactionary movement, 
the Kurdish nationalist character of the rebellion was emphasized in the Kemalist press also. 
Cumhuriyet asserted that one of the sons of Abdulhamid II was proclaimed the king of Kurdistan 
by the rebels.648 The Minister of Interior Cemil Bey pointed out that the rebels wanted to conquer 
Diyarbakir to establish an independent Kurdistan.649 According to Cumhuriyet, Kasim Bey, one of 
the leaders of the rebellion, said the rebels were agitated by British to establish an independent 
state.650 Kasim Bey was mentioned by the newspaper Aksam once more on May 19, 1925. While 
Sheikh Said said he mutinied only for religion and rejected the thought of an independent state,651 
Kasim Bey asserted that their only goal was establishing a Kurdish state.652 Strikingly, at that time, 
Kasim Bey acted as a rebel, but, he was an agent of the Kemalist Government among the rebels 
and he was responsible for the capture of Sheikh Said. In the official periodical Ayin Tarihi, the 
rebellion was identified as a Kurdish nationalist rebellion which used religion as a guise. It also 
                                                 
647 “31 Mart” [31 March], Akbaba, 26 Feb. 1925, 1. 
648 “Kurdistan Krali” [The King of Kurdistan], Cumhuriyet, 27 Feb. 1925, 1. 
649 “Dahliye Vekili Cemil Bey’in Isyan Sahasindaki Son Vaziyet Hakkinda Gazetemize Beyanati” [The Minister of 
Interior Cemil Bey’s Statement about the Last Situation in the Rebellious Fields], Aksam, 11 Mar. 1925, 1. 
650 “Isyanda Ingiliz Parmagi Oldugu Anlasildi” [The British Hand in the Rebellion was Revealed], Cumhuriyet, 21 
Apr. 1925, 1. 
651 Necip Fazil Kisakurek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumlari [The Religious Victims of the Last Period], 10th ed., 
(Istanbul: Buyuk Dogu Yayinlari, 2008), 35-37. Cemal, Seyh Sait Isyani, 97-98. 
652 “Genc Isyaninin Muhakemesi Hakkinda Muhabirimizin Telgrafi” [The Telegraph of Our Correspondent about 
the Court of Genc Rebellion], Aksam, 19 May 1925, 1. 
 173 
claimed Sheikh Said collaborated with Armenians and Nestorians to establish an independent and 
united Kurdish-Armenian state.653 
Military measures were seen as effective solutions for suppressing the rebellion. In 
Cumhuriyet, Yunus Nadi Bey described the importance of the army as the core of the state which 
prevented not only the external threats but also the internal threat such as the Sheikh Said rebellion. 
He believed that the “iron hand’ of the Turkish army would destroy this rebellion completely.654  
Some of the scholars at that time pointed out the socio-economic conditions of the eastern 
provinces as the reasons of the rebellion. Mehmed Emin Bey, professor in the department of 
philosophy in Istanbul Darulfununu,655 emphasized the backwardness of the region. According to 
him, people lived in medieval conditions in the eastern provinces. They were not settled very well 
in that area. Their religious mentality was totally different than Turks. Their laws and customs 
were totally different than the Turkish society. Moreover, the ordinary people worked for the 
dignitaries and sheiks. Turks were far more modern than those people in the eastern provinces. 
Mehmed Emin Bey thought that the Turkish revolution was proper for the social level of the 
Turkish nation. However, the rebellious region was inferior to the Turkish level. Therefore, this 
inferiority created a favorable environment for the rebellion. The rebellion should be suppressed 
by military measures, but after that the intellectuals and youth organizations should do their duty: 
to educate those people who lived in that region. However, Mehmed Emin Bey’s proposal included 
a number of Turkification goals, for the mass in the eastern part of Turkey had to change their 
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beliefs and their future generation had to think, feel, and believe like Turks as a sole solution of 
their backwardness.656   
The revolt became a serious one when the rebels occupied Elazig on February 24, 1925, 
and laid siege to the important military center of Diyarbakir at the end of February 1925.657 By the 
beginning of March the rebellion had spread southeast Turkey and seemed a serious threat to the 
republican regime. After the rebels’ threat to Diyarbakir, the Kemalist government took strong 
countermeasures as soon as the extent of the insurrection became clear. The Kurdish rebels were 
now rapidly pushed back into the mountains. After armed clashes in many parts of the region 
surrounding Diyarbakir, the rebellion was violently suppressed by massive state forces and aerial 
bombardments. Sheikh Said was captured by the Turkish forces on April 15, 1925.658 The Kemalist 
press depicted this event as the victory of young Republic. Sheikh Said, labelled an oaf by 
Kemalists, deserved the iron fist of the Republic. Yunus Nadi Bey saw the capture of Sheikh Said 
as defeating the enemies of Republic. 659 After the rebellion was over, the government through the 
military authorities and the independence tribunals dealt harshly with the Kurds. Sheikh Said was 
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sentenced to death, together with forty-six of his followers, by an ‘independence tribunal’ in 
Diyarbakir, on June 29, 1925.660  
After the rebellion was suppressed totally in June 1925, large numbers of Kurds, more than 
20,000 in all, were deported from the southeast and forcibly settled in the west of the country in 
where they were surrounded by Turkish peasants.661 Beyond the deportation of Kurds, the 
Kemalist regime officially denied the existence of a separate Kurdish identity after 1925. Kurds 
were called as ‘Mountain Turks’ by the Kemalist government and were given the same rights as 
any Turkish citizen but without any national privileges.662 
2.5.4 Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu (Law on the Maintenance of Order) and 
Elimination of the Opposition Party 
Despite the consolidation of Mustafa Kemal’s hold on power in the elections of June-July 
1923, another opposition group emerged after the second period of the Assembly was convened 
on August 11, 1923.663 Some individuals like Rauf Bey and Kazim Karabekir Pasha, who had won 
fame during the national struggle, had the political stature to compete with Mustafa Kemal for 
leadership roles within the People’s Party. These individuals were relatively more gradualist in 
their approach to many questions of modernization and political change. The establishment of the 
Republic caused some resentment within the Kemalist party.664 This faction within the party, 
labeled a “Secret Opposition” by Mustafa Kemal, started their opposition to Mustafa Kemal 
                                                 
660 “Seyhlerle Hempalari Isyan ve Hiyanetlerinin Cezayi Sezasini Cektiler” [The Sheikhs and their Cohort Paid the 
Penalty of Their Rebellion and Treachery], Cumhuriyet, 30 Jun. 1925, 1. Lewis, The Emergence, 261. Ozoglu, From 
Caliphate to Secular State, 90. Lundgren, The Unwelcome Neighbor, 43. 
661 Zurcher, Turkey, 172.  Yalman, Turkey in the World War, 288. Price, A History of Turkey, 132. 
662 Price, A History of Turkey, 132. Zurcher, Turkey, 172. 
663 Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats, 91.  
664 Shissler, Between Two Empires, 187. Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 32-33. 
 176 
because of his authoritarian tendencies. Roderic Davison pointed out the characteristic of this 
opposition as:  
Kemal was not, however unopposed. Many Turks were shocked at the abolition of 
the caliphate, and at the accompanying blows to Islamic institutions. Some of these 
men, along with others who were quite western-minded, were also concerned about 
the uninhibited power that Kemal was gathering into his own hands. Among them 
were several of his staunchest supporters from the early days of the Nationalist 
movement- men like Rauf ( Orbay), Ali Fuad ( Cebesoy) Kazim Karaekir and Dr. 
Adnan [ Adivar] who were honest opponents of one man rule.665 
Dietrich Jung emphasizes the reasons behind the establishment of an opposition party to 
the Kemalist majority as: 
The motives behind the opposition within the military- bureaucratic elite were 
twofold. In the first place, fundamental programmatic differences, concerning 
issues such as the idea of maintaining a constitutional monarchy, the position and 
strength of the legislature, and the role of the localities, had grown since the 
proclamation of the Republic. In the second place, strong personal existed among 
leading members of the independence movement, in which the ‘edginess of several 
illustrious generals towards Mustafa Kemal’s ascendancy’ was of great 
importance.666 
 
Hakan Ozoglu points out that the main struggle between the Kemalist mentality and the 
opposition’s mentality as:   
Differences in the second TGNA generally stemmed not from the content or the 
spirit of the laws discussed in parliament but rather from the methods employed to 
pass them. This was the main difference between the opposition in the first and the 
second TGNA. Most (though not all) members of the group that formed the 
Progressive Republican Party shared a political vision similar to that of Mustafa 
Kemal for the modernization of the state. Yet they were more responsive to the 
demands of the public and hence can be described as evolutionists. On the other 
hand, the other group, often regarded as the revolutionists, believed that there was 
no time to waste in introducing and promoting new reforms. People needed to be 
led, and the reforms, if possible, had to be forced top down for the good of the 
country.667 
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When Mustafa Kemal demanded that all army commanders relinquish their seats in the 
Assembly and return to army posts in October 1924, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Ali Fuat Pasha, and 
Refet Pasha instead relinquished their army commissions.668 They also resigned from the People’s 
Party and, together with Rauf Bey, Adnan Bey, and other fellow critics of Mustafa Kemal formed 
the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkasi (Progressive Republican Party), in opposition to Mustafa 
Kemal’s People's Party in November 1924.669 Kazim Karabekir Pasha became the president of the 
new party. There were, in total, thirty two deputies who broke with the People’s Party caucus in 
parliament.670 
 The Progressive Republican Party had a more liberal program based on decreasing the role 
of the state to a minimum and introducing administrative decentralization. Beyond that, it 
emphasized democratic practices, the separation of powers, and civil liberties in its program. One 
of the main principles of the new party was its respectful approach to religion. Article 6 of the 
Progressive Republican Party’s program specified that “the party is respectful of religious ideas 
and beliefs.”671 
The establishment of an opposition party was not welcomed by Mustafa Kemal. Hakan 
Ozoglu emphasized that “Mustafa Kemal did not approve of the formation of the PRP as a political 
                                                 
668 Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats, 26. Davison, The Modern Nations, 130. 
669 Howard, History of Turkey, 94. Kramer, Islam Assembled, 6. Vanderlippe, The Politics of Turkish Democracy, 
21. Orga, Phoenix Ascendant, 154. Kinross, Ataturk, 448. Bahrampour labels the Progressive Republican Party as a 
“conservative party”, Turkey, 16. 
670 Howard, History of Turkey, 94. Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 33. Miller, The Ottoman Empire, 
556. Yerasimos gives this number as 22, Stefanos Yerasimos, “The Monoparty Period”, in Turkey in Transition: 
New Perspectives, ed. Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 83. 
671 Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, 17. Yerasimos, “The Monoparty Period,” 83. Davison, The Modern Nations, 130. 
Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 33. Zurcher, Turkey, 168. 
 178 
opposition the leaders of which had the potential to replace his leadership.”672 Like Ozoglu, 
Stefanos Yerasimos also underlines the dissatisfaction of Mustafa Kemal:  
Three days after the foundation of the Progressive Party, on 20 November, Mustafa 
Kemal gathered the leaders of his party, told them of the “counterrevolutionary 
threat” provoked by the religious reaction, and made them understand that he 
wished to undertake extraordinary measures. But since the party was reluctant to 
follow, he understood that it would be necessary to drop some ballast. Thus, he let 
go his government consisting of the “hardliners” of his party under the presidency 
of Ismet Pasha; and he named a new Prime Minister, Fethi Bey ( Okyar), who was 
known as a moderate. Nevertheless, from the outset, Mustafa Kemal was openly 
hostile toward the new party, portrayed it as reactionary, and sought the opportunity 
to break it. The occasion arose three months later, at the time of the first Kurdish 
uprising since the proclamation of the republic, that of Sheikh Said.673 
The struggle of the Progressive Republican Party to stop autocracy in Turkey became a 
null after the Sheikh Said Rebellion. The rebellion gave an opportunity to the Kemalist 
Government to pressure the opposition. Government asked the Progressive Republican Party to 
close down its local branches for fear of arousing the religious feelings of people in that region. 
The PRP refused this initiative of the Kemalist Government.674 The PRP leaders told the 
Government that if some of its members agitated such feelings, the Government could prosecute 
if necessary.675 Beyond that, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, the chairman of Progressive Republican 
Party, gave his emphatic support to government policy in the east, both in the Assembly and in the 
press.  
The Kemalist contradictions on the Kurds were seen in the change of Ali Fethi Bey’s 
Cabinet. Ali Fethi Bey, a moderate Kemalist, was forced to leave his position on March 2, 1925. 
Zurcher described the reasons behind this decision as: “the pressure of the hawks within 
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Republican People’s Party on Fethi was rising, Ismet had already returned to Ankara and attended 
the cabinet meetings.” 676 Kemalist orthodoxy alleged that Ali Fethi Bey was a docile man who 
could not deal with the rebellion in the eastern provinces very well. While the Assembly accepted 
martial law unanimously on February 25, 1925, the radical wing in the Kemalist party wanted 
more severe measures against the rebels just one week later this decision.677 During the discussion 
in the Assembly, Ali Fethi Bey explained that his Government had become a minority in the party 
discussion therefore he wanted to leave his position. On March 2, 1925, Fethi Bey lost a vote of 
confidence by the RPP faction when Mustafa Kemal himself sided with the hardliners who 
demanded stronger measures.678 Rauf Bey, one of the opposition leaders in the Assembly, 
criticized Ali Fethi Bey’s decision, for leaving his position would sow doubts within the state and 
abroad. Rauf Bey demanded more information from the Prime Minister about his decision.679 The 
next day, a new Cabinet was formed by Ismet Pasha. Ali Fuat Pasha, another opposition leader, 
criticized the change of the Cabinet as a secret plan. He mentioned that just a few days prior the 
Assembly gave a vote of confidence to Ali Fethi Bey’s Cabinet. However, after a secret meeting 
in the Republican People’s Party, Kemalist deputies repudiated their vote of confidence in the 
Prime Minister. According to Ali Fuat Pasha, there was another reason for this change: “the 
rebellions and reactionary movements have to be suppressed. The rebels and reactionaries have to 
be punished. There is no doubt about this. But, I request from the Government not to carry out the 
measures which restrict and oppress the rights and freedom of people in the administration.” The 
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new Cabinet of Ismet Pasha received a vote of confidence from 153 deputies on March 4, 1925. 
23 deputies were opposed.680     
The concerns of Ali Fuat Pasha became a fact after the Law on the Maintenance of Order. 
Following the government’s formation, a drastic ‘Law on the Maintenance of Order’ was rushed 
through the Assembly, giving extraordinary and, in effect, dictatorial powers to the government 
for two years on March 4, 1925. This law, which remained in effect until 1929, provided the 
administrative basis for the government’s authoritarian tendencies. It effectively served the 
Kemalist regime in crushing political opposition, silencing critical journalists and rushing through 
the cultural reforms.681 In the first article of this law, the Government was empowered to ban by 
administrative measure any organization or publication it considered might cause disturbance to 
law and order for two years. 682 
In the parliamentary discussions about the Law on the Maintenance of Order, the first 
article was interpreted as violating the Constitution by the opposition. Moreover, the opposition 
argued that the law would allow the banning of any group or publication deemed a threat to 
national security.683 Feridun Fikri Bey, deputy of Dersim, and Zeki Bey, deputy of Gumushane, 
opposed this law because of its clash with the Constitution. This law gave the Government 
authority to carry out death sentences by itself. Beyond this, Feridun Fikri Bey noted the broad 
meaning of “huzur” (order). According to him, violating order had a vast meaning and it was not 
easy to restrict it. Moreover, Feridun Fikri believed that the Government would control all political 
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actions and publications of the press under this law. Therefore, he was against this law as opposed 
to the Constitution, Republic, and national will.684 The president of the opposition party Kazim 
Karabekir Pasha was also against this law because of its diminution of national sovereignty. 
According to him, after this law, the voice of deputies could be heard only in the Grand National 
Assembly. Kazim Karabekir warned the Government this law would dishonor the history of the 
Republic.685 Kemalist press blamed the objections of the opponents as “bizarre” immediately.686 
The Kemalist press welcomed the Law on the Maintenance of Order. Yunus Nadi Bey was 
one of the advocates of the law. In his article in Cumhuriyet, he emphasized that the law was 
necessary because of the recent events in the state. Even though the law was not appropriate to the 
spirit of the republic, Ismet Pasha was forced to accept it to rescue the Republic from a reactionary 
rebellion. Yunus Nadi Bey admitted the law was severe, but the Government did not demand this 
law from delight in violence or imperious ambition but to defend the future of state.687  
The freedom of press was under the attack of the Kemalist deputies during debate. Recep 
Bey, Minister of Defence, directly attacked the Istanbul press. According to the Minister, the 
Istanbul press wanted to destroy the authority of Government. It depicted an Assembly of 
debauched and self-seeking people. Their publication affected especially the ignorant.688 While 
the Kemalist majority attacked the Istanbul press, the Minister of Interior gave an interview to the 
correspondent of Aksam. In this interview, Cemil Bey said that the law’s purpose was not imposing 
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censorship on newspapers but liability on people who caused factions within the state.689 However, 
the Kemalist Government took severe measures against the press immediately. Eight of the most 
important conservative, liberal, and even Marxist newspapers and periodicals, such as Tevhid-i 
Efkar, Son Telgraf, Istiklal, Sebilurresad, Aydinlik and Orak-Cekic, were banned by the 
Government. The Kemalist regime left the government organs Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National 
Sovereignty) in Ankara and Cumhuriyet (Republic) in Istanbul as the only national papers.690 The 
Minister of Interior pointed out that some of those newspapers were banned for using religion as 
a tool in the politics and some of them because of their objection to the current form of the 
government.691 
The freedom of press suffered a blow after the Law on the Maintenance of Order was 
accepted by the Assembly on March 4, 1925. The Kemalist regime’s long term dissatisfaction with 
the Istanbul press ended after this law was effectuated. The ban of the conservative and socialist 
publications left the Kemalist press as the only source of information for public opinion. Therefore, 
the Sheikh Said Rebellion had presented an opportunity to silence the press opponents of the 
Kemalist regime.  
After the law was effectuated, Independence Tribunals were reestablished in two different 
locations, one in the rebellious region and the other in Ankara. Mustafa Kemal used these tribunals 
as a weapon for the prosecution of political opponents and he was no longer ready to share his 
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power with other social or political groups that had supported his case in the war of 
independence.692 The Independence Tribunal in Ankara published a declaration proclaiming that 
people who used religion as a tool in their personal and political aims would be punished 
severely.693 
The Kemalist press started to attack opponents after the rebellion had ended in mid-1925. 
Yunus Nadi Bey criticized the opposition leader Kazim Karabekir Pasha, who had sown doubts in 
public opinion during the debate over the Law on the Maintenance of Order.694 Cumhuriyet also 
mentioned that the program of the opposition party had some points that should be investigated.695 
Beyond that, all the leading journalists from Istanbul were arrested and brought before the 
Independence Tribunal in the East. Eventually they were released, but they were not allowed to 
resume their work because of the strict control of the Kemalist regime.696 
The Sheikh Said Rebellion gave a great opportunity to Mustafa Kemal to ban the first 
opposition party in the Grand National Assembly. The Rebellion resulted in the closing down of 
Progressive Republican Party branches in eastern Anatolia on May 25, 1925. Correspondingly, 
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eight days later, on June 3, 1925, the government, based on the Law on the Maintenance of Order 
and on the advice of the Independence Tribunal, closed down the Progressive Republican Party.697 
According to the tribunal, members of the party had supported the rebellion and tried to 
exploit religion for political purposes. The relationship between the opposition party and the 
rebellion was systematically inculcated by the Kemalist press at that time. According to 
Cumhuriyet, Sheikh Said confessed that he liked the Progressive Republican Party and the 
newspapers Sebilurresad and Tevhid-i Efkar.698 Not only the opposition party but also the Istanbul 
press came under attack. Cumhuriyet asserted that Sheikh Said had confessed the publications of 
the Istanbul press influenced his thoughts and actions.699  
The Progressive Republican Party, established by the close friends of Mustafa Kemal, was 
banned and its leaders expelled from political life after June 1925. However, this was only the 
beginning. The final blow to the opposition came after the assassination plot on Mustafa Kemal in 
June 1926. Mustafa Kemal spent May and June 1926 on an extended inspection tour of the south 
and west of the country. When he was about to arrive in Izmir on June 15, 1926, a plot to 
assassinate him was uncovered. The organizer Ziya Hursid Bey, former deputy of Lazistan in the 
first period of the Assembly, opposed the abolition of the caliphate and also nourished a personal 
grudge against Mustafa Kemal. He was arrested with his friends before they achieved their goal. 
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Beyond the plotters, 21 members of parliament from the former Progressive Republican Party were 
arrested as organizers and members of the assassination plan also.700 
Accordingly, Rauf Bey, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Ali Fuat Pasha, Refet Pasha, and some 
other members of the assembly and minor officials were tried by the Independence Tribunal in 
Izmir in June 1926. The trial began on 20 June in the Alhambra cinema in Izmir; the presiding 
judge was Ali Cetinkaya, an old soldier, a deputy, and a veteran of the Kemalist cause from the 
beginning. On 13 July sentences of death were pronounced against the accused, and carried out 
the next day. Rauf Bey was tried in absentia for at the time he was in self-imposed exile in Europe. 
He was sentenced to ten years’ banishment. While some opponents of minor importance were 
executed, old friends of Mustafa Kemal, such as Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Ali Fuat Pasha and others 
were acquitted. The trial was a decisive blow to the opposition. Most of the war heroes appeared 
in court and after the decision they were totally expelled from political life in Turkey during 
Mustafa Kemal’s lifetime.701 
The Kemalist press agitated the public opinion against these people. Falih Rifki wrote in 
Hakimiyet-i Milliye that “antagonism to Mustafa Kemal was the apparent sign of the treason to the 
country. Any enemy of the Turkish nation loves him and any of his antagonists is the friend of 
Turkish nation. This is impossible.”702 Moreover, Falih Rifki Bey exalted Mustafa Kemal as “you 
are our father and will always be at the head of us.” Another pro-Kemalist Yunus Nadi Bey voiced 
his feelings as “they wanted to kill Gazi Mustafa Kemal, the president of Turkey. They wanted to 
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shoot him in the head and kill the great Turk who saved the Turkish nation. Finally, they would 
attempt to kill the symbol of Turkish nation, Mustafa Kemal. What kind of lofty thoughts and 
purposes are these?”703 The Kemalist press exalted the name of Mustafa Kemal as the symbol of 
Turkish nation and any criticism of him was tantamount high treason. Therefore, after this incident 
it would be impossible to criticize Mustafa Kemal.        
2.5.5 Cult of Personality of Mustafa Kemal After the Establishment of the 
Kemalist Autocracy 
 Eliminating the oppositions enabled the creation of an autocratic regime in Turkey in 1926. 
The image of Mustafa Kemal was exalted and his cult of personality was established by erecting 
his statues and monuments throughout Turkey. Fikret Baskaya summarizes this situation as “there 
was not any other leader except Mustafa Kemal had statues and monuments both in his lifetime 
and after his death.”704  
The epidemic of erecting the statues of Mustafa Kemal started in Istanbul in 1925. The 
Istanbul Municipality decided to erect a bronze statue of Mustafa Kemal in Gulhane Park, close to 
the Marmara Sea.705 Heinrich Krippel, the Austrian sculptor, was invited to Turkey for erecting 
this statue. Mustafa Kemal posed in front of him almost two hours.706 Before his departure to 
Vienna, Heinrich Krippel had an interview with the Turkish press. He emphasized that he would 
be successful because he was inspired by the great person in Cankaya, that is, Mustafa Kemal.707  
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The foundation stone of the first statue to Mustafa Kemal was laid in August 1925. The 
local governor and officials organized a ceremony to celebrate this event.708 After the statue was 
erected, the dedication ceremony was held in April 1926. However, the first statue was not 
approved by Turkish authorities. The head of sculpture was not look like Mustafa Kemal and the 
position of the arm in the statue was not accepted by the experts.709 Necmeddin Sadik Bey objected 
to erecting this statue in Istanbul. He saw no correlation between this statue and the genius, 
achievement, and personality of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal. He found this statue unattractive. 
Therefore, Ghazi could not be represented in this way and the citizens of Istanbul could not give 
as a gift to their Savior such a bad example as this statue. Necmeddin Sadik Bey saw the 
importance of a great statue of Mustafa Kemal as “after for many centuries, the first time a statue 
is erected in Istanbul, the most modern city of Turkey. Therefore, this statue has to be one of the 
most important statues in the world; otherwise it would be a shame for the citizens of Istanbul.” 
Necmeddin Sadik Bey advised local administrators that they had to find a great sculptor who would 
erect the best statue in the world. Necmeddin Sadik Bey exalted Mustafa Kemal as the most 
important person of the century, and his statue should be perfect, particularly since sculpture had 
been banned for many centuries. Moreover, Necmeddin Sadik Bey criticized the chosen place 
erecting of this statue. To him, Sarayburnu was not an appropriate place since it lacked population; 
therefore, the square of Sultanahmet or Ayasofya would be better for this statue.710 Finally the 
statue was erected in Sarayburnu on October 4, 1926.711   
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As Krippel’s sculpture was not accepted by the Kemalist press, these newspapers promoted 
bizarre suggestions. One was erecting a statue of Mustafa Kemal on the Maiden’s Tower of 
Istanbul. According to this plan, the statue should be faced to Europe, and its arms should be 
directed to the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. The correspondent of Aksam found this very 
interesting.712    
Not only the local administrator was interested in erecting a statue in Istanbul but the 
Government decided on another one in Ankara also. The Kemalist Government signed another 
contract with Krippel to erect a statue of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara. Krippel brought models to 
show Mustafa Kemal of the future statue in Ankara. According to Aksam, this statue would be 
seventeen meters in height and would have three figures around the statue.713  
Erecting a statue of Mustafa Kemal became a race between the Kemalis administrators and 
local notables. The local newspaper Turk Sozu started a campaign to erect a beautiful statue in a 
public garden in Adana. The newspaper advised the municipality to create the statue “while the 
dear fellow countryman of Adana is showing the way of felicity.”714 The municipality of Bursa 
and its branch of Republican People’s Party sent a committee to Ankara to inform Mustafa Kemal 
of their decision to erect one of his statues in Bursa. The citizens of Sivas sent a committee to 
thank to the President in Ankara also.715 The mayor of Corum indicated that in the celebration of 
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the Republic Day they laid the base of the statue of Mustafa Kemal which would be the temple of 
their lofty aim.716   
Destroying the opposition and purging opponents from the politics enabled the 
establishment of an autocracy in Turkey in 1926. After that year, the cult of personality of Mustafa 
Kemal was created by Kemalists. Erecting the statues of Mustafa Kemal was the first step in this 
cult. Firstly, the mayor of Istanbul decided to erect a statue of Mustafa Kemal in Sarayburnu, close 
to the Topkapi Palace, thus showing a new Sultan of Turkey to the public. Moreover, erecting 
statues was a major affront to the religious identity of Turks. Statues had been banned by Islamic 
thought for many centuries; however, Mustafa Kemal paid no attention to this ban. His 
encouragement promoted his statues in every city of Turkey after 1926. Local notables showed 
their loyalty to Mustafa Kemal by erecting his statues and bowed to them to show their respect. 
In conclusion, the abolition of Sultanate in 1922 and Caliphate in 1924 broke the traditional 
political structure in Turkey. The modernization and secularization of Turkey concerned 
conservatives over the future of society. After the abolition of the Caliphate, traditional schools, 
the madrasas, were banned by the Government in 1924. The religious character of the society was 
under attack by the Kemalist secularization. Religious sentiments were stronger in the eastern 
Turkey among the Kurds, who felt loyal to the Caliph in the meaning of fraternity in Islam. The 
Caliphate was the common tie between Turks and Kurds in the society and cutting this tie made 
Kurds disappointed. The fury of people in eastern Turkey produced the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 
1925, which started on February 13, 1925 and spread rapidly to eastern cities. The Rebellion was 
suppressed on April 15, 1925 after the surrender of Sheikh Said. The Rebellion gave a good chance 
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to the Kemalist regime to ban the opposition Progressive Republican Party from the politics 
through the Law on the Maintenance of Order accepted on March 4, 1925.Therefore, the rebellion 
was a turning point in establishing Kemalist autocracy. One of the consequences of this autocracy 
was creating the cult of Mustafa Kemal by erecting his sculptures in every part of Turkey.  
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Chapter 3 - Kemalist Reforms in Social and Legal Structure of 
Turkey 
After the establishment of the Kemalist single-party regime, which was ensured by the help 
of the extraordinary laws in the political structure of Turkey in 1925, social and legal reforms were 
launched and implemented by the Kemalist Government in a Jacobin way. For modernizing a 
nation, Mustafa Kemal and his allies gave a great importance to these reforms. The significance 
of social and legal reforms cannot be gainsaid during the Kemalist regime. However, these top 
down reforms were implemented by the force of the Law on the Maintenance of Order, which was 
accepted in March 1925.  
While the Kemalist orthodoxy asserts that there is an affinity between republicanism and 
democracy and Mustafa Kemal insisted that republicanism was synonymous with democracy in 
1933,717 the reality was totally different than this assertion. The style of elections and the mentality 
of the elected deputies denied this concept. The character of the Turkish elections was summarized 
very well in a New York Times’ articles in 1927. In the caption, the newspaper indicated the notion 
of election in Turkey as: “Kemal will pick his parliament.” The opposition was barred by the Law 
on the Maintenance of Order and the single party regime consolidated its power. This situation led 
to Mustafa Kemal’s designation as an “autocratic president.” Moreover, the confession of Mustafa 
Kemal’s friends gave a great detail about the mechanism of the regime: “his word is law is 
frequently said of Kemal, but his final and fully control of the sovereign assembly will turn this 
worshipful phrase into plain reality.”718  
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Beyond the elections, the strong popular demonstrations against the Kemalist regime after 
the social reforms showed how people grew tired of the authoritarian tendencies of the politicians 
who still disregarded their interests and concerns. Even though the name of the regime was 
changed to a Republic, public opinion was still ignored by the administrators. The New York Times 
indicated about this reality from the mouths of the Kemalist leaders as: “ this one-man rule, 
Kemal’s friends contend, is needed for ten years or more, for they consider their soldier chief, the 
man who balked the Allies, a great, ruthlessly patriotic leader who must guide the weak young 
nation until it learns to walk alone.”719 From this perspective, the new ruling elites wanted to 
continue a single party regime until they felt the Turkish people were mature.  
The main declared goal of the Kemalist regime in modernization was to destroy the 
obsolete institutions and notions of the religious structure in Turkey. To achieve their goals of 
modernizing Turkey, Kemalists tried to change the Turkish society in many ways. They wanted to 
dismiss Islam from the social and legal structure of Turkey. People’s lives and life styles, which 
were seen as obsolete and backward by the Kemalists, were exposed to the attacks of Kemalist 
modernization. The authoritarian Kemalist regime tried to change people’s traditional costumes, 
institutions, and beliefs in a harsh way by the help of strict laws. 
This research will show the continuation of the Ottoman reforms under the Kemalist 
leadership, contrary to the Kemalist orthodoxy which has seen Mustafa Kemal as the main source 
of all reformation movements for creating his cult of personality. The main difference between the 
Kemalist reforms and the previous eras was the high-speed of the Kemalist reforms. This research 
will show dissatisfactions among the Turkish people because of this precipitancy also.  
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3.1 The Dress Code: The Hat Law of 1925 
After crushing the opposition party and silencing critical journalists, the struggle of power 
ended with the victory of the Kemalists in the political arena in 1925. After this victory, Mustafa 
Kemal tried to change the society top down methods in a Jacobin way by using his political power. 
He started this change firstly by changing people’s attire.720 The main motive in his mind in this 
issue was that participation in European civilization would be possible by changing the outer 
appearance of the Turkish people. Wearing different clothes or a different headdress was seen as 
“being peculiar” by the Kemalist elites at that time. The New York Times indicated that “Mustapha 
Kemal and his associates evidently want the Turks to cease being a peculiar people, in either 
garments or habits.”721 Mustafa Kemal strongly believed that the Turkish nation needed to accept 
the entire values of the modern and civilized nations.  Therefore, the Turkish people must follow 
the civilized nations firmly and accept hats as a headdress as a symbol of this process. He strongly 
advocated this idea and started his campaign against fez, which was seen as a symbol of the past.722 
In his six-day long speech in 1927, Mustafa Kemal pointed out the importance of banning the fez 
as: “Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, 
of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilization, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary 
headdress of the whole civilized world, thus showing, among other things, that no difference 
existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilized 
mankind.”723 
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Bernard Lewis interprets this Kemalist reform on the ground of politics as: “The events of 
1925 had shown that the forces of reaction were still powerfully entrenched, and able to offer 
serious resistance to the progress of Westernization. The removal of the Caliphate had not sufficed; 
a further shock was necessary- a traumatic impact that would shake every man in the country into 
the realization that the old order had gone, and a new one come in its place. The fez was the last 
bastion of Muslim identification and separateness. The fez must go.”724 Like Lewis, Ahmed Emin 
Yalman emphasizes this reform as one of the important struggles between Kemalists and the 
“reactionary front” as a political matter. He points out that “the Turkish fez had embodied one of 
the few fortified positions left to reactionaries. They instinctively felt that the abandonment of the 
fez would mean the end of their power, that it would put the seal on the liberation of the people 
from the influence of religious tradition.”725 
Merve Kavakci emphasizes this ideology as: “Ataturk utilized in implementing his project 
of social change the introduction of immediate changes in the appearance of women and men as 
symbols of westernization. The hat law, which mandated Turkish men to wear hats in lieu of 
Islamic fez, was introduced within this context.”726 Yael Navaro-Yashin describes this policy in 
the same orthodox way also as: “…his hat law of 1925 prohibited the wearing of fez, a symbol of 
‘Orient’ in the eyes of Westerners, and decried its associated Ottoman social rankings. The bowler 
hat to be donned by men was to symbolize the association of the new republic with western as 
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opposed to Islamic civilization.”727 Anil Cecen, who shares the Kemalist orthodoxy like the others, 
thought about this change as a necessity to create a modern Turk.728 Moreover, Ayten Sezer Arig 
strongly believes that people’s minds would be changed by changing their outer appearances. 
Therefore, the Kemalist Government had a very strict policy on this issue from 1925 to 1934.729  
While Yashin thinks that this reform elevated the situation of Turkish women in society 
and “with the hat law, Ataturk also encouraged men to be tolerant to their wives and daughters’ 
dressing habits”730, this assertion is not totally true. This Law outlawed the traditional head 
garments for men in favor of the Western hat, through no comparable policies were implemented 
for women.731 Therefore, the Kemalist Government implemented Western hats by the force of Hat 
Law of 1925, but, the change of women’s headgear was left to some time in future. Ann Dismorr 
emphasizes this Kemalist attitude as “it was regarded as too delicate a challenge to take on.”732 
3.1.1 The Headdress Reform in the Ottoman Empire before the Hat 
Law 
The Hat Law of 1925 was one of the Kemalist top down reform. Mazhar Mufit Kansu, one 
of the closest friends of Mustafa Kemal, mentioned that Mustafa Kemal had a project to change 
the attire of Turkish society in 1919 in his memoirs.733 Even though there was no clear proof to 
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confirm this assertion, it is known that Ottoman statesmen attempted to change dress in the 
nineteenth century. It is historically true that headgear had always played an important role in the 
classical period of the Ottoman Empire. Each social and professional group (viziers, military 
commanders, Islamic scholars, artisans, different Christian communities, Jews, etc.) had its 
specified headgear, which helped to identify the social identity of a person in public space. 
Moreover, wearing of the headgear of a social group not one’s own was forbidden. There existed 
various forms of turbans even for different bureaucratic ranks.734 
The fez, a cylindrical red head covering, had been introduced to the Ottoman society as 
part of his reforms by Sultan Mahmud II after 1826. Ironically it was a Greek Christian fashion, 
prevalent in the islands and initially derived from the Barbary Corsairs. It was manufactured for 
the Ottoman market in Austria. Sultan Mahmud II had borrowed the fez from them when he 
decreed at the beginning of the nineteenth century that the fez be worn, as symbol of Ottoman 
citizenship, by all the races, religions, and nationalities in the Empire. It became compulsory for 
all civil servants and military officers to wear as a new official headgear. That headdress became 
the symbol of the Islamic-Ottoman Empire, even though Ottoman Christians and Jews also wore 
the fez after 1826.735 Paul Gentizon emphasizes the historical processes before and after Sultan 
Mahmud II  as: “Before the reforms instituted by Sultan Mahmud II in 1830 it was even possible 
to tell professions by the headgear, and court dignitaries wore turbans whose form and color were 
minutely prescribed to correspond with their duties. After the massacre of the janissaries, Mahmud 
decreed that only the holy men should henceforward be authorized to wear a turban, - which, 
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however, was simplified, - and that all other Ottoman subjects, soldiers or civilians, should wear 
the fez.”736 While Gentizon asserts that fez should be worn by civilians, there was not any 
compulsion for ordinary people in this issue. The Empire made pants, jacket, and fez compulsory 
clothes and headdress for the military and civilian personnel because of they were seen as the 
representatives of the Government. On the other hand, the ordinary people were free to wear what 
kind of headdress they wanted.737 
After this reform, the fez was accepted as the headdress for the Ottoman citizens to unite 
them and to remove differences among citizens. However, this expectation was not realized totally. 
Paul Gentizon indicates this failure as “… although the headdress prescribed was a kind of national 
emblem until the revolution of 1908, it nevertheless failed to rally all the Mohammedans of the 
Empire.” Arabs had their original headdress, keffieh, Kurds had their pointed headdress by the 
innumerable folds of a monumental turban. The Lazes, the minority in the Black Sea region, had 
another headdress which was called ‘bashlyk’.”738 
During the Second Constitutional Era, which started after the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908, the hat became popular among the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.739 The hat was 
seen as a Christian headdress by the majority of the Ottoman Muslims. Falih Rifki Atay, a staunch 
Kemalist, told how Muslims categorized their Christian neighbors in his book “Cankaya”. 
According to Atay, Muslims classified their Christian countrymen into three different groups: the 
first group was “makul kefere” which signified a good Christian; the second group was “gavur”, 
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signified a bad Christian; and the last one was “sapkali gavur”, literally means an infidel with hat, 
which signified the worst Christian.740 Therefore, the Muslim Ottomans had a strong belief about 
hats as a symbol of Christianity. In their mentality, wearing hats was seen as converting to 
Christianity which was unacceptable for them. 
It is historically true that the reform in headdress was started during the Sultanate of 
Mahmud II. The fez, which was expected to be a kind of national headgear after 1830, slowly 
gained prevalence among Ottoman society. Especially in urban areas, the fez became the symbol 
of the Ottomans. The main difference between the Ottoman reform and the Kemalist reform was 
the compulsion of a modernized headgear for society in a Jacobin way. While the Ottoman 
reformers preferred a slow change in society without compulsion, the Kemalist modernizers acted 
differently from their predecessors.  
3.1.2 Reasons of Religious and Cultural Objections to a Headdress 
Reform 
The Kemalist reform in the dress code met some objections among the religious people. 
There were two steps in this reform and both of them got objections from religious circles of the 
Turkish society. In the first step, the Nationalist Turks tried to accept the kalpak, which had the 
advantage of being brimless so the worshipper could still bow his covered head in prayer, touching 
his brow to the ground, as the headdress of the society.741 The kalpak, which became popular 
during the Turkish War of Independence among the Kemalist circle, was offered as a national 
headdress to the society by two pro-Kemalist deputies in the Grand National Assembly.   
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On April 29, 1920, just a week after the opening ceremony of the Assembly, the advocates 
of Westernization tried to remove the fez and accept the kalpak as the national headdress. Emin 
Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of Bursa, and Sevket Bey, another Kemalist deputy of Sinop, introduced 
a proposal which aimed to change the headdress of the Turkish people to the Grand National 
Assembly. In their resolution, the deputies mentioned the high cost of importing fezzes from 
abroad. Beyond this, the deputies did not accept the fez as a national headdress and suggested 
instead of the fez, the kalpak should be accepted as a headdress for the Turkish people. Even 
though the kalpak was appropriate for daily prayers, this resolution was rejected fiercely by the 
conservative deputies. Mustafa Taki Efendi and Hasim Bey stressed the importance of the fez as 
a distinguishing feature of the Muslim world and especially the Ottomans. According to Mustafa 
Taki Efendi, removing the fez and accepting the kalpak as a headdress would cause turmoil among 
Muslims. After these discussions, the resolution was rejected by the majority of the Grand National 
Assembly.742   
In another session Ali Sukru Bey, one of the prominent conservative figures of the 
Assembly, underlined the untimely discussions about the headdress. He pointed out that, the 
country was in a time of life and death and the discussions of a national headdress were 
unnecessary. He also indicated that the Europeans recognized the fez as the national headdress of 
Turks. Moreover, the Muslims in Far East, like Indian and Javanese Muslims, showed their respect 
for the fez because they thought that it was the headdress of the Caliph. For these reasons, Ali 
Sukru Bey believed that the fez was the national headdress of Turks and it was unnecessary to 
remove it.743 It is clear that the fez was seen as a national headdress and a respectful symbol of the 
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Ottomans in the Muslim World. Therefore, the conservative deputies did not want to diminish the 
reputation of the fez abroad.   
The second religious objection to the Kemalist reform in headdress was the 
inappropriateness of the hat during the prayer. The headgear of a religious Muslim, soldier or 
civilian, had been visorless, because it had been essential that the believer should be able to touch 
the earth with his forehead during the ritual prayers. For this reason, Muslims preferred to wear 
the fez, which was a visorless cap, because of it permitted touching the forehead to the ground in 
prayer.744 While the kalpak was appropriate for this religious duty, the conservatives did not accept 
it as a national headdress. On the other hand, the European hat had a brim, or visor, and did not 
permit the wearer to touch his forehead to the ground in the course of his ritual prayers as Muslim 
custom required, without uncovering his head. To uncover the head, especially when praying, was 
not done. As a result, religious people did not find the hat a suitable gear during their prayer and 
showed their objection to this headdress.  
The third objection was that possible mimicry of the infidels was seen as a great sin for 
Muslims. As mentioned above, the traditional Ottoman Muslims had a strong belief about the hat 
as a symbol of Christianity.745 In their mentality, wearing hats was seen as converting to 
Christianity which was unacceptable for them. Eleanor Bisbee emphasizes this attitude as: “During 
the century that the fez was the Ottoman headdress, its significance had narrowed as the Empire 
shrank. It began to signify only Muslims. The Christians in nations which were freed from Ottoman 
rule first, again wore brimmed hats, except those in Ottoman official circles. Muslim subjects kept 
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the fez, and Muslims outside of the Empire wore it too. Thereafter, to the Ottoman subjects, the 
fez more and more meant the difference between the Muslim and the Christian.”746 
Some of the religious authorities showed their defiance to the Westernized thoughts in the 
hat issue by publishing pamphlets to illuminate public opinion. The well-known pamphlet in this 
subject was “Frenk Mukallitligi ve Sapka” (The Mimicry of the Frankish Hat) which criticized 
harshly the mimicry of infidels.747 The author of the pamphlet was Iskilipli Atif Hoca who 
considered wearing a hat as sacrilege. The pamphlet was published in July 1924 before the Hat 
Law passed in the Assembly in November 1925. Atif Hoca was sent to trial and executed in 
February 1926, because of refusing to obey the Hat Law. This execution was one the extreme cases 
in this reform.  
For these reasons the Muslim majority had a negative attitude towards a possible reform in 
headdress. They were resisting against the possible change of the national headdress in the early 
1920s, but, their resistance was broken by anti-democratic laws in mid-1920s. Before their 
resistance was broken by the regime, the Kemalist leadership tried to convince people to accept 
this change. 
3.1.3 First Kemalist Initiatives to Convince People of Headdress 
Reform 
The Kemalist Government started to accustom Turkish society to the hat reform by 
promoting some changes in the military. New military hats which protected soldiers from sunlight 
were accepted as the new headdress. After these changes, the headdress of policemen, judges, 
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court criers, and court clerks were determined.748  These changes showed similarities to Ottoman 
reformation. The Tanzimat Reforms started to change soldiers’ dress at the beginning and later 
officers’.749 Finally the reform encompassed the entire society. From this perspective, the Kemalist 
reform in this subject was a continuation of the Tanzimat reforms. The main difference was the 
speed of the reforms which became an obstacle for people to approve them easily.  
As mentioned above, the traditional and conservative thought towards the hat was negative 
because of its inappropriateness during prayer. On the other hand, the Kemalists tried to use the 
official religious and juridical authorities to convince public opinion a change in headdress was 
appropriate. Firstly, the Chief Justice Omer Lutfi Bey told journalists that there was no relationship 
between headdress and faith.750 The New York Times expressed this news as “breaking a tradition” 
in Turkey. According to the newspaper after this interpretation of the Chief Justice, some changes 
happened in Turkey. One of the first results in the breach of the old tradition was the appearance 
for the first time of many Turks in straw hats.751 While the New York Times asserted that there 
were many Turks were seen in straw hats, there was not a huge interest in straw hats at that time.  
3.1.4 Mustafa Kemal as a Role Model during the Headdress Reform 
Mustafa Kemal, as an ardent reformer, believed that Turkey should adopt whole-heartedly 
and unreservedly modern civilization as it existed in elsewhere in the world. Adopting clothing 
and headgear was a part of this change in his mentality. For realizing this reform, Mustafa Kemal 
appeared as a role model and made a tour in the northern part of Turkey. He chose Kastamonu, a 
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conservative city in the northern of Turkey, to debate the hat issue with people.752  He chose a 
religious town to convert people who thought that wearing hats was a kind of impiety. He went to 
Kastamonu with a Panama hat on August 23, 1925, and started the reform from the Black Sea 
region. He walked with his hat among people and tried to accustom them to this reform. He stated 
that there was no relationship between religion and hats. The goal of Mustafa Kemal and his allies 
was to change both people’s minds and outlook with this reform.753 Mustafa Kemal gave a speech 
in Kastamonu and clarified his thought about hat reform. According to him, invigorating Old 
Turkic Turan dress was unnecessary and to accept international dress would be better. He 
continued his speech as: “I want to say this clearly. The name of this headdress is hat. Some people 
hesitate on this issue. I call them as ignorant and unwary and ask them why accepting the fez which 
is a Greek headdress is licit but the hat is not? ”754 Beyond that Mustafa Kemal warned the people 
about the necessities of civilization and modernization. He declared that “the nation must know 
that civilization is a fire so powerful that it burns and annihilates all those who are indifferent to 
it.”755 
After Kastamonu, Mustafa Kemal visited Inebolu, a port city in the Black Sea region which 
played a loyal part in the War of Independence, and continued his attack on the fez and the 
traditional garments still worn in provincial Anatolia. In a series of speeches he ridiculed them as 
wasteful, uncomfortable, and, above all, barbarous – unworthy of a civilized people. In Inebolu, 
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Mustafa Kemal elaborated his previous speech in Kastamonu which was related the importance of 
civilization. He indicated that “I am telling you this as an indisputable truth: Fear not, this oath is 
imperative, and this obligation leads us towards a lofty and important goal. If you wish, I can tell 
you that to reach such a lofty and important goal, we shall if necessary suffer casualties. This has 
no importance.”756    
This speech was welcomed by the Kemalist press as one of the greatest speeches of the 
Great Savior- Mustafa Kemal- who showed a new modern path to the nation.757 After Mustafa 
Kemal started to be a role model for this reform, the statesmen followed him immediately. His 
officials hastened to conform by donning European hats. On his return to Ankara, a group of hatted 
officials and friends were welcomed Mustafa Kemal on September 1, 1925.758 The Youth’s 
Companion summarized this situation as: “the President of Turkey not only wears a soft felt hat 
of the kind that is familiar on Broadway and the Strand, but he has ordered all government officials 
to do the same.”759 From this perspective it can be said that because of this compulsory advice, all 
of the highest authorities welcomed Mustafa Kemal with their hats. Moreover, although Ismet 
Inonu thought that Mustafa Kemal’s action ended objections from Turkish society,760 it is hard to 
say this idea was true for ordinary people. They showed their dissatisfactions after the Hat Law 
forced them to wear hats. After Mustafa Kemal’s tour in the north part of Turkey and his 
encouragement of the new headdress for Turkish people, the Government accepted a group of new 
decrees directed against the theocracy included a ban on the wearing of religious vestments or 
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insignia by persons not holding a recognized religious office, and an order to all civil servants to 
wear Western suits and hats.761 
The Turkish press, which can be called Kemalist press after the Law on the Maintenance 
of Order, was eager to support the new reform. Yunus Nadi Bey, deputy of Mugla and the owner 
of newspaper Cumhuriyet, proved this eagerness. In an article in Cumhuriyet, Yunus Nadi Bey 
expressed his thoughts as: “however much we strive to escape from the ties of past, we could not 
manage it. We suppose that if we break our ties with past, we would fell down. However it is not 
true, the past was decayed for a long time.” After this comment Yunus Nadi exalted Mustafa Kemal 
as a farsighted man who saw this decay and showed people that the past was dead. Moreover, 
Yunus Nadi pointed out that the peasants welcomed Gazi bareheaded and applauded him. These 
attitudes were interpreted as the correctness of Mustafa Kemal in this reform.762   
Akbaba described the general attitude of people in the first days of this reform. In its 
columns Akbaba summarized the gloomy atmosphere of fez vendors who were thinking about 
their future. On the other hand some of the shrewd vendors started to sell imitations of Panama 
hats or homburgs. The author observed that there was a flood of hats after the evening break in the 
government agencies. According to the author, people, except tactless and rude ones, were waiting 
a sign to wear hats. After today, the old fezzes could be used only for floriculture.763 The Kemalist 
press tried to convince people that hats were widely accepted after Mustafa Kemal became a role 
model in this reform. Cumhuriyet mentioned that hats became popular among women also.764 
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On the other hand, many problems occurred in the first days of this reform. One of them 
was the lack of infrastructure for this reform. While Mustafa Kemal started his campaign against 
fez and kalpak and in favor of modern hat as a symbol of civilization, hat profiteers appeared in 
Turkey. Hat manufacturers demanded high prices for hats, and this caused many difficulties for 
people. Later the Government intervened in this situation to stop profiteering.765 The Prefect of 
Istanbul set a limit to the hat dealers’ profit, 15% on ordinary hats and 25% on fancy ones.766  
There were no Turkish factories to manufacture hats at that time and this was another 
obstacle to ordinary people obtain a hat easily. The Government imported hats in bulk “by every 
ship and every train” to meet the demand which occurred after Mustafa Kemal’s decree against 
the fez.767 Cumhuriyet called for the establishment of hat factories immediately to solve the 
economic difficulties.768  
Another problem was the economic hardship of the officials who had to be forced to get a 
hat. For resolving this problem, the Government issued advance payments to the entire officials. 
Those payments would cut from their salaries in future.769 These news in the Kemalist press were 
proofs of how the basis of this reform was immature. The government did not prepare the 
infrastructure of this reform. 
Mustafa Kemal continued his visits to different parts of Turkey to spread the reform. On 
September 23, 1925, he gave a speech in Bursa. In his speech he pointed out that in the near future 
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the dervishes, disciples, and hodjas would be satisfied the hat as a civilized headdress.770 In another 
speech in Akhisar, Mustafa Kemal identified the hat as one of the characteristics of Western 
civilization. He underlined that the debate about wearing hats or not was unnecessary. Turkish 
society would wear hats and accept all the civilized products of Western civilization.771 Journal 
de Genève covered the visits of Mustafa Kemal around the country. According to the newspaper, 
while Turks thought that the hat was a symbol of infidels, and a contemptible headdress, the 
Turkish Government launched an attack to the fez which used to wear as a national headdress in 
the past. The newspaper described the demonstrations in Bursa against the fez, too.772 
The columns of Cumhuriyet covered Mustafa Kemal’s visit to Bursa. On September 28, 
1925, Cumhuriyet declared that “people will organize an enormous cheer in front of the Kiosk of 
Mustafa Kemal today, people who did not find a hat will tour bareheaded, and the fezzes will be 
torn immediately.”773 This suggests local administration organized these kinds of meetings to show 
how people were eager for the reform. It is doubtful the participation of people took place without 
government compulsion. After these visits, school teachers and students were forced to wear hats 
by the Government’s general instruction.774  
While the early stage of reform at the beginning of September 1925 was described as an 
enthusiastic reception of the reform started by Mustafa Kemal, the Kemalist press was obliged to 
confess that people were not so eager for this reform at the end of October 1925. In Cumhuriyet, 
Yunus Nadi conceded that people who came from Asia Minor to Istanbul were surprised that so 
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many people still wore fezzes in Istanbul. While the Anatolian people – mostly peasants- followed 
the path of Mustafa Kemal in this reform, Istanbul was resistant. Yunus Nadi tried to convince his 
readers that intellectuals in Istanbul followed the Great Savoir immediately, but there were in fact 
still many people wore fezzes.775 Yunus Nadi was correct about the passive resistance of people 
in Istanbul. However he was mistaken by the attitude of the people in Asia Minor. Anatolian Turks 
showed their dissatisfaction after the Hat Law of 1925 passed in the Assembly on November 25, 
1925.  
A news in the New York Times on October 30, 1925, described the same reluctance of 
people to wear hats in Istanbul. However, the solution of the Government for this problem revealed 
the confusion of the Kemalist Government which was certain of people’s willingness to wear 
modern hats. The New York Times described the situation in Istanbul as: “the celebration of the 
proclamation of the Turkish Republic was made notable by the almost complete absence of fezzes 
and kalpaks on the streets. Until yesterday Constantinople had not adopted European headgear 
with any particular fervor, but yesterday morning it was learned that the authorities had been told 
to make the wearing of hats and caps compulsory. Warnings to this effect were given to passersby 
by the police and in the house-to-house visits of night watchmen.” As a result of this pressure to 
people, the newspaper mentioned that there were raids on the shops selling anything that looked 
like a hat. These hats were a fair imitation of European fashions and the newspaper found their 
types so ludicrously unsuitable.776     
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3.1.5 The Hat Law of 1925 
After Mustafa Kemal’s visits to different parts of the country, government bureaucrats, 
officers, and intellectuals started to wear hats, but the majority of people in Turkey did not accept 
this situation. In November 1925, the Assembly passed a law requiring men to wear hats and 
outlawing the wearing of the fez.777 On November 16, 1925, Refik Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of 
Konya, and his colleagues presented a resolution to the Grand National Assembly.778 The 
resolution was debated in the Assembly on November 25, 1925. During the discussions in the 
Assembly, the Kemalist majority emphasized the importance of this reform to remove the 
distinction between Turks and other modern states in the headdress. According to the Kemalist 
deputies, the Turkish nation decided to follow the civilized nations and accept the hat as a symbol 
of this process. Moreover, as a Kemalist exaggeration, they claimed Turkish people accepted hats 
and became a good example. However, the reality was totally different than this Kemalist 
assertion. After accepting this law, the ordinary people were forced to wear European hats.  
The resolution of Refik Bey was debated in the Assembly on November 25, 1925.In the 
resolution, Refik Bey explained the reasons for accepting the hat as a national headdress. 
According to him, the headdress issue had a particular importance for Turkey which aimed to enter 
the civilized world. The fez was a distinction between Turks and the rest of modern states; 
therefore the fez should be replaced with the hat. Refik Bey pointed out that Turkish people 
accepted hats and became a good example for officers. The first article of the Law was quite 
interesting. In this article, members of the Parliament and the officers would have to wear hats 
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accepted and worn by Turkish people.779 According to this law, the Turkish people accepted hats, 
and after that day it should be compulsory for every officer and Member of Parliament. This law 
was one of the great contradictions of the Kemalist regime. The majority of Turkish people did not 
accept hats before that day, but this law made it compulsory for everyone. This pressure from top 
to bottom caused many protests against the Kemalist Government. 
The Hat Law was discussed and passed in the Grand National Assembly on November 25, 
1925. The Kemalist majority in the Assembly did not allow free speech to opponents during 
discussions of this law. Nureddin Pasha, deputy from Bursa, was the only opponent to this law and 
offered a resolution to the Assembly not to accept this law which contradicted the Constitution. 
According to Nureddin Pasha, the bill would cause damages, restricting people’s free will and 
freedom of speech.780  
The resolution of Nureddin Pasha caused great tension among Kemalist deputies. Firstly 
Refik Bey argued the Turkish nation showed a great desire to wear hats and this was a great step 
in Turkish history. The Turkish nation aimed to accept the entire values of the modern and civilized 
nations.  Therefore, Turkish people accepted the hat as their headdress like the rest of the modern 
World. After summarizing the general attitude of the Turkish people, Refik Bey attacked the 
resolution of Nureddin Pasha. He blamed Nureddin Pasha for not understanding and representing 
his voters. According to Refik Bey, the polling district of Nureddin Pasha did not agree with him 
and all of them would be angry with his resolution. Moreover, Refik Bey stated that the nation 
accepted hats without any preaching and after today nobody could touch it.781 
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After Refik Bey, Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat Bey laid out his thoughts about the Hat 
Law. He rejected the claim of Nureddin Pasa that this Law was against the Constitution. Mahmut 
Esat Bey rejected the restriction of freedom of the Turkish people with this law but added there 
was no limit for the freedom. According to him, the freedom could be limited with the great 
benefits of the Turkish nation. The Minister believed that the highest authority would be the 
interest of Turkish nation and nobody could violate this principle even through the legal process. 
The Turkish nation decided to follow the civilized nations and accepting the hat as a headdress 
was a symbol of this process. Mahmut Esat Bey warned Nureddin Pasha against violating the 
notion of freedom. From his perspective, this freedom would be a toy which was played by 
reactionaries, and the Government would not allow this possibility.782  
Agaoglu Ahmet Bey, deputy of Kars, joined to the discussion on the Kemalist side. He did 
not understand the relation between the hat and the Constitution in the resolution of Nureddin 
Pasha. Instead of looking at Nureddin Pasha’s concerns about people’s freedom, Agaoglu Ahmet 
Bey used a very strange argument. According to him, accepting the Hat Law meant accepting the 
Constitution because the source of the Constitution and Hat Law was same: the civilized nations. 
Agaoglu Ahmet Bey was one of the prominent figures of the Republican People’s Party at that 
time and his approach to this Law represented the radical wing of the Party. In their perspective, 
accepting all forms of the Western Civilization was necessary. Moreover, Agaoglu Ahmet Bey 
concluded his speech that if there were a thought among Turkish people that the Hat Law 
contradicted the constitution; he would then be convinced that the Constitution was not established 
in Turkey. When people were totally free to change their dresses and headdresses, it could be said 
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that the Constitution existed in Turkey.783 The problem with his approach was that the Turkish 
people were not ready to accept this reform willingly at that time. People who did not want to 
change their headdresses by their free will to were subject to prosecution.  
After Agaoglu Ahmet Bey, Ilyas Sami Bey came to the podium and attacked the resolution 
of Nureddin Pasa. Ilyas Sami Bey was a good example to prove that how Kemalist deputies 
attacked the opposition to silence them within the Assembly. Ilyas Sami Bey reminded Nureddin 
Pasha of the notion of revolution which was a flood removing all obstacles on its way. After 
reminding him of the meaning of revolution, Ilyas Sami Bey thought that Nureddin Pasha should 
not give the resolution to the Assembly and not mention it in the Assembly.784 This is a small 
example, but it illustrates how it was difficult to criticize any Kemalist reform in the Assembly. 
When a dissident deputy had many difficulties in showing his rejections of any reform, rejecting 
a law would be impossible for the ordinary people.   
Rasih Effendi, deputy of Antalya, brought up foreign propaganda against the Turkish 
Government over religious issues. These propagandas, which suggested that Turks changed their 
religion, were very effective within the state. Rasih Effendi suggested talking about this issue in 
the scientific area. He wanted to research this law to see if it was against the religion or not. From 
his perspective, wearing hats was not against religion because wearing pants, shirts, and ties could 
be thought in that way. According to Rasih Bey, wearing hats would not make people Christian 
which was the main concern of the Turkish people at that time.785  
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While Rasih Effendi mentioned about the religious concerns was unnecessary, the boldest 
attack on Islam came from Sukru Kaya, deputy of Mentese. In his speech in the Assembly, Sukru 
Kaya Bey examined the subject in three aspects. The first aspect was religious, which should be 
discussed in mosques, not in the Grand National Assembly. According to Sukru Kaya Bey, the 
material issues and interests of Turkish nation should be discussed in the Assembly. He underlined 
that the Turkish nation would not connect its destiny to the obsolete thoughts of sixth and seventh 
centuries, the Era of Prophet Mohammad. The Turkish nation emancipated itself from all of the 
ties of the past. In the second aspect, Sukru Kaya mentioned national dress. According to him, 
national dress could be seen in the museums or history. All civilized nations had the same attire. 
It was impossible to differentiate a German from a British or a Frenchman because of their similar 
outer appearance. However, each of them had different national feelings.  Therefore, the aim of 
the Republican Government would be to grow up the next generation with this mentality. In the 
third aspect, Sukru Kaya Bey did not think that the law was a contradiction to the Constitution. 
After these explanations, Sukru Kaya Bey criticized the resolution of Nureddin Pasha, which he 
said should be not read in the Assembly.786 Sukru Kaya Bey showed how the radical wing in the 
Kemalist party was effective through his speech in the Assembly. 
Nurettin Pasha was not only criticized in the Assembly but also in the Kemalist press. The 
newspaper Cumhuriyet screamed: “What is the duty of a political reactionary pasha in the National 
Assembly?” According to the newspaper, Nureddin Pasha was advocating the fez instead of the 
hat, bigotry instead of rationalization, political reaction instead of revolution; therefore, there was 
no place for Nureddin Pasha in the Turkish Revolutionary Assembly.787 Yunus Nadi supported the 
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attitude of the Kemalist deputies toward Nureddin Pasha. According to him, Nureddin Pasha was 
torn apart by Kemalist criticism and he slipped away from the Assembly.788 Aksam denounced 
Nureddin Pasha as a reactionary. According to the newspaper, people appealed to the People’s 
Party to dismiss Nureddin Pasha and his allies from the Party.789 Not only the national press 
attacked to Nureddin Pasha but also the local press. Golge, one of the newspapers published in 
Adana, blamed Nureddin Pasha for encouraging traitors and ignorant people who disliked 
modernization.790 These examples demonstrate that any objection to the reforms suffered great 
pressure from the Assembly and the Kemalist press at the same time.  
The Kemalist assertion about Turkish people was following Mustafa Kemal in the hat 
reform became a delusion because of serious protests to the law organized by common people. 
These demonstrations will be covered in the next section. 
3.1.6 Implementation of the Hat Law and Protests against the Reform 
When the Kemalist Government passed the Hat Law, claimed to be embraced by the 
Turkish people widely, in the Assembly, the protests against to the Government’s enforcement and 
the way the regime pushed far ahead of public opinion revealed the Kemalist contradictions on 
this subject. When the Hat Law was implemented by the Kemalist Government in November 1925, 
there were many difficulties which affected the lives of ordinary people. The lack of hats for the 
ordinary people was a great problem at the early stage of the reform.791 Eleanor Bisbee describes 
this situation as: “the order was appalling to carry out. After a specified date no man was to appear 
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in public unless in a brimmed hat. There weren’t that many hats in the whole country. Merchants 
in Christian countries rushed outmoded hats from their dustiest shelves to Turkey. In the meantime, 
laughable or not, a man who had to appear in public bought or borrowed any style of hat or cap, 
sometimes even a woman’s hat with a brim.”792 Noel Barber also mentions about the police 
enforcement towards to the ordinary people as:  
Old people tied handkerchiefs on their heads before putting hats on top, until the 
police tore the handkerchiefs off. Peasants in Anatolia who had never seen a hat 
wore ancient discarded bowlers or straw hats or cloth caps from Russia. In Smyrna 
a farmer found a deserted Greek shop filled with women’s beribboned hats left 
behind during the panic of the exodus. He sold them in his village but not to the 
women. All the male villagers wore ladies’ summer hats on their way to market, 
even when working in the fields.793 
Irfan Orga emphasizes how the ordinary people tried to escape from wearing hats, seeing 
them as a strike to their beliefs: 
The people were apathetic, but defied the wearing of hats, their pious superstitions 
lending them the strength of subterfuge. Old men tied handkerchiefs over their 
heads and then, forced by the police to don the Christian hat, set it upright on the 
handkerchief, thus saving their consciences, for at least the hat itself did not make 
contact with their flesh. But the police, alert to such tricks, tore off the 
handkerchiefs and clamped the hat squarely and securely on the naked head and the 
peasants, horror struck, waited for God to strike them dead. The abolition of the fez 
struck at the very heart of belief.794 
 
Following the adoption by the assembly of the law mandating the wearing of hats, on 
November 25, 1925, a series of explosions occurred in various places in Anatolia. The first serious 
protest was organized in Erzurum, one of the biggest cities in the eastern Turkey.795 The Kemalist 
press described this event as “the black force,” that is reaction, was not sleeping. According to the 
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newspaper Aksam, in Erzurum, reactionaries wanted to organize a rally against modernization, but 
the Government suppressed this rally and arrested the organizers.796 Yunus Nadi Bey interpreted 
this event in Cumhuriyet. According to him, this protest was organized by people whose souls 
were bound to rotten things of the past. They did not like modernization and they could not 
understand what these efforts were. As a Member of Parliament and a close friend of Mustafa 
Kemal, Yunus Nadi was aware of how most of Turkish people were against these new efforts and 
they was not surprised by the people’s attitudes. Yunus Nadi compared the Turkish revolution with 
the French Revolution and said that even though the French Revolution (which lasted longer than 
the Turkish Revolution) did not manage to remove all loyalists, it was normal that there were many 
people who were not in favor of the Turkish Revolution, which had begun less than 15 years ago. 
The Republican regime would suppress these demonstrations severely to continue its existence. 
Yunus Nadi warned the opponents that the Republican regime was not afraid of these “nitwit 
people” who disliked it, because the Republic did not belong to hadjis, hodjas, usurpers, and feudal 
lords; the Republic belonged to the Turkish nation.797 The Erzurum incident was suppressed by 
executing six people and imprisoning at least eighty people.798 The New York Times described the 
same incident as: “old fashioned Turks who do not want to be westernized are fighting, and even 
dying, for their fezzes, which the Government has ordered to be replaced by modern hats. Reports 
reaching Angora tell of a riot directed against the Occidental reforms in one of the eastern 
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provinces.”799 Journal de Genève announced the Erzurum incident to its readers also. In its news, 
there were 8 people were executed because of their refusal to wear hats.800  
 The next day, Aksam warned people that: “because of passing the Hat Law in the 
Assembly, people in Erzurum, Sivas and the rest of Turkey have to wear hats.”801 However, when 
the Law was discussed in the Assembly, the Kemalist deputies asserted that the hat was accepted 
widely by the Turkish people and they wanted to make a law because of the people’s demands. 
This is one of the major paradox in this reform.  
The Erzurum incident was followed by the Rize incident on November 28, 1925.802 Some 
of the local imams condemned the Government as accepting the infidels’ headdress. This situation 
caused a protest against the Government. The Government sent the Independence Tribunal to 
suppress the demonstration. Finally, eight people were executed by the Independence Tribunal.803 
The next day, another protest occurred in Maras, a southern Turkish city. People gathered in front 
of the government office and shouted “we don’t want hats.”804 The incident was suppressed by 
imprisoning forty people.805 Another incident occurred in Giresun, in north-eastern Turkey. In this 
protest, sixty people were imprisoned.806 According to the New York Times, “two devout 
Mohammedans” who refused to abandon their fezzes were condemned to death by hanging.807 
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People in Istanbul were anxious about the Government’s decision also. The district of Fatih was 
the center of protesting the Hat Law in Istanbul and police arrested many opponents because of 
their dissatisfaction with the Law.808 Prime Minister Ismet Pasha talked about these protests in the 
Assembly. According to him, all of these demonstrations were organized by traitors who posed as 
hodjas, religious commissars. They were controlled by a center within the state but had some 
connections abroad.809 Accusing foreigners of agitating people at home was a state tradition in 
Turkey. Ismet Pasa also continued the same tradition by accusing some centers of organizing the 
protests from abroad.   
While the Kemalist regime called itself secular, not intervening in the faiths of people, this 
was not true. The Government directly intervened in religious practices, contradicting its secular 
character. As an example, the Kemalist regime published a circular letter which tried to convince 
people there would be no religious problem if they prayed with their hats.810 The circular letter did 
not attract enough attention and finally the Government sent another ultimatum to religious 
institutions to provide uniformity by wearing hats by the congregation during the religious 
services.811 While people were forced to wear hats even in the mosques during prayers, the 
Kemalist press celebrated religious leaders who accepted wearing hats. The mufti of Ayvalik was 
praised by the newspaper Cumhuriyet and hailed as a modern mufti. While the mufti was an 
insignificant man, Cumhuriyet interpreted this event as the reform was accepted by local religious 
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people and as proof of how the reform spread from intellectual centers to local places in 
Anatolia.812  
After the implementation of the hat law in Turkey, the results of the reform were observed 
by foreign correspondents. Their observations gave more details about phases of the reform in 
Turkish society.  In May 1926, John H. Finley described his visit to Turkey and the effects of the 
hat reform in the New York Times. Finley pointed out that he was in Ankara in 1923, when Ismet 
Pasha returned from Lausanne after the draft of the treaty was signed by the representatives of the 
Western powers and Turkey. In that great crowd waiting for Ismet Pasha, Finley indicated that he 
was the only person who wore a hat. However, this time, he visited two major Turkish cities, 
Istanbul and Ankara, and saw only one person who wore a fez. According to Finley, this religious 
man presumably had an official license to wear a fez. Finley emphasized that the enforcement of 
prohibition in the matter of headdress was completely effective. From this perspective, he showed 
that the Kemalist regime achieved the implementation of this reform by the help of this law. 
Another point in this article was the future of this reform. According to Finley, the fez would be 
only a memory and the change in headgear would be a symbol of Turkey’s irreparable break with 
her past.813 
In November 1927, Harry A. Franck visited Istanbul and he relayed his observations in the 
New York Times. Like Finley, Franck noted the complete abolition of the fez in Istanbul. He 
indicated that the fez “was as completely disappeared as dinosaur” from Istanbul. Moreover, 
Franck described the situation in Anatolia. According to him, “after two years of practice, 
something like six Turks out of ten in the Asiatic and less sophisticated part of their contracted 
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country will be found with the visor of a cap.” This testimony shows that at least 40% of Anatolian 
people did not wear any European cap, even though Franck interpreted this reform as an 
“insignificant subject of the overnight change, by dictatorial decree.” Beyond this lack of interest 
of the Anatolian peasantry in the reform, Franck mentioned about another crisis of the reform: the 
deficit of modern European hats in Turkey. He gave some details about the early phase of the 
reform as: “in the early days of the new order there was what ‘the educated Constantinopolite calls 
in his second language a crise de chapeaux.’ Such stocks as were on hand disappeared like the first 
snow on a heated sidewalk. Almost any substitute for Western headgear was acceptable. In the 
interior, away from European-familiar Constantinople, women’s hats in the whole gamut of styles 
of the past decade sallied boldly forth on male heads.” 814 This is another tragic result of the reform. 
The Anatolian people were not aware of what they wore. To save their lives, they wore absurd 
women’s hats. 
In Bursa, there were 114 package containing fezzes captured by the government in 1930. 
This situation agitated the official circles as the reactionary elements were still active in Turkey. 
J. W. Collins reported that the authorities would deal severely with persons engaged in the illegal 
fez trade, and it was possible that they would be hanged. Not only people who lived in the western 
Turkey were against the European headdress but also the eastern provinces. Collins described that 
“Kurds preferred to go bareheaded rather than adopt the European form of headdress, which was 
utterly foreign and distasteful to them.” Moreover, some Turkish people persisted in wearing their 
fezzes underneath their hats or caps.815 This testimony also shows passive resistance to the 
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Kemalist reform continuing among the ordinary people through 1930. While this resistance was a 
fact, Collins believed that there was a very little chance to undo this reform.    
On January 4, 1931, Clair Price was also described the same incident in Bursa. She 
expressed her thoughts about the fez as: “the Turkish fez dies hard. Although it has now been 
officially dead for more than five years, it still continues to bob up from its grave and to shake a 
grieved tassel at the hats and caps of the republic before being hurriedly thrust underground 
again.”816 Moreover, Price described the attitudes of the believers during their religious duties in 
mosques. She indicated that the “uncovered believers may at times take from their pockets the 
traditional headwear of their faith and don it as they kneel toward Mecca.”817 These observations 
show that while the Government forced people to wear European hats, there was passive resistance 
to the Government’s decree among the ordinary people in Anatolia. 
In conclusion, the modernization was seen as a necessity in formal alterations such as 
changing people’s outer appearances or cleaning and organizing streets etc. by Ottoman Young 
Turks and later Kemalists. Kemalists inherited the ideology of changing people’s outer 
appearances from their predecessors. Therefore, there was continuity in this reform mentality 
between the Ottoman reformers and Kemalists. However, the Kemalist discourse claims that 
Mustafa Kemal had the most original ideas during his reformation. This is one of the Kemalist 
misinterpretation in the social and penal reforms during the Kemalist era. As a staunch Kemalist, 
Falih Rifki thought that the Hat Law was a distinction of the Kemalist reform rather than the Young 
Turks reforms because of its permanent character.818 However, he did not mention about the 
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importance and usage of the extraordinary laws, such as Law on the Maintenance Order in 1925, 
for implementing reforms in Turkey.  
Another Kemalist false claim in this subject was the claim of popular demand to change 
their traditional headgear. While the Kemalist orthodoxy asserts that the Kemalist regime accepted 
the Hat Law of 1925 as a demand of people, historical records prove that Turkish people resisted 
this reform by protesting the Government. The result of these demonstrations was the suppression 
of people’s freedom not to wear hats. People’s dissatisfactions were labeled as a reactionary 
movement and the Kemalist regime had a basis to suppress these rebels. Forcing people to wear 
hats was not only threatening to ordinary men in Turkey, but many deputies and officers also had 
concerns about this law. Ismet Inonu recalled his close friends in the party voicing their concerns 
about this law. One of the deputies, Haci Bedir Aga, warned him about this law as people were 
thinking that the Ankara Government became infidel by accepting this law. However, when the 
law was passed in the Assembly, Haci Bedir Aga wore a hat as one of the vanguards of this law.819 
However, Ismet Pasa did not mention about the compulsion of this law which was not easy to defy 
it.  
3.2 Closing down the Dervish Lodges 
One of the most significant social changes in Turkey during the Kemalist modernization 
was closing down the “tekke ve zaviye” (dervish lodges) which had been deeply rooted in Ottoman 
society for centuries. The dervish lodge, one of the most important institutions in Islamic culture, 
was a place where Sufi mystics, ideas, and practices were introduced to people. People went to 
these lodges to cure and rest their souls which were tired because of worldly fatigue and trouble. 
These institutions were also places for people to spend their leisure time. Moreover, the dervishes 
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prayed and made invocations in these places. 820 Beyond their religious function, many dervish 
lodges also fulfilled social and cultural functions. Some dervish convents served as hospices for 
strangers, while other were in a sense schools for the fine arts, where calligraphy, poetry, and 
music were taught and performances constituted a part of the mystical exercises. Some dervish 
lodges served as leprosaria, while others were the meeting places of guild members.821 Therefore, 
these institutions were very active during the rise of the Ottoman Empire and they played a very 
significant role in Islamizing Asia Minor.822 However, some of them deteriorated like other 
governmental institutions at the end of the Ottoman Empire.823 The Westernized Ottoman 
intellectuals wanted to reform these deteriorated lodges but they could not manage it. Semseddin 
Gunaltay, the Prime Minister of Turkish Republic in 1949, thought that the negative effects of the 
dervish lodges were a reason of the decay of the Ottoman Empire. From his perspective, once upon 
a time the dervish lodges were the core of the Ottoman rise, but when the Empire lost its power 
against its enemies, the dervish lodges could not fulfill their duties in this period.824  
When the Kemalist regime consolidated its power after the extraordinary law in March 
1925, it started to show its aversion to religious institutions outside of its control. Even though, 
some of the dervish lodges degenerated, most of them were useful during the Turkish War of 
Independence War between 1919 and 1922. In general the brotherhoods seem to have rallied to 
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the support of the nationalists in Anatolia. The first Grand National Assembly included ten of their 
leading sheikhs, drawn from the Mevlevi, Bektasi, and even the Nakshibendi order. Ozbekler 
Tekkesi in Uskudar district of Istanbul, Hatuniye Dergahi, Taceddin Dergahiwere the main dervish 
lodges which supported the National forces during the war.825 Moreover, Mustafa Kemal got 
personal support from both the Chief of the Dervishes, the Mevlevi lodges, in Anatolia826 and Haci 
Fevzi Efendi, the Sheik of the Nakshibendi dervish sect.827 Like the rest of the religious institution, 
the dervish lodges were seen as a threat to the newly secular state and they were banned. The 
religious authorities were controlled by the Directorate of the Religious Affairs, established in 
March 1924. The Kemalist regime controlled and domesticated religion by using this Directorate 
while it asserted that the regime had a secular mentality.  
In 1925, after the law passed in the Grand National Assembly, “the tarikats,” the religious 
orders, which formed the backbone of folk Islam in rural Anatolia, and dervish lodges were banned 
by the Government.828 This was one of the significant Jacobin-style interventions to the people’s 
religious life during the Kemalist modernization. As a modernist, Mustafa Kemal showed zero 
toleration to the religious social institutions which were seen as responsible for the backwardness 
of the Turkish society. The Law on the Maintenance of Order was one of the biggest factors in 
achieving this change.  
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3.2.1 Kemalist Reasons Behind the Closure of Dervish Lodges 
What were the main reasons behind this significant reform? The first reason was that the 
independence of these dervish lodges was seen as a political threat to the centralist and secular 
government. Erik Zurcher emphasizes this situation as: “Whatever their political position, their 
widespread networks of convents and shrines, the obedience their followers owed to their sheiks 
and the closed and secretive culture of brotherhoods made them independent to a degree that was 
unacceptable to a modern centralist national government.”829 This independence gave a change to 
the dervish lodges to mobilize the masses. Therefore, the secular Kemalist government aimed to 
impede religious interests, particularly the mass mobilization capability of the religious orders 
from being influential in the realm of politics.830 As an example, Kemalist regime responded the 
Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925, was led by Sheikh Said, an influential and revered sheikh of the 
Nakshibendi dervish order among the Zaza tribes, as banning all the dervish lodges in the east part 
of Turkey. 
In addition, all of these religious orders and dervish lodges were seen as obsolete by the 
Kemalist reformers.  In his political speech, Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal describes this reform as:  
To abolish the dervish lodges and to ban all of the religious orders were done 
during the era of the Law on the Maintenance of the Order. The executions and 
applications in this issue were very necessary to prove that our society did not 
consist of people who were primitive and tied to the superstition. Is it possible to 
say a modern nation has a society which was dragged by sheikhs, sayyids, chalabis 
and left their fates and souls to the hands of fortune tellers, wizards, and exorcists? 
Should the works of these men and institutions, which showed the real character of 
the Turkish nation in a false way, be overlooked in the new Turkish State and 
Republic? We used the Law on the Maintenance Order in this reform to prove that 
our nation was not bigoted and in the medieval mentality.831 
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The third reason for this reform was the positivist attitude of the Kemalist reformers. 
Mustafa Kemal, as an ardent positivist, thought that all these religious institutions were not 
appropriate for the material benefits of the Turkish society and the leaders of these institutions 
were nothing against the light of science. In August 1925 he pronounced their doom in a speech at 
Kastamonu.832 Mustafa Kemal declared:  
It is shameful for a civilized nation to expect help from the dead. Let the worthy 
occupants of …tombs rest in the happiness which they have found in a religious 
life. I can never tolerate the existence, in the bosom of civilized Turkish society, of 
those primitive-minded men who seek material and moral well-being under the 
guidance of a sheikh, possibly blind and hostile to the clear light of modern science 
and art. Comrades, gentlemen, fellow countrymen! You well know that the 
Republic of Turkey can never be a country of dervishes and sheiks and their 
disciples. The only true congregation is that of the great international confraternity 
of civilization. To be a real man it is necessary to do what civilization commands. 
The leaders of the dervish lodges will comprehend this truth, which will lead them 
voluntarily to close those institutions as having already fulfilled their destiny.833  
 
3.2.2 First Kemalist Initiatives Against to Dervish Lodges and Their 
Closure 
The Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925, led by dervish sheiks who urged their followers “to 
overthrow the godless Republic and restore the Caliph,”834 helped Mustafa Kemal not merely to 
stifle his opposition but to push through the rest of his religious reforms. Since the revolt had been 
inspired by a dervish order, the Nakshibendi, it was a good moment to sweep away all the dervish 
orders, regardless of complexion. After suppression of Revolt in June 1925, the Independence 
Tribunals banned all the dervish lodges in the east part of Turkey.835 The Tribunal advised the 
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Government to ban all of these institutions in the rest of Turkey. However, the Government did 
not take a decision in this subject until Mustafa Kemal showed his dislike to the dervish lodges.  
The first attack on the dervish lodges came from Mustafa Kemal in August 1925. While 
Mustafa Kemal was on a trip to the north part of Turkey to promote wearing hats, he mentioned 
the dervish lodges, too. He directly showed his dissatisfaction with the existence of these 
institutions. In his speech in Cankiri on August 31, 1925, Mustafa Kemal said that the dervish 
lodges should be shut down. “None of us needs the advices of the dervish lodges. We are 
strengthening ourselves by civilization, science, and technique; we are walking on our path with 
this mentality.”836  
After getting the sign from Mustafa Kemal, the Government took a decision to ban all 
dervish lodges on September 2, 1925.837 According to this decree, the dervish lodges were 
ramshackle and filthy institutions which led the innocent Turkish people astray. They were also 
seen as obstacles on the way of modernization and progress. By these decrees of the government 
the dervish lodges were dissolved and banned, their assets impounded, their convents and 
sanctuaries closed, their prayer meetings and ceremonies prohibited. The ban of the dervish lodges 
expelled 20,000 dervishes from their missions.838 Moreover, the Government decided to arrange 
the dress of the religious officers by this decree. After the ban of entire dervish lodges, Turkish 
people were warned against making any donations to these institutions.839   
This decision of the government was welcomed by the Kemalist press. Yunus Nadi Bey, 
head of the newspaper Cumhuriyet and the deputy of Mugla, expressed his thoughts about the 
                                                 
836 Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 1 Sep. 1925, 1. Aksam, 2 Sep. 1925, 1. 
837 BCA, 2 Sep. 1925, Document no: 5.43.18. Zurcher, Turkey, 173. 
838 Lewis, The Emergence, 405. “Dervishes Are Ousted By Turkish Decree,” the New York Times, 25 Oct. 1925, E1.  
839 Ayin Tarihi [History of Month] 6, no. 18 (Sep. 1925), 517. BCA, 3 Sep. 1925, Document no: 13.114.53.  
 228 
dervish lodges in his article “tekayalar” (dervish lodges). In his article, Yunus Nadi Bey mentioned 
the historical phases of the dervish lodges. According to him, at the beginning they were functional 
for the fraternity of the society but all of them degenerated at the end of the Ottoman Empire. After 
repeating the Kemalist thesis in this issue, Yunus Nadi praised Mustafa Kemal how he was right 
in this action.840  
The decree was applied as soon as possible in the major cities by the Government. In 
Istanbul, all the dervish lodges, approximately two hundred, were closed on September 7, 1925. 
Not only the dervish lodges were closed but also the tombs of Ottoman Sultans were banned.841 
The ban on dervish lodges and the tombs of the Ottoman Sultans were very welcomed by the Dean 
of the College of Science and the members of the University in Istanbul.842  
After the abolition of the dervish lodges, the Government took some decisions about the 
goods and the buildings of these institutions. One of these decisions was sending all goods which 
had historical values to museums for protection. Beyond this decision, the appropriated buildings 
of the dervish lodges would be converted into schools. Moreover, one of the most well-known 
dervish lodges in Konya, the Rumi dervish lodge, was converted into Museum after the decision 
of the Government.843 
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3.2.3 Debates in the GNA and the Implementation of Penal Sanctions 
towards to Members of Dervish Lodges 
The dervish lodges were banned by the Government’s decree on September 2, 1925, but 
there were not any penal sanctions on their members before November 1925. The law, which 
enabled the imprisonment of the disciples of the dervish lodges, was passed in the Assembly on 
November 30, 1925. Refik Bey, deputy of Konya, was the architect of this law like the Hat Law 
of 1925. During these discussions in the Assembly, the Kemalist majority controlled the Assembly 
entirely. There was no objection to be heard from any dissidents. Refik Bey and Ekrem Bey talked 
about the negative effects of the dervish lodges on the Turkish society in their speeches in the 
Assembly. While Refik Bey denounced the dervish lodges as the tools of poisonous efforts and 
main sources of treachery, Ekrem Bey pointed out that these lodges were sources of the ideological 
fanaticism. As an interesting point, while there was no objection to this law, the Kemalist deputies 
did not hesitate to stifle any possible opposition in their speeches.  
In the resolution of the law which aimed to ban the dervish lodges, Refik Bey repeated the 
Kemalist thesis that these dervish lodges were the tools of poisonous efforts within the state. Even 
though there were some innocent people who were the disciples of these dervish orders, these 
places were the main sources of treason. After Refik Bey, Ekrem Bey, deputy of Rize, supported 
the abolition of all dervish lodges. Ekrem Bey thought that this law would be one of the most 
important laws in the history of Turkish Republic. He showed his satisfaction with the ban of these 
entire dervish lodges which he saw as disgusting social places. Moreover, he believed that these 
lodges caused political turmoil during crisis. Ekrem Bey pointed out that these dervish lodges were 
sources of ideological fanaticism, and should be sliced and broke into pieces by Republican laws. 
Ekrem Bey said that he was proud of this law for killing ideological fanaticism. The Turkish 
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Republic would be a role model for the rest of states which were struggling under the pressure of 
ideological fanaticism. While he was condemning the fanaticism of the dervish lodges, Ekrem Bey 
himself gave a good example for the Kemalist fanaticism in his speech. He further attacked 
Nureddin Pasha because of his last proposal. Ekrem Bey said that there was no difference between 
Nureddin Pasha and the people who were executed because of their actions against the Hat Law.844 
This was one of the best examples of the restriction of freedom of speech in the Assembly and 
how Kemalist deputies were intolerant to this freedom.845 After the reading of all articles, the law 
was accepted and passed in the Assembly on November 30, 1925. With this law, all the dervish 
lodges and the tombs of religious leaders and Ottoman Sultans were closed and if someone trying 
to organize and open a dervish lodge would be punished with this law.846  
This law was interpreted by the New York Times very interestingly. William Jourdan Rapp, 
described Turkey as a “kaleidoscopic country” in his article. This event was seen as more important 
than the rest of the revolutions enabled by the Kemalist regime. In his article Rapp underlined this 
important situation as: “in the Republic of Turkey one of the recent revolutionary changes, not 
even the abolition of the Caliphate and the disestablishment of the religious courts and the religious 
schools in the separation of Church and State, is as important in their effect on the religious life of 
the people as the suppression of the various dervish orders recently decreed by that iconoclastic 
body the Grand National Assembly of Angora.” Rapp pointed out the importance of these lodges 
for the illiterate classes for gathering and learning some basic knowledge. In Istanbul there were 
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258 monasteries belonging to the seventeen more important orders. Many orders held their 
meetings in private homes with a great number of them well-attended. As a result of this ban the 
religious practices of great numbers of people would be affected. Rapp thought that this ban was 
related with the Kurdish revolt which occurred in February 1925. On the other hand, the 
ideological approach of the Kemalist regime towards to the dervish lodges was interpreted as: “the 
nationalists, who are in general extreme rationalists and non-believers, also regard the practices of 
the dervishes as medieval and feel that they must be abolished if the country is to embrace Western 
civilization successfully.”847  
In conclusion, one of the Kemalist reforms in the social area was the ban on the dervish 
lodges which had run for centuries in Turkish society. Instead of chastening these old social 
institutions, the Kemalist movement chose to destroy them forever as a radical blow. The 
institutions for the ordinary Muslims were banned and the Kemalist regime eliminated another 
social and political organization which threatened its existence. However, the Kemalist regime 
could not stop all these institutions forever. The dervish lodges have carried on their existence in 
a secret way until today.   
Direct intervention into people’s religious duties presented another problem. The regime 
wanted to control every single religious authority. It gave no credit to any independent religious 
authority. The Directorate of the Religious Affairs,848 the highest religious authority under the 
direct control of the regime, became an institution which was forced to approve the regime’s 
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policies. This attitude contradicted the Kemalist regime’s efforts to represent itself as a secular 
system.   
The regime’s attitude to the freedom of speech and conscience was another problem with 
the enlightenment ideology of Kemalist discourse. As mentioned above, the Kemalist regime 
achieved all these reforms by the help of the penal sanctions, especially by the help of the Law on 
the Maintenance of Order. All opposition to Kemalist decisions was seen as a reactionary attempt 
on the existence of the regime. Not only had the ordinary people been silenced but also members 
of the Parliament. The weak objections of Nureddin Pasa to the Hat Law were suppressed by 
threatening him with expulsion from the Assembly. The Kemalist discourse, which depicted itself 
as a people’s regime, did not care so much for the concerns of people.   
The Kemalist thought, which has blamed the Islamic tradition as a backward one because 
of the regime’s so-called positivist and rational character, has another contradiction. According to 
the Kemalist notion, tombs visited by ordinary people were symbols of reaction and backwardness. 
Because of this mentality, the tombs of the Ottoman leaders were closed for visits. However, the 
tomb of Ataturk was later seen and used by the Kemalist regime with the same logic. Mustafa 
Kemal’s mausoleum became a central place where the statesmen showed their respect to Mustafa 
Kemal. Kemalist leaders sometimes visit his mausoleum today to complain about the so-called 
reactionary efforts against him. This is a kind of contradiction with the enlightenment mentality of 
Kemalist modernization.   
3.3 Legal Reforms: Accepting the Swiss Code as the New Civil Code in 1926  
One of the important reforms during the Kemalist modernization was a new Civil Code for 
the state in 1926. The Swiss civil code was translated with minor modifications and adopted as the 
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civil code of the Turkish Republic as on February 17, 1926.849 The Swiss Civil Code was seen as 
the “newest, best, and most democratic civil code” among the rest of the European civil codes by 
the Kemalist Government. Therefore, the Kemalist regime preferred to accept that civil code for 
modernizing the laws in Turkey.850 Beyond the Swiss Civil Code, the Kemalist Government 
accepted a new penal code based on the Italian code and a commercial code based on the German 
code at the same year.851 
The Kemalist mentality behind this reform was to repeal Islamic Holy Law from the legal 
sphere of the Turkish Republic.852 Creating a secular state would be possible by removing Islam 
from the legal structure of the old Ottoman society. Mustafa Kemal and his companions believed 
that after dismissing Islam and its law in Turkey, the modernization and secularization of the 
country would be achieved. The old tradition of the Ottoman legal system, which gave rights to 
every ethnic and religious group to apply their customary law, was ended with this reform. Ersin 
Kalaycioglu summarizes the general purpose of the Kemalist regime in this reform as: “The legal 
system of the Turkish Republic was thus based on completely secular principles. All linkages 
between religion and law were severed. The clergy was left devoid of any legal authority to 
exercise over any realm of life. The legal and religious authority of the religious institutions of the 
ancien regime was thus completely eradicated.”853 
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Another goal of this reform was to achieve the European legal system which was based on 
reason and wisdom.854 For these reasons, Mustafa Kemal sought to change the legal system of the 
country in an appropriate time. He managed this change when the Law on the Maintenance of 
Order was in force and there was no opposition to his modernization attempts. Therefore, this 
change was another one which came from top to bottom. This section will cover the contradictions 
of this reform in the early period of the Turkish Republic. 
3.3.1 The Mecelle and Legal Reforms in the Ottoman Empire 
In the classical era of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic law (Sharia) was the predominant 
source of the law. Islamic law had four different sources, which were the Quran, the prophetic 
tradition (Hadith), the consensus of opinion (ijma) and the “analogy of the jurists” (kiyas) in the 
Ottoman Empire. While Islamic law was predominant in civil law, customary law (orf) and 
sultanic law (kanun)855 were used, together with Islamic law, in financial, administrative, and 
political areas. The two latter legal systems, however, were not permitted to conflict with the 
principles of Islamic law.856  
The secularization of the legal structure of the Ottoman Empire was seen in the Tanzimat 
Era the first time. The prominent figure of the Tanzimat Era Ali Pasha was the leader of this 
project. The introduction of a land code and a new penal code in 1858, a reorganization of the 
commercial tribunals (amalgamated with mixed courts in 1860), and further commercial and 
maritime codes of French origin in 1861 and 1863, were realized during this period. While Ali 
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Pasha mostly desired to accept an adoption of the French Civil Code, Cevdet Pasha, who was 
convinced that a Christian-based law would not be acceptable to the Muslim population, was in 
favor of basing a civil law on Islamic principles. For effectuating the new civil law, a committee 
was set up. The Mecelle, consisting of 16 books and 1851 clauses, served as the civil code of the 
Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was the first attempt to 
codify a part of the Sharia-based law, which was mostly relied on the Hanafi legal tradition, in an 
Islamic state. The first section of Mecelle was appeared in 1869, and it was completed in 1876.857 
The Mecelle provided previously scattered legal precedents with a coherent framework and 
introduced the first Islamic laws on procedures for judgment, debt, and real property rights. While 
it covered most areas of civil law, it exempted family law, inheritance law, and pious foundation 
law (waqf). Therefore, the Mecelle was not a complete Civil Code. However, this did not diminish 
the importance of the Mecelle during its implementation. After the Kemalist single party regime 
was established in 1925, further legal reform, which was one of the significant steps of the 
Kemalist regime in Turkey, became possible. The Mecelle was changed completely in 1926 as the 
last step of the secularization of the civil code.858 This change enabled unification of the legal 
system in Turkey. 
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3.3.2 Searching an Alternative Civil Code and First Kemalist 
Initiatives towards to the Legal Reform 
The Mecelle was yet not seen as an obsolete civil code during the Turkish War of 
Independence. The Kemalist leadership did not totally disagree with its necessity. In his speeches, 
Mustafa Kemal underlined the importance of the Mecelle and suggested possible changes to some 
of its articles which did not fulfill the necessities of people at that time. In his opening speech in 
the Assembly in March 1922, Mustafa Kemal emphasized that a committee would be established 
for changing some articles of the Mecelle which were not useful for needs of people. The next 
year, he also underlined the works of the committee as adding laws about inheritance and testament 
which did not take part within the Mecelle. Mustafa Kemal pointed out once more that the Mecelle 
would have to accommodate the modern necessities.859  
While Mustafa Kemal had an idea to reform the Mecelle between 1920 and 1923, his 
thought changed at the end of 1923. He evaluated the Mecelle as insufficient for realizing his 
reforms in this area.860 Therefore, he sought to replace Mecelle with another civil code. The 
Kemalist reform attempts in the legal system started at the end of 1923 after Mustafa Kemal’s 
speech about Mecelle, the Ottoman civil code. In his speech Mustafa Kemal declared that the new 
Turkey would not adhere to the provisions of Mecelle which were inapplicable for the necessities 
of the Turkish society at that day. Moreover he added that “we would ameliorate our legal system 
until we achieved one like the most civilized nations. It was blindness and ignorance to govern 
today’s people with the laws which were legislated a hundred, five hundred, a thousand years ago 
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for the society at that time.”861 In Aksam, Necmeddin Sadik echoed the thoughts of Mustafa Kemal 
on the modernization of the law. In his article Necmeddin Sadik underlined that society should be 
governed by civil laws but not be hostile to Islamic provisions. When Turkish society accepted 
European science in different areas, such as the economy, it would be inevitable to accept 
European laws. Turkey would accept the European civil code in the subjects of marriage, 
divorcement, and inheritance. The religion should be removed from the worldly affairs and kept 
in the conscience. According to Necmeddin Sadak, Mustafa Kemal was the enemy of reaction and 
especially of spiritual sovereignty. The reactionary was the enemy of the progress of the Turkish 
society. Necmeddin Sadak supported Mustafa Kemal in his modernization effort and he believed 
that the People’s Party of Mustafa Kemal needed unity in these efforts. Mustafa Kemal could not 
incite the society to modernization by himself; he needed a strong party and government for 
achieving his goals. However, there was a very strong opposition within the party against such 
modernization.862 From this perspective, it is clear that Mustafa Kemal did not have an absolute 
power within the state to realize top down reforms in a Jacobin way at the end of 1923. This would 
be enabled after the law on the Maintenance of Order was accepted in March 1925. Moreover, the 
Kemalist press did not ignore the Islamic provisions completely in 1923.   
Mustafa Kemal and his associates tried to set up new commissions in the Ministry of Justice 
to change the old legal system in 1924. However, the members of these commissions did not accept 
foreign laws at the beginning. For them, the provisions of existing law were preferred firstly to 
solve a problem, if they were not enough for a solution, the laws of other nations would be used. 
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Beyond the commission members Seyid Bey, the Minister of Justice, had also some concerns about 
foreign laws. In his speech in the Assembly Seyid Bey discussed future changes in the Turkish 
civil code. He talked about the work in the commission about the possible changes. According to 
Seyid Bey, if the Members of Parliament found these changes insufficient and wanted to expedite 
them, it would not be logical, because foreign laws were very comprehensive and they had to be 
examined very carefully. Therefore, the change in a law should not be hurried. Moreover, Seyid 
Bey discussed different approaches to law. According to him, there were two main systems in the 
world at that time. One was Islamic law and the other was European law. There was a conflict and 
difference between European law and Islamic law in some points, but a unity in other matters. 
However, it was not easy to compile this unity, because the committee had to consider the social 
conditions of Turkish society carefully and which necessities would be appropriate for it. 
Therefore, legal reforms should be slow if the Government did not want to modify them 
subsequently.863 The approach of Seyid Bey was very interesting at that time. As the Minister of 
Justice and a staunch Kemalist Seyid Bey was looking for a moderate change in the civil code 
instead of a sudden change in 1924. Moreover, the Kemalist Minister believed that there were two 
different laws in the world and Islamic law was not easily disregarded. 
The cautious attitude of the members of the commission triggered the wrath of Kemalist 
press. In Aksam, Necmeddin Sadik ridiculed the commission as a republic based on Sharia 
provisions. In his article Necmeddin Sadik compared the works of the commission members to 
religious books. Those works did not fulfill the needs of the Turkish society because of their 
narrow minded perspectives. The commission members evaluated the problems of the society in a 
religious way and they had no idea about the worldly affairs of the society. Necmedin Sadik said 
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that it was a normal attitude for these ascetic commission members who were preparing the nation 
only for the Day of Judgment.864  
While the commission and the Minister of the Justice preferred gradual change, Mustafa 
Kemal did not find this approach sufficient for achieving his goals in the legal area. As an 
authoritarian leader, he wanted to change society rapidly. The legal reform would be possible after 
the Law on Maintenance of Order, passed by the Assembly in March 1925. In his speech during 
the opening ceremony of the Grand National Assembly in November 1925, Mustafa Kemal 
pointed out that the legal reforms should be passed in the Assembly as soon as possible. Mustafa 
Kemal thought that the Turkish society had many troubles and difficulties because of the obsolete 
provisions of outdated laws. Therefore, the Republic should be reinforced by modern European 
laws. He especially mentioned about the changes in the civil code and the commercial code in his 
speech.865 As mentioned above, in March 1922 and March 1923, Mustafa Kemal had previously 
held a positive attitude towards to the Mecelle. He was looking for some modification of it but not 
totally altered. However, when he became the absolute authority in Turkey, the fate of Mecelle 
was sealed also.  
3.3.3 Accepting the Swiss Civil Code as the New Turkish Civil Code 
The directive of Mustafa Kemal in the Assembly accelerated the works of legal reformers 
in Turkey. Mahmut Esat Bey, who became the Minister of Justice in November 1924, was the key 
figure in the change of the legal system in Turkey. As an ardent Kemalist, Mahmut Esat Bey was 
also influenced by Western thought. He believed that the Western legal system should be accepted 
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completely without any hesitation. If someone opposed the decision of the Turkish revolution 
which would embrace the Western civilization utterly, he would be wiped out.866 This was a good 
illustriations of the Kemalist reaction against any opposition to its modernization efforts. If 
someone opposed any reform, he should be wiped out.  
While a commission of twenty-six jurists, deputies, lawyers set to work on adapting a new 
civil code to Turkish needs in September 1924, this commission was not effective at the beginning. 
Mahmut Esat Bey and his close associates like Sukru Saracoglu and Sukru Kaya became 
influential in this task after the regime became solid in March 1925. While Lewis asserts that this 
commission began to work on adapting the Swiss Civil Code in September 1924,867 this assertion 
is not true. When Mahmut Esat Bey and his colleagues decided to translate a European civil code 
instead of preparing a Turkish civil code which would be based on the Western principles, the 
commission examined many civil codes of European nations during summer 1925. The French 
civil code was dismissed as an outdated civil code and the commission did not want to accept that 
one. On the other hand, the Austrian civil code was considered as having an absolutist notion of 
the Habsburg Dynasty. Therefore, the commission did not prefer that civil code, either. The 
German civil code was another one to be considered as a new Turkish civil code, but it was seen 
very technical by the members of the commission; therefore, it was not accepted. The last civil 
code, examined by the commission, was the Swiss civil code. The commission preferred the Swiss 
civil code as a new Turkish civil code because of its secular and democratic mentality. Moreover, 
it was a new civil code and had a plain language which was easily understood and interpreted by 
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the jurists.868 Because of its notion of the equality of men and women, the Swiss civil code was 
seen as the best civil code by the Kemalist regime.869  
Cumhuriyet announced this civil code as the new Turkish civil code which would reinforce 
the Turkish family with strong principles. Polygamy would be banned by this civil code, and 
marriages would be solemnized by civil officers not by the religious authorities.870 Not only 
polygamy but also divorce by the mere fiat of the husband would be ended in Turkey under the 
modernized Civil Code which was to be introduced in the National Assembly soon.871 The equal 
divorce right for women was praised by the New York Times. This matter would put an end to “one 
of the bitterest phases of women’s subjection – the right of a man to divorce his wife at will and 
with no trial” according to the newspaper. However, this new law could not be retroactive. This 
matter was important because of recent rumors of the divorce of Mustafa Kemal in an old style. 
While Latife Hanim, the former wife of Mustafa Kemal, tried to attempt to annul the divorce, it 
was not successful. Mustafa Kemal used the old style to be divorced from his wife.872 Andrew 
Mango summarizes Mustafa Kemal’s divorce as: “On 11 August, Mustafa Kemal informed the 
government that, six days earlier, he had divorced his wife according to Muslim canon law.”873 
From this perspective, while Mustafa Kemal wanted to establish a Western civil code in Turkey, 
he divorced his wife in an old style.  
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After the Commission finished its task, the Swiss Civil code was translated and presented 
to the Government. The Inonu Government accepted this outline of the commission on December 
20, 1925. The proposal of the Government was accepted without any change by the Commission 
of Justice in the Grand National Assembly. Before the discussions in the Assembly Mahmut Esat 
Bey, the Minister of Justice, tried to convince public opinion. He gave an interview to the 
correspondent of Cumhuriyet on January 12, 1926. In his interview, Mahmut Esat Bey said “there 
is no doubt that our new civil code is the best of the civilized World.”874  
The adaptation of the Swiss Civil Code was praised for its treatment of minority rights in 
Turkey by the New York Times. The newspaper emphasized the consequence of this adaptation as 
“the Lausanne Treaty provision for the protection of Greek, Armenian and Jewish minorities will 
automatically disappear, because the Swiss code places minorities on the same legal footing as 
citizens of Turkey.”875 However, the implementation of the new Civil Code pruned these minority 
rights after a bunch of regulations. In particular the rights of establishing pious foundation (waqf) 
for the minorities were banned after the new Civil Code was accepted.876 Beyond the pious 
foundations, the minorities forced to forgo their rights in family laws which were related with their 
religion. First of all the Jewish minority surrendered its rights on August 1, 1926, after a meeting 
was held in their Rabbinate in Istanbul.877  
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3.3.4 Acceptance of the New Civil Code in the Grand National 
Assembly and Afterwards 
Finally the proposal of the Commission was discussed and accepted by the Assembly on 
February 17, 1926.878 During discussions in the Assembly, the Kemalist majority controlled the 
Assembly totally. In the discussions, Kemalist deputies asserted that the Mecelle was not a 
sufficient civil code and could not respond to the current necessities. Beyond that, it had a 
complicated structure which was a problem for judges. Moreover, the religious character of 
Mecelle was another problem for the Kemalist parliamentarians. According to their mentality, 
societies which were based on a religious law were in an early stage and would never progress. 
Therefore, they would not tie the destiny of Turkish people to medieval laws.  
The Swiss civil code was preferred by the Government because of its more democratic 
structure than the rest of civil codes in Europe. While some Turkish authorities were concerned 
about the possibility of the Swiss civil code being applied in a relatively backward society, the 
Kemalist deputies had no doubt about its implementation. Beyond that, Kemalist deputies 
underlined the benefits of a new civil code for Turkish society in the future. According to them, 
Turkish women would rise to the position they deserved with this law. Mustafa Kemal was praised 
by Kemalist deputies as the inspiring leader behind this reform during discussions in the Assembly. 
In the draft bill, Mahmut Esat Bey, the Minister of Justice, explained the reasons for this 
bill. According to the Minister, the Turkish Republic did not have a compiled civil code at the 
present. There was Mecelle, which consisted of 1851 articles, in effect, but only approximately 
300 of these were appropriate for the current necessities. The rest of those matters were 
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unnecessary for Turkish society. The base and the outlines of Mecelle was religion. However, the 
lives of human beings were exposed to radical transformation every day, even every moment. 
Nations which were based on religious laws could not fulfill the demands of nation and state in a 
very short time. Mahmut Esat Bey was sure that religions comprised of fixed provisions would be 
insufficient for the people’s necessities in future. Therefore, religion should be kept only in the 
conscience.879  
Mahmut Esat Bey discussed the reasons why the Kemalist regime accepted the Swiss civil 
code as a new civil code for the Turkish Republic. According to him, Mecelle, the civil code of 
the late Ottoman period, was not sufficient for judicial decisions. Moreover, the jurisprudence of 
Mecelle was not clear enough for judges. Mahmut Esat Bey did not agree with the concerns about 
the suitability of a foreign civil code for fulfilling the necessities of Turkish society. According to 
him, there were no differences between modern nations which were seeking to fulfill their needs. 
Especially the economic and social relations enabled the nations to create a great civilization. 
Therefore, the translation of the Swiss civil code would not be problem for the Turkish society. 
Moreover, Mahmut Esat Bey underlined that, if the Swiss civil code was applied well in an 
ethnically diverse state, referring to the German, French and Italian population in Switzerland, it 
would be applied in Turkey more easily because of its almost 90 percent homogenous structure.880   
The Swiss civil code was seen as a fully developed code of a civilized nation by some of 
the Turkish authorities. Some were concerned about the possibility of the Swiss civil code’s being 
applied in a relatively backward society. Mahmut Esat Bey rejected this concern also. According 
to him, the history of Turkish modernization belied this concern. The Turkish nation had a 
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capability to accept all of the changes in a modern way, but only a small group of people were 
against these changes because of their personal interests. Mahmut Esat Bey underlined the 
importance of the Turkish Revolution, which was proof of broad acceptance of the principles of 
modern nations. As a Kemalist, Mahmut Esat blamed religion and religious institutions as 
obstacles in the way of progress. From his perspective, if there was a contradiction between the 
modern civilization and the Turkish society, it was because of religious intuitions and medieval 
thoughts, not because of the capability of the Turkish nation.881 This approach became popular 
among the Kemalist elites after the single party regime was established in 1925.  
The destruction of the old Ottoman structure was another goal for Kemalists.  For realizing 
this, Mahmut Esay Bey believed that old tradition and customs should be removed and the Western 
principles accepted immediately for the new society. He expressed that the Turkish nation would 
adapt its structure to the modern civilization, not to adapt the civilization to its structure. Therefore, 
the Turkish Republic should keep up with the European civilization without any hesitation. 
Mahmut Esat Bey recalled the replacement of old customs in modern states, like Germany, France, 
and Switzerland. He advised the same attitude for the Turkish Republic also. Mahmut Esat Bey 
heralded that with this law bill Turkey would change its thirteen centuries old civilization, and 
enter a new civilization.882 This is one of the best example of the Kemalist modernization 
mentality. The Kemalists relied on changing society top down methods by accepting a few laws 
in a very short time. 
During discussions in the Assembly, the Kemalist majority controlled the Assembly 
totally. The Kemalist deputies talked about the benefits of a new civil code for the Turkish society 
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in future. First of all, Mahmut Esat Bey explained the reasons of this bill of law. He underlined 
that he was encouraged by the inspiration of his great leader, Mustafa Kemal, when he gave this 
proposal. Mahmut Esat Bey believed that this law would complete the Turkish revolution. 
Therefore, it should be accepted immediately. Turkish society would be beneficial by the help of 
this modern civil code.883    
After Mahmut Esat Bey, Sukru Kaya, deputy of Mentese, expressed his thoughts about this 
subject. He also thanked to the Great Savior, referring to Mustafa Kemal, for his inspiration in this 
law. According to Sukru Kaya, when the Turkish nation took definite steps towards progress and 
civilization, connecting its worldly affairs to dull and obsolete provisions was illogical. Therefore, 
the Turkish nation could not tie itself to these kinds of old principles. Sukru Kaya blamed Ottoman 
governments for not accepting any change in the civil code. However, the Mecelle was the civil 
code during the last period of the Ottoman Empire, but Sukru Kaya ignored this point. In his 
speech, Sukru Kaya talked about the notion of the republic as a salvation by the Turkish nation. 
According to him, to protect and reinforce the Republic could be possible by accepting modern 
laws and dismissing the principles which fostered reaction. Sukru Kaya elucidated why he 
preferred the Swiss civil code to a wholly new civil code. First of all, making a new civil code 
would take time, and the Government could not wait. Therefore, a new and modern civil code 
could be applied easily to the Turkish society. The Swiss civil code, which was a virtuous civil 
code according to him, was seen as the most modern and liberal by the Government.884 
Emin Bey, pro-Kemalist deputy of Tokat, underlined the future secular character of the 
Turkish civil code. He thought that this law marked a new stage for modern Turkey. According to 
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him, political progress under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal was the first stage of the national 
sovereignty. This law would reinforce the notion of the national sovereignty as a second stage. 
Besim Atalay, another Kemalist deputy of Aksaray, raised the same topic. He pointed out that the 
Turkish Republic achieved many goals in the political and economic areas and by accepting the 
civil code its achievement in the legal area would be fulfilled. Moreover, Besim Atalay argued that 
the Republic could not be governed by the obsolete provisions of the Sultanate and Caliphate. 
Following the Western path in the legal area should be the core understanding, because the Turkish 
Republic should follow Western civilization in science and technique; it would be same in the law 
also.885   
Yusuf Kemal Bey, deputy of Sinop, was the last Kemalist deputy to talk about this bill. He 
suggested attacks on the tradition and customs would be beneficial for the state. In his speech, 
Yusuf Kemal Bey blamed the Mecelle as it was accepted without popular demands,886 ignoring 
that there was not any demand from the public for this Kemalist reform too. Therefore, this 
situation –reforms in spite of people’s wills- contradicted the populist character of the Kemalist 
regime.  
 The new Turkish Civil Code, which with a few exceptions was identical to Switzerland’s, 
was approved by the Assembly unanimously on February 17, 1926.887 The legislation was 
published on April 4, 1926 in the Official Journal.  The new Civil Code was effectuated six months 
later on October 4, 1926. 888 The newspaper Aksam announced this event as the Turkish Republic’s 
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taking a special position among civilized nations by accepting and applying the new civil code. 
According to the newspaper, the Swiss civil code was one of the masterpieces of civil codes in the 
World.889 Mustafa Kemal showed his satisfaction with this new civil code in his inaugural speech 
in the Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1926. In his speech, he indicated that the 
obstacles which prevented the progress of the Turkish nation were removed by this legal reform. 
According to him, this reform met the real necessities and wishes of the nation and the results 
would appear in a short time.890    
The reform in the legal area was praised by the foreign press after it was accepted in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly. The New York Times interpreted the main reason for the 
Kemalist legal reform as “the leaders in the new Turkish Republic were plainly making a 
determined effort to free themselves from the fetters which had bound them to medieval 
viewpoints and regulations.”891 In the Living Age F. de Garando emphasized this determination as: 
“the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian penal code have ousted Islam’s old customary religious 
law.”892 Beyond Islamic law, the Muslim religious teachers were affected negatively because of 
this reform also. Wedding ceremonies which had been performed by religious teachers for 
centuries, would be void after the law was implemented. Under the new Civil Code, effective 
September 1, marriages would be performed by a municipal functionary designated by the Prefect. 
The prefect of Istanbul, Muhiddin Bey, would soon perform the first marriage under the new 
code.893 
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In conclusion, the Kemalist reform in the legal area aimed to secularize Turkey by 
dismissing Islam from the judicial system. While the Kemalist modernists interpret this reform as 
an original reform totally different than the Tanzimat and Constitutional Eras894, it is clear that the 
legal reforms during the Kemalist modernization followed a similar path. The Mecelle was a result 
of modernizing the judicial system in the late period of Ottoman Empire. Its Islamic character was 
dismissed by the Kemalists in order to make Turkey a secular state. 
 Mustafa Kemal mentioned the necessities and demands of Turkish people for a new civil 
code in many speeches. However, this was not entirely true. Ordinary people, especially in rural 
areas, did not really knew about the reforms during the Kemalist regime. Bernard Lewis 
emphasizes this reality as: “The voting of the Swiss civil code by the Turkish Assembly did not, 
of course, transform Turkey overnight into a Middle Eastern Switzerland. In the towns and in the 
villages near to the main roads and railway lines, the new laws of marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance were, in the main, enforced. In the countless villages that made up the rest of the 
country, the old ways survived.”895 These reforms were completely ordered top down method in a 
Jacobin style and some people in the rural areas resisted these reforms. According to records in 
the archives, not only the ordinary people acted against the laws but some officials also. As an 
example, in Kutahya, the head of the township and the other headmen in the villages were 
dismissed because of their marriages contrary to the law.896 From another document, it is clear that 
the Islamic marriages were common in rural areas even in 1940s. The Government decided to 
record children who were born outside civil marriages.897  
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Ismet Inonu, the closest friend of Mustafa Kemal and the second President of Turkey, 
described the reluctance of people to accept legal reforms. He pointed out that the reforms were 
criticized harshly by reactionaries during this period.898 Interestingly there was not any opposition 
in the Assembly to this reform. This situation was one of the results of the Law on the Maintenance 
of Order, which barred freedom of speech at that time. While ordinary people showed their 
dissatisfaction to the reforms, the MPs were totally under the influence of the Kemalist leadership.    
Dismissing traditions and customs caused reluctance among people during this reform. 
While they could not show their dissatisfaction easily, one of the main critiques to the Kemalist 
reformation in the legal area came from Riza Nur, former Minister of Health and later Minister of 
Education in early 1920s.  He escaped from the country in 1926 because of the Kemalist attack on 
opponents at that time. In his memoirs, Riza Nur Bey interpreted the reform as an unfortunate 
development for Turkish society. According to him, while Turks escaped Arab customs and 
traditions, they were caught by foreign customs. The new civil code was based on Roman law and 
contained overtones of Christianity, but, Turks had been Muslims for more than a thousand years. 
Accepting a foreign civil code without any retouching was a grave mistake.899  
3.4 Women’s Rights during the Kemalist Modernization 
Women’s rights was one of the most important pillars of Kemalist modernization and its 
discourse. Change was seen as great progress in Turkish society. The main Kemalist assertion is 
that Turkish women got most of their rights from the Kemalist regime. It is true that the women’s 
revolution was a significant part of Kemalism. However, the contribution of the Kemalist regime 
to women’s rights is exaggerated by staunch Kemalists. As an example, Nermin Abadan-Unat, 
                                                 
898 Inonu, Ismet Inonu’nun Hatiralari, 101.  
899 Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim [My Life and Memoirs], (Istanbul: Altindag, 1968), 1192-1193. 
 251 
who was the first female political scientist, an ex-senator, a promoter of women in academia, and 
a defender of women’s rights in Turkey, declared “if Mustafa Kemal did not exist, perhaps I would 
not exist. I suppose now you have understood why I am a Kemalist, why I am a nationalist.”900 In 
another example, Gunseli Naymansoy reviewed the biographies of female engineers in the early 
republican period. According to Naymansoy, “if Mustafa Kemal did not exist, the female engineers 
would have no chance in their education.”901 This belief has been common among Kemalist 
scholars.  
However, education for girls was not exclusively a Kemalist goal. To educate women was 
one of the traditions of Tanzimat and the Second Constitutional Era in the late period of the 
Ottoman Empire. Moreover, when the Grand National Assembly was inaugurated on April 23, 
1920, the parliamentarians shared the mission of Ottoman intellectuals, even though the state was 
in the midst of the liberation war. As an example, just a month after the inauguration of the 
Assembly, Haci Suleyman Efendi, a conservative deputy of Izmir, emphasized the importance of 
education for girls. While the Turkish War of Independence was continuing and the state was in 
grave danger, conservative deputy Haci Suleyman Efendi blamed ignorance as the reason for 
Turkey’s plight. The future of Turkey would be saved by the education of peasants and girls. One 
of his quotes was very significant: “To establish a small school in a village is better than to establish 
a great mosque in a big city.” Haci Suleyman Efendi underlined the importance of education of 
women to grow future generations. If Turkish girls would be more educated, they could produce a 
better future. Therefore, this goal should be achieved as soon as possible.902 This speech 
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demonstrates how conservative deputies also shared the importance of the women’s education with 
Kemalists in the early stages of the Turkish War of Independence.  
Another Kemalist fallacy is denying the Ottoman contribution to the progress of women’s 
rights. Moreover, this approach asserts that the condition of women and their rights actually 
deteriorated under the Ottoman Empire.903 According to this Kemalist discourse, women lived in 
the dark and had not enough rights before Mustafa Kemal deigned to give all of their rights to 
them. Turkish women were in a better situation in pre-Islamic times, so the regime should improve 
their situations, which had deteriorated during the Ottoman Empire.904 For achieving this 
advancement, Mustafa Kemal granted women’s rights, even though they were not accepted by 
some modern European states.905 Moreover, the Kemalist discourse holds that Islam was the 
barrier to equality of men and women. Because of this conception, Kemalist leaders denied their 
Ottoman past and looked for remedies in pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic times. However, women’s 
rights were a phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, in both the classic and late period 
of the Ottoman Empire, women had rights and there were not many differences between them and 
their European contemporaries.906 This section will explain the reality behind Kemalist discourse 
on women’s rights. 
3.4.1 Women’s Rights in the Ottoman Empire 
The Ottoman Empire was one the longest-lived dynasties in history. Islam was the main 
characteristic feature of the Empire. The relationship between different nations, races, and ethnic 
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groups were organized by Islamic and customary laws. The relationship between women and men 
was also determined Islamic law and popular tradition. The degree of the influence of these factors 
was dependent on social conditions and geographic location. Muslim women living in towns prior 
to the 19th century were circumscribed by the main conditions of Islamic law.907 
Did Islam exclude women from every sphere of life in the Ottoman Empire? The answer 
of this question will correct of one of the main Kemalist mistakes. While Kemalists assert that 
women were mostly oppressed under the Ottoman Empire, the classical and late period of the 
Empire disproves this assertion. In the classical era, especially in the sixteenth and seventieth 
centuries, the women of the Imperial Harem were very influential on the politics of the Empire. It 
is true that being veiled restricted some of actions of women in the public sphere; however, in the 
private sphere Ottoman women had a great freedom which was not different than Ottoman men. 
It is known that the higher class of the Ottoman women had great wealth. The middle and the lower 
class women also had some wealth in the classic era of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman women 
held 30% of real estate properties in the classic period of the Empire, a ratio almost the same as 
today.908  
Beyond Nisanyan, Bernard Lewis discusses the status of women in the classical era. Lewis 
underlines the importance of the property rights of Ottoman women in an Islamic society as:  
It has often been remarked that the position of women in the Islamic world was in 
one important respect significantly better than that of women in the Western World 
until quite modern times. That is in the ownership of property. In the Western 
world, until fairly recently, in most countries married women did not dispose of 
their own-property, which became more or less the property of, or at least was fully 
controlled by, the husband. This was not the case in Islamic law. A woman could 
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own property, inherit property, and even after marriage, retain certain rights to the 
property she brought into the marriage.909  
Eleanor Bisbee also emphasizes the rights of women in the classical era: “Property rights 
of Turkish women have always been respected. Turkish husbands receive no dowries. Wives retain 
control of their own property of every kind from cash to real estate, and can use or dispose of it 
with or without their husbands’ consent.”910 From this perspective, it can be said that women had 
their rights to possessions, and the ratio of the Ottoman period was similar like the modern Turkey. 
Therefore, it is impossible to say that Ottoman women were excluded from property rights in the 
classical era of the Ottoman Empire. 
During the Tanzimat Era, Ottoman women showed their ability to fight for their rights like 
their European counterparts. At the beginning, the Ottoman women fought to gain their right to 
education. A major change of the Tanzimat Era was the extension of educational opportunities for 
girls. Women of the highest classes of society had always had access to a good, private education; 
the Tanzimat reformers had added a few girls’ schools, women’s training colleges, and art 
schools.911 The first secondary school for girls was inaugurated in 1859. The first female teacher’s 
training school was established in 1870 and the first female teacher started to teach in 1873.912 The 
Female Teachers’ Seminary, which was established in 1870, constituted the beginning of women’s 
participation in public life. Beyond these schools, an industrial school (mektebi sanayi) for women 
was set up in 1884. Ottoman women had some achievements in publishing during the Tanzimat 
Era also. Sukufezar, the first magazine which was published by women, had a good reputation 
                                                 
909 Bernard Lewis, Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, (London: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 94. 
910 Bisbee, The New Turks, 38.  
911 Lewis, The Emergence, 224-225. 
912 Berkes, Development of Secularism, 176.  
 255 
among the Ottoman women in 1886. Moreover, female authors like Fatma Aliye and Ayse Sidika 
became the prominent representatives of Ottoman women, demanding greater rights for them.913 
Following the revolution of 1908, women increasingly took part in public social activities 
in the Second Constitutional Era. The Committee of Union and Progress and its ideologue Ziya 
Gokalp regarded it as their duty to raise the social status of Muslim women. While educated 
women were still few in number in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman women enjoyed the sympathy 
and support of most men among the Young Turks for female education and emancipation at this 
period. This support enabled noteworthy progress especially in the women’s education. Opening 
the doors first of the middle and secondary schools, then of the university, to female students, thus 
preparing the way for their entry into the professions and into public life, was one of the successes 
of the Young Turk regime.914 In 1908 and 1909 the Young Turk regime started a number of new 
normal schools, and founded two high schools for girls on the model of high schools for boys 
already in existence, which had been patterned after the French.915 Moreover, the Turkish 
university in Istanbul was open to men and women on equal terms from 1916, and Ottoman girls 
could go to university after that time.916 
Ottoman women were welcomed in activities outside of their homes in World War I. First 
of all they were considered as an important strength, useful during the war, by the leaders of the 
CUP. Handan Nezir emphasizes the contribution of the Ottoman women to the Ottoman forces in 
the war as:  
In an era of war, women could further contribute to the strength and efficiency of 
Turkish army through their participation in the war effort both on and off the 
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battlefield. Women could help the needy, raise funds for the war effort, take part in 
patriotic demonstrations, and nurse wounded soldiers. Talat pasha, in particular, 
urged women to contribute to the nation’s military revival by joining the Red 
Crescent, like their European counterparts in the various national Red Cross 
organizations. The Women’s national Defence League (Mudafaa-I Milliye 
Hanimlar Cemiyeti, 1913), the Women’s Section of the Red Crescent Society 
(Osmanli Hilali Ahmer Cemiyeti Kadinlar Heyet-I Merkeziyesi, 1914), and the 
Society for Aid to Needy Soldiers Families (Asker Ailelerine Yardimci Hanimlar 
Cemiyeti, 1915), became the leading philanthropic societies of the time.917 
Beyond their activities in the battlefields, Ottoman women replaced men in certain jobs, in 
factories, offices, and public services also. “The Society for Finding Employment for Women”, 
which aimed both to make them useful and to give them a means of livelihood in the absence of 
their men was established by the Young Turk Government at this period. As an example, women 
of the laboring classes established a labor unit and did their jobs with brooms and carts as street 
cleaners in Istanbul during World War I.918 
After the Second Constitution was accepted in 1908, there were more than twenty political 
and social organizations established by women active in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman women 
were seen in industrial and business life in this period also. Many notable female figures appeared 
in this period in the late Ottoman history. Bedriye Osman Hanim became the first official to work 
for the telephone service in 1913. Belkis Sevket Hanim was the first female pilot who achieved a 
great fame in 1913. Belkis Hanim tried to prove that “oriental women will not accept a position 
that falls behind that of their Western sisters.” If we look at those figures carefully, we can say that 
the position of Ottoman women was not as backward as the Kemalists asserted. The difference 
between the status of Turkish women and their European counterparts in the opportunities for 
education and acquiring a profession was not wide. It is true that the change affected a small elite 
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group of Ottoman women at the beginning, but the situation in was not very different than Ottoman 
women.919 
From this perspective, it is a fact that the Kemalist reformation grew out of Ottoman 
reforms. The distinction between the Kemalist reforms and the Ottoman reforms in women’s rights 
emphasizes energetic and quick character of the Kemalist reforms. It is true that the Kemalist 
movement took very rapid steps in the modernization of the Turkish women by the help of 
extraordinary laws. However, this urgency caused many rejections and dissatisfactions among 
Turkish women afterwards. As an example, while the Kemalists thought that they would make 
women free by prohibiting headscarves in the early republican period, the headscarf became a 
symbol of freedom for the Turkish women after 1980s. The Turkish Governments have continued 
to ban the headscarf in the public sphere, and this attitude has been seen as an intervention against 
women’s rights in an antidemocratic way.920  
3.4.2 Women’s Rights and Turkish Women Between 1920 and 1925 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly was inaugurated on April 23, 1920 and a new 
Government was formed the next day in Ankara. The Ankara Government dealt with many 
problems in the war times and post-war times. Women and their rights were mentioned a few times 
in the Assembly in this period. The general attitude of the Assembly was very volatile in these 
years. There were some significant proposals, such as the political rights of women, offered by the 
conservative deputies rather than the Kemalists in the first period of the Grand National Assembly.  
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3.4.2.1 Women’s Rights in the Social Life  
The seclusion of the Ottoman women from the public sphere diminished during the 
modernization attempts in the period of the Young Turks after the constitution was restored in 
1908. One of the main parts of the modernization of Young Turks was raising the status of Ottoman 
women. By the help of educational opportunities, some Ottoman women had public positions such 
as doctors and civil servants at that time.921 The Kemalist modernization followed the same path 
and tried to remove the seclusion of women totally in the social life.   
Mustafa Kemal and his companions were aware of the importance of women in a modern 
society. In his tours in many cities in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal expounded his thoughts about 
women. In his speech in Izmir on January 31, 1923, Mustafa Kemal pointed to the importance of 
education not only for men but also for women. He underlined that modernization could be 
achieved by an entire society if it progressed together. If the modernizing of Turkey was desired, 
women should acquire modern skills like men.922 Mustafa Kemal’s visit to a different part of 
Turkey and his speeches about the emancipation of Turkish women was appraised by the New 
York Times. In his visit to Bursa Mustafa Kemal addressed to the teachers. Speaking before the 
Teacher’s Association at Bursa, he declared that the work before the nation could be perfected 
only if Turkish women joined equally with the men in educating themselves and in taking an active 
part in the nation’s affairs. During his tour in 1923 Mustafa Kemal never blamed Islam for 
women’s seclusion from the public sphere. According to him the present seclusion of women in 
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Turkey came from Persian influence, asserting that it was not in accordance with the precepts of 
the Moslem religion. Moreover Mustafa Kemal recalled the olden times when Turkish women 
went to war side by side with their husbands, and when women succeeded to the throne of the 
Sultans.  He added that at the very dawn of Islam there were woman savants, women of letters, 
women orators and women who opened schools, lectured and took a great part in public life. The 
Moslem religion, he said, ordered women to educate themselves in the same degree as men.923   
The seclusion of women was a city habit, according to Mustafa Kemal. In another speech 
he said that Mohammed did not authorize or command the hiding of women from masculine eyes 
except those of their husbands and nearest relatives, and, anyway, the relegation of women to 
obscurity never has been among Moslems more than an urban custom.924 Mustafa Kemal made a 
distinction between this urban practice and rural tradition. According to him, Turkish peasant 
women engaged in every phase of men’s work, cultivation of the fields, raising of livestock, and 
heavy timber jacking, and after the day’s work is done participate in the same social life as the 
men. From Mustafa Kemal’s perspective eighty percent of the Turkish women enjoyed the same 
rights as men. Part of the other 20 percent of women in big cities like Istanbul were restrictedand 
their emancipation became a goal for Mustafa Kemal and the Kemalist leaders.925   
In the first period of the Grand National Assembly, which was lasted between April 1920 
and April 1923, Kemalist leaders preferred a moderate path in women’s rights which would not 
be contrary to Islamic principles. However they started to loosen the strict Islamic rules in different 
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ways in 1923. One was abandon control of women’s hair. The Chief of the Police declared that 
they could not cut women’s hair or warn them to cover their hair if they were seen in public.926 
For ending the seclusion of women from the public sphere, the Kemalist Government took 
another step in 1924. The curtains separating the Moslem women’s compartments from those of 
the men’s in Turkish trains, trolley cars and omnibuses were lifted that year.927 However, this event 
triggered very harsh reactions against the decision of the Government. The protest against the 
Government even within the Assembly proved that the Kemalist modernization project had no 
popular support in this area. When the Chief of Police ordered lifting of all the curtains which 
separated women and men in the trams and ferries, Ziyaettin Efendi, a conservative deputy of 
Erzurum, addressed a parliamentary question to the Minister of the Interior.928 In his question, 
Ziyaeetin Efendi emphasized that lifting the curtains would cause many problems for Muslim 
women who had to stay together very closely with non-Muslim men. This would be a contradiction 
to Islamic law. Due to these reasons, he asked the Minister who gave this order to the police, and 
what kind of benefits was expected from this policy?929   
Ferid Bey, Minister of Interior, responded to this parliamentary question that the Ministry 
did not give any order directly to the police chief in Istanbul. The curtains were lifted due to the 
sanitary necessities which were mentioned in the report of the Directorate of the Sanitary Matters. 
Moreover, Ferid Bey added that while the curtains were lifted, women and men did not sit together. 
Ziyaeddin Efendi was not convinced by these reasons. According to him, if the sanitary necessities 
were valid, why the police did not change the rest of the materials, such as velvet armchairs, which 
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could disseminate microbes too. Ziyaeddin Efendi expressed that he was not against the notion of 
modernity but he thought that every nation should protect its traditions and cultures. As a typical 
conservative, Ziyaeddin Efendi underlined his perspective on modernization as: “modernity is to 
assure security everywhere, to reconstruct the destroyed state, to construct new highways and 
railways, to exalt the nation in education, economy, and industry. While European nations are 
flying in the sky, we are transporting by oxcarts. When we are in these miserable conditions, do 
you think to modernize women in this way? Is modernization only sitting together with women? 
Where will we induce the nation? Will we drag the nation debauchery by the guise of modernity? 
Will we disrespect holy things?” Beyond these concerns, Ziyaeddin Efendi advised to the rest of 
the deputies in the Assembly to imitate Europe in the areas of science, education and industry, not 
imitating the attitudes which were inappropriate to the culture and the religion of Turks.930 
However, these concerns of the conservatives were totally ignored by the Kemalist authorities after 
the Kemalist regime consolidated its power against conservative opponents in 1925.  
The polygamy question was another subject of the women’s rights in this period. While it 
was an Islamic tradition, plurality of marriages had never been common in Turkey. In Ottoman 
Anatolia and the Balkans, polygamy was practiced only in a narrow circle of wealthy Muslims; 
traditionally, monogamy was the dominant practice.931 Therefore, it had been practically 
abandoned in the early twentieth century in the Ottoman Empire.932 Even the extraordinary 
conditions of the Turkish War of Independence could not revitalize this old tradition. One 
conservative attempt at restoring the harem as a national institution became a fact after Salib 
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Hoca’s resolution in 1923. He emphasized that the statistic of Government which showed that 
there were 6,171,000 women to 5,473,000 men in Turkey. With his supporters he argued that 
Turkey was unable to absorb this excess of women into its primitive economic system unless well-
to-do Turks were permitted to support more than one wife. However, this attempt became void 
after Mustafa Kemal opposed this resolution. 933 Although the proportion of polygamous marriages 
to the total number in Turkey was less than one to a thousand in 1924, the Kemalist Government 
confirmed a new law to forbid marriage to more than one wife except in ‘unusual cases’.934 Thus, 
the polygamy question was over for the Kemalist reformers at that time. 
The participation of the Ottoman women in local dance halls in the early 1920s created 
great anger among the conservative circles in this period. Religious authorities and deputies were 
also very anxious about the situation of Turkish women in Istanbul where foreign occupation was 
a fact. The religious deputies demanded a declaration about the immoral attitudes of Turkish 
women in Istanbul. Abdulgafur Efendi, one of the conservative deputies in the Assembly, 
summarized the situation in Istanbul as: “some of the women who called themselves Turk and 
Muslim were dancing with foreign officers in private and public meetings. They were committing 
infamies to scorn and degrade Turkishness and Islamism.” Abdulgafur Efendi underlined that they 
were fighting not only for rescuing the homeland which was determined by National Pact, but also 
for the honor and the religion of the nation. Therefore, those men and women who were dancing 
with the officers of the occupied powers would be punished by the Turkish Grand National 
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Assembly. Hafiz Ibrahim Efendi, deputy of Isparta, supported Abdulgafur Efendi in this case. He 
condemned westernizers that to deceive the Turkish youth by the name of the modernity.935  
While conservatives thought that dances were immoral, the Kemalist regime later 
promoted them as a sign of modernity when it increased its power in Turkey. The New York Times 
mentioned this encouragement by the Kemalist regime in 1924. The newspaper indicated that  
“three months ago it would had been impossible to see these ‘dansants’ at the leading hotels of 
Istanbul frequented by Turkish ladies, but today the wives and daughters of the best families are 
prominent on the public dancing floors.” According to the newspaper, the trend was encouraged 
by the Government at Ankara.936 
3.4.2.2 Women’s Rights in Politics   
Women’s suffrage was an important issue in this period, and allegedly one of the most 
progressive steps taken by Mustafa Kemal. It is true that Mustafa Kemal took a very progressive 
step in 1930s. We will see the positive and negative parts of this action in the next section. 
However, the suffrage issue was first raised by Huseyin Avni Bey, a prominent leader of the 
opposition Second Group in the Assembly, many years before Mustafa Kemal. Huseyin Avni Bey, 
later condemned as reactionary by the Kemalist regime, was the architect of this subject in the 
Assembly.  
In November 1921, even though the Turkish War of Independence was continuing, 
Huseyin Avni Bey argued for women’s participation in local administration. In his speech, he 
pointed out that, because of the war, in many villages the population of men had decreased 
dramatically and women took all responsibility in their daily lives. Huseyin Avni Bey suggested 
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“if the taxes are collected from women, we have to accept their rights; there are no men in villages. 
There are many women more virtuous than men. You have to respect their virtues. There are 
hundreds of women who are the slaves of the usurpers in villages. The poor women are caring 
three or more families as the head of the family today. The Turkish Grand National Assembly has 
to accept women’s suffrage.” The demand of Huseyin Avni Bey caused some protests. When 
Hasan Basri Bey, deputy of Karesi, teased him with “I congratulate the feminist perspective of 
Huseyin Avni Bey,” Huseyin Avni responded “congratulate my humanity!” Even though some of 
the MPs were rejected Huseyin Avni Bey’s demand, Tunali Hilmi Bey, deputy of Bolu, supported 
his point of view. Tunali Hilmi Bey emphasized that the first time someone reflected his voice to 
the entire Turkish and Islamic world in this issue and because of that he congratulated Huseyin 
Avni Bey for his proposal.937 Finally, this proposal was rejected by most Kemalist deputies. 
Women’s suffrage issue was discussed in the Assembly a second time in 1923 when the 
first period of the Turkish Grand National Assembly was over. Tunali Hilmi Bey raised the issue. 
When he explained his thoughts about electoral law, he mentioned women’s suffrage. After the 
Independence War, in many places, the female population was larger the male population. When 
Tunali Hilmi Bey raised the population issue, the rest of the Assembly shouted him down. Finally 
Tunali Hilmi retreated and could not finish his speech up because of the harsh reactions.938  
While Tunali Hilmi Bey was criticized by the deputies, the Turkish press supported this 
initiative. Akbaba gave full support to his venture, emphasizing the inequality of women and men 
in economics and education. As an example, a woman who paid taxes had no rights in elections, 
but an 18-year-old man who was a servant to this woman could vote. This situation was an 
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injustice. On the other hand, an ignorant man who had no ability could be elected, but women who 
were well-educated could not.939 Akbaba tried to convince the public opinion by some lyrical 
poems. In one of these poems, women should be elected as deputies in the Assembly, in order to 
dismiss old thoughts.940 In another poem, Yusuf Ziya Bey supported Tunali Hilmi in his efforts. If 
he overcame opposition, fanaticism would be ended and his name would go down in history.941 
The newspaper Vakit also discussed the possible election of Turkish women. The newspaper 
organized a questionnaire to assess public opinion in this subject. Most who participated were in 
favor of women’s suffrage.942 
In this period, a strong feminist movement was appeared in the press and politics. Nezihe 
Muhiddin Hanim, who was a Turkish women's rights activist, journalist, writer and political leader, 
touched on the problems of Turkish women in many interviews.  In one she underlined her policy 
as: “we must first awaken and educate our Turkish women; we must teach them to aspire to higher 
things and teach them how to attain them.” 943 Public opinion in support of women’s rights 
encouraged Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim and her friends to organize a meeting for women’s rights.944 
These reformist women had their own agenda to achieve their goals beyond the Kemalist regime. 
They wanted to participate to the elections and get a chance to join the Grand National Assembly 
in two years. Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim and her friends thought that they would be in the Assembly 
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in 1925.945  Even though, the Republican People’s Party was not established by Mustafa Kemal, 
Nezihe Muhiddin tried to establish Women's People Party with her friends in June 1923.946 Nimet 
Hanim, the vice president of the WPP, explained their aims as: “we neither want to be deputies 
nor to pursue political movements. Our first goal is to see the fruition of social and economic 
reforms. We will work and prove that women are a necessary quantity for the state. After proving 
this, we will demand our rights. Rather, we will say ‘give them’. We will struggle until we will 
take them.”947 This statement is very important. While the Kemalist orthodoxy asserts that 
women’s rights were granted by Mustafa Kemal to the Turkish women, and Kemalist scholars, 
like Nermin Abadan-Unat, summarized her views as “if Mustafa Kemal did not exist, perhaps I 
would not exist”; there was a strong feminist movement beyond the Kemalist regime’s aims.  
The establishment of the Women’s People Party and the participation of Turkish women 
in politics was seen as an important event by the foreign press also.948 In the Living Age, Josef 
Hans Lazar reported “an organization called ‘The Turkish Women’s Party’ has been formed. It is 
already taking an active part in public affairs, and marks an important milestone in the evolution 
of Eastern and Islamic culture.”949 In this interview Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim described the policy 
of the party as: “the objects of our Party are in a general way similar to those of feminist parties 
elsewhere in Europe; but our tactics are necessarily different from those of our Western sisters, 
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because we live in a different kind of society, having a different civilization. The Turkish woman 
must share in the renaissance of her country. We Turkish women claim in social and political life 
the position that we are qualified to occupy and that we have a right to claim in return for our 
sacrifices and services in our country’s war of liberation.” Moreover, Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim 
added that their aim was the social, economic and political equality of women with men in Turkey. 
The first practical measure they sought was women’s suffrage. She wanted the right to vote and to 
hold office as soon as possible. Beyond this, she did not feel that the political equality was not an 
end in itself but a means to a higher end. Equality would open the door to what they sought 
ultimately to attain – equal educational opportunities and equal property rights with men.”950 
While Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim was waiting on approval from the Government, the Turkish 
press showed their attention to this movement. In the magazine Sus, this new party was depicted 
as aiming to ameliorate the social and economic conditions of women instead of pursuing political 
goals.951 This aimed of reducing Kemalist doubts about the newly established movement. 
However, the Government did not accept the establishment of this party. Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim 
and her friends then established a Turkish Women’s Union in February 1924.952 The Union was 
counted as a public interest union by the Government.953 Next year, when the Union wanted to 
nominate some of its members to the Assembly, Kemalists condemned this in Cumhuriyet in 
February 1925.954 While Kemalist discourse asserts that women’s suffrage was the original idea 
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of Mustafa Kemal and granted by him later, the official reports of the Grand National Assembly 
and the activities of the Women’s People Party prove that this is another Kemalist distortion. 
3.4.3 Women’s Rights and Turkish Women From 1925 to 1935 
After the founding of the Turkish Republic in October 1923, the Kemalist Government 
started its struggle for progress on women’s rights. However, conservative opinion was very strong 
and the Kemalist regime could not take serious action during the first years of the Republic. The 
progress could be seen only after the Law on the Maintenance of Order was passed in the Assembly 
in March 1925. By the help of this law, Kemalists started their modernization efforts from top to 
bottom and women’s rights were part of these reforms. Women’s rights can be separated into two 
major parts in this period. The first is civil rights of Turkish women; the second is the right to vote. 
The first one was established after the Swiss civil code was accepted in 1926. The second one had 
three steps in 1930, 1933, and finally 1934. These reforms were considered the liberation of women 
by many Kemalists at that time.955 While Kemalist discourse identified itself as the vanguard of 
the women’s rights movement in Turkey, this discourse has many contradictions, discussed below. 
3.4.3.1 Women’s Right in the Social Life  
It is true that the Kemalist regime managed to change many traditions by its top down 
reforms. Dismissing the veil in public spaces, establishing a coeducational system, and extending 
suffrage to women were achievements of Kemalist modernization. However, these reforms in the 
women’s rights were seen more important than improving the general rights of the Turkish 
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people.956 Why did the Kemalist regime pay too much attention to these reforms? The answer is 
mostly related to the Kemalist aim to create an image of an ideal woman in social life.  
First of all, the Kemalist Government tried to change women’s outer appearance in a 
moderate way. The veil never was completely outlawed in Turkey, but its use in public buildings 
and events was later prohibited.957 The regime tried to convince women to remove it. During his 
campaign to reform of men’s headdress, Mustafa Kemal was certain Turkish women could be 
easily persuaded to throw aside their heavy veils. In his speech in Inebolu, Mustafa Kemal wanted 
Turkish women to show their faces to the world.958 While Turkish women in urban areas unveiled 
easily, Turkish women in country towns adhered to the veil.959 To break this tradition, some local 
governors tried to oblige women to uncover their faces. This experiment in the province of Trabzon 
aimed to test the reaction among women, who were more fanatic in their traditions and on the 
whole less submissive than the Turkish men.960 However, women did not appear in public, but 
instead stayed indoors until the order was repealed, and the order was a failure.961  
Foreign observers gave some details about the differences between urban and rural areas 
during their tours in Turkey. While these observers saw not a single veiled woman on the 
Europeanized side of Istanbul, they very rarely saw a woman’s face in most parts of the Anatolia.962 
Finally, in the mid-1930s, some of the Kemalist authorities discussed whether women should be 
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prohibited from wearing a veil, but it was decided not to recommend any legislation on the subject. 
They believed that the rising generation which had not taken to the veil would be examples for 
their elders.963 
In the early stage of the Turkish War of Independence, it was impossible for the Kemalist 
modernization to attack Islamic principles in law. However, this situation changed after the 
Kemalist regime became more powerful in 1925. When the new Civil Code was discussed in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly in February 1926, the Kemalist regime tried to eliminate 
theology from legal subjects. By accepting this new law, polygamy was abolished, civil marriage 
became obligatory, divorce was a matter for the courts to settle, the status of women was affirmed, 
and the laws of inheritance were equal for both sexes.964 According to Kemalist leadership, Turkish 
society would benefit from this modern civil code. Mahmut Esat Bey, Minister of Justice, pointed 
out that Turkish women would rise to the position which they deserved under this law.965  
Therefore, the Kemalist Government preferred the Swiss civil code as a new Turkish civil code 
because of its secular and democratic mentality. Moreover, it was a new civil code and had a plain 
language which was easily understood and interpreted by jurists. Because of its notion of the 
equality of men and women, the Swiss civil code was seen as the best civil code.966 Turkish 
women, especially in the urban areas, found more opportunities to get official posts after the 
implementation of this law.  
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While the participation of women to the dance halls were condemned by the conservatives 
during the Turkish War of Independence, beauty contests and dances were promoted by the 
Kemalist Government. In September 1925, Turkey had a really bizarre contest, totally alien to its 
tradition and moral values. Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu, the oldest sport club in Turkey, organized 
a contest for the most beautiful pair of legs. The newspaper Cumhuriyet, one of the main Kemalist 
journals, announced the event and tried to convince women to participate. Only four ladies joined 
the contest and Enise Hanim, a student at the American College, won the contest. Cumhuriyet 
publicized Enise Hanim as the modern Turkish woman.967 This event was shocked the foreign 
press also. The New York Times interpreted this event as: “the modernization of Turkish femininity 
proceeds apace. The movement to discard the ancient Moslem veil seems to be merely a beginning 
and now Constantinople has had a contest to determine the owner of the most beautiful pair of legs 
in the City of the Golden Horn.”968 
Beyond this contest, the participation of women in dancing was encouraged by the 
Kemalist Government. The foreign observers had very good details of the mentality of the 
Kemalist regime in these activities. Rose Lee indicated that the foxtrot was the main dance in the 
new Turkey in 1926. The participation of women in this dance was seen as a symbol of feminine 
emancipation by the Kemalist Government. Moreover, the Kemalist mentality forced people to 
join these activities as a symbol of modernity. Lee mentioned that “every official must bring out 
his wife and his daughters. Every woman must dance, whether or not she had ever done it before. 
The president himself was there to direct the festivities.”969  
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Beyond Lee’s observation Rosalind Toynbee mentioned strange attitudes of the Kemalist 
regime to women participating in dancing: “Since the establishment of the new regime, women 
have undoubtedly become more conspicuous in ordinary life. They mix more freely with men on 
all social occasions and go to theatres and restaurants and dances – which they did not do before. 
The story is told of Kemal Pasha’s order to his chief officials and generals to organize public balls 
in the provincial towns with the express purpose of inviting mothers to dance. If a high official 
organized the ball, the lower official had to attend, and his wife had to dance if the high official 
invited her. If once the mothers danced- so the argument ran- they could not forbid their daughters 
to do so and the taboo would be broken.”970 From these perspectives, it can be said the Kemalist 
reform had no roots in the society, as even the high authorities and their wives could not accustom 
themselves to the situation easily. 
3.4.3.2 Women’s Rights in Politics 
The Kemalist concept in women’s rights was to exhibit women as a symbol of modernity. 
However, their concept was not original. The Kemalist modernists followed the same path as the 
Tanzimat reformers. They imposed reforms and wanted women to be passive during these reforms.  
Unlike their forefathers, Kemalists determined a two-sided mission to the Turkish women in this 
period. First of all, women would serve as the “body” of the reforms which would be visualized 
by their bodies. Secondly, the Kemalist women could be a good role model to stop possible 
degeneration of women in society.971 In this case, what would happen if Turkish women resisted 
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being submissive to their fate as determined by Kemalist men? The Kemalist answer was “you 
will be free under our conditions.” The fate of Nezihe Muhiddin and Women’s Union was proof. 
The Kemalist Government was opposed to the activities of the Women’s Union under the 
leadership of Nezihe Muhiddin. The main character of the Kemalist approach to the women’s 
rights movement was to control it strictly. As mentioned above, the political participation of 
women in the elections in 1925 was criticized harshly by the newspaper Cumhuriyet, one of the 
prominent publications of the Kemalist regime. The struggle of Nezihe Muhiddin was depicted as 
“irritable propaganda” by Cumhuriyet.972 Cumhuriyet tried to dismiss the works of the members 
of the Union and criticized them harshly.973 The activities of the Women’s Union decreased after 
the Law on the Maintenance of Order in March 1925. The Union started to merge with the 
Republican People’s Party in January 1926, but the Kemalist Party rejected the participation of 
women in the political activities. The leaders of the Republican People’s Party suggested women 
to work in social projects instead of participating in political activities.974 Thus, the Kemalist 
regime promoted women’s rights after antidemocratic laws were passed in the Assembly. In a few 
years, Mustafa Kemal was exalted as the vanguard of the feminist movement, a great exaggeration 
by Kemalists. 
After the Swiss Civil Code was accepted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 
February 1926, the women’s rights movement accelerated. In March 1927, the new Committee of 
the Union of Women was elected.975 In April 1927, Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim launched another 
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campaign for women’s suffrage. She said that Turkish women insist on their political rights.976 
She underlined that they had the wisdom and perception of Turkish men, therefore, they could 
think as well as men in state affairs.977 While the Women’s Union showed its seriousness in 
participating in the election, the leaders of the Kemalist regime stopped them again. First 
Semseddin Bey, deputy of Sivas, indicated that the Constitution specified only Turkish men could 
be elected as deputies to the Assembly.978 Kazim Pasa, the President of the Grand National 
Assembly, declared that Turkish women could not be deputies in the Parliament.979 Finally, the 
Kemalist regime threated Nezihe Muhiddin and her friends’ political activities in June 1927.  
During a discussion about exemptions from military service in June 1927, Hakki Tarik 
Bey, deputy of Giresun, mentioned the women’s suffrage issue and the contribution of women to 
the military services. He underlined that suffrage was a right for women and would happen in the 
future. Moreover, he pointed out that if voting was an issue related to the future of the Turkish 
state, military duty was another such issue. If women wanted to join in elections, they had to join 
in military duties too, because of the equality of the sexes.980  
Recep Bey, the Minister of Defense, summarized the Kemalist point of view in explaining 
the relationship between women and the defense of the country. According to him, the theory held 
that if a state could reach perfect democracy, it could encumber all responsibilities of the state to 
all of its citizens equally. However, no states reached perfect democracy. Recep Bey said that 
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Turkish women participated in the defense of Turkey by raising their children for the state. 
Motherhood was a central ideology of the Kemalist regime in second part of 1920s. In addition 
Recep Bey mentioned that there was an organization, pretending to be representative of Turkish 
women, which wanted to participate in political and social organizations. He reminded those 
women that the destiny of the state was not only in participating elections or discussions in the 
Assembly; there was another front, meaning motherhood.981 Because of Kemalists’ lack of 
enthusiasm women’s suffrage was postponed until 1930.   
The Kemalist press began to ridicule the participation of women in elections and the efforts 
of Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim. While the magazine Akbaba supported women’s suffrage in 1923, its 
attitude changed totally by 1927. Akbaba dismissed Nezihe Muhiddin’s efforts as the same “hash” 
which had been uttered for more than ten years. The magazine suggested Turkish women should 
raise the next generation and deal with household chores. The magazine summarized its point of 
view as: “in short: we don’t want to accept our women with their manicured nails to the Assembly 
which is appropriate for men.”982 Necmeddin Sadik Bey interpreted the discussion in the Assembly 
as the result of the “racket” of Turkish women in the press.983 While the Kemalist press criticized 
the Women’s Union harshly, Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim was hopeful for debate in the Assembly.984 
However, the political struggles of Nezihe Hanim were not accepted by the Kemalist regime for a 
long time. The Government wanted to purge Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim and her friends in September 
1927. On September 10, 1927, her Union was investigated by the police.985 Finally, Nezihe 
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Muhiddin Hanim was purged from all of her activities in the Union at the end of September, 
1927.986 After this purge, the Women’s Union became a charity organization instead of a political 
movement. Women’s suffrage did not become a current issue again until 1930.  
In March 1930, women’s suffrage was discussed once more in the National Assembly 
during debate on the law of municipalities.987 On March 20, 1930, the change about the law of 
municipalities was discussed in the Assembly. In the preamble of the draft law, Sukru Kaya, 
Minister of the Interior, mentioned the importance of this draft. He underlined that this draft was 
prepared and written by the inspiration and directives of Mustafa Kemal. According to Sukru 
Kaya, Turkish women were already equal to men, and this draft would establish their rights in 
municipal elections. By the help of this law, Turkish women would get important positions in the 
municipalities.988  
Agaoglu Ahmed Bey, deputy of Kars and future spokesman of the Liberal Republican 
Party, supported the draft also. He congratulated the Government’s decision which enabled 
Turkish women to participate in local elections. He held that municipalities would be more 
representative than the Grand National Assembly, for after this law women would participate in 
the municipalities, but the Assembly would be represented by only men. Agaoglu Ahmed Bey 
proclaimed his hopes that women would be in the Grand National Assembly soon.989  
The change in law of municipalities was approved by the Assembly on April 3, 1930, 198 
deputies accepting this law by unanimous vote.990 When this law was discussed in the Assembly, 
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Afet Hanim, (Mustafa Kemal’s adopted daughter who became a history professor later), gave a 
public lecture in Ankara. At the beginning of her lecture, Afet Hanim said that the right of election 
would be enabled for all people regardless of sex. She was hopeful for the possibility of Turkish 
women as members of the Parliament. This law was a beginning of the full participation of Turkish 
women in elections.991 When this law was effectuated, Turkish women were accepted into the 
Republican People’s Party. Afet Hanim was accepted as the first female member of RPP at the 
same day.992 Resmiye Hanim became the first female member of the RPP in Istanbul.993 The 
decision of the Government was welcomed by the Women’s Union enthusiastically. The Union 
organized a meeting in Istanbul to support the Government’s decision.994  
After this change, Turkish women participated in local elections in September-October 
1930. Some of the nominees of the Republican People’s Party were elected in these local elections 
and became representatives in local municipalities.995 Therefore, this change was accepted as the 
first step for the women suffrage issue in the Kemalist reformation, followed by a change in the 
village law in 1933. 
Changing some articles of village law was discussed in the Assembly on November 26, 
1933. First of all Sukru Kaya Bey suggested changing the twentieth and thirtieth articles of the 
village law. According to him, if the Turkish children were known for their moral values and good 
character, this was the result of the compassion of Turkish women. According to Sukru Kaya, 
Turkish women were masters of their houses. In the villages, they were the masters of the 
                                                 
991 Cumhuriyet, 4 Apr. 1930, 1. 
992 Vakit, 4 Apr. 1930. 1. “Turkish Women Keen for Vote Instruction,” the New York Times, 20 Apr. 1930, 52. 
993 Milliyet, 7 Apr. 1930, 1. 
994 BCA, 14 Apr. 1930, Folder: 8024, Document no: 80. 526.4.  
995 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 89.  
 278 
economics. Therefore, they had a right to participate in village elections. After this law was passed 
in the Assembly, they could be elected as village head.996  
After Sukru Kaya, Recep Bey, deputy of Kutahya, summarized Kemalist reforms in 
women’s rights since the Civil Code of 1926. According to him, Turkish women became equal to 
Turkish men after the Turkish revolution became a fact. While women were treated as secondary 
in the Ottoman Era, the Republican Government treated them as equal as men. After the Civil 
Code of 1926 was effectuated, Turkish women had opportunities to receive education alongside 
men. Moreover, the Republican Government granted election rights in the law of municipalities in 
1930. Therefore, this new draft bill was the second step in women’s suffrage. Turkish peasant 
women got their rights to be elected as the head of their villages only a few years after their urban 
sisters. Recep Bey mentioned the total number of the Turkish women who would have a right to 
say something about the destiny of Turkey. According to him, after the law of municipalities of 
1930 and the village law of 1933, approximately five million Turkish women could participate in 
politics. This was a huge number and very important to future democracy.997 However, it is very 
difficult to talk about the democracy in Turkey at that period. The concept of election and the 
determination of the deputies was far removed from democracy. After the village law of 1933, the 
last step for women’s suffrage in Turkey was the change in the Constitution which enabled women 
to be elected as parliamentarian in 1934.998  
The amendment of the constitution to allow women rights to be elected as parliamentarians 
was discussed in the Assembly on December 5, 1934. Firstly, Ismet Inonu, Prime Minister of 
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Turkey, explained the reasons for the proposal. He mentioned the role of Turkish women in history. 
When Turkish women had participated in the destiny of the state, Turkish civilization and the state 
were exalted in the world.  Moreover, Ismet Inonu blamed the Ottoman period for treating women 
as a “knickknack,” never involved in state affairs. According to Inonu, the attitude of the Ottomans 
was not a Turkish tradition. Turkey should abandon Ottoman tradition, and the Kemalist revolution 
would use women in state affairs. Ismet Inonu emphasized that these rights were not a favor to 
Turkish women, for Turkish women had been forced to be backward unfairly. He raised the 
Turkish women’s struggle which merited all praise during the Turkish War of Independence. 
Turkish women had intervened in the destiny of the state; therefore they had a right to speak about 
state affairs. Ismet Inonu underlined the core of the Turkish revolution as the liberation of women. 
This liberation was the main achievement of Ataturk who rescued half of the nation, paralyzed by 
not having their rights.999 Ismet Inonu mentioned the liberation of women and their participation 
in elections. If we look at the first women parliamentarians closely, we can see how Kemalists 
used the notion of the liberation of women as a slogan.   
After Ismet Inonu’s speech, other deputies competed to exalt the name of Mustafa Kemal 
and his decisions on women’s rights. Refik Koraltan, deputy of Konya, described how villains in 
the Ottoman period downgraded women’s conditions and rights. Refik Bey was proud of the Great 
Savior who took this decision in keeping with the merits of Turkish women. Ismail Memet, deputy 
of Sivas, exalted Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasa as leading Turkish women and peasants to 
prosperity. According to him, if Turkish women demanded their rights from the Ottoman Sultans, 
the response could be execution. This is one of the weirdest Kemalist statements. Turkish women 
started their struggle for their rights in the late period of the Ottoman Empire, but we have no proof 
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of any executions. Refik Sevket Ince, deputy of Manisa, was also proud of Mustafa Kemal’s 
policies, which deserved all respect, on women’s rights.1000  
After the law passed in the Assembly, some notable Turkish women, such as Mevhibe 
Hanim, wife of Ismet Inonu, congregated in the Ankara People’s House and sent a telegram to the 
Grand National Assembly. In the telegram, they showed their satisfaction with the decision of the 
Grand National Assembly. After that day, Turkish women would be better incorporated in state 
affairs. Necip Ali Bey, deputy of Denizli, welcomed the telegram of the Turkish women on behalf 
of the Grand National Assembly. In his speech, Necip Ali underlined that the Turkish Government 
had acknowledged the rights of women for a long time. He mentioned that Turkish women became 
judges three years previously and this opportunity had not been given to women in other states. 
Therefore, he was sure about the capability of the Turkish women to involve themselves in state 
affairs.1001    
    The general election for the fifth period of the Grand National Assembly was held on 
February 8, 1935. 17 women were elected as deputies from 400 total seats.1002 The ratio of the 
women deputies was 4.5%, and number of female deputies would not surpassed until 2007.1003 In 
a single party regime, however all these names were chosen by Mustafa Kemal. If Mustafa Kemal 
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announced someone as a nominee of the Party, he or she would be a deputy. Therefore, it is better 
to understand that Turkey was far away from the representative democracy at that period  
After the election of 1935, the Ismet Pasa Cabinet was formed on March 7, 1935. Turkish 
women parliamentarians had a chance to speak in the Assembly for first time during the vote of 
the confidence in the Cabinet. Nakiye Elgun, female deputy of Erzurum, addressed the Grand 
National Assembly. In her speech, she was proud of showing confidence in the Ismet Pasa cabinet 
as a female member of the Parliament. Nakiye Elgun expressed her satisfaction as a female being 
in the Parliament for first time and she thanked Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who cherished Turkish 
women and gave them those beautiful and happy days.1004 Nakiye Hanim and the other female 
members of the Assembly were from the chosen minority of Turkish women who were staunch 
Kemalists. On the other hand, Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim and her friends struggled for women’s 
rights were ignored by the Kemalist regime. Their Union was forced to close down after they 
hosted the Twelfth Congress of the International Alliance of Women in 1935.1005 This closure 
demonstrated how the Kemalist mentality used women’s rights. According to the regime, there 
were no meaningful demands women could make on the state since the state had already given 
women their rights.1006 The state and the regime were seen as an authority to bestow rights on 
women, demonstrating another contradiction of Kemalist regime.  
In conclusion, the Kemalist regime, which followed an authoritarian path to modernize the 
country from top to bottom, accomplished social and legal reforms in Turkey after the Law on the 
Maintenance of Order was accepted in March 1925. The opposition was stifled by the Kemalist 
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autocracy, a step possible because of the regime’s anti-democratic character during these reforms. 
However, the strict Kemalist regime could not stop popular protests. People, tired of authoritarian 
tendencies, showed their dissatisfaction to the regime in many ways. In particular, the Hat Law of 
1925 caused much passive and active resistance, suppressed by the the Kemalist Government. 
The Hat Law of 1925 was an early attempt at intervention by the regime in people’s lives. 
The mentality of Kemalist regime was absurd in equating participating to the European 
Civilization with changing the outer appearance of the Turkish people. Another Kemalist 
contradiction was the supposed eagerness of people to change their traditional headgear. Kemalist 
orthodoxy asserts that the Kemalist regime accepted the Hat Law of 1925 in response to popular 
demands, after Mustafa Kemal became a role model for Turks. However, people were opposed to 
this law and they showed their dissatisfaction by protest. People’s dissatisfactions were easily 
labelled a reactionary movement and the Kemalist regime then had a basis to suppress this protest. 
This law was not only a problem for the ordinary men, but also for deputies and officers. Many 
deputies in the Kemalist party were concerned about this change, but they were forced to accept 
this autocratic measure silently. 
Another Kemalist reform was the ban on dervish lodges, which had existed for centuries 
in the Turkish society. The Kemalist regime preferred to destroy these social institutions instead 
of reforming them. Ordinary Muslims lost their institutions because of the antidemocratic attitudes 
of the regime. The contradiction in this reform was the direct intervention of the Kemalist 
Governments in people’s religious beliefs while it called itself a secular regime which did not 
intervene in faith. Moreover, the Directorate of the Religious Affairs, the highest religious 
authority under the direct control of the regime, became an institution which was forced to approve 
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the regime’s approach. This attitude was a contradiction for the Kemalist regime while represented 
itself as a secular regime.   
Kemalist reform in law aimed to secularize Turkey by removing Islamic principles from 
the judicial system. The change in the civil code in 1926 was an important step. This change was 
the last phase of secularizing the Islamic Civil code which started after the Tanzimat Era. The 
Mecelle, which was the Ottoman civil code, was replaced by the Swiss Civil code which was seen 
as the newest and most appropriate civil code for the Turkish society. The Kemalist contradiction 
in this subject was the ambiguous attitudes of the Kemalist regime during this change. There was 
not any systematic and clear plan in the Kemalist mentality. Their decisions easily changed in a 
short period. While the regime thought to revise Mecelle in 1924, one year later they were seeking 
an entirely new civil code in a short period. Beyond this, while experts thought a quick change in 
the civil code would cause many problems, the Kemalist leadership did not share these concerns.  
Finally, the Kemalist regime has a reputation for its achievements in women’s rights, but 
it in fact only continued the tradition of modernizing efforts which started after the Tanzimat Era. 
The distinction of the Kemalist reforms in this area was their energetic and quick character, such 
as education of women and women’s suffrage, through extraordinary laws. However, the education 
of women was not only the interest of Kemalist modernists; conservative deputies of Grand 
National Assembly shared the same idea. On the other hand, the Kemalist discourse gives undue 
praise to Mustafa Kemal for women’s suffrage. As mentioned above, however the demands of 
women were uttered by intellectual Ottoman women, such as Halide Edib Hanim and especially 
Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim, many years before Mustafa Kemal. Not only these intellectual women 
voiced their rights but deputies such as Huseyin Avni Bey and Tunali Hilmi Bey raised this issue 
in the first period of the National Assembly. Moreover, the Kemalist attitude was mostly negative 
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until 1930. Therefore, the Kemalist discourse which says that Mustafa Kemal was the creator of 
women’s suffrage is a great delusion. Moreover, the participation of women to the Parliament was 
a nominal one, strictly controlled by Mustafa Kemal. Beyond this, the feminist movement outside 
Kemalist control was not welcomed by the regime. The Turkish Women’s Union, a significant 
organization, was dissolved because of its anti-government attitude in 1935. The Kemalist 
orthodoxy saw the state as giving all rights to women, so the Union was unnecessary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 285 
Chapter 4 - Educational Policies of Kemalist Regime in Turkey 
Education is one of the most important phenomenon to transform the traditional structure 
of Turkey into a modern one for the Kemalist modernizers. Kemalist orthodoxy suggests that the 
‘civilized Turkish nation’ could only be successful by means of education. Mustafa Kemal 
criticized previous educational methods and blamed them for the backwardness of Ottoman 
society. Besides, Mustafa Kemal advised to the educators to inspire the next generations to struggle 
against foreign elements, both Western and Eastern, which were interfering with their existence, 
rights, and unity. He asserted that without changing people’s minds or without liberating people 
from tradition, nothing could be achieved. One of his well-known quotes he suggested this notion 
as an order to the teachers: “teachers, the new generation will be your creation.” Moreover, he 
described the educators as the honorable vanguards of the future salvation.1007 
From Mustafa Kemal’s perspective, individual actors were being insisted on as more 
important than the system; not a new educational system but teachers were seen as vital for the 
creation of new generations.1008 This approach was an ideological approach which accepted 
teachers as the key factor of the transformation of society. These teachers should be organized 
under the guidance of the Teacher’s Association which would be an ideological instrument of the 
regime in every city of Turkey. The main goal for this association was to create youth who 
understood the ideology of the state and could transfer this ideology to the next generations as a 
vital role for its existence.  
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Kemalist historiography emphasizes the ideological importance of Kemalist education in 
many ways. Nilufer Gursoy summarizes the aims of Kemalist education as: “national education is 
the most important means to create a modern society.” Moreover, Gursoy points out that the duty 
of education is to imbue the next generations with the values of the Turkish revolution. The basic 
mission of national education is to keep the state alive; the political mission of the national 
education is to create loyal citizens for the state; the social mission of education is to create people 
who are compatible with society; and the economic mission of education is to create the best 
producers and consumers in the society.1009 Serafettin Turan stresses this Kemalist notion in 
education as the Kemalist regime aimed to create a youth liberated from superstitions derived from 
the past. This youth should love the hard sciences and the fine arts. They had to be free in their 
thoughts, conscience, knowledge, and culture. This youth should understand the ideology of the 
state and should transfer this ideology to the next generations. They had to be consciously 
republican, democrat, and secular. They had to improve not only their thought but also their 
psychical education.1010     
Nationalist and secular education was the main goal for the Kemalist regime in 1920s and 
1930s. The Kemalist discourse indicates the necessity of a secular education system in Turkey 
because of the backwardness of Eastern societies based on a theocratic notion of education. 
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Therefore, Mustafa Kemal wanted to create secular education in Turkey.1011 However, the 
ideologic approach of Kemalist regime in education hindered successes in this area.     
4.1 Education in the Ottoman Empire 
The Kemalist regime inherited a reform mentality in education from its predecessors. 
Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize Ottoman education and the reform attempts for a better 
understanding of Kemalist reforms. Education was basically of a religious nature during the 
classical age of the Ottoman Empire. The core of this education was memorizing the Quran and 
learning basic Islamic precepts. The main institution for this Islamic education was the madrasa. 
The first Ottoman madrasa was established in Iznik in 1331. These madrasas had a number of 
different branches of study, such as calligraphic sciences, oral sciences, and intellectual sciences, 
though they primarily served as an Islamic center for spiritual learning. Halil Inalcik points out 
this reality as "the goal of all knowledge and in particular, of the spiritual sciences is knowledge 
of God."1012 The madrasa education reached a state of maturity during the reign of Suleyman I. 
However, during the socio-economic deterioration of the empire from the late sixteenth century 
onward, religious education was affected also.1013 Therefore, at the end of the eighteenth century, 
Ottoman statesmen were looking for a change in the educational system. 
The first stirrings of educational reform appeared in the Ottoman Empire in the latter part 
of the eighteenth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s need to adopt European technology 
and science for its army and administration enabled the establishment of military engineering 
schools at this period. Beyond these engineering schools, the first military medical school was 
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founded in 1827, during the sultanate of Mahmud II (1808- 1839). These schools became the first 
institutions of higher education where natural sciences were taught.1014   
After the sultanate of Mahmud II, educational reform progressed at an accelerated pace in 
the Tanzimat Era (1839- 1876). One of the major steps in this period was the Hatt-i Humayun 
(Imperial Edict) of 1845. In March 1845, the Sublime Porte appointed a committee to investigate 
existing schools and prepare places for new ones. The Committee proposed establishing an 
Ottoman University, a system of primary and secondary education, and a permanent Council of 
Public Instruction in August 1846. The Council of Public Instruction was created immediately, 
and in 1857 became a Ministry. A turning point in educational modernization was the Regulation 
of Public Education in 1869, by which primary, secondary, and higher education were integrated 
into a single institutional framework.1015  
One of the major attempt in education was the establishment of the Mekteb-i Mulkiye (The 
School of the Civil Service) in the Tanzimat Era. This institution, a training center for civil 
servants, was founded in Istanbul in 1859. Beyond Mulkiye, in September 1868, influenced by the 
French Lycée model, a school was established under the name "Lycée Impérial Ottoman de Galata-
Sérai" (Galatasaray Mekteb-i Sultanisi). In this school the language of instruction was French and 
a serious attempt was made to give a modern and Western curriculum of secondary education. 
According to Bernard Lewis, “the Galatasaray School was the first serious attempt by a Muslim 
government to provide modern education at secondary level in a Western language. Another new 
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feature was the teaching of Muslim and Christian pupils side by side- a step towards religious de-
segregation.”1016 
The expansion of modern education in the capital city and the provinces accelerated after 
1880, during the sultanate of Abdulhamid II. The most impressive achievement was in higher 
education, where the number of schools and the number of students both considerably increased 
in the Hamidian regime. To the existing schools, Abdulhamid added no less than eighteen new 
higher and professional schools. The School of the Civil Service became an institution of higher 
education in 1877. The most important event in education was the founding of a Turkish university. 
After unsuccessful attempts in 1847 and in 1866-71, the university (Darulfunun) was founded in 
August 1900.1017  
In the last ten years of the Ottoman Empire (1908-1918), the Second Constitutional period, 
“pedagogical thought flourished, emphasizing ‘terbiye’ (education) rather than the traditional 
concept of ‘maarif’ (knowledge).” One of the most important event in this period was Provisional 
Law of Elementary Education of 1913, the most important piece of legislation in the field since 
1869. By the help of this legislation, control of primary schools was taken away from the ulema, 
who had administered them through the evkaf (pious charitable trusts), and given to the Ministry 
of Education for the first time.1018  
4.2 Kemalist Regime and its Educational Policies between 1919 and 1923 
During the Turkish War of Independence, the school system was chaotic, uncoordinated 
and highly fragmented. Beyond that there was a dichotomy between secular and religious 
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education.1019 While the modernization of the school system was one of the most important 
Kemalist reforms after 1924, the Kemalist attitude was in its early stages traditionalist, not secular. 
The Grand National Assembly saw education in mostly religious during the war years. Looking at 
debates in the Assembly expands this understanding beyond the existing literature by showing that 
how conservative the Kemalist attitude was. When conservative deputies tried to convince the 
Assembly of the importance of religion and religious education, Kemalist leaders agreed with 
them. As an example, Hamdullah Suphi Bey, the pro-Kemalist Minister of Education, thought that 
the core of education was to protect religious traditions in 1921. Dichotomy in education was not 
seen as a problem by Kemalist deputies. The Kemalist majority was instead in favor of the 
combination of traditional religious schools and modern schools. The Darulhilafe Madrasas 
(reformed madrasas) were seen as a remedy for educational problems by the Kemalist deputies. 
While the Kemalist deputies were in favor of Darulhilafe Madrasas and religious schools, Huseyin 
Avni Bey, leader of the Second Group, was totally against them. The Assembly debates proves 
that Huseyin Avni Bey, later condemned as a reactionary by the Kemalist regime, was again a 
vanguard in the unification of education in a modern way before the Kemalists achieved that goal 
in 1924. The parliamentary debates prove that the problem of education was one of the main 
concerns of the Ankara Government. Beyond that, these debates show that both Kemalists and 
their opponents paid importance to the value of education at an early stage of the Assembly.    
The problems of education were discussed in the Assembly just a few days after its 
inauguration. Conservative deputies tried to convince the Assembly of the importance of religion 
and religious education. Hafiz Ibrahim Bey, deputy of Isparta, was in favor of the religious 
education. According to him, the elementary school system and religious education in school 
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should be approved by the Commission of Sharia, connected to the Minister of Sharia and Pious 
Foundation. He said “Religion is never the barrier of progress. Islam is the most important servant 
of scientific progress today.”1020 Hafiz Ibrahim Bey’s speech summarized the general thought of 
the conservative deputies in the Assembly. They were also aware of the backwardness of the 
society. They believed that scientific progress could not be thought without religion; therefore, 
they tried to combine science and religion.  
Moreover, Hafiz Ibrahim Bey underlined that the public educational system should be 
aligned with religion. Religion was accepted as the savior of Ottoman people – in this case 
Ottoman Muslims- which rescued the Muslims from the miserable debaucheries of Europe. 
Therefore, not only the social life and traditions of the Muslim society should be organized by 
religion but education also. Therefore, education and instruction should be combined with the 
religious matters. Hafiz Ibrahim Bey was sure about that education would be improved by this 
unification.1021              
The Kemalist authorities had no firm policies about the secularization of education in April 
1920. Hamdullah Suphi Bey, deputy of Antalya and later Minister of Education in December 1920, 
argued that religious scholars had boundless rights to demand a religious education for the next 
generation. This demand could not be rejected by anyone. There was religious education in every 
nation. Turkish children could and should get this religious education and this principle was 
general and unconditional. After mentioning the importance of religious education, Hamdullah 
Suphi Bey tried to outline different branches of education in Turkey resembling the rest of the 
world. He emphasized that courses, such as chemistry and agriculture, related to worldly affairs, 
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should be differentiated from religious subjects. Therefore, Hamdullah Suphi Bey suggested not 
intertwining these branches and instead the separation of the two spheres. Hamdullah Suphi Bey 
advised the Commission of Sharia to give suggestions to the Commission of Education, which 
would devise the educational program for children.1022 This statement suggest Kemalist cadre did 
not have an exact program to secularize the educational system at the beginning. Their agenda was 
mostly to separate but not eliminate the religious courses from the education in 1920. As mentioned 
in the first chapter, the Kemalists appeared loyal to the Sultanate and Caliphate at that time because 
of their lack of power to control the state totally. Their attitude to educational change would 
become more radical after the abolition of the Office of Caliphate in March 1924. 
     The separation of religious and secular education was not very welcomed by some 
conservative deputies. These deputies supported unifying education within the state. Mustafa Taki 
Efendi, deputy of Sivas, asserted that the Ottomans’ deprivation of progress was because of 
thinking of religion and world affairs separately. He pointed out that Islam was not an obstacle to 
the material progress, like other religions. Mustafa Taki Efendi underlined the misunderstandings 
between students of science schools and religious schools. According to him, the students of 
science schools were considered strangers and unbelievers by traditional school students. On the 
other hand, students who studied science in the schools considered the students of madrasah, 
Moslem theological schools, as bigoted and useless. This situation caused dissidence in the public 
opinion. Mustafa Taki Efendi advised unifying religious and secular schools for the sake of the 
state.1023 This suggestion to unify the school system in Turkey came well before Kemalists 
managed it. While conservatives sought a combination of science and religion in a unified school 
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system in 1920, the Kemalist system rejected this combination after the unification of education 
became possible in March 1924. The Kemalist approach was more radical, rejecting religious 
education and eradicating it step by step after March 1924.           
The first Government of the Grand National Assembly was formed on May 3, 1920. On 
May 9, 1920, the Government’s program on education was: “…our goal in education is to render 
a national and religious education to our children properly.”1024 From this perspective, it can be 
said that the religious education was still important for the Kemalist Government. Moreover, the 
Kemalist Government was initially in favor of an ‘Islamic nation’. On May 1, 1920, Mustafa 
Kemal described the Assembly as not consisting of only Turks but of a unity of Turks, Kurds, 
Circassians, and Lazs.1025    
The conservative deputies of the Assembly were as eager as Kemalist majority to make 
some progress in education in 1920. These conservative deputies believed that education could 
remedy the problems of Anatolian people. As an example, Haci Suleyman Efendi, deputy of Izmir 
and former muderris1026 of Nazilli madrasa, thought: “…nowadays establishing very small schools 
in villages is better than establishing very big mosques in cities.” Moreover, Haci Suleyman Efendi 
was aware of the importance of the girls’ education for the future of society. He thought that the 
education of girls more important than the education of boys because of its importance in terms of 
motherhood. According to him, a mother could teach her child at least seven years, so women 
should be equipped by education for a better society.1027      
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In the early period of 1921, conservative deputies of the Assembly raised their concerns 
over religious education. Haci Atif Bey, deputy of Ankara and one of the former muderris in 
Ankara madrasa, portrayed education in Turkey as Islamic education. At the same time, as a 
religious scholar he was in favor of sciences supported by the Government. However, the Islamic 
traditions were not valued by some scholars in these high schools, especially Ankara High School. 
Religious studies were seen as useless by these scholars and the directors, but, the generation 
taught by these scholars could emulate them if they were obedient to the Islamic traditions. Haci 
Atif Bey warned Hamdullah Suphi Bey, the Minister of Education in December 1920, that this 
disregard caused some popular dissatisfaction. Therefore, these directors and scholars should obey 
the Islamic traditions such as praying and fasting.1028          
Hamdullah Suphi Bey, the pro-Kemalist Minister of Education, shared the concerns of 
Haci Atif Bey. He also realized that religious education was neglected by some educators. 
However, because of the end of the semester, Hamdullah Suphi Bey did not want to change the 
places of these instructors. He promised to appoint instructors who were eligible to teach religion 
to fulfill the desire for religious education. Hamdullah Suphi Bey explained himself by giving an 
example in this subject. When he was conversing with a young teacher who was complaining about 
the lack of people’s support in education in Anatolia, another person joined their discussion. That 
person warned Hamdullah Suphi Bey that if the problems of education were to be solved, the 
children should be bonded to their family, traditions, and past. That person believed “if these 
students are alien and not appreciative of their state and people after their education, this style of 
education will not be approved by Anatolian people.” Hamdullah Suphi Bey underlined this 
concern as the soul of education in Turkey. He pointed out that he would follow a policy which 
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would aim to make children loyal to their past and turn them into their nation’s roots. Moreover, 
Hamdullah Suphi Bey wanted more efforts from the Ministry of Sharia to educate instructors to 
make their pupils love their religion and past. These efforts would protect the students’ conscience 
from the negative effects of Western tendencies.1029 Notably, while Hamdullah Suphi Bey was a 
staunch Kemalist, he had a very conservative attitude towards education in 1921. He thought that 
the core of education was to protect religious traditions. This situation was related to the political 
power of the Kemalist group. In 1921, Islam was still very important among the Anatolian people 
and Kemalists had an unclear secular and nationalist program in education in that year. However, 
this attitude would change in a few years later after they controlled the state totally.     
The Kemalist Government started to organize a congress to find solutions for the problems 
of education in mid-1921. This education congress was held on July 15, 1921 with the participation 
of more than 250 educators. Even though the difficulties of the War of Independence were 
continuing, the Ankara Government was looking for remedies for the educational problems.1030 In 
the opening speech of this congress, Mustafa Kemal emphasized the gathering as “a congress of 
knowledge and culture of learning” (ilim ve irfan kongresi). Moreover, he suggested that faulty 
educational principles had led to the nation’s decline and Turkey needed a culture of learning 
conductive to the development of an improved intelligence of its people.1031 
Mustafa Kemal criticized the previous educational methods and condemned them for the 
backwardness of the Ottoman society. Besides, Mustafa Kemal advised educators to inspire the 
next generation to struggle against foreign elements, both Western and Eastern, which were 
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interfering with their existence, rights, and unity. The Kemalist ideological approach which 
charged teachers with being the ideologists of the regime was mentioned the first time in this 
congress. Mustafa Kemal described educators as the honorable vanguards of future salvation.1032 
According to Gawrych “by holding the congress, Mustafa Kemal prepared teachers for the central 
role that education would have in postwar Turkey.”1033 Preparing the programs of elementary and 
secondary schools and training teachers for the village schools were discussed and accepted in the 
Congress. However, these programs could not be implemented because of the difficulties of the 
War. The mixed structure, female educators participated into the congress alongside male 
educators, of the Congress was criticized harshly by the conservative deputies. 1034 
At the end of 1921, the conservative deputies spoke up in the Assembly because of the 
mistakes of Hamdullah Suphi Bey, the Minister of Education. They asked the Assembly to force 
the Minister to resign from office. Hasan Basri Bey, deputy of Karesi, expressed the conservatives’ 
thoughts about education. According to him, education was the soul of the country, moreover the 
base of the national existence. He asserted that education was in crisis and there was a great deal 
of confusions over educational affairs. He criticized the modernists for their policy of Western 
education. According to him education was a kind of factory which produced people who were 
alien to their nation’s soul because of Western education established on a foreign basis. He thought 
that Western style education was harmful for the state. Because of this style of education, which 
caused friction between the people and the state, ignorance increased. People’s interest in 
education diminished in intensity because of this. Hasan Basri Bey attacked the policies of the 
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Kemalist Government in education as not establishing an educational system proper for popular 
traditions and feelings. Because of these mistakes, materialistic and spiritual collapse increased 
from day to day.1035 In the conservative mentality ‘people’ still had an Ottoman meaning of an 
‘Islamic millet system.’ Therefore when they talked about the people, it related to Muslims, such 
as Turks, Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, living in Anatolia. Moreover, the Kemalist regime did not 
have a clear Turkist agenda at that time. Their Turkish approach became more apparent after the 
Turkish War of Independence was won.    
Conservatives described the Kemalist tendency of making reforms in education as 
destroying the morality and spirit of people under the guise of making a social revolution. Hasan 
Basri Bey emphasized that modernists wanted to dismiss the religious education from schools 
under the guise of modernizing the school system. They made some reforms, such as changing 
prayer rooms to ballrooms in schools. Educators who regarded religious education as unimportant 
were promoted by the Ministry. Hasan Basri Bey enumerated the proper goals of the Grand 
National Assembly in education. These included strengthening the spirit of the people by education 
which was proper to the soul of the nation; improving instruction; removing popular resistance to 
education; giving children proper religious education; and giving a healthy direction to education 
which would produce people who were strong in material and spiritual thoughts. Hasan Basri Bey 
asked the Assembly which goals had been achieved by this Government. Moreover, he criticized 
the Minister for gathering the Congress in a mixed structure, which was an attitude even the 
Istanbul Government could not dare to do. According to Hasan Basri Bey, the Government’s acts 
made people resentful and their hatred towards schools became stronger after that Congress. All 
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this resulted in the resignation of Hamdullah Suphi Bey, the Minister of Education.1036 Hasan Basri 
Bey’s speech is very important to understanding the general situation in the Assembly at the end 
of 1921. The traditionalist point of view towards education was very strong among deputies in the 
Assembly. The Kemalists had no clear plan for systematic change in education. They had made 
some weak attempts, but, the Assembly showed strong resistance, meaning the Kemalist Minister 
was forced to leave his post. Mehmet Vehbi Bey was appointed as the new Minister of Education 
on November 20, 1921, after the resignation of Hamdullah Suphi Bey. He held the office until 
November 1922.    
In the opening ceremony of the Assembly in March 1922, Mustafa Kemal emphasized the 
importance of education from a traditional perspective. There was no sign in his speech about the 
secularization of education. He pointed out that educational affairs were the most important duties 
of the Government. A program, appropriate for the conditions of state and people and not 
contradicted by the necessities of modernity, would be prepared soon.1037 Mustafa Kemal 
underlined the experiences of the Ottoman governments which showed their desire in education. 
However, Mustafa Kemal criticized those experiences as imitating the West and East. Therefore, 
these experiences resulted as failure to save people from ignorance. Mustafa Kemal showed a 
populist approach in education in this speech, in accord with his populist program of 1921.1038 He 
suggested that the essential owner of the state was the peasant, therefore, the main goal of the 
Government in education was to eliminate illiteracy among peasants; to teach them some 
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knowledge about history and geography which introduced them their homeland, religion, and  
world; and finally to teach them the four basic arithmetical operations.1039 In this speech, Mustafa 
Kemal had a more populist and traditional approach in education than a secular one. He had not 
managed to get full powers in his hands at that time. Therefore, there was no clear sign of 
secularization in March 1922.                
 While there was not any Kemalist secularization in education in 1922, conservative 
deputies still complained about some reformist educators. In particular, the Association of 
Teachers, which was established in May 1921, attracted the wrath of conservative deputies in 
August 1922. This Association was the vanguard of organizing the first Congress of Education in 
July 1921. The Association published a manifesto in Hakimiyet-i Milliye, the Kemalist newspaper 
published in Ankara, on June 26, 1922. The Association summarized some of main revolutions in 
Europe and the establishment of a new life (yeni hayat) in these societies in twentieth century. 
Besides, it supported Mustafa Kemal’s policy that the essential owner of the state was the 
peasant.1040 Ismail Sukru Efendi, deputy of Karahisar-i Sahib and one of the prominent figures 
among conservatives in the Assembly asked a parliamentary question on July 1, 1922. In his 
resolution Ismail Sukru Efendi condemned this manifesto as a political instead of an objective 
intervention in educational affairs. The attitude of the Association towards to the revolutions in 
Germany and Russia was sympathetic. According to the Association, these revolutions had healthy 
consequences for their societies. Ismail Sukru Bey underlined the invitation of the Association to 
encourage educators to organize a movement to fight against so-called wrong and superstitious 
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beliefs to create a modern society in accord with twentieth century notions. Ismail Sukru Bey 
emphasized that this manifesto did not mention Islam even a single time; instead, it hailed political 
figures such as Karl Marx, and ideologies such as Socialism and Bolshevism. According to Ismail 
Sukru Bey, the Association’s manifesto caused much disaffection among teachers and the rest of 
the people. Ata Bey, Minister of Interior, replied this parliamentary question on August 14, 1922. 
According to the Minister, the manifesto was not political. Moreover, the board of directors of this 
Association was included some Kemalist deputies and teachers. All these members had legal 
qualifications for membership.1041   
Even though there were some reform attempts in education by some Kemalist deputies, the 
majority of them still were in favor of the combination of traditional religious schools and modern 
schools. Mazhar Mufid Bey, one of the closest deputies to Mustafa Kemal, advocated religious 
education in a modern way. According to him, everybody wanted learning and science. Referring 
to the Prophet Muhammad’s quote, “Seek knowledge even in China because acquiring knowledge 
is obligatory for every Muslim”, Mazhar Mufid Bey underlined that Islam was a religion which 
accepted reason and the Sharia was in accord with modern sciences. Due to the lack of schools 
and teachers in the villages, Mazhar Mufid Bey emphasized imams, local religious leaders, 
muderris, and clergymen, who were important to educating peasants in the villages. According to 
him, if those imams and other religious people could be educated in the Darulhilafe Madrasa, they 
could be very helpful for educating the peasants. The imams, caring for the souls of the villagers, 
would be very helpful to increase the light of education in rural areas. He underlined a very 
important detail in his speech also. He said that people were listening to imams (prayer leaders) 
more than educated people, therefore, if those imams could be educated by modern schools, they 
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could convince the peasants easily. According to Mazhar Mufid Bey, Turkey needed Darulhilafe 
Madrasas, in where both Sharia learning and modern basic sciences were taught together.1042 This 
speech proves that Kemalists had no clear secular notion in education at this time. They were aware 
of the importance of religion and religious leaders in the rural areas. After this speech some MPs 
wanted to establish Darulhilafe Madrasas in cities. As an example Resul Bey, deputy of Bitlis, 
gave a proposal to the Assembly to establish the Darulhilafe Madrasa in Bitlis. Another example 
was the initiative of Yusuf Bey, deputy of Denizli, for establishing a madrasa in Denizli.1043 
Beyond this speech, it is clear that the Ankara Government was so eager to establish and 
support local madrasas. In many Anatolian cities, local religious schools were established by the 
government. In Tarakli in Hendek, in Adapazari, and in Ula new medreses started their education 
with the support of the Kemalist government. Moreover, the Minister of Sharia in the Ankara 
Government sent a circular letter to local administrations to establish madrasas and sustain 
them.1044 These documents prove that the Ankara Government had no problem with the traditional 
religious schools during the Independence War. This support continued after the war was won. 
While the Kemalist deputies were in favor of Darulhilafe Madrasas and religious schools, 
Huseyin Avni Bey, the leader of the Second Group, was totally against them. Huseyin Avni Bey 
clearly condemned the dichotomy in the educational system. According to him, the programs of 
schools were erroneous, and the Darulhilafe Madrasas and the other schools were deficient. The 
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discord between these two different schools caused many problems. Huseyin Avni Bey declared 
that these madrasas were not modern schools.1045 Huseyin Avni Bey, who was later condemned as 
a reactionary by the Kemalist regime, was again a vanguard in the unification of education. The 
Kemalist Government managed this unification in March 1924 after the collapse of the Office of 
Caliphate.  
Conservative deputies opposed Huseyin Avni Bey and advocated the importance of 
madrasas. Mustafa Taki Efendi condemned the Tanzimat Era for the dichotomy in the educational 
system in the Ottoman Empire. Before the Tanzimat, there was no division in the Ottoman 
educational structure. Mustafa Taki Efendi mentioned that the Ottoman Government was 
threatened to force educational reform by the European powers. The modern school system 
became a challenge to the classical madrasa system. These modern schools became the centers of 
the European theories, philosophies, and customs. Mustafa Taki Efendi attacked religious scholars 
who accepted Western thought which saw Islam as an obstacle on the way of reformation. He once 
more underlined that Islam was not against scientific progress. Vehbi Efendi, deputy of Konya, 
opposed Huseyin Avni Bey’s condemnation of madrasas. He believed that the madrasas had never 
been a source of sedition. They were always places of improvement and never been a source of 
discord.1046 Traditional and religious schools were advocated by both Kemalist and conservative 
deputies in August 1922. Huseyin Avni Bey was one of the few deputies to attack to the dichotomy 
in education in Turkey. His thoughts were more radical than the Kemalist modernizers at that time. 
However, he and his allies were expelled from the Grand National Assembly when the first period 
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was over in April 1923. On the other hand, the Kemalists adopted this dichotomy in their nine 
principles, their program for the coming election in June 1923.          
The second term of the Grand National Assembly was inaugurated on August 11, 1923, 
and it functioned like a single party regime.1047 Education policies from August 1923 to March 
1924 were still not radical at this period. It could be said that the Kemalist regime was looking to 
remove the political actors of the old regime first and then to modernize education ideologically. 
The Office of Caliphate was still in existence in this transition period, therefore it had to be 
abolished first and then Kemalist ideological change in education would be possible. These 
changes in education became possible in March 1924 once the Office of Caliphate was abolished. 
The new and fifth Government of the Grand National Assembly was formed on August 14, 1923. 
The Government program was read on September 5, 1923 in the Assembly. In the program, the 
Government decided the educational policies would be based on unity in public and vocational 
education. The duties of the Government in education were the education of children, education 
of the people, and cultivating excellent people who had a nationalist mentality. The education of 
children would be provided by modern schools. Night courses and apprentice schools would be 
established for popular education. Talented students whose families could not afford to send them 
to schools would be supported by the Government for their higher education. Moreover, the 
Government would send to them to Europe for specialized training. The development of every 
degree of education, equality of opportunity, physical training and scouting, compulsory 
elementary education, and giving opportunities to girls equal to boys would be the goals of Ali 
Fethi Bey’s Government.1048 The New York Times highlighted this educational policy as a new 
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program for development of Turkish nation in education. The newspaper particularly mentioned 
scouting as a means for the government to increase pupils’ physical development.1049 
As it mentioned above, the second period of the Grand National Assembly was a single 
party regime from the beginning. Friction within the Kemalist party started after the establishment 
of the Republic which was seen as a coup d’état by Kemal’s opponents in the People’s Party. Some 
individuals like Rauf Bey and Kazim Karabekir Pasha were relatively more gradualist in their 
approach to many questions of modernization and political change.1050 The radical wing of the 
Kemalist Party winning a majority during the crisis of the establishment of the Republic. This 
radical wing had also its educational agenda in the secularization of education in Turkey. This 
agenda was mostly ideological rather than systematic or rational. The next section will discuss the 
ideological aims of Kemalist educational policies and their deficiencies during the unification of 
education in March 1924 and afterwards.  
4.3 Law for the Unification of Education in March 1924 and Afterwards 
It is a fact that the Kemalist regime had no objection to the Ottoman educational system 
during the Turkish War of Independence. Moreover, there were many deputies who were educated 
in the traditional religious schools, madrasas, in the Assembly. As mentioned in the previous 
section, the Kemalist deputies agreed about the importance of the religious education with the 
conservative deputies. When a significant number of conservative deputies lost their seats after the 
elections controlled by the Kemalist Government in June and July 1923, the Kemalist majority 
strengthened its power within the state. In the second period of the Assembly, the Kemalist 
majority planned to destroy the Office of Caliphate, to abolish the Ministry of Sharia, and to unite 
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the educational system on the same day, March 3, 1924. According to Hasan Kayali: “…when the 
caliphate was abolished and the Ottoman house once and for all dislodged, Mustafa Kemal turned 
to the task of unification. The law for the unification of education became the linchpin of the 
cultural program of the new Turkey.”1051 
The Law for the Unification of Education in March 1924 was an important step in the 
secularization of education in Turkey. By the help of this law, the republican government put all 
schools under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.1052 The Kemalist regime believed that 
traditional religious schools could not coexist with modern schools and therefore, this dichotomy 
in education should be removed. Hasan Kayali pointed out the effects of this bifurcation in every 
aspect of the Ottoman Empire: “The law for the unification of education was emblematic of the 
spirit of Kemalist reforms. Since the beginning of the Tanzimat, new institutions had continued to 
exist side by side with traditional ones, even as the former circumscribed the reach and scope of 
the older institutions. Western legal systems, secular schools, and dress had not entirely replaced 
existing ones. Mustafa Kemal’s brief experiment with separating the office of the caliphate from 
the sultanate was consistent with such bifurcation.”1053  
These changes would be implemented after a strong leadership took control of the state. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the political power of Mustafa Kemal enabled him to take 
significant steps in education and culture. Henry Rutz and Erol Balkan indicate the importance of 
the strong leadership in a radical change as: “The instrument of power was the 1924 Law of 
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Unification of Instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) that determined ‘all education instruments 
are to be placed under the control of the Ministry of Education’.”1054  
The Kemalist leadership wanted to create a nationalist educational system which would be 
helpful for raising future generations. Michael Winter sees this ideological approach as: “The Law 
for the Unification of Instruction was a fundamental step in the establishment of a unified, modern, 
secular, egalitarian and national educational system. Its nation-building role was especially vital 
in a country where identity was often Islamic rather than national, and which was fragmented into 
numerous regional, tribal, racial and linguistic units.”1055 The Assembly debates demonstrate this 
Kemalist ideological mentality in education.  
While the division of the Ottoman educational system was not a problem in the first period 
of the Assembly, the situation changed in the second period. The Kemalists strengthened their 
power in politics and their efforts to change the educational structure were directly proportional to 
their power. The first initiative started in February 1924. During the discussion about the budget 
of the Government in the Assembly, Vasif Bey, deputy of Saruhan and later the Minister of 
Education in March 1924, started to criticize the divided system mentioning the ‘nine principles’ 
(the election program of People’s Party) he stressed the fifth principle of that program. Under that 
principle, the unification of education was declared a goal of the party. According to Vasif Bey, a 
Government imposed and followed a single policy to raise and educate its individuals. The 
Government raised a generation who were touched by the same wishes and desires by the help of 
a united and standard education.1056 The next day, in the opening ceremony of the Grand National 
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Assembly, Mustafa Kemal declared the importance of the unification of education. In his speech, 
he warned the deputies to accept the coming law immediately for the sake of the state. Any delay 
in the law would be harmful for the education of nation. Mustafa Kemal wanted from the deputies 
to show their zeal in accepting the law for the unification of education in order to realize the results 
of this decision.1057          
The Law for the Unification of Education was accepted by the Assembly on March 3, 1924. 
Because of discussions over the abolition of the Caliphate, which was accepted the same day, this 
proposal was accepted with neither opposition nor discussion in the Assembly. In the proposal 
Vasif Bey underlined the reasons for the Government’s reform in education. While there is in fact 
no proof about the Tanzimat reformers wanted a unified educational system, Vasif Bey asserted 
that while the Tanzimat reformers wanted to unite education, they instead caused bifurcation. This 
bifurcation created many harmful results. The individuals of a society should receive a united 
education. The dichotomy in education would create two different types of people. This situation 
would violate the goals of uniting feelings and thoughts in society. Therefore, the unification of 
education was the best and most modern approach to promote national feelings and thoughts in a 
state.1058 After the law passed in the Assembly, the traditional religious schools (madrasas) were 
banned and all schools in Turkey were united under the administration of Ministry of National 
Education.1059 
The importance of the Unification of Education was undeniable. The Assembly debates 
demonstrate the main Kemalist goals in this reform as removing the dichotomy of the Ottoman 
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education system, eliminating the traditional religious schools, (madrasas) as backward, and 
assimilating minorities under the banner of Turkification. Moreover, teachers were seen as the key 
instrument of an ideological transfer to the future generations. The Assembly debates shed light 
on this Kemalist ideological effort also.  
4.3.1 Abolition of Madrasas and Opposition to the Kemalist 
Initiative 
The closing of madrasas became a fact after the law for the Unification of Education was 
accepted in the Assembly on March 3, 1924. The Ulema and Sufi orders were controlled by the 
regime after this abolition.1060 While the Kemalist bureaucratic reorganization was justified in 
terms of the necessity of “unification of education” under a national authority, the public and 
religious authorities still kept their hopes alive for a new arrangement of the religious schools 
before the law was passed in the Assembly. However, the Kemalist Minister of Education made 
public his decision “to close down the madrasas altogether because of their allegedly incurable 
backwardness and many other deficiencies.” Amit Bein emphasizes the importance of the role of 
Mustafa Kemal in this decision. He summarizes the fate of madrasas as:  “the madrasas of the 
capital closed their doors for the last time on March 15, 1924, without any guarantees being given 
to the professors about their future employment. A centuries long tradition of learning was 
symbolically eliminated while in reality a merely decade-old reformed system came to an abrupt 
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end after years of great expectations, some achievements, and many struggles, frustrations, and 
dashed hopes.”1061 
After the decision of the Kemalist government, all madrasas, 479 in number with a total 
enrollment of 18,000, were closed down. The Kemalist Government placed religious secondary 
education under the Ministry of Education in Ankara, which organized a relatively small number 
of schools for mosque liturgists and prayer leaders after the Law of the Unification of Education 
was accepted in the Grand National Assembly.1062 The Ministry of Education sent a circular letter 
to local administrations about the new law which they should take into consideration. The Ministry 
sent an ordinance to the local administrators as what kind of principles they had to obey in the 
schools.1063 
This initiative was another Kemalist ideological approach to the religious institutions. The 
main goal of this Kemalist act was to control religion and religious institutions instead of removing 
them from the public sphere. Michael Winter sees this ideological aim as: “the official Kemalist 
attitude was that religious instruction should be given privately at home and not in school, but the 
authorities acted cautiously. Religious lessons were not immediately dropped from the curriculum 
but rather phased out. At first they continued on a voluntary basis; then they were discontinued in 
the middle (orta) or junior high schools, and later in the secondary (lise) schools. In 1932, religious 
instruction was withdrawn from the curriculum of the primary schools as well.”1064 
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Ersin Kalaycioglu emphasizes the ideological approach of the Kemalist regime: “The 
republican government took another radical decision and put all schools under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of National Education in 1924. However, eventually the practice of providing some 
students religious education, while educating the rest in secular, scientific education, and instilling 
a nationalist creed in the minds and hearts of both groups of students seemed not to be feasible. 
Hence, the government adopted a policy of mainly educating the students in science, arts and 
humanities compatible with the nationalist creed of the regime, and permit religious instruction as 
much as feasible under the circumstances. Religious institutions diminished in numbers and the 
number of students instructed in religion also diminished sharply in the 1920s and the 1930s.”1065 
The Kemalist Government wanted to replace religious schools with Imam-Hatip Schools 
and the Faculty of Theology.1066 Some of the ex-Darulhilafe Medrese’s pupils were ranked as 
graduated from Imam-Hatip schools and they were assigned as imams in cities and rural areas. 
The Kemalist regime tried to train modernized imams, whom should be equipped with the modern 
sciences, in these schools. However, these Imam-Hatip schools would not be enough to meet needs 
for the next few years. Moreover, the Kemalist regime had no real desire to continue any religious 
education. As an example, the Government did not allow a hafiz school in Konya even though this 
school was suggested by the Directorate of Religious Affairs.1067   
Michael Winter describes the reluctance of the Kemalist regime to continue the religious 
education as: “Article 4 of the Law for the Unification of Instruction provided for the establishment 
of special schools to train religious functionaries, since the madrasas were about to be closed down. 
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In September 1924, 26 such schools were opened. Their principals had no special religious 
training; they were experienced educators, imbued with the goal of turning out enlightened men 
of religion who would be loyal to the Republic. Most of the teaching hours were devoted to the 
sciences and French, with religious subjects such as Koran and Hadith relegated to a secondary 
position. Arabic was not taught at all. This strange curriculum did not attract many students; in 
any case, the prevailing anti-religious atmosphere would not have encouraged the institutes to 
develop. Enrollment quickly declined, and the last of the schools was closed in 1930/1931.”1068  
The majority of ulema and Islamic intellectuals resented the closing down of the madrasas 
in 1924. Bein states: “Some reform-minded ulema felt particularly dismayed and even betrayed 
because they felt that the republican government had abruptly ended a project that was on the right 
track and could have had a bright future. Their years of struggle for the remaking of religious 
education, and then advances they believed they had achieved, were brushed aside. From their 
perspective, the madrasas not only were salvageable but actually were well on their way to 
becoming progressive schools of modern religious learning. The government’s explanations for 
closing them down therefore appeared to some of the reform-minded ulema as flimsy and 
dishonest.”1069  
Resentment from traditional religious scholars was echoed in the Assembly also. After the 
law on the Unification of Education was passed in the Assembly, the conservative deputies within 
the People’s Party showed their dissatisfaction about the law when the Ministry of Education’s 
budget was discussed. During the session held on April 17, 1924, a number of members of 
parliament asserted their reservations about the change. The debates in the Assembly prove that 
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the conservative deputies were very concerned about the direction of the Kemalist regime’s anti-
Islamic education. Most of them thought that the Kemalist attitude to the madrasas arbitrary. While 
the Kemalist authorities gave strong support to the local madrasas and religious education during 
the War of Independence, the shift in their policy was seen by the conservative deputies as an 
ideological agenda. During the debates in the Assembly, conservative deputies tried to convince 
the Kemalist deputies to reform the madrasas instead of abolishing them.  
The conservative deputies objected to claims about the quality of madrasas also. According 
to the Kemalist regime, the madrasas were useless because of their physical condition. Vasif Bey, 
the Minister of Education, evaluated madrasas as insufficient because of their educators. Madrasas 
had one or two educators and this was not enough for an educational institution. However, when 
the Kemalist government could not establish enough schools in the rural areas, they operated 
village schools with one or two teachers. For the conservative deputies this proved the reform was 
untimely. These deputies and the conservative press stressed that the establishment of the new 
religious schools would not be sufficient for the needs of the entire people and the Government 
was not interested in supporting these new schools. In the Assembly debates, the conservative 
deputies prophesied the future failure of these schools as and this became a reality in 1931. 
If we look at the discussions in the Assembly carefully, there were issues at stake beyond 
the role of state in inculcating Islamic principles. The contradictions of Kemalist notions of 
education were seen very well in these discussions. First the Assembly discussed the budget of the 
newly established the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The Ministry of Finance did not allocate 
any money in its budget for supporting religious affairs in the mosques. This attitude was criticized 
by Resit Aga, deputy of Malatya, very harshly. He pointed out that if Minister of Finance wanted 
to abolish all mosques (like the Minister of Education had done to madrasas), he had to explain his 
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attitude to the Assembly. Mustafa Feyzi Efendi, deputy of Konya, criticized the Minister of 
Finance for giving nothing to religious affairs. He also underlined that the Faculty of Theology 
could not be effective in educating muftis and other religious scholars because of economic 
deficiencies. Hafiz Ibrahim Efendi, deputy of Isparta, prophesied the fate of the Faculty of 
Theology as: “it would be shut down in two years.”1070 While education in the Faculty of Theology 
continued until 1933, the Kemalist regime always neglected religious education.       
The second and the most important subject in these discussions was the abolition of the 
madrasas. The conservative deputies in the Kemalist party tried to convince public opinion and 
the radical and secular wings of their party of the importance of religious education. Mustafa Feyzi 
Efendi, deputy of Konya, underlined the importance of madrasas and their teachers, muderris. 
According to him, in a district there were approximately thirty villages and there were thirty 
students from these villages gathered in the madrasa of that district for their religious education. 
The cadis, mufti, and muderris of that district could teach these students religious learning, Islamic 
canon law, religious duties, prayers, and ablution. Those students could teach these points to their 
villagers after returning back to their villages. However, the Minister of Education shut down those 
madrasas and sent those students home to their villages. Mustafa Feyzi Bey was upset by the 
Government’s attitude which did not allocate any budget for religious affairs. He emphasized that 
if these madrasas steered people wrong, the government’s decision was understandable, but if this 
decision was arbitrary, the decision should be revised. Mustafa Feyzi Bey said that if these 
madrasas were shut down because of an arbitrary decision, he could not consent to this decision.1071     
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Kamil Efendi, deputy of Karahisarisahip, underlined the contradictions in the decision of 
the Kemalist Government to abolish all madrasas. He separated madrasas into two parts: the 
Darulhilafe Madrasa and the medaris-i ilmiye.1072 According to Kamil Efendi, Darulhilafe 
Madrasa had a good program which was prepared in a modern and reformed spirit. Because of 
lack of funds, the Ottoman Government established only thirty Darulhilafe Madrasas. On the other 
hand, there were many villages in where peasants were looking for someone to educate their 
children. For raising imams to provide for peasants’ religious needs and educators to teach their 
children, the Ankara Government established medaris-i ilmiye during the ministry of Mustafa 
Fehmi Efendi, the Minister of Sharia in the national government. These religious schools had their 
own program, but were less important than the Darulhilafe Madrasas because of lack of scholars 
in their boards. Kamil Efendi underlined the hasty approach of the Kemalist Government to the 
abolition of madrasas. He advised the Minister of Education, Vasif Bey, to scrutinize every 
madrasa to see if it was suitable for education or not, instead of destroying all of them. If some 
madrasas were proper for education, they could continue their service, and the rest could be shut 
down. Kamil Efendi emphasized that while the state needed many educational institutions, the 
Government’s decision to shut down madrasas was not wise. After the Law on the Unification of 
Education was passed in the Assembly, the Ministry of Education could transform the Darulhilafe 
Madrasas into the imam-hatip schools. There were forty thousand villages in Turkey and those 
thirty religious schools would not be enough to serve the needs of people. Moreover, he stressed 
that the haste of the Ministry of Education was not logical. When Kamil Efendi said that within 
three years the Faculty of Theology could not register any students because of lack of secondary 
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education, other conservative deputies, such as Ziyaeetin Efendi from Erzurum and Hafiz Ibrahim 
Efendi from Isparta, approved him.1073 The conservative deputies were very well aware of 
Kemalist intentions in the religious education; however, their power was limited against the radical 
wing of the Kemalist party.     
The government’s decision to shut down madrasas was also criticized by Raif Efendi, 
deputy of Erzurum. When existing schools could satisfy just only one tenth of Turkey’s needs, the 
ban on religious schools was a mistake. It was true that some madrasas were not suitable for a 
quality education, but it could be possible to reform these institutions and transform them into 
modern schools. He asked the Minister of Education how many elementary schools the ministry 
had in the villages, how many elementary school teachers would be graduated from the teachers’ 
college, and who would teach villagers their religious beliefs? Raif Efendi asserted that without 
imams and teachers, the character of people would degenerate. If the Government would not send 
a teacher to the peasants to give them a religious education, these people could turn into 
savages.1074    
Raif Efendi described madrasas as the places in where people gained ideals. He especially 
gave the example of Mehmetcik1075 in the Turkish War of Independence. He argued that it was 
because of “the soul of Islam” and the soldiers’ devotion to God that the war had been won. When 
Raif Efendi asked how these Mehmetcik got their ideals, the Kemalist deputy Izzet Ulvi Bey 
shouted as “by Turkish blood.” Hafiz Ibrahim Efendi, deputy of Isparta, replied to same question: 
“by the soul of Islam.” Raif Efendi answered his own question as “the thing you call Turkishness, 
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gentlemen, (is about) placing Islamic faith into the Turkish nation’s bosom.” Imams educated in 
the madrasas gave this ideal to the people, according to Raif Efendi.1076  
The meaning of the Unification of Education was totally different in Raif Efendi’s mind. 
According to him the aim of the unification of the education system was for all educational 
institutions including the religious, scientific ones to be pulled under one center. It did not mean 
the closing down some of these institutions and keeping the others. If the Government shut down 
all the institutions at the same time, it could be understandable. Raif Bey criticized the Kemalist 
Government as instead of correcting the deficiencies of madrasas, they preferred to destroy them. 
However, destroying these institutions without establishing alternative schools was delusional. 
The Imam-Hatip Schools, which would be total only thirty schools in different parts of Turkey, 
would be insufficient for providing for the religious needs of people. Pupils from the villages 
would not go to Imam-Hatip Schools in the cities because of their distance. The result of this 
change would be savagery in the villages because of lack of imams and teachers.1077 
Vasif Bey, the Minister of Education, replied all these critics from the perspective of the 
Kemalist Government. First of all he underlined the obsolete mentality of madrasas which was 
admitted by the religious scholars in the Ottoman Empire. Because of their obsolescence, there 
were some reforms carried out by the Ottoman scholars as transforming these madrasas into 
Darulhilafe Madrasa which was a reformed religious school which had both religious and scientific 
courses in its curriculum. Vasif Bey was not sure about why these old style madrasas were opened 
by the Governments of the National Assembly. These madrasas were in ruins where all religious 
and scientific education was taught by a muderris. Vasif Bey emphasized that at least ten educators 
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should be employed in schools where an elementary and secondary education was given. Vasif 
Bey questioned the quality of education in these medreses in where just one or two muderris was 
employed. He assured the deputies that in any country an institution could not be run by one or 
two educators. Raif Efendi countered this assertion by asking how many educators were employed 
in the elementary schools. Vasif Bey confessed that as the Minister of Education he was not happy 
with the number of elementary school teachers who were employed in these schools. He indicated 
that the Ministry tried to employ at least six educators in a six-class elementary school and at least 
four teachers in a four-class elementary school. Therefore, the Government would not allow any 
institution to be active with two educators.1078         
Vasif Bey also criticized the effectiveness of the madrasas. The Minister of Education 
reflected the Kemalist perspective that while the madrasas trained many valuable people two or 
three centuries ago, they were not now in good condition. He also used statistics about the pupils 
in the madrasas. According to Vasif Bey, there were 18,000 students registered in the madrasas; 
however, just 6,000 of them were actually present. The rest were busy as grocers or tradesmen. 
Vasif Bey asked conservative deputies: “my honorable friends, is this a religious education?”1079   
The vocational school issue was another concern for the conservative deputies. Mustafa 
Fevzi Efendi stressed that it was necessary to educate in all areas after the Unification of Education. 
However, there was no school to educate pupils for religious professions. The elementary and 
secondary schools were not proper for religious education because they were not vocational 
schools. Mustafa Feyzi Efendi pointed out one common idea among the conservative deputies. 
Inasmuch as Turks would not be irreligious and the religion was necessary for them, religious 
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schools were needed for training muftis and imams. However, the Imam-Hatip schools, which 
were established after the abolition of the madrasas, were not sufficient.1080 
Vasif Bey tried to alleviate the concerns of the conservative deputies over vocational 
subjects. In compliance with the law on the Unification of Education, not only religious schools 
but military schools as well were came under the Ministry of Education. After the law was passed 
in the Assembly, the students would be selected from the high schools if they wished to join the 
Military Academy. Vasif Bey tried to explain that there were no vocational schools for professions 
such as law, medicine, agriculture, and trade. All these professions got their students from 
secondary schools which had unified program of instruction. Vasif Bey emphasized that he gave 
orders to establish imam-hatip schools as vocational schools for the religious education which 
were established after the law on the Unification of Education was passed.1081 While Vasif Bey 
pointed out that the military schools were under the Ministry of Education and their instructors 
were chosen from among the non-military educators,1082 the system was changed and the 
vocational military schools were returned to the Ministry of National Defense the next year. 
The lack of a systematic curriculum in education was another concern for the deputies in 
the Assembly. Kamil Efendi, another conservative deputy from Karahisar-i Sahip, stressed this 
lack. The lack of a common curriculum was a long-term problem of the state. He mentioned his 
experiences from the Tanzimat Era. The main lack in instruction was common program. Kamil 
Efendi emphasized the attitudes of muderris in madrasas and school managers. According to him, 
because of the lack of a systematic approach to education and this education’s dependence on the 
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scholar’s own methods, individual students were harmed. Kamil Efendi pointed out such harmful 
methods as superstitions among some of muderris of madrasas and natural theories which were 
inaccurate among some school managers. Young people were harmed by lack of an appropriate 
curriculum. Kamil Efendi gave credit to calisthenics which were beneficial for military programs 
in Turkey. On the other hand, intellectual training was too often not more than an encyclopedic 
approach which aimed to teach a small piece of every subject. Therefore, the goals of education 
were not met. Education should give a good self-control and a healthy character to youth.1083                       
Moral education was another topic discussed in the Assembly. According to Kamil Efendi, 
the moral education without the sacred feelings, that is, not based on the fear of God, was deficient 
and imperfect. If people did not feel the fear of God in their hearts, the Government could not 
provide law and order. Moral education was better than police for controlling people in a peaceful 
way. Kamil Efendi suggested to the Kemalist Government to base moral education on the fear of 
God.1084  
The right to establish private schools was another subject in the Assembly debates. 
Conservative deputies were in favor of this right, but the Kemalist Government was opposed. 
Mustafa Feyzi Efendi, deputy of Konya, asked the Minister of Education “if the madrasas will be 
shut down in the districts and the Government will not establish any school there, is it possible for 
a muderris to settle in a place and to educate pupils by himself? Does the Ministry have the 
authority to forbid this education? If yes, how does the Ministry get this authorization?” Vasif Bey 
replied these questions in a negative way. All schools would be controlled by the Ministry of 
Education and this law would not allow any kind of private school out of the control of the Ministry 
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of Education. Vasif Bey added that they would not accept foreign notions of private schools. 
Mustafa Feyzi Efendi summarized this answer as no freedom of thought and no freedom in the 
Republic. Ali Riza Efendi, deputy of Amasya, supported Mustafa Feyzi Efendi and added “in that 
case, there is not freedom of conscience either.”1085          
The Kemalist majority’s ideological aim in education produced another argument in the 
Assembly. Ziyaettin Efendi, deputy of Erzurum, was doubtful about the Government’s actions. He 
pointed out that more than forty madrasas were closed without establishing schools. He 
emphasized that if every decision of Government was supposed to be impeccable and to be 
approved by deputies without question, the Assembly meant nothing. Therefore, he saw the 
shutting down of the madrasas without establishing enough schools as either: because of the 
ignorance of the Government or to serve another purpose. Hafiz Ibrahim Efendi, deputy of Isparta, 
indicated that the action was a result of an ideological approach instead of a logical one. He 
condemned the Minister of Education for prejudice against religious students. As an example, 
while Vasif Bey was a public prosecutor in the Independence Tribunals, he stereotyped all madrasa 
students as fanatic adherents. Hafiz Ibrahim Efendi thought that the madrasas were forced to shut 
down because of the Minister’s personal thought, mentality, and desire.1086  
The last conservative objections to the Kemalist Government were seen in April 1924. 
After these discussions, there was no longer any serious disapproval of Kemalist educational 
policies in the Assembly because of the limited power of conservative deputies. From their 
perspective, in 1924, the republican authorities had simply executed the last stage of a clandestine 
scheme hatched by their Unionist predecessors a decade earlier. As Bein emphasizes, some of 
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these misgivings were even voiced in the press of Istanbul before the government clamped down 
on all opposition publications in 1925.1087  
The most significant conservative magazine in Istanbul at that time was Sebilurresad. The 
newspaper showed its dissatisfaction with the Law on the Unification of Education. It harshly 
criticized the sale of the madrasas to other institutions.1088 While the Kemalist press applauded the 
abolition of the madrasas as “destroying sixteen thousand hearths of fanatic adherents,”1089 
Sebilurresad rejected this idea and summarized the issue as “by the help of this law not sixteen 
thousand hearths of fanatics extinguished but the hearths of religious scholars.”1090 After the 
abolition of the madrasas, the Kemalist Government decided to establish imam-hatip schools. 
Sebilurresad described the fate of these schools as vague. According to Yahya Afif, these schools 
were vain and useless because of their curriculum. They could be useful only in Istanbul, but in 
small cities these schools were not attractive. In the old system, imams and preachers were 
educated by madrasas; people could send their children to the local madrasas. However, they 
would not send their children to a school in a different city. When people did not send their children 
to the imam-hatip schools, those schools were abolished one by one by the Government.1091 
Sebilurresad summarized these events “we heard that Nigde Imam-Hatip School was abolished. It 
was clear the purpose of the Law on the Unification of Education was the abrogation of the entire 
religious institutions. The Minister of Education mentioned the establishment of Imam-Hatip 
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Schools while the madrasas were shutting down. The purpose of the Government was deceptive 
when these schools were established. Right now, they were closing one by one.”1092 
After the abolition of the madrasas, the possessions of these institutions were given to 
different organizations in Turkey. Some of the ex-madrasas were converted into schools if they 
were appropriate for education. If not, those schools were sold for funds to establish new schools. 
The Madrasa of Hamidiye in Istanbul was leased to the Trade and Provisions Bourse in 1925. The 
madrasa of Zeynep Sultan Mosque was given to the Artists’ Association. Zincirli Cami Madrassa 
was granted to the Teachers’ Association as a headquarters.1093 The properties and possessions of 
the madrasas were distributed to many different associations and their traces erased by the regime. 
According to the newspaper Sebilurresad, this was the cause of great dissatisfaction among 
ordinary people.1094 
The abolition of the traditional madrasa system by the Law on the Unification of Education 
had caused particular dissatisfaction among Kurds. The  new ‘unified, modern, secular, egalitarian 
and national’ educational system of the Kemalist regime became a problem for a society, which 
identified itself as Islamic rather than national, and which was fragmented into numerous regional, 
tribal, racial and linguistic units.1095 Kurds were affected negatively because of this nationalist 
education. Omer Taspinar sees this as an assimilation program: “The nationalist-secularist 
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priorities of the new Government were clearly reflected in the Law on the Unification of Education 
which closed all religious schools and effectively banned the education of non-Turkish languages. 
As the tradition of Ottoman cosmopolitanism and tolerance for multi-nationalism came to an end, 
the new Government purged most of the Kurdish officials from senior level public administration 
in the eastern provinces. All references to a land called “Kurdistan” were removed from maps and 
official documents, and Turkish names gradually replaced the names of Kurdish towns and 
villages. During the years to follow, the Turkish state embarked upon a program of assimilation 
whereby the national education system and military service became primary instruments of 
‘Turkification’.1096  
After the Sheikh Said rebellion, on September 24, 1925, the Turkish government prepared 
the “Sark Islahat Plani”, Reform Plan for the East, which provided for special administrative 
arrangements for eastern areas and introduced the Inspector-General system.1097 This Turkification 
program, which included 27 points, was implemented after the Kemalist regime started its 
assimilation plan in eastern Turkey. In the second article, Turkey was separated into five different 
inspectorate regions and eastern Turkey became the fifth inspectorate region. The Kemalist 
Government decided to settle Turkish and Albanian immigrants from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 
into the eastern region. Moreover, these Turkish immigrants were settled in abandoned properties 
left after the Armenian deportation, so not distributed to Kurds.  
Articles 13, 14 and 16 in the Reform Plan for the East related to the cultural and educational 
assimilation of the Kurdish people under the banner of Turkification. In article 13, the Kemalist 
Government banned any language besides Turkish from governmental institutions, street bazaars, 
                                                 
1096 Taspinar. Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey, 79. 
1097 Akcura, Devletin Kurt Filmi, 51. 
 324 
schools and other public places in many cities, such as Diyarbakir, Malatya, Elazig, Van, and Bitlis 
which were located in this region. The Kemalist regime categorized these cities as originally 
Turkish, but Kurdish identity had become dominant. Therefore, the Kemalist Government tried to 
save these cities by prohibiting all languages except Turkish.1098  
In article 14, the Kemalist Government decided to establish branches of Turk Ocaklari 
(Turkish Hearths) and schools in cities, such as Siirt and Mardin, predominantly inhabited by 
Arabs. The regime asserted that these people were originally Turkish but these Arabs regarded 
themselves as Kurdish. Therefore, they had to be saved as soon as possible from the Kurdish effect. 
Moreover, establishing girls’ schools and increasing girls’ desire to these schools were encouraged 
by the Government in article 14. The province of Dersim was seen as a key point to decrease 
Kurdish influence.1099 In article 16, the Kemalist Government banned speaking Kurdish in western 
Turkey where Kurds lived as a minority. Beyond this ban, girls were encouraged to go to schools 
and learn Turkish as soon as possible.  
In conclusion, Kemalist plans for madrasas was changed many times. The Kemalist attitude 
was positive towards to the madrasas and religious education during the Independence War. 
Moreover, the Kemalist Government supported new types of madrasas in 1921 and 1922. 
However, Kemalist patience with madrasas was over by1924 after they strengthened their power 
in the Government.  The dichotomy in education was seen impossible by the Kemalist authorities 
in this period. Struggles of the conservative deputies within the Kemalist party ended in March 
1924. Moreover, the traditional ties between Turkish and Kurdish ethnic groups were damaged 
after the closure of the madrasas in 1924.  
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4.3.2 Kemalist Educational Policies and its Deficiencies after 
the Law on the Unification of Education 
Mustafa Kemal and the rest of the Kemalist leaders were initially hopeful for the results of 
the Law on the Unification of Education. In the opening speech of the Assembly in November 
1924, Mustafa Kemal pointed out that reforms would continue in a serious way. He emphasized 
that these reforms needed a long time to get positive results. Even though the last reform had been 
implemented just eight months ago, the results of the law were seen clearly. Mustafa Kemal had 
observed the eagerness of republican teachers who were a ‘military of wisdom’ with their pupils 
in different parts of Turkey. Moreover, those teachers were very useful in teaching the rest of 
people in their location. Beyond the eagerness of teachers, republican and progressive people also 
felt desire for schools and showed their dissatisfaction with ignorance.1100 In the program of the 
new Ali Fethi Bey Government, popular interest in education was stressed once more. The 
Government would increase the number of educators and refrain from the useless changes in 
educational programs. In the program, Ali Fethi Bey assured the deputies that the main goal for 
the Government was raising a generation who were ready for life by the help of an ordered and 
disciplined education.1101 
While Mustafa Kemal and the Prime Minister Ali Fethi Bey were hopeful for the future of 
education in Turkey, the Assembly debates prove that the chronic problems in education were not 
solved in this period.  First of all, the small budget for the education was the biggest obstacle. 
When the Kemalist government allotted only 400,000 Turkish liras out of 150 million liras to 
education, the members of the opposition party, Progressive Republican Party, demanded to 
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increase the budget of education at least 2% out of the general budget. Beyond that, the Assembly 
debates show that the total number of schools and students in a very low level. Nearly 300,000 
students had a chance to go to school out of more than a million students in 1924.  
 The Unification of Education was an ideological decision which was not well considered 
by the Kemalist leadership. The debates in the Assembly show this short-sighted ideological 
approach many times. First of all, when the Kemalist government needed to create institutions in 
the villages with one or two instructors, this contradicted their justification for the abolition of the 
madrasas. During the debates about the abolition of the madrasas, Vasif Bey, the Minister of 
Education, insisted that the quantity of the educators in the madrasas were not enough for a modern 
school, so the Government could not allow any institution to be active with only two educators.1102 
Beyond this, in vocational schools, the Government’s ideological aim was evident. When the Law 
on the Unification of Education aimed to unify all schools under the control of the Ministry of 
Education, deputies who had military background managed to return the military schools to the 
control of the Ministry of National Defense. However, the religious schools remained strictly 
controlled by the Ministry of Education. 
Critiques of educational policies were voiced by deputies soon after the Law on the 
Unification of Education was accepted in the Assembly. Ihsan Hamit Bey, deputy of Ergani, was 
one of the pessimistic deputies about the progress of education in Turkey. He described education 
as a ‘disaster’ in Turkey at that time. According to him, education was becoming anarchy. He 
described strikes and indiscipline of students in higher education. The strike of Teachers’ College 
students, and the incidents at the Trolley School, Medical School, and Law School were proof of 
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heartbreaking events in higher education.1103 Beyond this anarchy in higher education, Ihsan Hamit 
Bey emphasized that how the situation in the elementary schools was woeful. There were 3694 
elementary schools in Turkey at that time, but 2394 of these schools were not appropriate for their 
desired goals. The remaining 1300 were insufficient for the 13 million in Turkey at that time. 
Therefore, there was a school for every ten thousand people. The total number of elementary 
school students was 238,000; however, nearly one million students could not have a chance to go 
to any schools. Ihsan Hamit Bey compared the situation Turkey and Sweden. While the population 
of Sweden was half of Turkey, there were 14500 elementary schools there and just only 1300 in 
Turkey. Ihsan Hamit Bey asked to the Minister of Education how he would solve these problems 
in education. He answered his own question: “in my opinion, our present laws and methods are 
not enough to solve our problems in this case. I request the law of primary education as soon as 
possible from the Ministry of Education. By this means one fourth of our children will have 
chances to receive education.”1104 This speech is one of the most important confessions of the 
deficiency of the Kemalist policy in education. When conservative deputies warned the 
Government against abolishing the madrasas without establishing any schools instead of them, the 
secular wing of the People’s Party did not listen. Their concern were ignored by the Kemalist 
Government. Less than a year later, these deficiencies were admitted to by Kemalist deputies also.    
During the discussions about the budget of the Ministry of Education on January 31, 1925, 
the Kemalist regime confessed the deficiencies in their budget policies and educational reforms. 
At the end of the discussion, some decisions taken by the Government. First, the budget of Ministry 
of Education had been increasing since 1908 except for the war years; however, it was a very small 
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amount of money which could not fulfill the necessities of the state. Therefore, the Ministry of 
Education should have searched for new sources and tools to complete these necessities. The lack 
of a clear program was another deficiency which was mentioned in this report. The change in the 
Ministry caused much confusion in the educational affairs; therefore, the Ministry of Education 
needed a new program. Another deficiency in the report was the number of students in the age of 
compulsory education. Only three hundred thousand children had a change to go to school out of 
more than a million. This problem had to be solved immediately. Another deficiency was the lack 
of a kindergarten system in Turkey. These schools should be established as a supplementary school 
to the primary education as soon as possible.1105 These deficiencies, in particular the alternative of 
not destroying the madrasas but instead transforming some of them into modern schools, were 
uttered by the conservative deputies after the law for the Unification of Education was accepted 
by the Assembly. However, the Kemalist government ignored the realities of the educational 
conditions that time.   
The Progressive Republican Party criticized the educational policies of the Kemalist 
Government in the Assembly. First of all, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, the leader of the Progressive 
Republican Party, summarized the history of education in Turkey for a better understanding of 
present problems. According to him, education meant the progress of the people, and this progress 
was related to public education. Education in the Ottoman Empire was not backward prior to the 
era of machinery and the discovery of microbes. After the progress in these areas, the Ottomans 
could make no headway and education was hurt. The gap between the developed nations and 
Ottomans became wider.1106  
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Kazim Karabekir Pasha compared the Tanzimat Era in the Ottoman Empire with modern 
nations in Europe. According to him, the modern states had balanced progress in every aspect of 
life; therefore, they managed to reconcile their educational system with other social and political 
institutions and they prepared their youth for economic and social life. Modern nations sought to 
achieve common soul, common goal, and common interest through education. However, the free 
administration could not be established in the Ottoman society in the nineteenth century, therefore, 
these three assets could not be achieved in Ottoman education.1107  
When the Tanzimat Era ended, Ottoman society passed to the Constitutional Era without 
creating a united structure in a spiritual, sentimental, and material way, unlike developed nations. 
Kazim Karabekir Pasha emphasized that by the help of Ottoman citizens who read foreign works 
and got a European education, Ottoman education showed some progress. The meaning of 
education was partly understood at that era. However, political changes forced alterations in the 
personnel who had responsibility for education. Therefore, Ottoman education could not achieve 
real progress.1108   
In the Republican Era, Kazim Karabekir Pasha criticized the educational policies of the 
Kemalist Government in many ways. First of all, an insufficient curriculum was a serious problem 
for the education in Turkey. He mostly focused on the practical knowledge instead of theoretical 
one had become outdated after the First World War. The practical education came into 
preeminence after the economy became the axis of life. According to Kazim Karabekir Pasha, the 
Ministry of Education should prepare program based on practical education for making progress. 
This program should be considered as a future program which would solve the possible problems 
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for the next decade. If the Government prepared a program for only this year, the next year that 
program could be cancelled by another government. Therefore, this kind of short-term programs 
would not be beneficial. He advised to the Government to prepare a long-term program and not 
change people administering this program frequently.1109 Moreover, the Government accepted 
only the curriculum of developed nations but not practical courses which were useful for real 
life.1110     
The lack of public education in the program of the Ministry of Education was another 
critique by Kazim Karabekir. The opposition leader pointed out that the enemy was not only a 
foreign power which invaded the state. People in Turkey should be educated to recognize enemies 
in sanitary, economic, and intellectual problems. People should be equipped with knowledge for 
struggling against these enemies. According to Kazim Karabekir, if the people in Turkey were 
equipped with that knowledge, the modernity could permeate Turkish society easily.1111  
The budget for the Ministry of Education was another critique. Feridun Fikri Bey, deputy 
of Dersim, indicated that the Education budget was not enough to raise future generations under 
the notion of popular sovereignty and republic. Moreover, this lack would be a problem in enabling 
people to show their proficiency and sufficiency in performing political and civil duties. The 
Kemalist Government allocated only 400,000 Turkish liras for primary education out of 150 
million Turkish liras in the government budget. This was a very small amount of money, which 
seemed nothing to Feridun Fikri Bey. While the developed nations, such as France, attached 
importance to the all levels of education, in countries where the total number of literate people was 
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low, such as Turkey, the primary education should be considered as the most important level. The 
Turkish Government should attach importance to the primary education for the sake of the Turkish 
nation. Feridun Fikri Bey asserted that the deficiency in the primary school budget would cause 
some problems in the development of democracy, republicanism, and popular sovereignty. He 
advised the Government to devote at least two percent of the government budget to primary 
education.1112  
During discussions about the budget of the Ministry of Education, the Kemalist deputies 
defended the policies of the Kemalist Government in education. Agaoglu Ahmet Bey, deputy of 
Kars, emphasized the importance of an ideal in education. According to Ahmet Bey, raising 
practical people who would be useful to society was important in education. He agreed with 
opposition leader, Kazim Karabekir, on this point. However, he was against the notion of raising 
only practical people who thought only of their livelihoods. This response is not entirely true. 
While Kazim Karabekir Pasha indicated the importance of practical people for the sake of state, 
the Kemalist deputy twisted his words the next day. Agaoglu Ahmet Bey described the situation 
in Germany in the mid of the nineteenth century. According to him, Germany was advanced in 
many areas, such as science, philosophy, literature, and industry. However, the lack of ideals in 
German society and personal interests over national interests hindered possible unification.1113 
Agaoglu Ahmet Bey’s speech revealed a more ideological approach to education rather than an 
objective one under the guise of giving an ideal to future generations.  
Any deficiency of the education budget was denied by some Kemalist deputies. Hakki 
Tarik Bey, deputy of Giresun, claimed the total amount of spending for the educational affairs was 
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enough and acceptable. He emphasized that there were many new matters, which were not seen in 
previous government budgets, added to the education budget. Beyond this, Hakki Tarik Bey 
asserted that the budget of the Government for education was double of the budget of the first 
government of the Constitutional Era. Therefore, the opponents should accept this budget with 
pleasure.1114      
While Hakki Tarik Bey was satisfied with the education budget, its deficiencies were 
confessed by the Minister of Education, Sukru Saracoglu Bey. The Minister conceded that if the 
Government did not retire any educator and hired all students of the Teacher’s College after their 
graduation, they could solve the problem of appointing teachers in 64 years. 1115 This confession 
is telling: when the government banned all madrasas, conservative deputies asked the Minister of 
Education how they could fulfill the needs of villages and small towns for teachers. The Kemalist 
regime had exact plan to solve the illiteracy problem.     
After the confession of the deficiencies in the primary education, Sukru Saracoglu Bey 
tried to convince the Assembly to solve the problem with the help of a new type school which 
would be established in the villages. The Kemalist Minister described these schools as ‘village 
school’ which required less money and less time to establish. According to this project, teachers 
would be selected from people already close to the peasants’ life styles. Sukru Saracoglu indicated 
that just one or two educators would be enough in these schools.1116 This is another Kemalist 
reversal. While the conservative deputies tried to explain the importance of the madrasas in the 
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small town and villages, especially in the eastern regions in where the modern school system was 
insufficient Minister of Education Vasif Bey rejected their critique.1117  
The military high schools were another problem in the Kemalist educational policies. 
Military schools were attached to the Ministry of Education after the Law on the Unification of 
Education. However, the deputies who had military origins started a challenge to attach those 
schools to the Ministry of National Defense again. Ekrem Bey, deputy of Rize, criticized the 
Government’s policy as being a barrier on the enrollment to the Military Academy and the Military 
Medical School. Cafer Tayyar Pasha emphasized that it was difficult to inculcate a military spirit 
in the pupils in the civil schools controlled by the Ministry of Education. Kazim Karabekir Pasha 
rejected the notion of transforming all schools into civil schools by government action. Sukru 
Saracoglu Bey replied to all these critiques as a violation of the revolution if these schools were 
separated from the administration of the Ministry of Education. According to the Minister of 
Education, any school which saw education as a goal could not be excluded from the management 
of the Ministry of Education and its program.1118 However, the speech of Sukru Saracoglu Bey 
became void when the government decided to attach all military schools to the Ministry of National 
Defense.  
When the Sheik Said Rebellion broke out in February 1925, the moderate Cabinet of Ali 
Fethi Bey resigned and the Cabinet of Ismet Inonu, more radical than Ali Fethi Bey’s Cabinet, was 
formed in March 1925. Hamdullah Suphi Bey was the first Minister of Education of Ismet Inonu’s 
government. He started to carry out his agenda to solve the lasting problems in education. 
However, his ministry lasted only until December 1925. The most important educational policy in 
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his ministry was the ‘regional vocational schools.’ Hamdullah Suphi Bey agreed with the opinion 
of the opposition leader, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, in the importance of vocational schools. 
According to the Minister of Education, at least 75 or 80% of all schools should be vocational 
schools. These schools should provide for local needs. Therefore, every regional vocational school 
should have a different program because of the varieties of people’s needs.1119 These types of 
schools were established in 1940 as ‘Village Institutes’, offering both practical and classical 
courses. Another mission of these institutes was training teachers for each village and sending 
them back to form new village schools.  
In December 1925, Mustafa Necati Bey, one of the closest associates of Mustafa Kemal, 
became the Minister of Education. His Ministry lasted until his death on January 1, 1929. Mustafa 
Necati Bey’s ministry was the longest one in the early period of the Turkish Republic. During his 
ministry the chronic problems of education could not be solved. The same deficiencies lasted until 
his death. The vocational schools subject was the key turning point for the Kemalist regime in 
educational affairs. Halit Bey, deputy of Kastamonu and one of the members of the opposition 
party, underlined the mistakes of the Law on the Unification of Education for vocational schools. 
According to him, leaving all vocational schools to the administration of the Ministry of Education 
was a mistake. If the agricultural schools were left to the Ministry of Agriculture and the other 
schools to the related Ministries, progress in the vocational schools could be achieved. Mustafa 
Necati Bey confessed the incompetence of the Ministry of Education to manage the vocational 
schools under its administration.1120  
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The deficiencies in the primary education were mentioned once by Halit Bey. This problem 
was a catastrophe in the eastern Turkey. After the revolt of Sheik Said was suppressed, the 
Kemalist Government did little for education in this region. School statistics proves how awful the 
situation was. Halit Bey discussed the province of Hakkari first. According to him, there was 
neither primary school nor high school in this province in 1926. This is a really striking reality 
which proves the Kemalist failure in education in the Eastern provinces. The madrasas were the 
core of education in this region, but, the Kemalist regime cut all of these ties without put anything 
instead of them. Beyond the province of Hakkari, Halit Bey discussed the province of Genc, in 
where the Sheik Said Revolt was broken out. There were only eight primary schools with 170 
pupils in this province. The total number of pupils was negligible in this province also. The 
condition of education was catastrophic; nevertheless, the rest of Turkey was hardly better. 
According to the statistical data, school enrollment in Turkey was 2.8% of the total population of 
13 million. Halit Bey compared the miserable situation in Turkish education to Germany and 
Bulgaria. According to him in a German battalion there was no illiterate person. In a Bulgarian 
battalion 80-90% were literate. On the other hand, total literacy in a Turkish battalion was 3-5%. 
Halit Bey advised the Government to allocate enough money for education. The Cabinet of Ismet 
Pasha paid attention to the railways at that time and allocate millions to transportation. Halit Bey 
emphasized that the Government should allocate the same budget for education if they wanted to 
make progress.1121  
Mustafa Necati Bey admitted the deficiencies, voiced by Halit Bey, in primary education. 
He confessed that there were 350,000-360,000 pupil at all educational levels in Turkey. However, 
there were around a million and half students of school age. Moreover, just only 100,000 pupils 
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were in good conditions to continue their education. Mustafa Necati Bey indicated that the lack of 
educators was the main problem. Therefore, the Government aimed to educate at least 3000 
students in the teachers’ college and would send them to the villages after their graduation. 
Optimistically, the problem in this area would be solved within 10 years.1122   
4.4 Alphabet Reform of 1928 and Literacy Drives  
During the Kemalist modernization, the most drastic measure in the educational and 
cultural life of Turkey was the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928. Following the acceptance 
of Islam, Turks used the Arabic script for their language and Arabic and Persian loanwords and 
phrase structures became part of the Turkish language over many centuries.  This Arabic script 
was one of the last tangible links connecting Turkey to its Ottoman past and to the rest of the 
Muslim world while at the same time separating it from the West. Therefore, the first task of the 
third period of the Assembly was to cut this tie and reform the Turkish alphabet.1123 
The main Kemalist assertion about this reform was the inappropriateness of Arabic script 
for authentic Turkish phonology, which needed a new set of symbols to be correctly represented. 
Howard describes this situation as: “the Arabic script, they asserted, was ill-suited to the Turkish 
language. This was of course true: the orthography of Arabic, a Semitic language, relied on 
consonants arranged in groups and offered only three symbols for writing vowels. Many of its 
phonemes were foreign to Turkish and thus the written symbols for them had no relevance.”1124 
Like Howard, Erik Jan Zurcher emphasizes this phonetic reason behind the reform project: “While 
this suited the Arabic and Persian vocabulary, which made up three-quarters of written late 
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Ottoman, it was highly unsuitable for expressing the sounds of the Turkish part of the vocabulary, 
Arabic being rich in consonants but very poor in vowels while Turkish is exactly the opposite. The 
result was that Ottoman Turkish sometimes had four different signs for one single sound, while it 
could not express other sounds at all.”1125 
Most Kemalist scholars emphasize the rationale for this reform as educational rather than 
ideological. The common idea among Kemalist scholars is the Arabic alphabet was an obstacle to 
the progress of education because of its difficulties for Turkish people.1126 Like Ozgen, Henry 
Elisha Allen underlines this assertion as: “displaying a veritable mania for education and a 
determination to stamp out illiteracy, the new government in 1928 decided to scrap the Arabic 
alphabet in which Turkish has been awkwardly written for centuries, and replace it with a Latinized 
alphabet which not only would suit the language better but which would also be much easier for 
the ordinary person to learn.”1127  
On the other hand, Douglas Howard rejects the idea of seeing Arabic script as the only 
reason behind the illiteracy problem in Turkey. He indicates the other reasons as: “another 
argument for the alphabet change was that a phonetic alphabet would aid in raising literacy among 
the Turkish population. This probably was true also, but the low level of literacy in Turkey could 
hardly be blamed on the use of the Arabic script. The Arabic script had adequately served written 
Turkish for about a thousand years. For most of these centuries, few people anywhere in the world, 
including in Europe, had believed it necessary or good to educate common people. Low levels of 
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literacy were more especially the result of the absence of a system of national public education 
and the belief that such a system was unnecessary.”1128 
The results of the alphabet reform prove the ideological aims of the Kemalist 
modernization in education. Roderic Davison indicates that the alphabet reform was psychological 
in intent and aimed to cut another tie to the past, and to the Islamic East, and to push the nation 
toward the future and the West.1129 By the help of this, religious and other non-secular and non-
nationalist texts of the past became increasingly inaccessible to the new generation of the Turkish 
Republic. Moreover, the alphabet reform severed future Turkish generations from the written 
Ottoman cultural heritage. Children, educated in the new characters, could not read what their 
ancestors had written, unless it were transcribed or republished in the new alphabet.1130   
The success of the alphabet revolution encouraged the Kemalist elite to remove all Arabic 
and Persian loanwords from the Turkish language in the early 1930s. According to Erik Jan 
Zurcher: “After the alphabet reform, for several reasons the more extreme purists came to the fore. 
In the first place, the success of the alphabet reform encouraged the idea that this type of 
‘revolution by decree’ was possible. In the second place, the nature of the new script encouraged 
purism. It had been designed to reflect the actual sounds of spoken Turkish, not to transcribe the 
shape of the old Ottoman writing in new letters. As a result, many of the originally Arabic and 
Persian words looked alien and even unintelligible in the new script. In the third place, the radical 
solutions of the purists – to remove all Arabic and Persian words from the language and create a 
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pure Turkish one- were in tune with the extreme nationalism of the 1930s.”1131 In particular, the 
Turkish Language Association, established in 1932, was a key player in this task. By the help of 
this Association, the Kemalist cadres created a pure Turkish language by introducing words from 
Turkic dialects in Central Asia and ancient literary sources.1132  
This section scrutinizes the debates in the Assembly and in the Turkish press about the 
alphabet reform. The Turkish press was the main center of these discussions in the era before 1928. 
Especially in 1924, debates became very intense between pro-reformers and anti-reformers. Not 
only religious circles were against a language reform, but also some authors in the Kemalist press 
as well. In particular, in Akbaba and Aksam there was a great debate between pro-reform and anti-
reform movements within the Kemalist circle. However, there were very few debates about the 
alphabet reform in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1924. When the Kemalist regime 
became stronger after the Law for the Maintenance of Order was accepted in March 1925, the 
ideas about reform in language became stronger in the Turkish press. The reform movement grew 
after 1926 and the Kemalist press tried to accustom Turkish public opinion for a possible reform. 
Finally, the reform became possible in November 1928, after discussions on the Law on the 
Adoption and Implementation of the Turkish Alphabet were held in the Assembly, where there 
was no opposition to the Kemalist regime. The Assembly debates indicate that Kemalist cadres 
was sure that the new alphabet would solve the illiteracy problem within a few years in Turkey. 
However, even though the regime started many literacy drives, the results did not satisfy Kemalist 
leaders. This section will scrutinize these ideological literacy drives also. 
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4.4.1 Attempts of Alphabet Reform Before the Kemalist 
Regime 
The reform of the alphabet and language was not a new topic for the Kemalist cadres. There 
had been proposals for an improvement of the Arabic script since the time of the Tanzimat Era. 
When the chasm between the written Ottoman of the literate elite and the vernacular of the Turkish 
population became very wide in the nineteenth century, the Young Ottomans attempted to bring 
the written language closer to the spoken one in the mid nineteenth century. Beyond these early 
initiatives, especially during the Second Constitutional Era, there were some initiatives for an 
alphabet reform. In this period, several Young Turk writers- Huseyin Cahit, Abdullah Cevdet, 
Celal Nuri- advocated the adoption of the Latin alphabet.1133 
The rise of Turkish nationalism was one of the major key points behind these quests. Turk 
Dernegi (Turkish Society), established in December 1908 and publishing a journal of the same 
name, aimed to realize a simplified Turkish. As an important scholarly and cultural organization 
at that period, the Society included many non-Turkish Ottomans and foreign scholars among its 
members. Their initiatives for a simplified Turkish were a turning point in the relation between the 
language and culture.1134  
While Turk Dernegi had little impact on the change of language, Turk Yurdu Cemiyeti 
(Turkish Homeland Society) was more influential. The society, founded in August 1911, became 
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a center of Turkism under the leadership of Yusuf Akcura and Ahmet Agaoglu.1135 The society 
advocated the simplification of written Turkish to better reflect the spoken language, and also 
worked to promote the political and economic interests of Turks all over the world. The ideology 
of Turk Yurdu Cemiyeti was expanded by Turk Ocaklari (Turkish Hearths) which was founded in 
1912. Turkish Hearths had more materialistic aims than its predecessors. Bernard Lewis indicates 
that “Turk Ocaklari intended to advance the national education and raise the scientific, social, and 
economic level of the Turks, who are the foremost of the peoples of Islam, and to strive for the 
betterment of the Turkish race and language.”1136 All these aimed to create an ideologically 
nationalist perspective in the language subject. 
In the literature circles, Genc Kalemler (Young Pens) was the vanguard of a simplified 
language reform during the second constitutional period. The journal, under the leadership of Omer 
Seyfeddin and Ziya Gokalp, was published in Salonika in 1911. Its members advocated a ‘new 
language’ (yeni lisan); therefore, they were known as Yeni Lisancilar.1137 Omer Seyfeddin was the 
major author who focused on using the spoken language in literature. He refused to use Arabic or 
Persian particles, or compounds in his articles.1138 Omer Seyfeddin disagreed with a radical 
purification which could create an artificial language. He believed that the possible artificial 
language would be the death of Turkish words. However, he supported the idea of using spoken 
Istanbul Turkish as the literary language, keeping all foreign words which had been assimilated 
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and become part of the spoken language.1139 The negative results of the purification would be seen 
in the Kemalist reform later. The artificial language, created in the mid-1930s, resulted in some 
ridiculous projects, such as the Sun Language Theory which was a hypothesis in the 1930s that 
proposed that all human languages are descendants of one proto-Turkic primal language. Ziya 
Gokalp was another influential author in the society of Yeni Lisancilar. While his ideas were 
shaped by nationalist ideology, Ziya Gokalp was not an advocate of a new script. Moreover, he 
defended the preservation of the old script as a link with other Muslim societies.1140 Erik Jan 
Zurcher underlines his gradualist approach: “Ziya Gokalp and his circle advocated the replacement 
of Arabic and Persian grammatical elements in the language with Turkish ones and the discarding 
of ‘superfluous’ synonyms, but unlike the purists they accepted Arabic and Persian words that had 
become part of everyday language.”1141 
The idea of switching to the Latin alphabet was defended openly for the first time in the 
Second Constitutional Period. Bernard Lewis mentions that “the possibility of adopting the Latin 
alphabet was a topic of conversation among Ottoman officers during the Gallipoli campaign." One 
of these examples was the initiative of Enver Pasha, the leader of the Committee of Progress and 
Union. He had experimented with a reformed version of the Ottoman script, by separating the 
Arabic letters instead of running them together into the normal script. However, the project caused 
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some difficulties, such as misunderstanding of orders by military commanders, therefore; it had to 
be given up during the second year of the War.1142 
4.4.2 Attempts of an Alphabet Reform during the Kemalist 
Regime 
During the Turkish War of Independence an alphabet reform was not an issue because of 
the hard conditions of the state. However, after the victory reform was promoted by Kemalist 
reformers. At a meeting with representatives of the Istanbul press in September 1922, Huseyin 
Cahid Bey, the editor of newspaper Tanin, asked Mustafa Kemal “Why don’t we adopt Latin 
writing?” Mustafa Kemal answered: “It’s not yet time.” George Lewis describes this attitude of 
Mustafa Kemal as ‘understandable’ because of the structure of the Grand National Assembly, 
which was consisted of  some fifty members of which were hodjas (professional men of religion), 
in addition to eight dervish sheikhs and five men who gave their occupation as ‘tribal chief’ at that 
time.1143 
The idea of abandoning Arabic script entirely and replacing it with the Latin alphabet was 
put forward and discussed in Turkey in 1923 and 1924. Firstly, the issue was raised at the Izmir 
Economic Conference in February 1923, three months after the abolition of the sultanate. At the 
Economic Congress, a proposal for the adoption of the Latin alphabet was put forward and 
discussed, but was defeated on March 2, 1923. Kazim Karabekir Pasha, the chairman of the 
Congress, rejected it as damaging the unity of Islam. He explained “to adopt the Latin letters would 
be put a splendid weapon into the hands of all Europe; they would declare to the Islamic world 
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that the Turks have adopted foreign writing and turned Christian. Such is the diabolical idea with 
which our enemies are working.”1144  
The proposal in the Economic Congress was caused a public debate which lasted for 
several years. Bernard Lewis indicates that proposals to switch to the Latin alphabet were 
decisively rejected in 1923 and 1924.  According to Zurcher, “there was still much opposition to 
the adoption of the Latin script in conservative and religious circles, but from 1925 the opposition 
was silenced.” 1145 By the help of the Law on the Maintenance of Order in March 1925, the 
conservative and socialist press was banned because of their opposition to the Kemalist agenda. In 
particular, the conservative periodicals Sebilurresad and Sirat-i Mustakim were very effective 
before the Law was accepted in the Assembly, but both were banned in March 1925. 
The Turkish press was the main center for these questions. In particular in 1924, the debates 
became very intense. One of the realities in these debates contradicts the assertion of Zurcher. Not 
only religious circles were against a language reform but also some authors in the Kemalist press 
in 1924. Especially in Akbaba and Aksam, there was a great debate between pro-reform and anti-
reform movements within the Kemalist circle. On the other hand, the Assembly debates indicate 
that there were few discussions about alphabet reform in 1924. Only Sukru Saracoglu Bey 
defended a change in the alphabet in that year. The Law on the Maintenance of Order in March 
1925 was a turning point in the alphabet reform. Like the rest of Kemal’s major reforms, the change 
of the alphabet was a result of this extraordinary period. After the law was effectuated, ideas about 
language reform became stronger. In 1926, the debates about a language reform sparkled once 
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more in Turkey. The Kemalist government promoted the possible change in alphabet strongly after 
this year and finally the new alphabet was accepted by the Assembly in 1928.  
Alphabet reform was an important subject in the Turkish press in 1924. In Akbaba, the 
recent efforts of Huseyin Cahit Bey were ridiculed by comparing them to the failures in the Second 
Constitutional Era. The newspaper mentioned about the struggles of Milasli Ismail Hakki Bey. 
“The poor doctor wasted his breath and money on this subject. He published many pamphlets but 
who cared about all of these works” Moreover, the newspaper mentioned about the negative effects 
of the reform of Enver Pasha, which was based on the attempts of Milasli Ismail Hakki,  at the 
beginning of the First World War. Akbaba warned Huseyin Cahit Bey his fate would be as same 
as Milasli Ismail Hakki who was forsaken by his friends because of his failures. Akbaba criticized 
the assertion of Huseyin Cahit Bey that education would be easier after accepting the Latin 
alphabet.1146 
Not only some authors in Akbaba defended the old script but also the Kemalist newspaper 
Aksam. Celal Esad Bey argued the Turkish script was superior to the Latin script. According to 
him, the main reason for the failures of reform was not thinking about each problem separately but 
instead mixing them together. The form of characters, grammar, printing type, terminology, and 
language issues should be discussed separately. However, the intellectuals mixed all these subjects. 
Celal Esad Bey pointed out that the old script was not to blame. Even if the Latin alphabet were 
accepted, the grammar and language problems would not be ended. He indicated that the script 
which was used by Turks was not Arabic script but Turkish script. He asserted that any Turk could 
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read an Arabic text written in fifth century. Moreover, Turks gave their souls and language to the 
Arabic characters, therefore, the script had become Turkified.1147   
Not only were advocates opposed to the alphabet reform heard in Kemalist circles in 1924, 
but there was an important movement in the Kemalist press also. In the column of “Laklakiyat” in 
Akbaba, a very strange proposal appeared. According to the author, the change of script was not 
enough; the language should be changed totally. It was difficult to accept the Latin script directly; 
at least some minor changes should be done before accepting it. The author underlined that if the 
Turkish society wanted to utilize the Western culture and to possess the works created by 
Europeans, they had to change their language. He recommended accepting French as the language 
of society. According to him, when French was accepted the language of the society, the society 
would gain millions of literary works at the same time. 1148 This idea was the weirdest one heard 
from the Kemalist press.  
Necmeddin Sadik Bey also advocated reform in his column in Aksam. He strongly 
supported the idea of reform proposed by Huseyin Cahid Bey in the newspaper Tanin. Moreover, 
he celebrated a strong disengagement of newly established Turkish Republic from the Islamic 
world. According to Necmeddin Sadik, Turks would no longer see themselves as a part of Islamic 
world. Like the rest of the reform, if Turks accepted the Latin script in their literature, it would be 
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for the sake of Turkish society. The Turkish state would ignore critics from the Islamic world even 
in the alphabet reform.1149 
In 1924, there were very few debates about alphabet reform in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly. There was support for alphabet reform in the official reports, but, it was relatively 
limited. Sukru Saracoglu Bey, one of the devout Kemalists in the Assembly, underlined his support 
for reform. While the Assembly debated the lack of literacy in Turkey, Sukru Bey blamed Arabic 
characters as barriers to education. According to him, these characters were not suitable for Turkish 
writing. Therefore, literacy reached only 2-3% in spite of all the struggles of educators to teach 
something to people.1150  Blaming the Arabic characters as sole reason for a low level of literacy 
was a characteristic approach of Kemalist deputies.  
The Turkish press mostly advocated reform. Not only public periodicals supported reform 
but also regional. As an example, Afyonkarahisar’da Nur, a local magazine published in Afyon, 
supported a possible reform in language. In his article “Lisanimiza Dair” in Afyonkarahisar’da 
Nur, Tahir Hayrettin mentioned the importance of language reform. According to him, the republic 
had achieved many goals in the political and administrational areas; but an alphabet reform would 
be more important. Tahir Hayrettin believed that an alphabet reform would be helpful for 
improving Turkish culture. A radical reform should be done in grammar, orthography, vocabulary, 
and script. The purification from foreign words, especially Arabic and Persian, was another key 
point for Tahir Hayrettin.1151 
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In 1926, the debates about a language reform arose once more. When the Turkic republics 
of the Soviet Union decided to adopt the Latin alphabet after the congress of Turcologists 
assembled in Baku that same year, this decision gave added impetus to the discussions in 
Turkey.1152 Following this decision, the Minister of Education, Necati Bey, had spoken of the 
political significance of Romanization.1153 While the Kemalist government showed their interest 
in possible reform, there was still opposition to language reform in the Kemalist press. However, 
this opposition became less active by comparison to the opposition in 1924. In this period, the 
Kemalist press mostly tried to accustom Turkish public opinion to a possible reform. In 
Cumhuriyet, Yunus Nadi declared his support for reform to Latin script. In his article he 
summarized the debates. He thought that every opinion should be expressed for illumination of 
public opinion.1154 The newspaper Aksam started a questionnaire about the Latin script. Some 
intellectuals advocated language reform. Sekib Bey, professor in the psychology department in 
Istanbul University, supported language reform. According to him, the current Turkish alphabet 
was like ‘Chinese shoes’ which were not sufficient for society.1155 Refet Avni Bey, literature 
teacher in Galatasaray High School, indicated that none of the searchers could deny the 
insufficiency of the Arab script to express the Turkish words. Moreover, he thought that it was 
better to establish a new style rather than correcting a bad one.1156 The most interesting support for 
a language reform came from Abdullah Cevdet Bey. He assumed that the Latin script was 
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originally derived from Hittites who were considered forefathers of Turks. Therefore, the Latin 
script was Turkish script because of its origin.1157 
On the other hand, there was also opposition among the intellectuals to the alphabet reform. 
Even though they could not utter their objection loudly because of the Law on the Maintenance of 
Order, their objections were seen in the Turkish press. Ali Ekrem Bey thought that Latin script 
was not favorable for the Turkish language. He emphasized that there would not be significant 
changes if the Latin script was accepted. The main problem for education was the lack of enough 
primary schools.1158 Velid Celebi was also opposed to the Latin script. He underlined that the Latin 
characters were not proper for expressing the Turkish dialects.1159 Avram Galanti, one of the 
prominent opponents of alphabet reform, was against the Latin script because of the cultural 
continuity of the Turkish language. According to him, the excellence of the Turkish language could 
be realized simply by adding some characters to the Arabic script.1160 Another concern among the 
opponents was the demolition of the cultural heritage of the Ottomans by accepting a different 
script. Necib Asim Bey indicated that the reform would be a farewell to the ‘thirteen centuries long 
literacy heritage’ of Turkish society; therefore he was against the reform.1161    
The possible alphabet reform was backed by the New York Times in 1926. The recent 
discussions about the alphabet reform were mentioned in the newspaper. The New York Times 
indicated that “in the line with its policy to bring Turkey up to Western standards of education and 
culture, the Nationalist Government had decided to introduce the Roman alphabet in place of the 
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present cumbrous Arabic characters.” While for a time the future change could entail great 
confusion and expense, the Kemalist Government thought that this decision would hasten the 
linguistic unity of the country which it had sought so long. 1162  
While the idea of abandoning the Arabic script entirely and replacing it with the Latin 
alphabet was rejected 1923 and 1924, the situation had changed in the Kemalist circle by 1927. 
Bernard Lewis points out that “The Kemalist regime was now firmly in the saddle, and in 
possession of virtually dictatorial powers; the religious opposition was cowed and disheartened by 
a series of crushing blows. A new factor of some importance was the decision of the Soviet 
authorities to adopt the Latin alphabet in place of the Arabic for the Turkic languages of the USSR, 
thus providing both an example and an incentive to the government of the Turkish Republic.” The 
Kemalist Government prepared itself for a reform in alphabet during 1927, but nothing was heard 
in public until January 1928. Mahmud Esad Bey, Minister of Justice, made a speech in which he 
praised the merits of the Latin script on January 8, 1928. After Mahmud Esad Bey, the Minister of 
Education, Hamdullah Suphi Bey declared that “the adoption of the Latin letters is for us a 
necessity” the next day.1163 
The alphabet reform was the last part of deleting the Islamic background of the Turkish 
society in 1928.  In April 1928 the reference to Islam as the state religion was deleted from the 
constitution, completing the process of legal and constitutional secularization in Turkey. Lewis 
underlines this process as an important step but not a finished task. He points out that “however, 
the Arabic script remained as a ‘potent and universal’ symbol of Turkey's attachment to the Islamic 
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world."1164 The Kemalist administration decided to reform the script in 1928. Debates about an 
alphabet reform started that year once more again.  
Before the reform in script was realized, the first legislative step was taken by the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly to adopt ‘international numerals’ in place of the Arabic figures which 
Turkey had previously shared with other Muslim countries on May 20, 1928. After accepting this 
law in the Assembly, the use of the international numerals became compulsory in all official 
departments and institutions from June 1. George Lewis emphasizes the ease of this reform as “the 
Arabic numerals did not have the sanctity of the Arabic letters and there seems to have been little 
if any opposition.”1165 This reform was the last step on the Language Reform in 1928.  
When international numerals were discussed in the Grand National Assembly, Kemalist 
deputies asked for an alphabet reform also. Hasan Fehmi Bey, deputy of Kastamonu, summarized 
the process of previous reforms. He mentioned that the Kemalist government accepted the Julian 
calendar a few years before but not international numerals. Hasan Fehmi Bey could not understand 
that why the government did not accept the numerals along with the Julian calendar. Moreover, 
the government decided to change the numerals in May 1928 but not attempt a change in alphabet. 
Hasan Fehmi Bey questioned the undecided approach of the government in this subject. He tried 
to understand what kind of objections hindered this reform. Muhittin Nami Bey, deputy of Bitlis, 
was sure that the government would take action for this reform during the next period of the 
Assembly. According to him, the alphabet reform would be a very important step on the way of 
progress.1166 
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Sukru Saracoglu, Minister of Finance, agreed with the other deputies. He mentioned that 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly intended to see the reports of experts in the language 
commission before accepting a reform. According to him, the government would accept this 
reform when the commission finished its duties. Mustafa Necati Bey, Minister of Education, 
pointed out the struggles of the commission also. He suggested that the commission needed time 
to realize this reform.1167  
After the international numerals were accepted by the Assembly on May 20, 1928, the 
Language Commission, which would work for the question of alphabet and grammar, was 
established in June 1928. The modified Latin alphabet that was adopted in place of the Arabic 
script was the result of six weeks of work by the Language Commission under the direction of 
Mustafa Kemal himself.1168 According to Falih Rifki Atay, when he put forward the proposal of 
the new alphabet to Mustafa Kemal, he asked to Falih Rifki Bey what the commission thought 
about the possibility of this reform. Falih Rifki Bey expressed the two proposals of the 
commission: the first was a long term plan which would take 15 years, and the second one was 
five-year-short term plan. However, Mustafa Kemal wished to see the reform immediately, such 
in three months.1169  
The Turkish press showed a great interest to the Language Commission’s work. Aksam 
mentioned the initiative to implement the Latin alphabet on August 1, 1928. According to the 
newspaper the efforts of the Commission would end in a few days. Aksam illuminated public 
opinion on the possible changes. The new alphabet would be based on a vowel system. According 
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to this system every vowel would be expressed by a letter. Aksam pointed out that there would be 
no future for the Arabic script. The newspaper mentioned that the commission would not accept 
any letters which were not used internationally. The editor of Aksam, Necmeddin Sadik Bey, 
expressed that the commission was almost done with its work and the new alphabet would be 
accepted after a few minor changes.1170 
When the alphabet was ready after six weeks work, Mustafa Kemal introduced it to the 
vast crowds attending a Republican People's Party gala in Gulhane Park on the evening of August 
9, 1928. Towards eleven o’clock of that night, Mustafa Kemal himself appeared, and after a while 
he rose to address to the leading figures of the PRP and ordinary people.1171 In his speech Mustafa 
Kemal emphasized that the richness of the Turkish language would be understood and seen after 
the new alphabet spread to the entire country. According to Mustafa Kemal, Turkish people had 
to free themselves from some of the incomprehensible signs, referring to the Arabic letters, which 
were a barrier for improvement of education. Moreover, he ordered intellectuals to teach this new 
alphabet to the ordinary people as soon as possible. Mustafa Kemal thought that it was a shame 
for a society if only 10% or 20% of them were literate.1172 Aksam described this gala as a brilliant 
one and paid attention to Mustafa Kemal’s speech. Mustafa Kemal saw the new alphabet reform 
was an important step towards modernization and Aksam welcomed this change warmly.1173  
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Akbaba, the humor magazine, attacked the Arabic script after Mustafa Kemal’s speech. In 
the caricature of the magazine on August 13, 1928, the Kemalist cliché that Arabic script was a 
barrier for improvement of education was mentioned again. The magazine announced the change 
as: “the ‘crooked style’ Arabic script which was responsible for the illiteracy of people for 
centuries were replaced by the new Turkish letters.” In the caricature, the Latin script was kicking 
the Arabic script and telling it to “get out to the Sultanate’s ruins.”1174 While the Kemalist press 
reported the enthusiasm of people for Mustafa Kemal’s reform, Andrew Mango indicates that most 
of the attendees at this party were ordinary people rather than the intellectual elite which were still 
resistant to the Latin alphabet.1175  
After the introduction of the Latin alphabet, Mustafa Kemal strove to be a role model for 
intellectuals. Aksam reported how Mustafa Kemal became a role model for the people and worked 
for this task days and nights. Moreover, the newspaper underlined that the duty of intellectuals 
would be teaching the new script to the people immediately.1176 An alphabet mobilization was 
proclaimed in the following months by Mustafa Kemal. In September 1928, Mustafa Kemal went 
on tour in Thrace and Central Anatolia, explaining the new letters and exhorting everyone to learn 
them quickly and to teach them to their compatriots. He started the new educational campaign in 
Samsun, the significant place where Mustafa Kemal started his duty in the Turkish War of 
Independence. After Samsun he visited Tokat, Sivas and some minor cities to show his eagerness 
to the new alphabet. After the order of Mustafa Kemal, the PM and deputies followed his example, 
“and soon all Turkey was a schoolroom, which the nation’s intellectuals, armed with blackboard 
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and easel, teaching the people to read and write the new script.”1177 Aksam emphasized that 150 
deputies were spread out in Turkey for teaching the new reform to the ordinary people.1178  
The new alphabet reform started among students and soldiers first. The teachers’ training 
school students became the first center for this reform. Later officers started to teach the new 
alphabet to soldiers in the military.1179 Not only teachers and soldiers started to learn the new script, 
but the Kemalist government also encouraged local religious commissaries to learn the new 
alphabet under the supervision of a teacher.1180 The Kemalist press started to encourage people’s 
interests in this reform. Aksam mentioned that everyone had started to learn the new letters 
immediately. In particular illiterate women were more eager to learn the new alphabet than men 
according to the newspaper Aksam.1181 
After the introduction of the new alphabet, newspapers began using the new alphabet for 
their headlines in August 1928. The newspapers started to publish a few columns in Latin script in 
mid-August, 1928.1182 Akbaba changed some of its parts in Latin script on August 23, 1928. In 
that copy, the editorial, the identification tag of the newspaper, and the name of day was written 
in Latin script.1183 Hakimiyet-i Milliye started to publish the new forms of orthography and letters 
on this day also. The next day some of the news was published in new alphabet. On September 3, 
1928, Hakimiyet-i Milliye started to publish one of its columns in Latin script.1184Aksam predicted 
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that after the implementation of the new law on alphabet reform, newspapers would be partially 
published in Latin script, but, within one year they would be published completely in Latin 
script.1185 In another copy, Aksam announced that before December 1928, the newspapers would 
be completely published in the new alphabet.1186     
The local press was also aware of the importance of the alphabet reform. Mustafa Kemal’s 
speech in the RPP’s gala in Gulhane Park became a source of motivation for local intellectuals. 
Cankiri’da Ince Gelis, a local newspaper published in Cankiri, announced the significance of 
Mustafa Kemal’s speech. The newspaper underlined the backwardness of Arabic script and shared 
the Kemalist idea in this reform also.1187 Fikirler, another local newspaper published in Izmir, 
supported the language reform also. Mehmet Mithat Bey discussed this reform in his article in 
Fikirler. According to the author the new alphabet spread among intellectuals after it was accepted 
and encouraged by the Turkish genius, Mustafa Kemal. Mehmet Mithat Bey underlined that when 
the Turkish Savior, Mustafa Kemal, decided to accept the Latin alphabet to complete the 
civilization and to transform the society in a Westernized style, objections to this reform were 
stopped and the Government took a decision to encourage the reform. Mehmet Mithat Bey 
confessed that intellectuals in the Turkish press did not show a great sympathy for the Latin script 
until that time. These intellectuals had some concerns about a change of the alphabet. First of all 
the old script was seen as a symbol of identity. Secondly, they expressed concern over losing the 
new generation’s attention to old documents if the alphabet was changed. The third concern was 
not expressing Turkish, which had been mixed with Persian and Arabic for centuries, very well 
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with only twenty letters. However, after the Great Savior’s decree, these rejections were cut off 
and the mobilization was started. The branches of the People’s Party, Turkish Hearths, the 
Teachers’ Association, and the rest of the societies only waited on the end of the Commission’s 
tasks for this mobilization.1188 
Finally the language commission prepared a new dictionary which had 25,000 words and 
sent it to Mustafa Kemal on October 29, 1928. The new dictionary and alphabet was discussed a 
few days later in the Assembly. The change was formalized by the Turkish Republic's law number 
1353, the Law on the Adoption and Implementation of the Turkish Alphabet, passed on November 
1, 1928, in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Kemalist Government preferred to refer 
this new alphabet as Turkish script instead of Latin script when it was introduced into the 
Assembly. The Government was identified this new script as “the key which would enable the 
people of Turkey to read and write easily.”1189  
Debate on the Law on the Adoption and Implementation of the Turkish Alphabet, was held 
in the Assembly, in where there was no opposition to the Kemalist regime, on November 1, 1928. 
The Assembly debates prove that the Kemalist cadres was sure that the new alphabet would solve 
the illiteracy problem within a few years. In the opening ceremony of the new period, Mustafa 
Kemal expressed the goals of the regime. Education played an important part in that speech. 
Mustafa Kemal pointed out that the results of their struggles in education allowed them to take 
radical decisions. Mustafa Kemal described the importance of language reform as: “… the Turkish 
nation can escape from illiteracy in a short time by accepting a reform which is suitable for its 
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beautiful and noble language. The key for this achievement is alone the adaptation of the Latin 
alphabet.”1190 Mustafa Kemal asserted that the success of the Latin alphabet among the Turkish 
people who lived in the cities and villages was seen after a few experiences. He also mentioned 
the duties of the intellectuals. Literate cadres should teach the new alphabet to the illiterate majority 
even in their personal lives. Mustafa Kemal was sure that the centuries-long illiteracy problem of 
Turkish society would be solved within a few years. The reform in the alphabet was one of the 
radical decisions of the Kemalist regime. Mustafa Kemal thought that this reform would be a key 
solution to solve the illiteracy problem in Turkey. According to him, after a few experiments, the 
Turkish people who lived in cities or villages were easily taught the new alphabet. Finally, Mustafa 
Kemal congratulated the Assembly for their decision. He was sure that the importance of this 
decision would be written not only in Turkish history but also the history of humanity.1191  
Ismet Pasha, the PM of the Kemalist Government, declared he was sure that Turkey would 
be on a bright path after accepting this reform. According to the PM this initiative aimed to solve 
illiteracy. Ismet Pasha was sure like Mustafa Kemal that the adaptation of the Latin alphabet 
provided an easy means to destroy ignorance. Ismet Pasha pointed out that Turkish nation had 
been looking for a key to solve the illiteracy problem for a long time, so it showed great enthusiasm 
for this reform. The PM underlined the importance of the national schools which would be the key 
instrument of educational mobilization. Ismet Pasha guaranteed that the government would teach 
the new alphabet to the ordinary people, who were busy with their works in factories and fields, 
by the help of the national schools. The government would help teachers with new educational 
means for realizing the goal of this campaign. Not only were the teachers responsible for this 
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achievement but also all officials and intellectuals. All these groups would be busy with this goal 
over next few years.1192 
Not only was the PM sure the language reform would be a great success but also some of 
the MPs. Mehmet Emin Bey, deputy of Sarkikarahisar, believed that after accepting this reform 
the gap between the common people and intellectuals would be decreased. This new alphabet 
would motivate the 14 million population of Turkey with a great enthusiasm. The intellectuals and 
common people established a unity on the way to modernize after this reform.1193 
Refik Bey, deputy of Konya, was one of the MPs in favor of the alphabet change. Like the 
rest of the MPs, he started to his speech by exalting the cult of Mustafa Kemal. According to Refik 
Bey, all these good works came from Mustafa Kemal’s mind. This reform was credited to Mustafa 
Kemal who was the pride of the twentieth century. While he was struggling to prepare an honorable 
and lofty status for his nation in war and peace time, he realized the alphabet reform would achieve 
educational goals in the future. Refik Bey uttered the Kemalist cliché one more in his speech also. 
According to this cliché, the Arabic script was one of the biggest reasons for the backwardness of 
Turkish society. Refik Bey mentioned that the great Savior – Mustafa Kemal - would lead the 
society to a lofty status after this reform.1194  
After the law was passed, ‘the Turkish letters’ were mandatory for all government 
departments and commercial and private institutions at once. Newspapers were printed in Arabic 
script for the last time on December 1, 1928. Finally, the law mandated the use of the new alphabet 
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in all public communications after January 1, 1929. The final deadline for changing all printed 
documents and ending the use of Arabic script as shorthand for stenographs was June 1, 1930.1195 
While the Kemalist deputies described the positive sides of the alphabet reform in general, 
there were some negative effects discussed in the press. The print run of newspapers was 
dramatically down after they were forced to be published in the new Latin alphabet. Henry Elisha 
Allen points out that “with the suddenness of the change, most publications were deprived of 
virtually their entire reading public”, therefore, the government had to spend hundreds of 
thousands of liras to subsidize newspapers and other periodicals.1196 The Assembly debates also 
show the hard condition of the Turkish press after the change in the script. Debates about the 
incentive payments took place on June 2, 1929. Hakki Tarik Bey, deputy of Giresun and owner of 
the Kemalist Vakit newspaper, gave a proposal to the Assembly to give bonuses to newspapers 
still publishing when the reform was accepted. In the proposal, the newspapers which were printed 
by rotary press would be granted 5,000 Turkish liras and the others would be granted 1,500 Turkish 
liras by the government. Talat Bey, deputy of Ankara, opposed this huge amount of money and 
suggested that 1,000 liras would be enough for these newspapers. In his speech, he suggested that 
the government could not help the poor citizens enough; therefore, these newspapers should be 
tolerant of the government’s decisions. Hakki Tarik Bey expressed the urgency of the 
government’s help due to heavy conditions of the alphabet reform on the Turkish press. After these 
discussions the proposal was rejected by the Grand National Assembly.1197 The Turkish press 
encountered by the great difficulties after the untimely reform. The result of this lack was a 
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dramatic fall of the numbers of the total newspapers in Turkey. According to Nisanyan, total issues 
of daily newspapers in the late Ottoman Empire was around 100,000. However, this number 
declined to 40,000 in 1925, and finally to 20,000 at the end of 1928.1198 
Mustafa Kemal and other prominent figures in his party were certain about the rapid 
success of the language reform, but literacy did not increase monotonically throughout his 
presidency. Stefanos Yerasimos reports: “It (the alphabet reform) was accompanied by a great 
crusade against illiteracy, and the new alphabet was presented as a panacea against ignorance. Yet, 
a quick glance at educational statistics does not provide justification for such enthusiasm. 
According to the census of 1927, there were 6,043 primary schools nationwide; the number rose 
to 6,598 four year later. Similarly, secondary schools increased from 78 to 83, and lycees from 19 
to 22, during that same period. It is true that the rate of illiteracy decreased between the census of 
1927 and that of 1935, but only from 90 to 80 percent.”1199  
According to Ersin Kalaycioglu, “The lingering problems of education indicate that the 
literacy rate of the country has been sensitive to nontechnical, and more socioeconomic and 
cultural factors.”1200 These socioeconomic and cultural factors could be understood very well if 
the literacy rate of the period of Mustafa Kemal and afterwards were compared.  According to 
governmental statistics, in 1927 the population of Turkey was 13,650,000 and 1,106,000 of the 
total population was literate. In 1935, while the total population increased 16,157,000, the literate 
people increased to 2,453,000. In this period, it could be said there was a doubling in the number 
of literate people. However, if we look at the total numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, people showed 
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more interest to the education. In 1960, there were 27,755,000 people in Turkey and the total 
literate population was 8,901,000. In 1970, the total population increased to 35,605,000 and the 
total literate population to 16,455,000. From this perspective, it could be said that not only the 
educational campaign was important for increasing the literacy in the society, but also the need of 
people for education. Sevan Nisanyan interprets this reality as: “…although the national 
educational campaign was continuing insistently, just only 10.3% illiterate people became literate 
during this campaign.” Nisanyan underlines that the extraordinary campaign of the Kemalist 
regime could not as successful as the increased rate of the literacy in 1960s. Therefore, he does not 
think that the alphabet reform is enough only for covering the illiteracy problem in Turkey.1201 
In conclusion, replacing the Arabic script with the Latin script enabled the turn of Turkey 
towards to the West. The main Kemalist assertion in this reform was the inappropriateness of the 
Arabic script for authentic Turkish phonology, which needed a new set of symbols to be correctly 
represented. The common idea among the Kemalist scholars is the Arabic script was an obstacle 
to the progress of education because of its difficulties to be learned easily by the Turkish people. 
Moreover, the Arabic script is considered as restraining the spread of Western thought in 
society.1202 The idea of switching to the Latin alphabet was defended openly first time in the 
Second Constitutional Period.1203 Moreover, this topic were discussed in 1923 and 1924, but 
decisively rejected. After 1925, when the Kemalists got full control of the state, the modernization 
of education became a part of their reform movement. The change of the script became available 
in 1928. 
                                                 
1201 Nisanyan, Yanlis Cumhuriyet, 155-156.  
1202 Ozgen, Cagdas Egitim ve Koy Enstituleri, 29. 
1203 Berkes, Development of Secularism, 422.  
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4.4.3 Schools of the Nation ( Millet Mektepleri) 
After the Law on the Adoption and Implementation of the Turkish Alphabet was passed in 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, an educational campaign was started by the Government. 
The name of the new organization for the literacy drive was ‘Millet Mektepleri,’ the Schools of 
the Nation, which was necessary for adults.1204 The Schools of the Nation were established after 
the ‘Directive of Schools of the Nation’ was passed by the Minister of Education, Mustafa Necati 
Bey on November 11, 1928.1205 In the directive Mustafa Necati Bey stated that every Turkish 
citizen between the ages of 16-45 had to join the Millet Mektepleri and this was mandatory. The 
goal of these schools was to create a literate population- from those who could not read and write 
at all to those who could do so only in the old characters. The third article of the directive declared 
that “Every male and female Turkish citizen is a member of this organization.” Therefore, the 
entire nation literally went to school, for adults were obliged to learn the new writing as well as 
schoolchildren. For teaching the new script to the adults, evening classes were opened. The fourth 
article of this directive declared that “the chief instructor of the Schools of Nation is His Excellency 
the President of the Republic, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal.”1206 These schools began to operate on 
January 1th, 1929.1207 
The Schools of the Nation became the core of the educational campaign of the Kemalist 
regime. The Assembly debates prove that the Kemalist leaders attached great importance to these 
schools. Moreover, they were certain of the success of these schools in a near future. Before its 
                                                 
1204 Heper, Historical Dictionary, 54.  
1205 BCA, 11 Nov. 1928, Folder no: 7284, Document no: 1.1.13. 
1206 Turer, Turk Egitim Tarihi, 288. Davison, The Modern Nations,134-135. Orga, Phoenix Ascendant, 171. Lewis, 
The Emergence, 273. Kinross, Ataturk, 505. TBMM ZC, 8 Nov. 1928, v.5, 26. 
1207 BCA, 25 Dec. 1928, Folder no: 490.1.0.0, Document no: 1.2.13. 
 364 
establishment, the importance of the schools of the nation was defended by Ismet Pasha, the PM 
of the Kemalist Government, in the Turkish Grand National Assembly also. In his speech Ismet 
Pasha emphasized that the government would establish these mobile schools for teaching the new 
alphabet to ordinary people while they could stay at their residence or engage in work. These 
schools would be mobile and spread all over the state, in the cities and villages. The government 
would organize two or four month courses to educate ordinary people who could not have a chance 
to go to a learning institution. Ismet Pasha declared that all officials from the highest rank to the 
lowest would be busy with this educational mobilization. According to the Prime Minister, the 
government decided to educate a few hundred thousand people who did not have a chance to go 
to schools.1208   
There were two types of courses in the schools of the nation. The first one was for illiterate 
people which lasted four months. The second one was for literate people in the old style and lasted 
two months. These schools could be mobile for reaching everybody. Especially at the end of 1928 
and early 1929 there were many schools of the nation were established within the country. At the 
beginning the only goal of these schools was teaching the new alphabet to ordinary people. In 
September 1929, the structure of these schools was changed. After that time, not only the alphabet 
was taught but also useful knowledge about social and economic life.1209  
The results of the schools of the nation were seen as positive by the Kemalist authorities. 
Successes of these schools were mentioned in the Turkish Grand National Assembly several times. 
As an example, while Ismet Pasha was talking about the effects of the extraordinary laws, he 
                                                 
1208 TBMM ZC, 8 Nov. 1928, v.5, 26. 
1209 Ersoy Tasdemirci, Turk Egitim Tarihi [History of Turkish Education], (Ankara: Gunduz Egitim ve Yayincilik, 
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emphasized the language reform also. In his speech, he pointed out that there were almost one 
million men and women learning to read and write their native language in these schools at that 
time. Another speech was given by Emin Bey, deputy of Eskisehir on May 18, 1929. According 
to Emin Bey, after the alphabet reform the Government educated 70% of the total population in a 
year, something which could be only possible in fifty years.1210 This is one of the greatest 
exaggerations of the Kemalist reform in the alphabet reform. As we know, the total achievement 
in educating people was rather lower than this assertion. Nisanyan refutes this assertion as only 
10.3% of the total population had a chance to be literate after the great propaganda and the literacy 
drive of the Kemalist regime.1211  
Mustafa Kemal was also sure about the great successes of the schools of the nation. In the 
opening speech of the new term of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, he emphasized that the 
schools of the nation educated hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens and eliminated early 
difficulties.1212 However, these schools lost their dynamism after 1932. While the first year of the 
literacy drive was relatively successful, due to the global economic crisis there was insufficient 
funding and the drive lasted only three years. 1213   
In conclusion, education was one of the important pillars of the Kemalist modernization. 
Education was seen as an important apparatus to create a new generation trained in Kemalist 
doctrine by many Kemalist scholars. Nationalist and secular education was the main goal for the 
Kemalist regime in 1920s and 1930s. For creating a secular education, the Kemalist cadres tried 
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to eliminate religious education from the educational system. This ideological attempt started in 
the second period of the Assembly from August 1923 to April 1927. During this period, Kemalists 
strengthened their power in politics and their attempts to change the educational structure were 
directly proportional to their power. The most important educational reform of this period was the 
Law for the Unification of Education in March 1924.  
The Kemalist ideological approach in education was seen in the abolition of madrasas as 
well. The Kemalist regime destroyed the madrasas, the traditional religious schools in the Ottoman 
Empire, in March 1924. However, before this closure Kemalists had expressed many 
contradictions in this subject. During the period of the Ankara Government and afterward, the 
Kemalist regime established many local madrasas from 1920 to 1923. Moreover, they supported 
the Darulhilafe Madrasa, a reformed style religious school, in 1922. Moreover, Darulhilafe 
Madrasa was initially seen as a vital institution in where the local imams would be educated by 
the Kemalist authorities. While Kemalist government was in favor of madrasas and duality in 
education from 1920 to 1924, Huseyin Avni Bey, the leader of the Second Group, was totally 
against them. Huseyin Avni Bey emphasized the dichotomy in the educational system. According 
to him, the programs of schools were erroneous, and the Darulhilafe Madrasas and other schools 
were deficient. The discord between these two different style schools caused many problems. From 
this perspective, the notion of Huseyin Avni Bey was more progressive than the Kemalist leaders. 
One of the ideological reforms of the Kemalist regime was the change of script in 1928. It 
is clear that the Kemalist radicalism achieved the deletion Islamic background of the Turkish 
society at that year. The first step in this year was eliminating state religion. In April 1928 the 
reference to Islam as the state religion was deleted from the constitution, completing the process 
of legal and constitutional secularization in Turkey. Lewis underlines this process as an important 
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step but not a finished task. He points out that “…however, the Arabic script remained as a ‘potent 
and universal’ symbol of Turkey's attachment to the Islamic world."1214 The Kemalist 
administration was so decisive to make a reform in the script in 1928. This was a radical attack to 
destroy the Islamic heritage of the Turkish society.  
After the Law on the Adoption and Implementation of the Turkish Alphabet was passed in 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the educational campaign was started by the Government. 
The new organization used in the literacy drive was ‘Millet Mektepleri,’ the Schools of the Nation. 
These schools became the center of Kemalist education. The Kemalist government paid a great 
importance to these schools. However, because of economic limitations, these schools lost their 
importance in 1929. When the positive effects of the schools of the nation diminished, the Kemalist 
government sought new solutions for public education. However, all these literacy drives could 
not solve the educational problems in Turkey during the Presidency of Mustafa Kemal. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk remains an important figure in the Turkish political and social 
landscape even today. Most of Kemalist scholars who have studied the Kemalist modernization in 
the early Republican era have given a huge credit to Mustafa Kemal as establishing a democratic 
regime in Turkey. This Kemalist orthodoxy, which is based on Mustafa Kemal’s six-day long 
speech (Nutuk) delivered in October 1927, advocates that Kemalist ideology sought to create a 
modern, democratic and secular nation-state and emphasizes the foundation of the Republic in 
1923 as one of the most important steps on the way of Turkish democracy. However, the Assembly 
debates prove that Mustafa Kemal utilized every single event to establish an autocracy instead of 
a democratic regime. The Law of Supreme Commander Act in August 1921, the abolition of 
Sultanate in 1922, the establishment of Republic in 1923, the abolition of Caliphate in 1924, and 
the elimination of opposition in 1925 were the key events on the way of the establishment of this 
personal autocracy.  
The Law of Supreme Commander Act of 1921 was the first milestone on the way of the 
Kemalist autocracy. The desperate conditions of Turkish army after the Battle of Kutahya and 
Eskisehir in July 1921, gave a chance to Mustafa Kemal to expand his power in the state. This 
difficult crisis of the state gave an opportunity for personal gain, military success, and national 
survival to Mustafa Kemal after centralizing the entire authority of the Grand National Assembly 
to his hands. The Supreme Commander Act of 1921, Law 144, was accepted on August 5, 1921, 
for a period of three months by the Kemalist majority in the Assembly. According to the second 
article of the Supreme Commander Act of 1921, Mustafa Kemal Pasha would be the single 
authority in legislative, executive, and judicial matters. He would undertake the duties of the 
Assembly for three months after this act would be implemented. This situation enabled Mustafa 
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Kemal to be a military dictator for the next three months. The Assembly debates prove that the 
probability of establishing a dictatorship was a concern of many deputies. Not only opponents but 
even some Kemalist deputies had also the same concern.  
Mustafa Kemal’s opponents were aware of his desire for absolute power. The Assembly 
debates prove that the opposition to the Kemalist majority in the Assembly, adamantly rejected 
any kind of personal autocracy and military dictatorship. In every extension, opponents showed 
their dissatisfaction with giving an unlimited authority to Mustafa Kemal by this act. While, 
opponents all agreed on the importance of this act during the war, they thought that giving all 
authority to a person was a danger for a nation. The Assembly debates prove that how the 
opposition did not see any person as superior to the Assembly, and not transfer their rights, which 
were given by people to them, to an individual person. While the opponents showed their 
dissatisfaction with this decision, Mustafa Kemal kept the title of the Supreme Commander until 
the Republic was established in October 1923. 
The abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate in November 1922 was a significant change in the 
political structure of Turkey. This was another milestone on the way of the Kemalist autocracy. 
While the Kemalist historiography indicates that Mustafa Kemal had an explicit and coherent plan 
in this change, the Assembly debates prove that Kemalist regime had a lot of zigzags in the 
abolition of Ottoman sultanate. At the early stage of the Turkish War of Independence between 
1919 and 1922, Mustafa Kemal was seen as a great admirer and follower of the Ottoman Sultanate. 
He pointed out that the only way to rescue the state and Sultan was the collaboration of all patriots 
and intellectuals who were deeply upset because of the occupation of state, a horrible situation for 
the people of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Kemalist deputies tried to eliminate all doubt about 
establishing another government in Ankara. According to Kemalist deputies, the real government 
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for the members of National Assembly was in Istanbul. The Assembly debates demonstrates that 
Mustafa Kemal and his allies seemed more loyalist rather than their opponents in this period. The 
Assembly debates show that members of the National Assembly started their attack directly to the 
person of Sultan Mehmed VI, especially after the victory of the Turkish army in the Second Battle 
of Inonu, which gave prestige and power to Mustafa Kemal. Sultan Mehmed VI was seen as a 
puppet in the hands of the Entente. Thus, the image of “captive Sultan,” which was depicted by 
Kemalists in the first stage of the war, was destroyed by them after April 1921. The Kemalists’ 
attacks on Sultan Mehmed VI started as describing him a coward in mid of 1921; then they became 
harsher in mid-1922, and the Sultan was described as a killer and traitor at the end.  
Mustafa Kemal’s decision about establishing a republic in October 1923 was another 
opportunist action which helped to strengthen his position and an important milestone towards the 
establishment of Kemalist autocracy. When the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished in November 
1922, the political structure of the new emerging Turkish state was still somewhat indeterminate. 
Turkey was ruled by the National Assembly, which elected not only the president but also every 
minister directly. This system was a barrier to Mustafa Kemal’s controlling the entire system 
because of the opposition’s power during these elections.   
Establishing the Republic of Turkey became possible after the government crisis, which 
was an intentional crisis which aimed to show the so-called weakness of the previous system of 
government in October 1923. Declaring the Republic was a fait accompli which was rejected by a 
significant number of deputies in the Grand National Assembly. The Assembly debates prove that 
they were not in favor of this decision because of its haste. When the Assembly gathered on 
October 29, 1923, only members loyal to Mustafa Kemal were in the Assembly. Even though there 
was only a single party in the Assembly at that time, Mustafa Kemal’s opponents within the 
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People’s Party were not in Ankara when the Republic was declared. Mustafa Kemal was elected 
as the first President of Turkey by 158 votes. He was elected unanimously in the Assembly, but 
132 members of Assembly were absent. 
While the Kemalist orthodoxy asserts public support for the decision to establish a 
Republic, this is another Kemalist distortion. The Turkish Press in Istanbul showed its reluctance 
to the establishment of a republic. According to the newspapers in Istanbul, the decision was taken 
in haste and not discussed enough by society. The opposition in Istanbul warned the Kemalist 
government that the republic could not survive with clapping, prayers, and carnivals if it did not 
change the mentalities of the statesmen. The criticism by the Istanbul press of the rapid change of 
the form of the government was shared by some of pro-Kemalist press also. They had some 
concerns about the formation of the new regime, seeing urgency as a handicap. 
After the abolition of the Sultanate in November 1922, the traditional power of religious 
authorities diminished but not totally end. The Kemalist regime was aware of the potential rivalry 
of the Caliphate to its ideological identity. The political competition between Ankara and Istanbul 
made the office of Caliphate the center of opposition to the Kemalist government. The Caliph was 
still considered as the head of the state by the common Turkish people and this situation was 
unacceptable to Mustafa Kemal. Therefore, he broke his ties with this long-run traditional power 
after the Peace Treaty at Lausanne was signed in July 1923. The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate 
in March 1924 was the final attack in changing political structure of the Ottoman society and was 
another milestone on the way of the Kemalist autocracy. 
The Assembly debates display that the Kemalist attitude to the Caliphate was positive at 
the early stage of the National Struggle. Kemalist deputies published a declaration against to the 
British occupation on May 9, 1920. In this declaration, Kemalists underlined that one of goals of 
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the British invasion was the annihilation of Caliphate. Moreover, the importance of the Caliphate 
was stressed many times by the deputies – both Kemalists and their opposition- in the Grand 
National Assembly. However, this attitude was changed after the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic in October 1923.  
The Kemalist orthodoxy asserts that the Caliphate had no real function.  Moreover, Mustafa 
Kemal declared that “the caliphate was in every way a liability to Turkey, that a Moslem union 
was a historic unreality, and that all attempts to bring Moslems together would only deflect Turkey 
from her supreme obligation toward her own interests.” During the discussions in the Assembly, 
Kemalists believed that the Office of Caliphate was useless, because during World War I Indian 
Muslim soldiers did not halt their attacks against Turkish soldiers fighting under the banner of the 
Caliphate. However, Kemalist deputies did not raise the help of Indian Muslims to the Turkish 
War of Independence, seen as a sacred war by Indian Muslims. For example, when peace 
negotiations in Lausanne was standstill, Indian Muslims threated the British Government if it 
started a war against Turkey. Moreover, the opposition pointed out that the Muslims were brothers 
in Islam in the parliamentary discussions. They believed that other Muslim nations respected Turks 
for supporting the Caliphate with their struggles for centuries.  
While the Kemalist orthodoxy explains the abolition of the Caliphate as a good deed, this 
strategy may not have been successful for the newly established Kemalist regime. The political 
power of the Caliphate against the British did not use in the Mosul Question. Besides, the abolition 
of the Caliphate would destroy the traditional loyalty of Kurds to the Turkish state. Kemalists 
ignored Kurdish disappointment with the decision to cut religious ties between these two nations. 
The consequence was the Sheikh Said Rebellion in the Kurdish region of Turkey in 1925 because 
of the Kemalist dismissal of the concerns of Kurds.  
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Abolition of the Caliphate was one the main reason of the Sheikh Said Rebellion started 
on February 13, 1925 and spread out rapidly in eastern Turkey. The Assembly debates prove that 
the Kemalist attitude changed frequently during the rebellion. While Kemalists initially blamed 
the rebellion as a reactionary uprising, their view shifted to a nationalist reaction which was backed 
by the British Government at the end. The Rebellion provided a good justification for the Kemalist 
regime to expel its opponents from the politics and press. Therefore, the rebellion was a turning 
point in establishing Kemalist autocracy. The Kemalist majority used the Sheikh Said Rebellion 
to establish the Law on the Maintenance of Order in March 1925. This Law gave extraordinary 
and dictatorial powers to the Kemalist government for two years and effectively served the 
Kemalist regime in crushing political opposition, silencing critical journalists and rushing through 
the cultural reforms. The Progressive Republican Party, which was the first opposition party in the 
Republican Era, was banned because of Kemalist assertion of a relationship between the rebels 
and the opposition party. Besides, freedom of press suffered a blow after the Law on the 
Maintenance of Order was accepted by the Assembly. The Kemalist regime’s long term 
dissatisfaction with the Istanbul press was fulfilled after this law was effectuated. The ban on 
conservative and socialist publications left the Kemalist press as the only source of information. 
This blow paralyzed the activities of the opposition against the Kemalist authoritarianism. The 
final blow came after the 1926 plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal in Izmir.  
Kemalist historiography credits Mustafa Kemal Ataturk with the original and unique 
conception of the social, legal, and educational reforms of the early Republican period, however 
this approach is not balanced. Although the Kemalist historiography asserts that Mustafa Kemal 
and his legacy represent carrying out Enlightenment ideals in an obsolete society almost totally 
ignorant of these principles, the Kemalist modernization got a great inheritance from its 
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predecessors, the Young Turks. Therefore, the Kemalist overstatement of an idealist figure of 
Mustafa Kemal is wrong in some degree. Besides, these reforms were launched and implemented 
by the Kemalist Government in a Jacobin way after the establishment of the Kemalist single-party 
regime, which was ensured by the help of the extraordinary laws in the political structure of Turkey 
in 1925.  
The authoritarian Kemalist regime tried to change people’s traditional costumes, 
institutions, and beliefs in a harsh way by the help of strict laws. The hat law of 1925 was the first 
attempt to change people’s headgears during the Kemalist regime. The main motive in Kemalists’ 
mind in this reform was that participation in European civilization would be possible by changing 
the outer appearance of the Turkish people. While Kemalists wanted to adapt Turkish people to 
Western headgear, there was a strong objection to this reform from the religious circles. Muslim 
Ottomans had a strong belief about hats as a symbol of Christianity and they thought that hat was 
not appropriate during the prayer.  
The Assembly debates prove the political struggle between Kemalist reformers and 
conservatives in this reform. As an example, when Kemalists were not enough strong in politics, 
the first Kemalist initiative to change the headdress failed. On April 29, 1920, Kemalists tried to 
remove the fez and accept the kalpak as the national headdress. Even though the kalpak was 
appropriate for daily prayers, this Kemalist resolution was rejected fiercely by the conservative 
deputies. However, when the Kemalist regime became stronger after the Law on the Maintenance 
of Order in March 1925, the reform in the headdress was debated in the Assembly on November 
25, 1925 again. Assembly debates show that there was a minor objection to this reform. When 
Nureddin Pasha opposed this bill because of its contradiction to the constitution on grounds of free 
will and freedom of speech, the Kemalist deputies showed a great anger to this approach. Their 
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attitude toward Nureddin Pasha was to silence him as soon as possible. Moreover, the Kemalist 
press attacked Nureddin Pasha also likewise Kemalist deputies in the Assembly. The Kemalist 
press condemned him as a reactionary who did not hold a position in the Assembly. 
While the Kemalist orthodoxy asserts that the Kemalist regime accepted the Hat Law of 
1925 as a demand of people, historical records prove that Turkish people resisted this reform. The 
religious concerns of people about accepting headgear associated with infidels until that time 
caused both active and passive resistance among them by protesting the Government. In particular 
some of the Anatolian cities, like Erzurum, Rize, Maras, resisted this change by not accepting to 
wear hats. Their resistance was stopped by the Independence Tribunals in December 1925. 
Therefore, people’s freedom not to wear hats was dismissed by the Government by force.  
Beyond the dress code, the Kemalist Government banned the dervish lodges and convents, 
which were the main socializing venues for people for many centuries. Instead of reforming them, 
Kemalist Government chose to destroy these institutions completely in 1925. According to 
Kemalist reformers, all of these religious orders and dervish lodges were obsolete. The Assembly 
debates show that Kemalist deputies denounced dervish lodges as the tools of poisonous efforts 
and main sources of treachery. Besides, they condemned these institutions as sources of the 
ideological fanaticism. However, this interpretation was not true. When some of the dervish lodges 
deterioriated, most of them were useful during the Turkish War of Independence. They supported 
the nationalist movement in Anatolia.  
Traditional customs and laws were also changed by the Kemalist regime. One of the 
important reforms during the Kemalist modernization was a new Civil Code for the state in 1926. 
The secularization of the legal structure of the Ottoman Empire was seen in the Tanzimat Era the 
first time. The Mecelle served as the civil code of the Ottoman Empire until the Swiss Civil Code 
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was accepted as a new civil code by Kemalists. It was the first attempt to codify a part of the 
Sharia-based law in an Islamic state. Assembly debates show that Kemalist reformers changed 
their opinions about the Mecelle many times. The Kemalist leadership had an idea to reform the 
Mecelle between 1920 and 1923, but their thought changed at the end of 1923. Debates in the 
Assembly indicated that the Mecelle was evaluated as insufficient by Kemalist leaders at the end 
of 1923, and they sought to replace Mecelle with another civil code.  
While the radical wing of Kemalist party wanted a significant change in Islamic laws, 
Assembly debates prove that many Kemalists had a gradual change in this area in 1924. When 
Mustafa Kemal and his associates tried to set up new commissions in the Ministry of Justice to 
change the old legal system in 1924, members of these commissions did not accept foreign laws 
at the beginning. In Assembly debates, the approach of Seyid Bey was very interesting. As Minister 
of Justice and a staunch Kemalist Seyid Bey was looking for a moderate change in the civil code 
instead of a sudden change in 1924. Moreover, the Kemalist Minister believed that there were two 
different laws in the world and Islamic law was not easily disregarded. This attitude was common 
some of the Kemalist deputies in the Assembly in 1924. While the commission and the Minister 
of the Justice preferred gradual change, Mustafa Kemal wanted to change society rapidly after 
1925. 
Assembly debates prove that Kemalists disregarded Islamic law completely when the 
Swiss Civil Code was accepted. The religious character of Mecelle was a problem for the Kemalist 
parliamentarians. According to Kemalist mentality, societies which were based on a religious law 
were in an early stage and would never progress. Therefore, Kemalists would not tie the destiny 
of Turkish people to medieval laws. This situation was a victory of radical wing in the Kemalist 
party. Assembly debates reveal many contradictions of Kemalist deputies during the legal reforms. 
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As an example, Sukru Kaya, a prominent Kemalist deputy, blamed Ottoman governments for not 
accepting any change in the civil code. However, the Mecelle was the civil code during the last 
period of the Ottoman Empire, but Sukru Kaya ignored this point. Besides, Yusuf Kemal Bey, 
another Kemalist deputy, condemned the Mecelle as it was accepted without popular demands, 
ignoring that there was not any demand from the public for this Kemalist reform also.  
Women’s rights was one of the admirable issues for many Kemalists, but many 
contradictions in this area hindered its effectiveness. One of the main Kemalist assertions is that 
Turkish women got most of their rights from the Kemalist regime. It is true that the women’s 
revolution was a significant part of Kemalism. However, the contribution of the Kemalist regime 
to women’s rights is exaggerated by staunch Kemalists. This Kemalist orthodoxy asserts that if 
Mustafa Kemal did not exist, perhaps they would not exist. Moreover, this approach asserts that 
the condition of women and their rights actually deteriorated under the Ottoman Empire. This is 
one of the contradictions of Kemalists. The Kemalist regime continued the same path like their 
predecessors in women’s rights which began in the Tanzimat period.  
While Kemalist discourse asserts that women’s suffrage was the original idea of Mustafa 
Kemal and granted by him later, the official reports of the Grand National Assembly and the 
activities of the Women’s People Party prove that this is another Kemalist distortion. It is true that 
Mustafa Kemal took a very progressive step in 1930s. However, Assembly debates prove that the 
suffrage issue was first raised by Huseyin Avni Bey many years before Mustafa Kemal. Besides, 
Tunali Hilmi Bey raised the issue in the Assembly a second time in 1923. Beyond these 
parliamentarians the demands of women were uttered by intellectual Ottoman women, such as 
Halide Edib Hanim and especially Nezihe Muhiddin Hanim. Even though, the Republican 
People’s Party was not established by Mustafa Kemal, Nezihe Muhiddin tried to establish 
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Women's People Party with her friends in June 1923. While the Kemalist orthodoxy asserts that 
women’s rights were granted by Mustafa Kemal to Turkish women, there was a strong feminist 
movement beyond the Kemalist regime’s aims. Moreover, the Kemalist attitude to this issue was 
mostly negative in Kemalist press until 1930.  
Education is one of the most important means to change the society for the Kemalist 
modernizers. While Kemalist regime aimed to establish a secular education, the parliamentary 
debates show that the Kemalist policy was totally different in early 1920s. It was traditionalist - 
not secular- during the first period of the Turkish Grand National Assembly between 1920 and 
1923. When the conservative deputies believed in that not only social life and traditions of the 
Muslim society should be organized by religion but education also, Kemalist leaders shared the 
same thought with them. The Assembly debates prove that Kemalists had no radical ideas of 
secularization of education at that time. 
While the dichotomy of the Ottoman educational system was not problem in the first period 
of the Assembly, the situation changed in the second period. The Kemalists strengthened their 
power in politics and their attempts to change the educational structure were directly proportional 
to their power. Ideological changes in education became possible in March 1924, after the Office 
of Caliphate was abolished. The most important educational reform was the law for the Unification 
of Education in March 1924. The parliamentary debates indicate that this idea was proposed by 
some of the conservative deputies before than Kemalists in the first period of the Assembly. While 
the conservatives advocated a combination of science and religion in a unified school system in 
1920, the Kemalist regime rejected this combination after the unification of education became 
possible in March 1924.  
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The abolition of madrasas became a fact after the law for the Unification of Education was 
accepted in the Assembly on March 3, 1924. This abolition was another Kemalist attempt to use 
the religious institutions in an ideological way. The Assembly debates prove that when Kemalist 
government was in favor of madrasas and duality in education from 1920 to 1924, Huseyin Avni 
Bey was totally against them. He emphasized his thought about the division in the educational 
system very clearly. According to him, the programs of schools were erroneous, and the 
Darulhilafe Madrasa and the other schools were deficient. The discord of these two different style 
schools caused many problems. From this perspective, the notion of Huseyin Avni Bey more 
radically reformist rather than the Kemalist leaders. 
During Kemalist modernization, the most drastic measure in the educational and cultural 
life of Turkey was the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928. While the main Kemalist assertion 
in this reform was the inappropriateness of the Arabic script for authentic Turkish phonology and 
its difficulties to be learned easily by the Turkish people, this reform was one of the ideological 
reforms in the early republican era. It is clear that the Kemalist radicalism reached a key milestone 
in deleting Islamic background from Turkish society in that year. The Kemalist administration was 
decisive in making a reform in the script in 1928. This was a radical attack to destroy the Islamic 
heritage of the Turkish society ideologically. After the Law on the Adoption and Implementation 
of the Turkish Alphabet was passed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, an educational 
campaign was started by the Government. The name of the new organization which would be used 
in the literacy drive was ‘Millet Mektepleri,’ The Schools of the Nation. These schools became 
the center of Kemalist education. The Kemalist government paid a great importance to these 
schools. However, for economic reasons, these schools lost their importance in 1929. While 
Mustafa Kemal was sure about the successes of the language reform in the Turkish society, the 
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illiteracy problem could not be solved in his period. Assembly debates also prove that the chronic 
problems in education were not solved because of limited budgets in his period. 
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